Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Cognis Corp

Filing 46

OPINION entered by Judge Michael P. McCuskey on 5/23/12. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT: (1) Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment ( 38 ; 40 ) are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (2) The parties may contact Magistrate Judge David G. Ber nthal's chambers to request a settlement conference to renew settlement negotiations, if desired. (3) A status conference, by telephone, is scheduled for June 13, 2012, at 9:30 a.m., to discuss scheduling a jury trial on the remaining issues in this case. See written Opinion. (VB, ilcd)

E-FILED

Wednesday, 23 May, 2012 03:42:03 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
URBANA DIVISION
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
STEVEN WHITLOW,
Intervenor Plaintiff,
v.
COGNIS CORPORATION,
Defendant.

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Case No. 10-CV-2182

OPINION

This case is before the court for ruling on the Motions for Summary Judgment (#38;
#40) filed by the Plaintiff, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and the
Intervenor Plaintiff, Steven Whitlow (“Whitlow”). This court has carefully reviewed the
arguments of the parties and the documents filed by the parties. Following this careful and
thorough review, Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment (#38; #40) are GRANTED in
part and DENIED in part.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 12, 2011, this court entered an Opinion (#35) denying the Motion for
Summary Judgment (#29) filed by the Defendant, Cognis Corporation (“Cognis”). In the
Opinion (#35), this court concluded that Cognis was not entitled to summary judgment
because Cognis failed to establish that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
Plaintiffs’ claims of retaliation. This court granted Plaintiffs leave to file a motion for

summary judgment solely on the issue of liability. Plaintiffs accepted this opportunity and
filed Motions for Summary Judgment (#38; #40) on January 6, 2012. Plaintiffs argued that
they were entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability with regard to Whitlow, and
each of the other employees1 who were required to sign Last Chance Agreements (“LCAs”)
as a condition of continued employment with Cognis. On February 6, 2012, Cognis filed a
Response (#41) arguing that factual questions on material elements of Plaintiffs’ retaliation
claims prevent an entry of summary judgment in Plaintiffs’ favor.
FACTS
The relevant facts in this case remain unchanged, therefore this court adopts the
factual summary contained in this court’s prior Opinion (#35). However, when this court
considered Cognis’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#29), this court construed the evidence
in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs and drew all reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs’
favor. In ruling on Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment (#38; #40), this court is now
required to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to Cognis and draw all
reasonable inferences in Cognis’ favor.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is appropriate “if the
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In ruling on a motion for
1

There are five Cognis employees, in addition to Whitlow, who received LCAs as their
sole alternative to termination. These employees, which will be collectively referred to as “other
employees” are as follows: (1) Dave Bunnell; (2) Moses Hillman; (3) Nathaniel Johnson; (4) Ed
Tholen; and (5) Keith Wright.
2

summary judgment, a district court “has one task and one task only: to decide, based on the
evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial.”
Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). In making this
determination, the court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Burwell v. Pekin Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 303,
213 F. Supp. 2d 917, 929 (C.D. Ill. 2002).
Therefore, the nonmoving party cannot rest on mere allegations or denials to
overcome a motion for summary judgment; “instead, the nonmovant must present definite,
competent evidence in rebuttal.” Butts v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., 387 F.3d 921, 924 (7th
Cir. 2004). Summary judgment “is the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in a lawsuit, when a party
must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of
events.” Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 385 F.3d 1104, 1111 (7th Cir. 2004).
Conclusory allegations not supported by the record are not enough to withstand summary
judgment. Basith v. Cook Cnty., 241 F.3d 919, 928 (7th Cir. 2001).
ANALYSIS—RETALIATION CLAIMS
I. Title VII Retaliation Standard
Employers are prohibited from retaliating against an employee for complaining about
discrimination that violates Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The language of the relevant
statute is as follows:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against
any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
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employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under [Title VII].
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Retaliation, by its nature, generally requires two events: (1) a
protected activity by the employee; and (2) discrimination by the employer because of the
protected activity. This court will refer to these two events, respectively, as: (1) the
“protected activity,” and (2) the “adverse employment action.”
Although a protected activity is generally required to state a valid Title VII retaliation
claim, courts have found that in certain instances, a plaintiff need not undertake protected
activity to successfully establish a retaliation claim. See, e.g., Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1
F.3d 1122, 1128 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Action taken against an individual in anticipation of that
person engaging in protected opposition to discrimination is no less retaliatory than action
taken after the fact; consequently, we hold that this form of preemption retaliation falls
within the scope of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).”); Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assoc., Inc., 301 F.3d
621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Sauers approvingly, stating “[s]uch a threat would be a form
of anticipatory retaliation, actionable as retaliation under Title VII.”). For example, in
Sauers, the defendant allegedly sexually harassed the plaintiff, and before the plaintiff had
taken any protected activity, the defendant reassigned the plaintiff. Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1128.
The court reasoned that because the evidence demonstrated that the defendant feared a sexual
harassment lawsuit by the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s reassignment occurred just two days
after the defendant expressed fear of a lawsuit, a jury could permissibly infer that the
reassignment was causally connected to the fear of suit. Id. The court concluded that based

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on these facts, the plaintiff successfully established a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation,
even though the plaintiff never took any protected activity. Id.
II. Plaintiffs’ Theories of Retaliation
Plaintiffs advance two separate theories of retaliation. Plaintiffs’ first theory2 is that
Whitlow took protected activity by challenging and revoking the LCA and was then fired in
retaliation for his actions by Cognis. Plaintiffs’ second theory3 is that the act of requiring
Whitlow and the other employees to agree to the terms of the LCA in lieu of termination
constitutes prohibited retaliation. This court will address each theory separately below.
Initially, this case is somewhat unusual, as it is not often that a plaintiff moves for or
is granted summary judgment on a Title VII retaliation claim. One reason for this is that
plaintiffs often do not have any direct evidence of retaliation, and therefore must proceed
solely under the indirect burden-shifting method outlined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). When proceeding under the indirect method, even if the
plaintiff is able to establish the prima facie case, a genuine issue of material fact is often
present regarding whether the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for taking the adverse
employment action is simply pretext for unlawful retaliation. In contrast, when proceeding
under the direct method of retaliation, as Plaintiffs are in this case on both theories of
retaliation, summary judgment in favor of a plaintiff is possible, in certain instances. The

2

This theory is only applicable to Intervenor Plaintiff Whitlow, as he is the only Cognis
employee who refused to be bound by the LCA.
3

This theory is applicable to Whitlow as well as the other employees because they all
were offered the same ultimatum—agree to the LCA or accept your termination.
5

Seventh Circuit has explained where summary judgment might be appropriate for a plaintiff
in a retaliation case as follows:
The plaintiff in a retaliation case should have two . . . distinct routes to
obtaining/preventing summary judgment. One, the more straightforward, the one that
is unrelated to McDonnell Douglas, is to present direct evidence (evidence that
establishes without resort to inferences from circumstantial evidence) that he engaged
in protected activity . . . and as a result suffered the adverse employment action of
which he complains. If the evidence is uncontradicted, the plaintiff is entitled to
summary judgment. If it is contradicted, the case must be tried unless the defendant
presents unrebutted evidence that he would have taken the adverse employment action
against the plaintiff even if he had no retaliatory motive; in that event the defendant is
entitled to summary judgment because he has shown that the plaintiff wasn’t harmed
by retaliation.
Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Util. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 2002) (emphasis
added).
A. Theory #1—Retaliation Against Whitlow
Plaintiffs, under the first theory of retaliation, argue that Whitlow is entitled to
summary judgment because he has direct evidence on each element of the prima facie case
and this evidence is uncontradicted by any genuine issue of material fact. To satisfy the
direct method for a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must present direct evidence that: (1) he
engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) an adverse action was taken by his employer;
and (3) there was a causal connection between the activity and the adverse action. Sitar v.
Indiana Dept. of Transp., 344 F.3d 720, 728 (7th Cir. 2003). Notably, if there is direct
evidence of each of these elements, the intent of the defendant is irrelevant to the question of
liability under Title VII for retaliation. See EEOC v. Board of Governors, 957 F.2d 424, 428
(7th Cir. 1992) (“When an employee’s participation in statutorily protected activity is the

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determining factor in an employer’s decision to take adverse employment action, that action
is invalid regardless of the employer’s intent.”).
Initially, Cognis concedes that there was an adverse action taken against Whitlow
when his employment with Cognis terminated on May 21, 2007. Cognis also does not
dispute that Whitlow engaged in statutorily protected activity on May 21, 2007. On May 21,
2007, Whitlow took two separate actions: (1) he asked Beverly Lemenager if the LCA could
be modified so that he could retain his civil rights; and (2) after being informed that the LCA
would not be modified under any circumstances, Whitlow revoked the LCA because it
restrained his civil rights.4 Although Whitlow’s first action was protected activity, there is no
direct evidence that Whitlow suffered an adverse action as a result of his request to modify
the LCA—therefore, under the direct method, this protected activity could not form the basis
for a successful retaliation claim.
Whitlow’s act of opposing the LCA and revoking his agreement to the LCA because
it restrained his civil rights also was protected activity. The LCA, by its clear language,
threatens retaliation for protected activity. Cognis’ requirement that Whitlow be subject to
an agreement restraining his statutory rights to avoid termination is an unlawful employment
practice. Therefore, opposing this practice by revoking his agreement to the LCA certainly
qualifies as protected activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (“[B]ecause he has opposed any

4

Defendants do not dispute this fact, but simply argue that it is immaterial under their
theory of the case. See Defendant’s Response (#41), p. 20.
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practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII] . . . .”). Therefore, Whitlow’s
act of revoking his agreement to the LCA on May 21, 2007 was protected activity.
After concluding that it is uncontested that Plaintiff has satisfied the first two elements
of the prima facie case, the only question is whether there was a causal connection between
Whitlow’s act of revoking the LCA and his termination.5 Cognis continues to rely on an
argument that this court previously explained “defies simple logic.” Specifically, Cognis
argues that the decision to terminate Whitlow occurred on or before May 10, 2007, and any
protected activity taken by Whitlow after this date could not possibly have any impact on the
decision made on or before May 10, 2007. This argument is flawed and does not create a
genuine issue of material fact regarding causation.6
First, Cognis’ argument ignores the undisputed fact that the LCA Whitlow signed
contained the following unambiguous language: “Cognis has decided to offer Whitlow one
last chance to continue his employment in lieu of termination . . . .” This fact alone makes it
clear that the unequivocal decision to terminate Whitlow was certainly not made on or before
May 10, 2007. Second, it is undisputed that Whitlow continued to work at Cognis after May
10, 2007, and there is no indication that he would have been terminated so long as he agreed

5

Cognis implicitly concedes this point as it argues only that “there is a genuine issue of
material fact regarding whether the alleged protected activity was causally connected to
Whitlow’s discharge.”
6

The Seventh Circuit has explained that: “An issue is genuine if a reasonable trier of
fact could find in favor of the nonmoving party. The judge must ask whether a fair-minded
jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. The existence of a mere
scintilla of evidence supporting a [party’s] position is insufficient; there must be evidence on
which a jury could reasonably find for the [party]. Insolia v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 216 F.3d
596, 599 (7th Cir. 2000).
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to be bound by the terms of the LCA. Third, Cognis concedes that Whitlow’s revocation of
the LCA triggered his termination.7 Cognis’ argument, in essence, asks this court to ignore
its decision to offer Whitlow a LCA in lieu of termination and to ignore that Whitlow
continued to work at Cognis after May 10, 2007.
Moreover, the absurdity of Cognis’ argument can be highlighted by a factual
comparison. Assume an employer required each of its new employees to sign an agreement
that they would not take statutorily protected activity, and if they did, their employment
would immediately be terminated. Additionally, assume that the employer made it very clear
to each new employee that they would not be hired unless they agreed to this condition of
employment. One particular employee, after working for the employer for two years,
informed the employer that he no longer was willing to be bound by the agreement because
he felt he had been discriminated against and would be filing a complaint with the EEOC.
The employer immediately fired the employee for refusing to be bound by their agreement.
The employer then argues that they did not retaliate against the employee by firing
him—rather, when the employee informed the employer that he no longer was willing to be
bound by the agreement, they merely reverted to the pre-agreement status where the
employer would not hire the employee unless the agreement was signed. Clearly, based on
this hypothetical situation, which is indistinguishable from Cognis’ treatment of Whitlow, a

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Defendant, in its Response (#41), explains that “[o]n May 21, 2007, Whitlow
revoked the LCA; that decision returned him to the pre-LCA status quo that his employment
was terminated for poor work performance per Cognis’ original decision.”
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jury could not reasonably conclude that the employee’s revocation of the agreement was not
the direct cause of his termination.
No reasonable trier of fact could find that the Whitlow’s revocation of the LCA was
not the direct cause of Whitlow’s termination from Cognis on May 21, 2007. Therefore, on
the issue of whether Cognis retaliated against Whitlow by terminating his employment on
May 21, 2007 after he took protected activity by revoking his agreement to the LCA, this
court finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that Whitlow is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.8
Even if a jury could reasonably accept Cognis’ interpretation of the facts, there
remains direct evidence of causation. Defendant explains in its Response (#41) that:
The Company’s evidence demonstrates that Whitlow’s employment was not
terminated because he challenged or revoked the LCA; rather when he elected not to
enter into the LCA, the Company reverted to the pre-LCA status quo which was that
Whitlow’s employment was terminated for poor performance (which . . . was a
decision made before May 10, 2007, and before any discussion of a potential LCA
ever even began).
Defendant acknowledges that it reverted to the pre-LCA status quo when Whitlow “elected
not to enter into the LCA.” Defendant attempts to distinguish this action from the revocation
of the LCA—however, this is simply not supported by the facts. Whitlow’s revocation of the

8

This court, in its prior Opinion (#35), in rejecting Cognis’ argument that it was entitled
to summary judgment on Whitlow’s claim, stated that “there is a genuine issue of material fact
which precludes summary judgment in favor of Cognis on the issue of whether or not there was a
causal connection between Whitlow’s protected activity and his termination.” Although this
genuine issue of material fact certainly would apply equally to the current motion, this language
in isolation does not accurately reflect this court’s prior analysis. Specifically, in the same
paragraph, this court explained that if the act of revoking the LCA was protected activity, “there
is no question that there is sufficient direct evidence of causation . . . .” After concluding that
revoking the LCA is protected activity, no genuine issue of material fact remains.
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LCA, which clearly was protected activity, was the same act as his “election not to enter the
LCA.” Therefore, even crediting Defendant’s theory of the case, the direct cause of
“reverting to the pre-LCA status quo” was Whitlow’s revocation of the LCA. This change in
Whitlow’s employment—reverting to a prior decision to terminate his employment—would
constitute an adverse employment action because it “might have dissuaded a reasonable
worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe
Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006). In conclusion, even under Cognis’ interpretation
of the facts in this case, there is no genuine issue of material fact that Cognis unlawfully
retaliated against Whitlow on May 21, 2007.
B. Theory #2—Retaliation by Offering LCAs
This court, in its prior Opinion (#35), addressed Cognis’ argument that offering LCAs
to Whitlow and the other employees did not constitute retaliation under Title VII. In
addressing this argument, this court considered two issues: (1) whether the enforcement of
the terms of the LCAs could be considered a retaliatory policy under Title VII; and (2)
whether threatening an employee with retaliation constitutes an adverse action. This court
concluded that “there is sufficient legal support . . . to reach the conclusion that Cognis’
threat of retaliation contained in the LCAs constitutes a retaliatory policy under Title VII.”
Also, this court explained that threatening retaliation can constitute an adverse action because
it “might . . . dissuade[] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.” White, 548 U.S. at 63. Nevertheless, this court did not find that Cognis’ use

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of the LCAs constituted Title VII retaliation as a matter of law.9 Rather, based on these
conclusions, this court explained that it would be able to find as a matter of law that Cognis’
use of LCAs constituted actionable retaliation in two hypothetical situations: (1) an employee
was offered the LCA because he opposed a practice made unlawful by Title VII or made a
charge under Title VII;10 or (2) the LCA was enforced, and an employee was fired, because
he opposed a practice made unlawful by Title VII or made a charge under Title VII.11 The
parties have now had an opportunity to offer further legal arguments relating to these issues
and this court will discuss each conclusion separately.
1. Retaliatory Policy
The policy that this court concluded was retaliatory, relying in part on the Seventh
Circuit’s opinion in Board of Governors, was the policy contained within the LCAs that
threatened termination if an employee took statutorily protected activity. The retaliatory
policy that the Seventh Circuit dealt with in Board of Governors was a collective bargaining
agreement provision that denied employees contractual rights to grievance proceedings if the
employee initiated an age-based discrimination claim. Board of Governors, 957 F.2d at 425.

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Although this court would like to find that requiring employees to agree to an
unenforceable waiver of rights is actionable as retaliation under Title VII, the statutory language
is clear that a cause and effect relationship is needed to be actionable. Here, although requiring
employees to sign an unenforceable waiver of rights is an adverse action, protected activity is
also needed under the clear statutory language.
10

In this scenario, being offered an LCA, which threatens retaliation, constitutes the
adverse action element of the prima facie case.
11

In this scenario, the adverse action is adhering to the retaliatory policy by firing the
employee for taking protected action, which is prohibited by the terms of the LCA.
12

In Board of Governors, there was no dispute that the employer implemented the policy and
that there were employees who filed age-based discrimination claims and as a result had their
contractual rights to a grievance proceeding denied. Id. at 426. In other words, there was no
dispute that each element of the prima facie case for direct retaliation was satisfied. The
question addressed by the Court was whether the good faith of the employer in adopting the
policy was relevant to the plaintiff’s retaliation claims. The Seventh Circuit concluded that
“[i]n a retaliatory policy case an employer’s alleged good faith is irrelevant.” Id. at 429.
In contrast to the factual situation in Board of Governors, the retaliatory policy
contained in the LCAs used by Cognis was never enforced against Whitlow or the other
employees. Therefore, Board of Governors does not provide support for holding that
Plaintiffs are entitled to a finding of retaliation as a matter of law in the absence of a showing
that there was any protected activity by Plaintiffs. The Sixth Circuit, in addressing a similar
factual situation, explained:
We do not find the Seventh Circuit’s Board of Governors opinion to be compelling
precedent with respect to this case. In Board of Governors, the employer actually
took an adverse action against the employee because the employee had pursued the
statutorily protected activity of filing a charge with the EEOC. That action clearly
constituted retaliation . . . . While the Seventh Circuit addressed what it determined to
be the facially retaliatory CBA provision that purported to authorize the action, that
policy was before the Seventh Circuit because the employer had implemented it and
had engaged in a retaliatory act. Here, [the defendant] has offered a contract, and, on
the record before us, has engaged in no further action.
EEOC v. SunDance Rehabilitation Corp., 466 F.3d 490, 498 (6th Cir. 2006).
Therefore, the conclusion that the threat of retaliation contained in the LCA
constitutes a retaliatory policy only allows this court to find retaliation as a matter of law if

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Cognis exercised the policy against any employee who took protected activity. However, in
this case, there is no evidence that Cognis ever enforced the retaliatory policy. Although
several employees entered into LCAs containing this retaliatory policy, Cognis undisputedly
never acted on the policy. As Cognis now concedes, the retaliatory policy is void because it
violates public policy. Nevertheless, the missing element from this theory of retaliation is a
situation where Cognis enforced the retaliatory policy against any of its employees.
2. Threat of Retaliation
In denying Cognis’ Motion for Summary Judgment (#29), this court reasoned that a
jury could permissibly conclude that requiring an employee to sign a LCA as a condition of
continued employment was an adverse employment action. The basis for this conclusion was
the determination that the threat of termination for undertaking future protected activity, a
threat explicitly made by the terms of the LCAs, “might have dissuaded a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” White, 548 U.S. at 63.
Nevertheless, this conclusion that a threat of retaliation can permissibly be considered an
adverse employment action only satisfies one element of the prima facie case of retaliation.
Plaintiffs must still establish that there was protected activity and that there was a causal
connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action (being forced
to agree to the terms of the LCA in order to remain employed by Cognis).
In this case, there is no evidence that any employee who received a LCA took
protected activity prior to receiving the LCA. Nevertheless, this court believes that the
factual circumstances of this case would allow a jury to determine that Cognis preemptively

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retaliated against poorly performing employees—therefore the fact that Plaintiffs took no
protected activity prior to receiving the LCAs does not foreclose their claims of retaliation.
See Sauers, 1 F.3d at 1128. Specifically, this court believes that a jury could reasonably
conclude that Cognis feared protected activity from poorly performing employees if they
were terminated and therefore offered LCAs which required the poorly performing
employees to give up their civil rights as their sole alternative to termination.12 Therefore,
because there is a genuine issue of material fact relating to whether Cognis anticipated
protected activity when it offered LCAs to Whitlow and the other employees, summary
judgment would be inappropriate on the theory that the mere offer of the LCAs to Whitlow
and the other employees was actionable retaliation.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
(1) Plaintiffs’ Motions for Summary Judgment (#38; #40) are GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part.
(2) The parties may contact Magistrate Judge David G. Bernthal’s chambers to
request a settlement conference to renew settlement negotiations, if desired.
(3) A status conference, by telephone, is scheduled for June 13, 2012, at 9:30 a.m., to
discuss scheduling a jury trial on the remaining issues in this case.
ENTERED this 23rd day of May, 2012
s/ Michael P. McCuskey
MICHAEL P. McCUSKEY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE\

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This court notes that the language of the LCA supports this inference, because fear of
such protected activity seems to be one of the only reasons for placing the retaliatory provision
in the LCA.
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