Repking v. McKennedy

Filing 61

OPINION by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins. Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint 52 is DENIED. See written order. (LB, ilcd)

E-FILED

Tuesday, 06 May, 2014 03:34:33 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
WILLIAM T. REPKING,

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Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID McKENNEDY,
Defendant,

No. 12-cv-2034

OPINION
TOM SCHANZLE-HASKINS, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff William T. Repking’s
Motion to Amend Complaint (d/e 52) (Motion). For the reasons set forth
below, the Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Repking brought this action to recover for personal injuries that he
suffered in a head-on automobile collision that occurred on Interstate 55
(I-55) in Central Illinois on August 23, 2010, between 12:00 a.m. and
1:00 a.m. McKennedy was driving in the wrong direction on I-55 at the
time of the collision. See Opinion entered October 18, 2013 (d/e 49)
(Summary Judgment Opinion), at 2-3 for a discussion of the circumstances
of the collision.
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Repking filed a two-count Complaint against McKennedy. Count I
alleged a claim for negligence, and Count II alleged a claim for willful and
wanton conduct. Complaint (d/e 1). Both Counts, however, only prayed for
compensatory damages. Compare Complaint, at 3-4 (Count I ¶ 7 and
Prayer for Relief), with Complaint, at 6 (Count II ¶ 7 and Prayer for Relief).
Repking only disclosed that he was seeking compensatory damages in his
Rule 26(a) initial disclosures. Plaintiff’s Rule 26 Disclosure (d/e 48). The
Court explained in the Summary Judgment Opinion that Repking needed to
disclose a claim for punitive damages in his initial disclosures in order to
present such evidence at trial. Summary Judgment Opinion, at 8 (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) and 37(c)(1)). The Court entered partial
summary judgment on the issue of liability on Count I and left the issue of
compensatory damages for trial. Summary Judgment Opinion, at 8-9.
Repking now asks to amend the Complaint to add a claim for punitive
damages in both Counts.
ANALYSIS
Generally, amendments to pleadings are governed by Rule 15. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a). This Court, however, directed the parties to file all motions
to amend pleadings by October 5, 2012. Scheduling Order entered June 5,
2012 (d/e 16), at 1. Repking filed the Motion on November 19, 2013, more
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than a year after the deadline. Under such circumstances, the Motion is
first governed by Rule 16(b). Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975
F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1992). Repking must first show good cause to justify
a modification of the Scheduling Order to allow the untimely filing of the
Motion. Id., at 608-09; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Once such good
cause is shown, he must demonstrate the proposed amendment is proper
under Rule 15.
Repking offers no explanation for the untimeliness of the Motion. The
Motion states that the proposed amendment alleges no new facts. Motion,
¶ 6. Thus, Repking knew all of the facts to support his claim for punitive
damages before the October 5, 2012, deadline. He could have filed the
Motion in a timely manner, but did not. The Court’s Scheduling Order may
be modified only if good cause justifies a modification. Fed. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(4). Repking offers no such cause. The Motion is denied as untimely.
The proposed amendment is also denied because the undue delay in
filing the motion would cause undue prejudice to McKennedy. Leave to
amend pleadings is to be freely given when justice so requires. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 15(a)(2). The Court, however, may deny leave to amend a
complaint under several circumstances, including when the plaintiff has
engaged in undue delay that results in undue prejudice to the defendant.
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Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); see e.g., Feldman v. American
Memorial Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 783, 793 (7th Cir. 1999).
In this case, Repking’s tardiness in seeking to amend his Complaint
constitutes such undue delay. Discovery has closed; partial summary
judgment on liability on Count I has been entered; and this matter is ready
for trial on damages. If the Motion is allowed, discovery will need to be
reopened, and the partial summary judgment will need to be reconsidered.
The trial will clearly be delayed. All of this will work an undue prejudice on
McKennedy.
If Repking now adds a claim for punitive damages, discovery would
need to be reopened. At a minimum, McKennedy would be entitled to
discover the facts on which Repking plans to rely: (1) to establish a right to
punitive damages; and (2) to prove the appropriate amount of punitive
damages. In Illinois, punitive damages are awarded only if the defendant’s
conduct was willful or outrageous due to evil motive or a reckless
indifference to the rights of others. Franz v. Calaco Development Corp.,
352 Ill.App.3d 1129, 1137, 818 N.E.2d 357, 366 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 2004).
McKennedy would be entitled to discover all of the evidence on which
Repking intends to prove these elements. Repking argues that discovery is
not necessary because driving the wrong way on I-55 is obviously
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outrageous conduct. Even if driving on the wrong side of the Interstate is
outrageous, McKennedy would still be entitled to discover whether Repking
intended to rely on any additional evidence to establish this claim.
McKennedy would also be entitled to discovery regarding the amount
of any punitive damage claim. Punitive damages are not subject to precise
calculation, but a punitive award must not be excessive. Farfaras v.
Citizens Bank and Trust of Chicago, 433 F.3d 558, 567 (7th Cir. 2006).
Three guideposts are used to evaluate whether punitive damages are
excessive:
This Court has enunciated “three guideposts” to steer the
evaluation of “whether a punitive damage award is grossly
excessive such that it offends due process: (1) the degree of
reprehensibility of defendant's conduct; (2) the disparity between
the harm or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and his
punitive damages award; and (3) the difference between this
remedy and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in
comparable cases.”
Id. (quoting Kapelanski v. Johnson, 390 F.3d 525, 534 (7th Cir.2004)).
McKennedy would be entitled to discover the method by which Repking
would apply the guideposts in this case. McKennedy would certainly be
entitled to discover any civil penalties that Repking believes would be
comparable to the punishment sought in the punitive award. See Davis v.
Harris, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 88000, at *12 (C.D. Ill. December 5, 2006).
This discovery would cause significant delay in this case.
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The Court may also need to reconsider partial summary judgment if
the Motion is allowed. McKennedy argued that partial summary judgment
on liability on negligence would cause jury confusion. This Court
acknowledged that possibility, “The Court acknowledges that some jury
confusion could arise if Repking proceeded to trial on damages only in
Count I and liability and damages in Count II of the Complaint.” Summary
Judgment Opinion, at 7. This Court found no risk of jury confusion,
however, because the Count II willful and wanton claim did not need to be
tried. Count II did not need to be tried because Repking was only seeking
compensatory damages in both Counts. The damages trial on Count I
would give Repking a complete remedy. Id., at 7-8. If the Motion were
allowed, this Court would need to reconsider the effect of jury confusion on
the question of partial summary judgment. The briefing necessary to
conduct this reconsideration would necessarily delay the proceedings and
impose additional expenses on the parties.
The delay and additional expense would be undue because Repking
could have asserted a claim for punitive damages when he filed the case.
He claims a right to punitive damages on the facts that he alleged in his
original Complaint. He chose not to include a prayer for punitive damages.
He also chose not to include punitive damages in his Rule 26 initial
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disclosures. He waited until after discovery was closed and until after
partial summary judgment was entered to seek this amendment. He further
offers no justification for why he waited. The delay that the proposed
amendment would cause would be clearly undue.
The undue delay would also prejudice McKennedy unduly.
McKennedy is entitled to a resolution of this case. He has fully participated
in discovery. He has defended against Repking’s partial summary
judgment motion. He is ready for trial. He should not be required to start
all over again because Repking at the last minute wants to add a claim for
punitive damages, particularly when he could have included this claim from
the beginning. The Motion is denied because it is untimely and because
the proposed amendment would cause undue delay that would unduly
prejudice McKennedy.
THEREFORE Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend Complaint (d/e 52) is
DENIED.
ENTER: May 6, 2014

s/ Tom Schanzle-Haskins
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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