Repking v. McKennedy

Filing 64

OPINION by U.S. Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins: Defendant David McKennedy's Fourth Motion in Limine 51 is DENIED. See written order. (LB, ilcd)

E-FILED

Thursday, 22 May, 2014 03:19:54 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
WILLIAM T. REPKING,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVID McKENNEDY,
Defendant,

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No. 12-cv-2034

OPINION
TOM SCHANZLE-HASKINS, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant David
McKennedy’s Fourth Motion in Limine (d/e 51) (Motion). The parties
consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to proceed before this Court.
Consent to the Exercise of Jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate
Judge, filed May 12, 2014 (d/e 62); and Order of Reference, entered May
14, 2014 (d/e 63). For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND
Repking brought this action to recover for personal injuries that he
suffered in a head-on automobile collision that occurred on Interstate 55
(I-55) in Central Illinois on August 23, 2010, between 12:00 a.m. and 1:00
a.m. McKennedy was driving in the wrong direction on I-55 at the time of
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the collision. See Opinion entered October 19, 2013 (d/e 49) (Summary
Judgment Opinion), at 2-3 for a discussion of the circumstances of the
collision.
Repking filed a two-count Complaint against McKennedy. Count I
alleged a claim for negligence, and Count II alleged a claim for willful and
wanton conduct. Complaint (d/e 1). Both Counts, however, only prayed for
compensatory damages. Compare Complaint, at 3-4 (Count I ¶ 7 and
Prayer for Relief), with Complaint, at 6 (Count II ¶ 7 and Prayer for Relief).
Repking only disclosed that he was seeking compensatory damages in his
Rule 26(a) initial disclosures. Plaintiff’s Rule 26 Disclosure (d/e 48). The
Court explained in the Summary Judgment Opinion that Repking needed to
disclose a claim for punitive damages in his initial disclosures in order to
present such evidence at trial. Summary Judgment Opinion, at 8 (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(iii) and 37(c)(1)). The Court entered partial
summary judgment on the issue of liability on Count I and left the issue of
compensatory damages for trial. Summary Judgment Opinion, at 8-9.
McKennedy now moves in limine that at trial:
a. Any evidence of the facts surrounding the accident at issue
be barred;
b. Any evidence that the Defendant was traveling in the wrong
direction on Interstate 55 when the accident occurred be
barred;
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c. Any evidence that the accident at issue was a head-on
collision be barred;
d. Any evidence of the severity of the impact be barred;
e. Any photographs of the accident or accident scene be
barred;
f. Any photographs of the motor vehicles involved in the
accident be barred.
Motion, at 1.1 McKennedy argues that the evidence is not relevant since
liability is established. McKennedy also argues that the evidence is unduly
prejudicial.
ANALYSIS
The request to bar all such evidence is denied. The nature of the
collision is relevant background information to explain to the jury the
circumstances that gave rise to Repking’s injuries. Repking should be
allowed to educate the jury on the circumstances of his injuries to help
understand the nature and severity of those injuries. See Phillips v.
Lawrence, 87 Ill.App.2d 60, 63, 230 N.E.2d 505, 507 (Ill. App. 5th Dist.
1967). One of Repking’s treating physicians, Dr. David Fletcher, M.D., also
considered the force applied in the collision in formulating his opinions
regarding Repking’s damages. See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s
1

The Court previously barred evidence of McKennedy’s mental state and use of drugs. Opinion entered
October 24, 2013 (d/e 50) (Opinion 50). This Opinion does not affect the rulings in Opinion 50.
McKennedy’s mental state or drug use is not relevant to the trial on damages to be held in this case.

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Fourth Motion in Limine (d/e 56), Exhibit A, Deposition of David Fletcher, at
44. The factual basis of an expert’s opinions would also be relevant. See
Fed. R. Evid. 702(b). This evidence sought to be barred is relevant.
McKennedy argues that even if the evidence is relevant, the evidence
should be barred because it would be unduly prejudicial. This Court may
exclude relevant evidence if the probative value of the evidence is
substantially outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice or if the evidence
is needlessly cumulative. Fed. R. Evid. 403. In this case, the probative
value of the evidence of the collision is limited to explaining the background
circumstances of Repking’s injuries and the basis for Dr. Fletcher’s
opinions. This background information is important to understand the
nature of the injuries and also to understand the basis of an expert’s
opinions. The Court finds admitting some relevant evidence of nature of
the collision is not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to
McKennedy. The Court, therefore, will not bar all such evidence in limine.
Extensive evidence of the collision, however, would not be necessary
and could create a risk of prejudice against McKennedy for his negligence
in driving the wrong way on the Interstate.

McKennedy may object at trial

to particular evidence that he believes is unduly prejudicial, needlessly
cumulative, or otherwise inadmissible.
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THEREFORE Defendant David McKennedy’s Fourth Motion in
Limine (d/e 51) is DENIED. McKennedy may object at trial to particular
evidence if he believes the evidence is unduly prejudicial, needlessly
cumulative, or otherwise inadmissible.
ENTER: May 22, 2014

s/ Tom Schanzle-Haskins
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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