Kauffman v. Petersen Health Care VII, LLC et al

Filing 30

OPINION Entered by Judge Michael P. McCuskey on 11/4/13. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT: (1) Mason Point's Motion for Summary Judgment 23 is GRANTED. Judgment is entered in favor of Mason Point and against Plaintiff on all of Plaintiff's claims. (2) This case is terminated. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. (SKD, ilcd)

E-FILED

Monday, 04 November, 2013 03:09:13 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
URBANA DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
DEBRA KAUFFMAN,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
Case No. 12-CV-2079
)
PETERSEN HEALTH CARE VII, LLC,
)
d/b/a Mason Point,
)
)
Defendant.
)
OPINION

This case is before the court for ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment (#23)
filed by Defendant, Petersen Health Care VII, LLC, d/b/a Mason Point (Mason Point). This
court has carefully reviewed the arguments of the parties and the documents filed by the
parties. Following this careful and thorough review, Mason Point’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (#23) is GRANTED.
FACTS1
Defendant Mason Point is a nursing home providing long term care to elderly
individuals and is located in Sullivan, Illinois. Plaintiff, Debra Kauffman, began working
for Mason Point in May 1981 as a beautician and performed beautician/hair care services for
Mason Point’s residents in a beauty shop located on the Mason Point campus. Plaintiff was
one of two beauticians employed by Mason Point. The other beautician is Nancy Burich.
Plaintiff’s job required her to be able to carry or lift weights in the range of 10 to 50 pounds.
1

The facts are taken from Defendant’s Statement of Undisputed Facts, Plaintiff’s
Statement of Additional Material Facts and the documents filed by the parties, including
deposition transcripts. This court has only included facts which are material to the issues in this
case and are adequately supported by the record.

Plaintiff worked from 7:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. on Mondays and Tuesdays. On Wednesdays
and Thursdays she worked from 7:00 a.m. to 4: 00 p.m. She worked 35 hours during a work
week. On Mondays and Tuesdays Plaintiff and Burich served residents who needed
assistance in being transported to the beauty shop. Plaintiff testified that after the residents
had eaten breakfast and had their meds:
we would take them and bring them down to the beauty shop, do
their hair. And at all times one of us had to stay in the beauty
shop because we couldn’t leave them there because they would
get out of their chair and fall. And then we would do their hair,
take them back home; and then get the next one and bring her
down, do her hair, take her back home; get the next one, bring
her down, take her back home. So Mondays and Tuesdays
that’s pretty much our day.
Plaintiff testified that the routine on Mondays and Tuesdays involved “[a] lot of
walking.” Plaintiff testified that the residents were already in their wheelchairs when she
went to get them and that, sometimes, the nurses would have them sitting at the desk waiting
to be picked up. Plaintiff also testified that the residents stayed in their wheelchairs while
she and Burich did their hair. Plaintiff testified that, on Mondays, they only did four to six
people if they did perms. On Wednesdays and Thursdays, she and Burich provided services
to Mason Point’s “home side” residents who were capable of transporting themselves to the
beauty shop.

However, Plaintiff and Burich still had to retrieve some residents in
2

wheelchairs on Wednesday and Thursday because they “couldn’t get them all done on
Monday and Tuesday.” Plaintiff testified that “sometimes” a CNA would transport a resident
to the beauty salon “if they were making a trip.” Plaintiff’s duties also included providing
manicures, providing services in resident rooms as well as in the beauty salon, cleaning the
bird aviary, assisting with laundry, participating in activities with residents and assisting with
breakfast and lunch service for residents.
It is undisputed that the Mason Point facility includes a number of residential
buildings. At least five buildings house residents and some of those buildings contained
multiple floors of residential housing. The path from the residents’ rooms to the beauty shop
from time to time required Plaintiff to navigate the resident in a wheelchair to elevators, up
and over ramps and through a series of hallways. Plaintiff served residents of different sizes
ranging in weight from 75 to 400 pounds. Plaintiff estimated that the average resident
weighed around 120 pounds. Plaintiff scheduled the residents’ appointments an hour apart
to allow her time to retrieve, care for, and return a resident to his or her room. At her
deposition, Plaintiff was asked how long it would take her to retrieve a resident from
Building 13, which appeared from the map to be the most remote of the residential buildings.
Plaintiff testified:
I would not really be able to tell you. I mean because
every time you’d even think you [were] going to make it just
like that, a resident would be standing in the hallway stopped
and talk to you. You’d start going again, then somebody would
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stop you at medical center, can I have her for a minute, we need
to weigh her. I mean as far as doing it in a time, I never really
timed it myself. Maybe two minutes or two and a half minutes
maybe. I don’t know.
On November 21, 2010, Plaintiff learned that she needed to have a hysterectomy. She
immediately advised Darin Wall, the administrator of Mason Point, that she would be having
surgery and needed six to eight weeks off work. On November 23, 2010, Plaintiff requested
a leave of absence pursuant to the Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA) for the period of
December 21, 2010, to February 2, 2011, and submitted a certification signed by her
physician, Dr. Jeffrey Pfeiffer. Mason Point granted Plaintiff’s request for FMLA leave.
Plaintiff underwent surgery as scheduled on December 22, 2010. Plaintiff testified
that, as part of the surgery, they had to do bladder repair and put a mesh lining on her
abdomen to hold the bladder up. On or about February 8, 2011, Plaintiff received written
permission from Dr. Pfeiffer to return to work on February 14, 2011, but with the restriction
that she could not “push over 20 pounds until released to do so.” Plaintiff testified that her
doctor knew she was a hairdresser and originally told her she could return to work with no
restrictions. She told him that she had wheelchairs she had to push and told him how heavy
the residents were. Plaintiff testified that he said “you can’t be pushing and lifting” and
“that’s when he made this work release up because he thought I was just a hairdresser who
did hair.” Plaintiff testified that Dr. Pfeiffer told her that if she started pushing “2 and 300
pound people again, over a repetitive time that’s going to tear that loose, and you’ll be back
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in for bladder repair again.”
On February 8, 2011, Plaintiff went to see Wall and gave him Dr. Pfeiffer’s written
permission to return to work with restrictions. Plaintiff deemed herself unable to push
residents in wheelchairs due to her physician’s restrictions. Wall advised Plaintiff that he did
not think that Plaintiff could work with a 20-pound weight restriction but that he would
discuss her request to return to work with his supervisors. Wall testified that Plaintiff was
telling him that it was going to be a lifetime restriction and explained her doctor’s concern
with the surgery and the possibility of damaging the repair of the bladder. Plaintiff testified
that Wall told her he was sorry but he did not think “you can come back with the restrictions
you have.” Plaintiff testified that Wall also said “we just don’t allow people to work with
restrictions, and you have a restriction on here.” Plaintiff testified that she did not believe
the 20 pound restriction was going to be permanent. When asked if she pointed out to Wall
that the 20 pound limitation would be changed at some point, she stated, “I don’t know that
I did.” In her Declaration, dated September 9, 2013, Plaintiff stated that she never told Wall
that she believed the 20 pound weight restriction prescribed by her physician would be a
lifetime restriction.
On February 14, 2011, Plaintiff went to Wall’s office to once again discuss her
potential to return to work at Mason Point. Wall said that he did not think Plaintiff would
be able to work with the restrictions she had. Plaintiff testified that Wall told her “[w]e don’t
allow people with restrictions to work.” Plaintiff asked Wall if someone else could push
residents for her and whether she could work part time or work in Mason Point’s laundry
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unit. Wall testified that he told Plaintiff that they were not able to accommodate that. He
testified that “[i]t would put a hardship on the facility to hire somebody to transport the
patients from the beauty shop to the resident’s room and back and forth” so “[t]hat was
something that we were not able to do.” After Wall refused to permit Plaintiff to return to
work with a 20 pound weight restriction, Plaintiff laid her security badge and keys on Wall’s
desk and left to collect her personal items from the beauty shop.
Plaintiff had one final phone conference with Wall six to eight weeks after February
14, 2011. During that phone conference Plaintiff inquired whether she could apply for the
open hairdresser position. Plaintiff did not tell Wall that her restrictions had changed.2 Wall
stated that he could not hire Plaintiff back, given the restrictions he understood she had.
At his deposition, Wall estimated that 70 to 75% of Mason Point’s residents require
wheelchair transportation to move about. Wall also testified that a beautician spent a very
large percent of her time transporting residents to or from the beauty shop. Wall estimated
that transporting patients took 60 to 65% of the beautician’s time. Wall also estimated that
transporting a resident to or from Building 13 would take 10 to 15 minutes. Wall stated that
between the building where the beauty shop is located and Building 13 there was a medical
center and Main Street Hall, “where you get stopped quite a bit.”

2

In fact, the documentation provided by Plaintiff shows that her 20 pound weight
restriction was not changed to a 50 pound weight restriction until July 2011. There is no
evidence that this information was provided to Wall or anyone else at Mason Point. Also,
Plaintiff has not provided any evidence regarding whether this change in the weight restriction
would have allowed her to push wheelchairs with residents who weighed between 75 and 400
pounds.
6

Nancy Burich stated in her declaration, dated September 11, 2013, that she was
provided with the assistance of a volunteer or nurse “who would transport any wheelchair
bound residents to and from the beauty salon” after Plaintiff left her employment. Burich
stated that she “was provided with this assistance until a part-time beautician was hired, at
which point I resumed transporting patients with occasional assistance from a volunteer or
nurse.” Burich also stated that “[t]he average time it would take to transport a wheelchair
bound resident from their residence at the Mason Point facility to the beauty salon is between
two and one half minutes.”3
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 24, 2011, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination against Mason Point with
the Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR). This charge was also automatically filed
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). On October 19, 2011, IDHR
issued a “Notice of Dismissal for Lack of Jurisdiction.” On November 10, 2011, the EEOC
issued a Notice of Right to Sue.
On January 23, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in the circuit court of Moultrie
County. Plaintiff alleged that she was discriminated against because of her disability in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and the Illinois Human
Rights Act (IHRA). Plaintiff also alleged that Mason Point failed to make reasonable
accommodations for her disability. On March 8, 2012, Mason Point filed a Notice of

3

This statement is unclear and was most likely meant to state between two and two and
one half minutes, which would be consistent with Plaintiff’s guess during her deposition.
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Removal (#1) and removed the case to this court. Mason Point stated that this court had
original jurisdiction over the Complaint because it alleged a violation of the ADA.
On August 12, 2013, Mason Point filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (#23) with
attached exhibits. Mason Point argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because
Plaintiff was not a “qualified” individual with a disability protected by either the ADA or the
IHRA. On September 11, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment (#26), with attached exhibits. She argued that genuine issues of material
fact existed regarding whether transporting residents in wheelchairs was an essential function
of her job. On September 27, 2013, Mason Point filed its Reply (#29).
ANALYSIS
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a district court “has one task and one task only:
to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that
requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). In
making this determination, the court must construe the evidence in the light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d
529, 533 (7th Cir. 2010). However, a court’s favor toward the nonmoving party does not
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extend to drawing “[i]nferences that are supported by only speculation or conjecture.” See
Singer, 593 F.3d at 533, quoting Fischer v. Avanade, Inc., 519 F.3d 393, 401 (7th Cir. 2008).
The party opposing summary judgment may not rely on the allegations contained in
the pleadings. Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 920. “[I]nstead, the nonmovant must present definite,
competent evidence in rebuttal.” Butts v. Aurora Health Care, Inc., 387 F.3d 921, 924 (7th
Cir. 2004). Summary judgment “is the ‘put up or shut up’ moment in a lawsuit, when a party
must show what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of
events.” Koszola v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 385 F.3d 1104, 1111 (7th Cir. 2004),
quoting Johnson v. Cambridge Indus., Inc., 325 F.3d 892, 901 (7th Cir. 2003). Specifically,
to survive summary judgment, “the nonmoving party must make a sufficient showing of
evidence for each essential element of its case on which it bears the burden at trial.”
Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 2007), citing Celotex Corp., 477
U.S. at 322-23.

ADA CLAIM
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified individual
with a disability. Bekker v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., 229 F.3d 662, 669 (7th Cir. 2000),
citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The term “qualified individual with a disability” means “an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform
the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.”
Bekker, 229 F.3d at 669, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Therefore, to establish disability
9

discrimination, Plaintiff must show that: (1) she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA;
(2) she is qualified to perform the essential functions of her job either with or without a
reasonable accommodation; and (3) she suffered from an adverse employment decision
because of her disability. Majors v. Gen. Elec. Co., 714 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir. 2013);
Bekker, 229 F.3d at 669-70. To establish that she is a “qualified individual with a disability,”
Plaintiff “must establish not only that she has a disability within the meaning of the ADA,
but also that she is qualified for the job, i.e., that she is able ‘to perform the essential
functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation.’” Gratzl v. Office of the
Chief Judges of the 12th, 18th, 19th & 22nd Judicial Circuits, 601 F.3d 674, 679 (7th Cir. 2010),
citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
In this case, Mason Point does not dispute that Plaintiff has a disability. Mason Point
has argued, however, that Plaintiff cannot be deemed a “qualified” person with a disability
because she cannot perform the essential functions of the position with or without a
reasonable accommodation. According to Mason Point, the ability to push residents in
wheelchairs is an essential function for a Mason Point beautician. Mason Point noted that
Plaintiff candidly admitted during her deposition that, on at least two if not three days a
week, she engaged in a lot of walking and pushing of wheelchairs. Mason Point further
argued that the magnitude of the wheelchair pushing was such that Plaintiff knew that the
function must be re-assigned to another in order to allow her to return to work. Mason Point
argued that the accommodation requested by Plaintiff, having someone else transport
residents to the beauty shop, was not reasonable or required under the ADA.
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In her Response, Plaintiff argued that the “only issue for consideration in determining
whether summary judgment is appropriate or not, in this instance, is whether genuine issues
of material fact exist” regarding whether “transporting residents in wheelchairs was an
‘essential function’ of Plaintiff’s job.”

Plaintiff conceded that “[i]t is clear that, in

Defendant’s judgment, it was an essential function.” Plaintiff nevertheless argued that there
were issues of material fact, taking issue with Wall’s estimate that transporting residents
made up 60-65% of her job. Plaintiff also noted that she spent some portion of her work day
doing tasks other than those of a beautician. Plaintiff provided her own estimates of the
percentage of time she spent transporting residents. Plaintiff estimated that she spent
between 6% to 24% of her time transporting residents on Mondays and 12% to 49% of her
time on Tuesdays.4 Plaintiff also pointed out that only a few of the residents who received
beauty services on Wednesdays and Thursdays were in wheelchairs. Plaintiff argued that this
showed that “the significant majority of Plaintiff’s time was spent doing beauty services” and
that providing salon and nail services were “clearly the only essential components to
Plaintiff’s position.”

Plaintiff also argued that Mason Point could have reasonably

accommodated Plaintiff’s temporary weight restrictions by having volunteers or CNA’s
transport residents to the beauty salon. Plaintiff argued that Mason Point provided just this
accommodation to Burich after Plaintiff’s employment was terminated.
In Reply, Mason Point argued that, under Seventh Circuit precedent, courts do not
4

The lower percentage figure was based upon an estimate that it took two to two and one
half minutes to transport a resident one way. The higher percentage figure was based upon
Wall’s estimate that a one way trip took 10 to 15 minutes.
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second guess an employer’s judgment as to what functions of a position are essential. Mason
Point argued that Plaintiff’s concession that, in Mason Point’s judgment, the pushing of
wheelchairs was an essential function of Plaintiff’s job, is therefore significant. Mason Point
argued that, because it deemed pushing of residents’ wheelchairs to be an essential function
of the position and its two beauticians in fact pushed residents in wheelchairs during the
course of performing their duties, it is entitled to summary judgment.
To determine whether a job function is essential, a court looks to the employer’s
judgment, written job descriptions, the amount of time spent on the function, and the
experience of those who previously or currently hold the position. Majors, 714 F.3d at 534,
quoting Rooney v. Koch Air. LLC, 410 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Gratzl, 601
F.3d at 679. Courts “presume that an employer’s understanding of the essential functions of
the job is correct, unless the plaintiff offers sufficient evidence to the contrary.” Gratzl, 601
F.3d at 679, citing Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 928 (7th Cir. 2001). The Seventh
Circuit has stated that “[a]lthough we look to see if the employer actually requires all
employees in a particular position to perform the allegedly essential functions, we do not
otherwise second-guess the employer’s judgment in describing the essential requirements for
the job.” Basith, 241 F.3d at 928, quoting DePaoli v. Abbott Labs., 140 F.3d 668, 674 (7th
Cir. 1998); see also Peters v. City of Mauston, 311 F.3d 835, 845 (7th Cir. 2002). Also, while
the time spent on the function is a consideration, “an essential function need not encompass
the majority of an employee’s time, or even a significant quantity of time, to be essential.”
Basith, 241 F.3d at 929; see also Peters, 311 F.3d at 845.
12

In this case, this court concludes that consideration of the relevant factors results in
a conclusion that picking up and returning residents in their wheelchairs was an essential
function of Plaintiff’s job as a beautician for Mason Point. It is undisputed that, in Mason
Point’s judgment, transporting residents in wheelchairs was an essential function of
Plaintiff’s job. This court also finds persuasive Mason Point’s argument regarding the reason
for assigning this task to the beauticians on staff. Mason Point argued:
Mason Point operates a nursing home where many Residents
obviously need assistance in moving from one point to another.
As the record here establishes, Mason Point’s operation is on a
campus with Residents residing in buildings other than the
building in which the beauty salon is situated. Someone must
assist the Residents in getting from their rooms to the salon.
Mason Point has elected to place that burden upon the
beauticians, and it is appropriate that it do so. As Plaintiff
testifie[d], different Residents have different hair care needs and
require differing amounts of time to care for those needs. It
does not enhance the quality of life for these Residents to be
seated in a wheelchair (which may or may not be a comfortable
position) and lined up at Mason Point’s salon. It is better for the
Resident to be brought down only when ready to be served and
the beautician is the only person capable of determining when
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she is ready to help the next Resident. The imposition of the
transportation duty upon the beauticians thus makes perfect
sense.
In addition, Plaintiff’s testimony showed that she actually spent time during her work
day transporting residents, especially on Mondays and Tuesdays. She testified that the
routine on Mondays and Tuesdays involved “[a] lot of walking.” She also testified that some
time was spent on Wednesdays and Thursdays transporting residents. While there is a wide
disparity in the parties’ estimates of the percentage of Plaintiff’s time spent performing this
function, this court concludes that this disparity does not raise a genuine dispute of material
fact regarding whether this function was an essential function of Plaintiff’s job. This is
because there is no question that Mason Point considers this function to be essential and
Plaintiff testified that she did perform this function when she was working in the position.
Burich’s Declaration states that, although she was provided temporary help in transporting
residents after Plaintiff’s employment was terminated, she has resumed transporting residents
as part of her job. This court therefore concludes that the evidence regarding the experience
of those who previously or currently hold the position confirms that Mason Point actually
requires its employees holding the position of beautician to transport residents in wheelchairs
to and from the beauty shop.
This court also notes that the lower estimates Plaintiff made regarding the percentage
of her time she spent performing this function are not based on definite, competent evidence
but were based solely on speculation and conjecture. She testified at her deposition that she
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really could not say and did not know how much time she spent making a one way trip to
pick up or return a resident. In addition, Burich’s statement in her Declaration that the
average time it took to transport a wheelchair bound resident was “between two and one half
minutes” can only be considered vague and inconclusive.
The written job description in this case, which Plaintiff testified that she had never
seen, does not specifically state that transporting residents is an essential duty of the job but
does state that “[a]n individual in this position will be required to carry or lift weights in the
range of 10 to 50 pounds.” After careful consideration, this court concludes that the written
job description does not preclude a finding that transporting residents is an essential duty of
the job.
Plaintiff also argued that Mason Point could have reasonably accommodated
Plaintiff’s temporary weight restrictions by having volunteers or CNA’s transport residents
to the beauty salon. “An ADA plaintiff can establish discrimination by showing the
employer failed to accommodate the employee, but she first must establish that she is a
qualified individual with a disability.” Majors, 714 F.3d at 535. Because Plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing that she can perform the essential functions of her job “with or without
reasonable accommodation,” she has not met this burden if the only accommodation she has
ever suggested is not reasonable. See Gratzl, 601 F.3d at 680. “To have another employee
perform a position’s essential function, and to a certain extent perform the job for the
employee, is not a reasonable accommodation.” Majors, 714 F.3d at 534. In Majors, the
evidence showed that lifting parts and material weighing over 20 pounds was an essential
15

function of the purchased material auditor position the plaintiff was seeking. Majors, 714
F.3d at 534. The plaintiff requested an accommodation that another employee lift heavy
objects for her. Majors, 714 F.3d at 534. The Seventh Circuit stated that the accommodation
the plaintiff sought, another person to perform an essential function of the job she wants, “is,
as a matter of law, not reasonable.” Majors, 714 F.3d at 535; see also Peters, 311 F.3d at
845-46. The Seventh Circuit therefore concluded that, because the plaintiff did not meet her
burden, the defendant was not required to show that the accommodation requested would
create an undue hardship. Majors, 714 F.3d at 535, see also Gratzl, 601 F.3d at 680 n.4.
In this case, based upon the applicable case law, this court agrees with Mason Point
that Plaintiff’s proposed accommodation, having someone else transport the residents for her,
was not reasonable. This court notes that Plaintiff never informed Wall that her restriction
was temporary and Wall believed that Plaintiff was asking for a permanent accommodation.
This court does not find persuasive Plaintiff’s argument that there was nothing in the written
release from Dr. Pfeiffer which indicated that the restriction was permanent because the
release said that Plaintiff could not lift or push over 20 pounds “until released to do so,”
indicating that there was some expectation of a release from the restriction. This court
concludes that Plaintiff is reading too much into the wording of the release and has not
provided any evidence that she ever requested a temporary accommodation.
Plaintiff has also argued that, because Burich was accommodated after Plaintiff left
her employment, Mason Point could have provided the same accommodation to her.
Burich’s Declaration is clear, however, that the help she received in transporting residents
16

was temporary. She stated that, after a part-time beautician was hired, she “resumed
transporting patients with occasional assistance from a volunteer or nurse.” Again, because
there is no evidence that Plaintiff requested a temporary accommodation, this argument is
fails.
Plaintiff has also argued that Mason Point is not entitled to summary judgment
because Wall’s statements and testimony show that Mason Point was enforcing a “100%
healed policy,” which is a per se violation of the ADA. See Powers v. USF Holland, Inc.,
667 F.3d 815, 819 (7th Cir. 2011), quoting Henderson v. Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 645, 653 (6th
Cir. 2001). Plaintiff argued that, in his deposition, Wall admitted that Mason Point did not
allow employees with restrictions to work. Plaintiff argued that, in fact, Wall stated that it
was either company policy or practice to not allow employees to return to work.
In its Reply, Mason Point argued that the evidence does not support Plaintiff’s
argument that Mason Point has a “100% healed policy.” Mason Point argued that Wall’s
testimony was not that Mason Point insisted that employees be 100% healed following injury
or illness, but only that they could meet the requirements of the job. Wall testified that
employees with restrictions were not allowed to return to work “[i]f it’s a lifetime restriction
that does not meet the job requirement, yes.” Wall clarified that the practice was that
employees with lifetime restrictions could not come back to work if they were not able to
meet the job requirements in their job description. Wall testified that they tried to
accommodate temporary restrictions.
This court agrees with Mason Point that Wall did not testify that Mason Point has a
17

“100% healed policy.” This court concludes that Wall’s testimony that employees had to be
able to perform the requirements of their job in order to return to work does not demonstrate
a per se violation of the ADA.
IHRA CLAIM
Mason Point argued that the claims Plaintiff brought under the IHRA mirror her
claims under the ADA and accordingly fail for the same reason that the ADA claims fail.
Plaintiff has agreed that her IHRA claims mirror her ADA claims. The IHRA’s prohibitions
are essentially the same as the parallel prohibitions found in the ADA. See Evoy v. Ill. State
Police, 429 F. Supp. 2d 989, 999 (N.D. Ill. 2006). Therefore, because Plaintiff cannot prevail
under the ADA, she also cannot prevail under the IHRA. Mason Point is therefore entitled
to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s IHRA claims.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
(1) Mason Point’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#23) is GRANTED. Judgment is
entered in favor of Mason Point and against Plaintiff on all of Plaintiff’s claims.
(2) This case is terminated.
ENTERED this 4th day of November, 2013.

s/MICHAEL P. McCUSKEY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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