Ibarra v. Anglin et al

Filing 63

OPINION entered by Judge Michael P. McCuskey on 11/2/2012. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 48 is GRANTED. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint 61 is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. See written opinion. Copy to Plaintiff by way of e-filing project. (JMW, ilcd)

E-FILED

Friday, 02 November, 2012 02:49:16 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
URBANA DIVISION
____________________________________________________________________________
JOSE IBARRA,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
Case No. 12-CV-2127
)
KEITH O. ANGLIN, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
OPINION

This case is before the court for ruling on the Motion to Dismiss (#48) filed by
Defendants, Keith Anglin, James Bailey, Ronald Derrickson, Larry Gustin, Jaime Hernandez,
John Myers, and Judy Oakley. Following this court’s careful consideration of the arguments
of the parties, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (#48) is GRANTED. In addition, Plaintiff’s
Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint (#61) is DENIED in part and GRANTED in
part.
BACKGROUND
On May 8, 2012, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint (#1) against Warden Keith O.
Anglin, John Myers, Larry Gustin, Judy Oakley, Joseph T. Smith, James Bailey, Correctional
Officer Bradwer, Dr. Tweedy, Jaime Hernandez, and Ronald Derrickson, brought pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff alleged that, while he was incarcerated at Danville

Correctional Center, he complained to various Defendants that his cellmate was threatening
to hurt him. Plaintiff alleged that he asked to be separated from the cellmate, but nothing was
done to protect him. Plaintiff alleged that he was attacked and injured by his cellmate on
December 14, 2011. Plaintiff alleged that he suffered a broken nose as well as injuries to his

eyes, mouth, and head. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Anglin, Gustin, Bailey, Bradwer,
Tweedy, Hernandez, and Derrickson were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm,
in violation of his constitutional rights.
Plaintiff also alleged that Defendants Myers, Oakley, and Smith subjected him to cruel
and unusual punishment and denied him his right to due process because there were flaws
in the administrative disciplinary procedure whereby he was found guilty of assaulting his
cellmate on December 14, 2011. Plaintiff attached documentation to his Complaint which
showed that, following the altercation on December 14, 2011, Plaintiff was placed on
Investigational Status by Defendant Myers. Subsequently, Defendant Myers wrote an inmate
disciplinary report which cited Plaintiff for “assaulting any person (fighting with a weapon).”
On January 10, 2012, the Adjustment Committee, consisting of Defendants Oakley and
Smith, conducted a hearing in which it considered the inmate disciplinary report and found
Plaintiff guilty of the offense. The Final Summary Report stated that the finding of guilty
was based upon Plaintiff’s admission that he kicked his cellmate and evidence showing that
Plaintiff attacked his cellmate with a wound up extension cord and an altered ink pen. The
Adjustment Committee, with the final approval of Defendant Anglin, disciplined Plaintiff
with: (a) one year C-Grade status; (b) one year segregation; (c) revocation of one year of
good conduct credits; (d) disciplinary transfer; and (e) restitution. The Final Summary
Report stated that it was served on Plaintiff on January 27, 2012. Plaintiff was transferred
to Menard Correctional Center on February 8, 2012. Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that
he did not receive a copy of the Final Summary Report until April 3, 2012.

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In his pro se Complaint (#1), Plaintiff stated that he was suing Defendants in their
individual and/or official capacities. Plaintiff requested declaratory relief and damages and
also requested injunctive relief “protecting Plaintiff [from] negligent treatment by staff.”
On June 20, 2012, this court held a merit review hearing and ordered that Plaintiff’s
case could proceed. Subsequently, all Defendants except Smith and Bradwer waived service.
Dr. Tweedy is represented by Attorneys Matthew Lurkins and Brian Michael Smith.
Defendants Anglin, Bailey, Derrickson, Gustin, Hernandez, Myers, and Oakley are
represented by Attorney Lisa A. Cook.
On October 5, 2012, a Case Management Order (#45) was entered. On October 9,
2012, this court allowed Defendants leave to file a Motion to Dismiss. On October 9, 2012,
Defendants Anglin, Bailey, Derrickson, Gustin, Hernandez, Myers, and Oakley filed a
Motion to Dismiss (#48) and a Memorandum in Support (#49). Defendants argued that
Plaintiff’s Complaint is deficient under the federal pleading standard as to any claims against
Defendants Anglin, Gustin, and Hernandez. Defendants also argued that Plaintiff fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted for a violation of due process. Defendants
noted that, to the extent that Plaintiff challenges the finding of guilt by the Adjustment
Committee or the discipline imposed, such a claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994). In addition, Defendants argued that Plaintiff is precluded from suing Defendants
in their official capacities and is barred from seeking the injunctive relief he requests.
On October 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed a pro se Response to Motion to Dismiss (#54) and
asked this court to deny Defendants’ Motion. On October 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion

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for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (#61). Plaintiff attached a copy of a proposed
Amended Complaint. In the proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiff included additional
factual allegations regarding Defendants Anglin, Gustin, and Hernandez in support of his
claim that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm. Plaintiff stated
that Defendants were sued in their individual capacity and omitted any statement regarding
suing them in their official capacity. Plaintiff also omitted his request for injunctive relief.
Plaintiff included a claim that Defendants Myers and Oakley subjected him to cruel and
unusual punishment and denied him his right to due process because there were flaws in the
administrative disciplinary procedure.
ANALYSIS
I. MOTION TO DISMISS
This court agrees with Defendants that the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint
(#1) regarding Defendants Anglin, Gustin, and Hernandez were insufficient. This court also
agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff is precluded from suing Defendants in their official
capacities and is barred from seeking the injunctive relief he requested. While Plaintiff
disputed these arguments in his Response to the Motion to Dismiss, his proposed Amended
Complaint indicates that he has conceded these points and is seeking to amend his Complaint
accordingly. This court also concludes that the doctrine set out in Heck applies to Plaintiff’s
claims and requires the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim that he was subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment and denied his right to due process because of flaws in the
administrative disciplinary procedure.

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In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that “the plaintiff in an action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 may not pursue a claim for relief that implies the invalidity of a criminal
conviction, unless that conviction has been set aside by appeal, collateral review, or pardon.”
Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d 899, 900 (7th Cir. 2008), citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. In
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), the Supreme Court extended this doctrine to the
decisions of prison disciplinary tribunals. Gilbert, 512 F.3d at 900. The Supreme Court in
Edwards held that claims which “necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of [an
inmate’s] good-time credits” are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless the prison
disciplinary decision has otherwise been invalidated, for example by expungement, a state
court order, or a writ of habeas corpus. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-48. Heck and Edwards
prevent a litigant from contradicting a valid judgment. Gilbert, 512 F.3d at 901. Therefore,
because the Adjustment Committee’s finding of guilty has not been invalidated, Plaintiff is
bound by this finding. See Gilbert, 512 F.3d at 900.
Accordingly, this court concludes that Plaintiff cannot raise his challenge to the
administrative disciplinary procedure, which resulted in the loss of one year of good time
credit and has not been invalidated, in this case brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-48. Because Plaintiff’s claim necessarily implies that his good
time was wrongly revoked, his federal remedy at this point is to invalidate the good time
revocation via habeas corpus, after he has exhausted his state remedies. See Harris v. Ashby,
2012 WL 414255, at *1 (C.D. Ill. 2012). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants
Myers, Oakley, and Smith subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and denied him

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his right to due process because there were flaws in the administrative disciplinary procedure
must be dismissed. See Edwards, 520 U.S. at 649.
This court notes that there may be Heck problems with Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate
indifference to a serious risk of harm as well. Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to
protect him and separate him from his cellmate, resulting in Plaintiff’s injuries when his
cellmate assaulted him on December 14, 2011. This is even though disciplinary sanctions
were imposed on Plaintiff based upon Plaintiff’s conduct on the same date, December 14,
2011. Plaintiff was found guilty of assaulting his cellmate (fighting with a weapon), a
finding Plaintiff cannot challenge based upon Heck unless the disciplinary decision has been
invalidated. If the disciplinary decision has not been invalidated, Heck and Edwards
preclude Plaintiff from maintaining a civil rights suit if a judgment in his favor would
“necessarily imply” that the ruling in his prison disciplinary case was invalid. See Moore v.
Mahone, 652 F.3d 722, 723 (7th Cir. 2011). Heck “forbids a prisoner in his civil rights case
to challenge a finding in his criminal or prison-discipline case that was essential to the
decision in that case; if he insists on doing that, the civil rights case must be dismissed.”
Moore, 652 F.3d at 723, citing Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2003).
However, “[o]nly a claim that ‘necessarily’ implies the invalidity of a conviction or
disciplinary board’s sanction comes within the scope of Heck.” Gilbert, 512 F.3d at 902.
This court concludes that Plaintiff’s claim is not necessarily barred by Heck. Plaintiff may
be able to allege that Defendants failed to protect him from an assault by his cellmate without
contesting that he assaulted his cellmate on the same date. This court warns Plaintiff,

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however, that he cannot challenge the findings made by the disciplinary board in stating his
claim. See Moore, 652 F.3d at 726.
II. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
Plaintiff has asked for leave to file an amended complaint and attached a proposed
Amended Complaint to his Motion. This court denies Plaintiff’s request to file the attached
proposed Amended Complaint because the proposed Amended Complaint includes Plaintiff’s
claim that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment and denied his right to due
process because of flaws in the administrative disciplinary procedure, a claim which is barred
by Heck and Edwards. However, this court grants Plaintiff’s request to file an amended
complaint and allows Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff’s amended
complaint should include additional factual allegations regarding Defendants Anglin, Gustin,
and Hernandez, omit any claims against Defendants in their official capacities, and omit a
request for injunctive relief. Plaintiff is also warned that he cannot challenge the findings
made by the disciplinary board in stating his claim or his claim will be subject to dismissal
under Heck.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
(1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (#48) is GRANTED. This court concludes that
the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint (#1) regarding Defendants Anglin, Gustin, and
Hernandez were insufficient and that Plaintiff is precluded from suing Defendants in their
official capacities and is barred from seeking the injunctive relief he requested. This court
also concludes that the doctrine set out in Heck v. Humphrey applies to Plaintiff’s claims and

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requires the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim that he was subjected to cruel and unusual
punishment and denied his right to due process because of flaws in the administrative
disciplinary procedure. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim regarding the disciplinary proceeding is
dismissed and Defendants Myers, Oakley and Smith are terminated as Defendants.
(2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (#61) is DENIED in
part and GRANTED in part. Because Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint includes his
claim regarding the disciplinary proceeding, Plaintiff is denied leave to file the proposed
Amended Complaint attached to his Motion. Plaintiff is allowed 30 days to file an Amended
Complaint which includes additional factual allegations regarding Defendants Anglin,
Gustin, and Hernandez and which omits any claims against Defendants in their official
capacities and omits a request for injunctive relief. Plaintiff is also warned that he cannot
challenge the findings made by the disciplinary board in stating his claim or his claim will
be subject to dismissal under Heck.
ENTERED this 2nd day of November, 2012.
s/MICHAEL P. McCUSKEY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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