Ibarra v. Anglin et al
Filing
95
OPINION entered by Judge Michael P. McCuskey on 4/5/2013. Defendant Tweedy's Motion to Dismiss 76 is GRANTED. Motion to Dismiss 84 is GRANTED. Motion 94 is MOOT. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Attach Exhibits to Plaintiff's Complaint 93 is DENIED. See written opinion. Copy to the Plaintiff by way of e-filing project. (JMW, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 05 April, 2013 04:07:17 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
URBANA DIVISION
____________________________________________________________________________
JOSE IBARRA,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
Case No. 12-CV-2127
)
KEITH O. ANGLIN, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
OPINION
This case is before the court for ruling on the Motion to Dismiss (#76) filed by
Defendant, Dr. Maureen Tweedy, and the Motion to Dismiss (#84) filed by Defendants,
Keith Anglin and Jaime Hernandez. Following this court’s careful consideration of the
arguments of the parties, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (#76, #84) are GRANTED.
Because of this ruling, Defendant Tweedy’s Motion to Stay Discovery (#94) is MOOT. In
addition, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Attach Exhibits to Plaintiff’s Complaint (#93) is
DENIED.
BACKGROUND
On May 8, 2012, Plaintiff filed a pro se Complaint (#1), brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, against Warden Keith O. Anglin, John Myers, Larry Gustin, Judy Oakley, Joseph T.
Smith, James Bailey, Correctional Officer Bradwer, Dr. Tweedy, Jaime Hernandez and
Ronald Derrickson. Plaintiff alleged that, while he was incarcerated at Danville Correctional
Center, he complained to various Defendants that his cellmate was threatening to hurt him.
Plaintiff alleged that he asked to be separated from the cellmate, but nothing was done to
protect him. Plaintiff alleged that he was attacked and injured by his cellmate on December
14, 2011. Plaintiff alleged that he suffered a broken nose as well as injuries to his eyes,
mouth and head. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants Anglin, Gustin, Bailey, Bradwer, Tweedy,
Hernandez and Derrickson were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm, in violation
of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff also alleged that Defendants Myers, Oakley and Smith
subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and denied him his right to due process
because there were flaws in the administrative disciplinary procedure whereby he was found
guilty of assaulting his cellmate on December 14, 2011.
On June 20, 2012, this court held a merit review hearing and ordered that Plaintiff’s
case could proceed. Subsequently, all Defendants except Smith and Bradwer waived service.
On October 5, 2012, a Case Management Order (#45) was entered. On October 9, 2012, this
court allowed Defendants leave to file a Motion to Dismiss. On October 9, 2012, Defendants
Anglin, Bailey, Derrickson, Gustin, Hernandez, Myers and Oakley filed a Motion to Dismiss
(#48) and a Memorandum in Support (#49). Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s Complaint
was deficient under the federal pleading standard as to any claims against Defendants Anglin,
Gustin and Hernandez. Defendants also argued that Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted for a violation of due process. Defendants noted that, to the
extent that Plaintiff was challenging the finding of guilt by the Adjustment Committee or the
discipline imposed, such a claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
In addition, Defendants argued that Plaintiff was precluded from suing Defendants in their
official capacities and was barred from seeking the injunctive relief he requested.
On October 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed a pro se Response to Motion to Dismiss (#54) and
2
asked this court to deny Defendants’ Motion. On October 30, 2012, Plaintiff filed a Motion
for Leave to File an Amended Complaint (#61).
On November 2, 2012, this court entered an Opinion (#63). This court concluded that
the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint (#1) regarding Defendants Anglin,
Gustin and Hernandez were insufficient and that Plaintiff was precluded from suing
Defendants in their official capacities and was barred from seeking the injunctive relief he
requested. This court also concluded that the doctrine set out in Heck applied to Plaintiff’s
claims and required the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim that he was subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment and denied his right to due process because of flaws in the
administrative disciplinary procedure. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim regarding the disciplinary
proceeding was dismissed and Defendants Myers, Oakley and Smith were terminated as
Defendants.
This court noted that, in Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that “the plaintiff
in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may not pursue a claim for relief that implies the
invalidity of a criminal conviction, unless that conviction has been set aside by appeal,
collateral review, or pardon.” Gilbert v. Cook, 512 F.3d 899, 900 (7th Cir. 2008), citing
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87. In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997), the Supreme Court
extended this doctrine to the decisions of prison disciplinary tribunals. Gilbert, 512 F.3d at
900. The Supreme Court in Edwards held that claims which “necessarily imply the invalidity
of the deprivation of [an inmate’s] good-time credits” are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 unless the prison disciplinary decision has otherwise been invalidated, for example by
3
expungement, a state court order, or a writ of habeas corpus. Edwards, 520 U.S. at 646-48.
Heck and Edwards prevent a litigant from contradicting a valid judgment. Gilbert, 512 F.3d
at 901. Therefore, because the Adjustment Committee’s finding of guilty has not been
invalidated, Plaintiff is bound by this finding. See Gilbert, 512 F.3d at 900.
This court further noted that there may be Heck problems with Plaintiff’s claim of
deliberate indifference to a serious risk of harm as well. Plaintiff claims that Defendants
failed to protect him and separate him from his cellmate, resulting in Plaintiff’s injuries when
his cellmate assaulted him on December 14, 2011. This is even though disciplinary sanctions
were imposed on Plaintiff based upon Plaintiff’s conduct on the same date, December 14,
2011. Plaintiff was found guilty of assaulting his cellmate (fighting with a weapon), a
finding Plaintiff cannot challenge based upon Heck unless the disciplinary decision has been
invalidated. If the disciplinary decision has not been invalidated, Heck and Edwards
preclude Plaintiff from maintaining a civil rights suit if a judgment in his favor would
“necessarily imply” that the ruling in his prison disciplinary case was invalid. See Moore v.
Mahone, 652 F.3d 722, 723 (7th Cir. 2011). Heck “forbids a prisoner in his civil rights case
to challenge a finding in his criminal or prison-discipline case that was essential to the
decision in that case; if he insists on doing that, the civil rights case must be dismissed.”
Moore, 652 F.3d at 723, citing Okoro v. Callaghan, 324 F.3d 488, 490 (7th Cir. 2003).
However, “[o]nly a claim that ‘necessarily’ implies the invalidity of a conviction or
disciplinary board’s sanction comes within the scope of Heck.” Gilbert, 512 F.3d at 902.
This court concluded that Plaintiff’s claim is not necessarily barred by Heck. This court
4
stated that Plaintiff may be able to allege that Defendants failed to protect him from an
assault by his cellmate without contesting that he assaulted his cellmate on the same date.
However, this court warned Plaintiff that he cannot challenge the findings made by the
disciplinary board in stating his claim. See Moore, 652 F.3d at 726. This court allowed
Plaintiff 30 days to file an amended complaint.
On November 19, 2012, Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint (#71) against
Defendants Anglin, Bailey, Derrickson, Gustin, Hernandez and Tweedy. Plaintiff alleged
that Defendants ignored his numerous complaints of a serious risk of harm and therefore
were deliberately indifferent to a serious risk of harm, in violation of his constitutional rights.
On December 13, 2012, Defendants Bailey, Derrickson and Gustin filed their Answer (#80)
to Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
On December 7, 2012, this court allowed Defendant Tweedy to file a Motion to
Dismiss, and her Motion to Dismiss (#76), with an attached Memorandum in Support, was
filed the same day. On December 21, 2012, this court allowed Defendants Anglin and
Hernandez to file a Motion to Dismiss. On December 21, 2012, Defendants Anglin and
Hernandez filed a Motion to Dismiss (#84) and a Memorandum in Support (#85). On
January 3, 2013, Plaintiff filed a pro se Response (#87) to Defendant Tweedy’s Motion to
Dismiss. On January 14, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Response (#90) to the Motion to Dismiss
filed by Defendants Anglin and Hernandez. Plaintiff also filed a Memorandum in Support
(#91).
5
MOTIONS TO DISMISS
I. STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2007), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
II. TWEEDY’S MOTION TO DISMISS
In her Motion to Dismiss (#76), Defendant Tweedy argued that Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint is deficient under the federal pleading standard as to any claims against Tweedy.
Defendant Tweedy also argued that Plaintiff’s claim against her is barred by Heck because,
in the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff insists that his cellmate started the altercation on
December 14, 2011. In doing so, Plaintiff challenges the finding of the Adjustment
Committee that Plaintiff was guilty of assaulting his cellmate on December 14, 2011.
In Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that, on or about November 29,
2011, he saw Defendant Tweedy in the health care unit of the Danville Correctional Center.
Plaintiff then alleged:
Also there was his assistant but I can’t ID his name, but she is
6
a young girl about 26 year old, white, and hair long and blond,
so I explained to her that my cellmate James was intimidate me
with beat me and that I can’t sleep, because I felt that my
cellmate James could attack me while I was sleeping, she
answered that she would talk with the warden Anglin about this.
This court agrees with Defendant Tweedy that it is unclear whether this alleged conversation
is alleged to have taken place between Plaintiff and Defendant Tweedy or Plaintiff and
Tweedy’s unidentified assistant. In addition, according to the Amended Complaint, the very
next day, November 30, 2011, Warden Anglin visited Plaintiff to address his concerns.
Plaintiff further alleged that, on November 30, 2011, correctional officers and their superiors
were aware of the situation and reported that everything was under control.
A prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth Amendment unless the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also
draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569 (7th
Cir. 2008). Once a prison official knows of a serious risk of harm to an inmate, he has an
obligation “to take reasonable measures to abate it.” Dale, 548 F.3d at 569, quoting Borello
v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2006). “Of course, an official’s response may be
reasonable even if it fails to avert the harm.” Dale, 548 F.3d at 569, citing Borello, 446 F.3d
at 747.
7
Based upon the applicable standard, this court agrees with Defendant Tweedy that,
even setting apart the vague and conclusory nature of the allegations against her, the
allegations of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint do not in any way suggest that Tweedy was
deliberately indifferent to any serious risk of harm to Plaintiff. This court agrees that
Plaintiff failed to sufficiently articulate what Defendant Tweedy knew and/or what she did
or did not do that could plausibly suggest that she consciously disregarded a serious risk of
harm by failing to take reasonable measures to deal with it. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847.
This court therefore concludes that Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Tweedy must be
dismissed. Accordingly, Defendant Tweedy’s Motion to Dismiss (#76) is GRANTED.
Because of this conclusion, Defendant Tweedy’s Motion To Stay Discovery Pending the
Court’s Ruling on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (#94) is MOOT.
Also because of this conclusion, this court does not need to consider Defendant
Tweedy’s additional argument that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint must be dismissed based
upon Heck. This court notes, however, that Defendant Tweedy has persuasively argued that,
despite this court’s warning to Plaintiff that he cannot challenge the findings made by the
disciplinary board in stating his claim, Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate indifference to a serious
risk of harm is premised on Plaintiff being the victim of an unprovoked attack by his
cellmate. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does appear to challenge the
Adjustment Committee’s final summary report, which concluded that Plaintiff was the initial
aggressor and also found Plaintiff guilty of “assaulting any person-inmate.”
8
III. ANGLIN AND HERNANDEZ’S MOTION TO DISMISS
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants Anglin and Hernandez argued that Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint is insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to
them. Defendants note that, as to Defendant Anglin, Plaintiff alleged only that he spoke with
Anglin on November 30, 2011, and asked for an interpreter but Anglin refused. Plaintiff then
alleged that he “assumed that Warden Anglin knew about [his] problems.” As to Defendant
Hernandez, Plaintiff alleged that he presented his concerns to Hernandez who “immediately
reported for radio to his superiors, and his superiors responded to him that they knew about
this matter and that for the moment all was under control.” This court agrees with
Defendants that Plaintiff’s own allegations establish that Hernandez responded reasonably
to his complaints and presented the issue up the chain of command. This court also agrees
with Defendants that Plaintiff’s assumption that Anglin knew about his problems is not
sufficient to state a claim under the Eighth Amendment, which requires actual knowledge on
the part of an individual. Plaintiff has argued that the allegations of the Amended Complaint
are adequate to show that Anglin knew about the substantial risk because he alleged that
Hernandez reported Plaintiff’s concerns to his superiors and Anglin is one of Hernandez’s
superiors. This argument, however, requires this court to speculate that Anglin may have
been one of the superiors Hernandez reported to. This court concludes that Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint does not state a facially plausible claim against Anglin because it does
not contain factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that Anglin
is liable for the misconduct alleged.
9
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
On March 12, 2013, Plaintiff filed a pro se Motion to Attach Exhibits to Plaintiff’s
Complaint (#93). Plaintiff asked this court to allow him to attach to his Amended Complaint
Defendants’ responses to his written discovery requests. Plaintiff argued this was necessary
“to prove this action.” Rule 26.3 of the Local Rules of the Central District of Illinois
provides that responses to written discovery “must not be filed with the clerk of this court’
except in very limited circumstances. Accordingly, this court does not generally allow the
parties to file responses to written discovery and sees no reason to allow Plaintiff to file these
documents as attachments to his Amended Complaint.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
(1) Defendant Tweedy’s Motion to Dismiss (#76) is GRANTED.
(2) The Motion to Dismiss (#84) filed by Defendants Anglin and Hernandez is
GRANTED.
(3) Because Defendant Tweedy’s Motion to Dismiss has been granted, Defendant
Tweedy’s Motion to Stay Discovery (#94) is MOOT.
(4) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Attach Exhibits to Plaintiff’s Complaint (#93) is
DENIED.
ENTERED this 5th day of April, 2013
s/ Michael P. McCuskey
MICHAEL P. McCUSKEY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
10
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?