Kennedy et al v. Elyea et al

Filing 8

OPINION entered by Judge Michael P. McCuskey on 10/11/2012. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 6 is Granted. Judgment is entered in favor of Defendants Elyea and Puisis and against Plaintiffs. Defendants Elyea and Puisis are terminated as parties in this action. This case is referred to Magistrate Judge David G. Bernthal for further proceedings. See written opinion. (DS, ilcd)

E-FILED

Thursday, 11 October, 2012 10:53:00 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
URBANA DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
ANDRE KENNEDY, et al.,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
v.
)
Case No. 12-CV-2155
)
WILLARD O. ELYEA, M.D., MICHAEL
)
PUISIS and LOUIS SHICKER, M.D.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
OPINION

This case is before the court for ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment (#6)
filed by Defendants, Willard O. Elyea and Michael Puisis. Plaintiffs have not filed a
Response to the Motion. This court has carefully considered Defendants’ arguments and the
documents filed. Following this careful and thorough consideration, Defendants’ Motion for
Summary Judgment (#6) is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs filed their Complaint (#1) on June 13, 2012. Plaintiffs, inmates or former
inmates of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), alleged that Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to Plaintiffs’ medical condition in that inmates did not receive needed
medical treatment for Hepatitis C. On September 4, 2012, Defendant Louis Shicker filed an
Answer and Affirmative Defenses (#5).
Also on September 4, 2012, Defendants Elyea and Puisis filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment (#6) and a Memorandum in Support (#7) with attached exhibits. Defendants stated
that Elyea resigned from the IDOC effective May 1, 2007, and Puisis resigned from the
IDOC effective April 30, 2009. Defendants argued that, pursuant to Heard v. Sheahan, 253

F.3d 316, 317-18 (7th Cir. 2001), Plaintiffs’ claims were outside of the applicable two-year
statute of limitations as to Defendants Elyea and Puisis. Defendants attached Elyea’s
affidavit which stated that he has not been employed by the IDOC after May 1, 2007. They
argued that any claim against Elyea accrued on May 2, 2007, so Plaintiffs’ Complaint filed
June 13, 2012, was approximately three years outside the statute of limitations. Defendants
also attached Puisis’s affidavit which stated that he has not been employed by the IDOC after
April 30, 2009. They argued that any claim against Puisis accrued on May 1, 2009, so that
Plaintiffs’ Complaint was outside the two-year statute of limitations by over a year.
Defendants Elyea and Puisis argued that, because Plaintiffs’ claims against them are outside
the applicable statute of limitations, they are entitled to summary judgment. Plaintiffs have
not filed a Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment and the time allowed for doing
so has passed.
ANALYSIS
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Rule 7.1(D)(2) of the Local Rules of the Central District of Illinois provides:
Within 21 days after service of a motion for summary judgment,
any party opposing the motion must file a response. A failure
to respond will be deemed an admission of the motion.
Further, when the non-movant does not respond to the movant’s statement of facts, the nonmovant concedes the movant’s version of the facts. Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp.,
24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir. 1994); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Landa, 974 F. Supp. 1, 3
(C.D. Ill. 1997). The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that such a rule is “entirely
2

proper.” Doe v. Cunningham, 30 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 1994).
However, a party’s failure to submit a timely response to a motion for summary
judgment does not automatically result in summary judgment for the moving party. LaSalle
Bank Lake View v. Seguban, 54 F.3d 387, 392 (7th Cir. 1995); see also Archer Daniels
Midland Co. v. Whitacre, 60 F. Supp. 2d 819, 823 (C.D. Ill. 1999). It remains “the movant’s
burden to demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that he is entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law.” Doe, 30 F.3d at 883. Accordingly, the district court
must make the further finding that summary judgment is proper as a matter of law. LaSalle
Bank, 54 F.3d at 392, quoting Wienco Inc. v. Katahn Assocs., Inc., 965 F.2d 565, 568 (7th
Cir. 1992).
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a district court “has one task and one task only:
to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that
requires a trial.” Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 920.
II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In this case, Defendants Elyea and Puisis have filed documentation showing that they
were no longer employed by the IDOC more than two years prior to the filing of Plaintiffs’
Complaint (#1). This court agrees with Defendants Elyea and Puisis that the two-year statute
of limitations ran on any claims against them before Plaintiffs filed their Complaint. See
Heard, 253 F.3d at 318 (statute of limitations begins running when the defendants no longer
3

had the power to do something about the plaintiff’s condition); see also Heard v. Wexford
Health Sources, 2011 WL 4479309, at *2 (S.D. Ill. 2011). Based upon the undisputed facts
and the applicable case law, this court agrees with Defendants Elyea and Puisis that they are
entitled to judgment on Plaintiffs’ claims as a matter of law.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
(1) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (#6) is GRANTED. Judgment is
entered in favor of Defendants Elyea and Puisis and against Plaintiffs.
(2) Defendants Elyea and Puisis are terminated as parties in this action.
(3) This case is referred to Magistrate Judge David G. Bernthal for further
proceedings.
ENTERED this 11th day of October, 2012
s/ Michael P. McCuskey
MICHAEL P. McCUSKEY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

4