Stafford v. Talbot et al

Filing 35

OPINION entered by Judge Michael P. McCuskey on 4/12/2013 granting 26 Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant Miller is terminated as a party in this action. This case remains schedule for a telephone status conference on 4/19/2013 at 10:30 a.m. Copy of this opinion mailed to the Plaintiff at Danville Correctional Center, 3820 E Main Street, Danville, IL 61834. (JMW, ilcd)

E-FILED

Friday, 12 April, 2013 02:35:04 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
URBANA DIVISION
______________________________________________________________________________
SHAWN L. STAFFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
DR. PAUL TALBOT and MARY MILLER,
Defendants.

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Case No. 12-CV-2253

OPINION

This case is before the court for ruling on the Motion for Summary Judgment (#26)
filed by Defendant Mary Miller. This court has carefully considered Miller’s arguments and
the documents provided, Plaintiff’s Response (#33) and Miller’s Reply (#34). Following this
careful and thorough consideration, Miller’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#26) is
GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his pro se Complaint (#1) on September 27, 2012. Plaintiff alleged that,
on December 3, 2010, Defendant Dr. Paul Talbot refused to renew a pain medication
prescription despite years of fully documented need. Plaintiff alleged that, on December 10,
2010, he asked Miller to intervene and received no response. Plaintiff alleged that he
suffered pain through March 28, 2011, when he was prescribed pain medication by P.A.
Tindera. Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Talbot again improperly refused to prescribe him pain
medication around August 30, 2011. Plaintiff also alleged that Defendant Keith Anglin was
given ample opportunity to act responsibly and refused. On January 25, 2013, this court
entered an Order (#23) and, pursuant to Plaintiff’s request, dismissed Anglin from this case

with prejudice.
On February 27, 2013, Miller filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (#26) and a
Memorandum in Support (#27), with Exhibit A attached. On February 28, 2013, Miller filed
a Motion for Leave to File Attachments (#29). Miller stated that she attached Exhibit A, the
Affidavit of Gina Allen, to her Memorandum of Law. She stated that, due to clerical error,
the attachments referenced in the Affidavit were not filed. Miller asked for leave to file the
attachments to the Affidavit in support of her Motion for Summary Judgment. Miller
attached the documents to the Motion for Leave. On February 28, 2013, this court granted
the Motion for Leave (#29) and directed the clerk to file the documents attached to the
Motion as attachments to Exhibit A, in support of the Motion for Summary Judgment.
Plaintiff’s response to the Motion for Summary Judgment was due by March 25, 2013.
No response was filed by that date and, on April 1, 2013, this court entered an Opinion (#32)
which granted Miller’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
Also on April 1, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File a Response (#31) and
thoroughly explained his failure to file a response by the date due. This court entered a text
order and granted Plaintiff’s Motion (#31). The documents attached to Plaintiff’s Motion
were filed as his Response to Defendant Miller’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#33). This
court vacated its Opinion (#32) and allowed Miller until April 18, 2013 to file a Reply to
Plaintiff’s Response. On April 3, 2013, Miller filed her Reply (#34).

ANALYSIS
I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
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Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). In
ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a district court “has one task and one task only:
to decide, based on the evidence of record, whether there is any material dispute of fact that
requires a trial.” Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (1994).
II. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In her Motion for Summary Judgment, Miller argued that, pursuant to the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) and the Illinois Administrative Code, Plaintiff was required
to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his claim against Miller. Miller attached
documentation showing that the only grievance Plaintiff filed which complained about Miller
was dated February 15, 2011. The first paragraph of this grievance stated that Plaintiff
wanted to “mention” that he tried to rectify “this issue” by appealing to Miller and received
no reply. Plaintiff referred to “Exhibit 1,” a letter dated December 10, 2010 that he had
written to Miller. Plaintiff attached a copy of the letter to his grievance and to his Complaint.
In the letter, Plaintiff discussed his skin condition that he had been controlling with
medicated T-Gel. Plaintiff stated that Dr. Talbot refused to continue his prescription and told
him to purchase dandruff shampoo from the commissary. Plaintiff stated that he tried to tell
Dr. Talbot that he had tried that, as well as the dandruff shampoo Miller supplied, but Dr.
Talbot would not listen to him. Plaintiff ended his letter to Miller by stating that his medical
history shows a chronic need and by asking Miller to “intervene and right this wrong.”
Nowhere in Plaintiff’s letter to Miller did he complain about Dr. Talbot refusing to renew his
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prescription for pain medication.
Following the first paragraph of Plaintiff’s February 15, 2011 grievance, Plaintiff
stated that the “main thrust” of the grievance was directed toward Dr. Talbot. Plaintiff then
recounted, at length, his problems with Dr. Talbot, first discussing Dr. Talbot’s refusal to
prescribe T-Gel medicated shampoo.
Based upon this documentation, Miller argued that Plaintiff did not file a grievance
against Miller regarding her failure to “intervene” in response to Plaintiff’s alleged December
10, 2010 request concerning Dr. Talbot’s refusal to renew Plaintiff’s prescription for pain
medication. Miller argued that Plaintiff therefore failed to submit and exhaust a grievance
regarding the claim against her in this lawsuit. Miller argued that she is entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s claim against her.
In his Response (#33), Plaintiff complained that Miller’s Motion for Summary
Judgment does not comply with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Rule 7.1
of the Local Rules of the Central District of Illinois. Plaintiff has asked this court to dismiss
Miller’s Motion for Summary Judgment because, in his view, she failed to adhere to
procedural requirements, failed to support her factual positions, failed to present admissible
evidence and failed to properly address a fact. This court concludes that Miller’s Motion
meets the applicable procedural requirements.1 Rule 56(a) provides:

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This court concludes that, in arguing that Miller did not provide documentation for her
positions, Plaintiff may be referring to Miller’s clerical error in failing to initially attach the
documentation to her Memorandum in Support (#27). However, this error was corrected the
next day when this court granted her Motion for Leave (#29) and directed the clerk to attach the
documents to the Memorandum in Support. This court concludes that Miller’s Motion for
Summary Judgment was adequately supported.
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A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each
claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on
which summary judgment is sought. The court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Local Rule 7.1(D)(1) sets out the requirements for a Motion for
Summary Judgment. In this case, Miller included the required sections, Introduction,
Undisputed Material Facts and Argument, in her Memorandum in Support. While Plaintiff
seems to believe that filing a Memorandum in Support was a violation of the Local Rules,
this court does not agree. This court concludes that Miller has complied with Local Rule
7.1(D)(1) by including the required sections. This court finds no violation of the Rule based
upon the fact that they were included in a Memorandum in Support rather than in the actual
Motion for Summary Judgment. In any case, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that district
courts have discretion in requiring compliance with local rules and that litigants have no right
to demand strict enforcement of local rules by district judges. Stevo v. Frasor, 662 F.3d 880,
887 (7th Cir. 2011).
As to the merits of Miller’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff has not disputed
that he was required to exhaust his administrative remedies regarding his claim against
Miller.2 Plaintiff argues, however, that his letter to Miller asking her to intervene was “non-

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This court notes that the only issue before the court in ruling on the Motion for
Summary Judgment is whether Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies regarding his
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specific.” In his Affidavit, Plaintiff stated that his December 10, 2010, request to Miller was
“not specific on purpose” and he could “specify [his] needs in person.” Plaintiff is
apparently arguing that his February 15, 2011 grievance regarding Miller was general enough
to include his claim that she refused to intervene regarding Dr. Talbot’s failure to renew his
prescription for pain medication. This court concludes that the grievance cannot be read that
broadly.
The Seventh Circuit requires strict adherence to the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement.
Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). The applicable statute provides:
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison or other correctional facility
until such administrative remedies as are available are
exhausted.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). To exhaust remedies under § 1997e(a), a prisoner “must file
complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules
require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002). The purpose behind the
exhaustion requirement is to give corrections officials the opportunity to address complaints
internally before a federal suit is initiated. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524-25
claim against Miller. In his Response, Plaintiff pointed out that he alleged in his Complaint that
Miller provided an inaccurate statement in response to a grievance. This court agrees with
Miller that this allegation relates to a later grievance, not the February 15, 2011 grievance. This
court further agrees that this allegation is not relevant to the issue of exhaustion and does not
concern his claim against Miller in the Complaint. This court additionally notes that, to the
extent that Plaintiff may be arguing that this is an additional claim against Miller, there is no
evidence that Plaintiff exhausted administrative remedies as to this claim.
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(2002). “Prisoners must follow state rules about the time and content of grievances.”
Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 523-24 (7th Cir. 2004). Failure to do this means failure
to exhaust available remedies. Riccardo, 375 F.3d at 524. The Illinois Administrative Code
provides that the “grievance shall contain factual details regarding each aspect of the
offender’s complaint, including what happened, when, where, and the name of each person
who is the subject of or who is otherwise involved in the complaint.” 20 Ill. Adm. Code
504.810(b); see also Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 721 (7th Cir. 2011).
This court recognizes that exhaustion is an affirmative defense with the burden of
proof on defendants. Maddox, 655 F.3d at 720. This court concludes that Miller has met her
burden to show that there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Plaintiff
exhausted his administrative remedies regarding his claim that Miller failed to intervene
when Dr. Talbot refused to renew his prescription for pain medication. This claim does not
appear in Plaintiff’s February 15, 2011 grievance. See Nelson v. Miller, 2007 WL 294276,
at *6 (S.D. Ill. 2007) (plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies where he failed to
include the particular claim in his grievance). Plaintiff’s argument that the grievance was
“non-specific” and was meant to include this claim fails because, under Illinois law, the
grievance must contain “factual details regarding each aspect of the offender’s complaint.”
20 Ill. Adm. Code 504.810(b); see also Buchanan v. Ramos, 2013 WL 1222304, at *5 (N.D.
Ill. 2013) (summary judgment granted because no reasonable jury could conclude that the
grievance alerted prison officials to prisoner’s claim).
Following careful review, this court agrees with Miller that Plaintiff did not exhaust
his administrative remedies regarding his claim against her and that she is entitled to
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summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
(1) Miller’s Motion for Summary Judgment (#26) is GRANTED. Judgment is entered
in favor of Defendant Miller and against Plaintiff.
(2) Defendant Miller is terminated as a party in this action.
(3) This case remains scheduled for a telephone status conference on April 19, 2013,
at 10:30 a.m.
ENTERED this 12th day of April, 2013
s/ Michael P. McCuskey
MICHAEL P. McCUSKEY
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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