Talley v. Reardon et al
Filing
8
MERIT REVIEW OPINION: Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This case is closed. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis should set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $455 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal. (SEE WRITTEN MERIT REVIEW OPINION) Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 2/2/2015. (GL, ilcd)
E-FILED
Monday, 02 February, 2015 11:15:22 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
DURWYN TALLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
WARDEN REARDON, et al.
Defendants.
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14-CV-2251
MERIT REVIEW OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and incarcerated in Menard
Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging retaliation for the exercise of Plaintiff’s First
Amendment rights.
The case is before the Court for a merit review pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the
factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff's
favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013).
However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient.
Enough facts must be provided to "'state a claim for relief that is
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plausible on its face.'" Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th
Cir. 2013)(quoted cite omitted).
ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff alleges that after he filed grievances against the
Defendants, the Defendants retaliated by falsely accusing him of
authoring a threat letter, insolence, and creating a dangerous
disturbance. Plaintiff alleges that the evidence used against him
was fabricated, and that he was denied the right to be heard before
an impartial hearing officer. In addition to damages, Plaintiff seeks
removal from segregation, expungement of the disciplinary charges
and a facility transfer.
ANALYSIS
“[A] prison official may not retaliate against a prisoner because
that prisoner filed a grievance.” DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607,
618 (7th Cir. 2000). The adverse action need not independently
violate the Constitution, rather “a complaint need only allege a
chronology of events from which retaliation may be inferred.” Id.
Potentially, the Defendants’ actions could rise to the level of a
constitutional violation upon a showing that the filing of Plaintiff’s
grievance was “at least a motivating factor” in the Defendant’s
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treatment of Plaintiff. See Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546
(7th Cir. 2009). The Court, however, does not make such a finding
because the Plaintiff’s claims are barred on other grounds.
“[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the
district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or
sentence . . . .” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). If it
would, a plaintiff has no cause of action under § 1983 “unless and
until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated,
or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus.” Id. at 489.
This requirement “is necessary to prevent inmates from doing
indirectly through damages actions what they could not do directly
by seeking injunctive relief—challenge the fact or duration of their
confinement without complying with the procedural limitations of
the federal habeas statute.” Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 647
(2004). The Supreme Court has held that the Heck doctrine applies
to prison disciplinary proceedings. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S.
641, 644-49 (1997); Lusz v. Scott, 126 F.3d 1018, 1021 (7th Cir.
1997) (“The ‘conviction’ in the prison disciplinary sense is the
finding of guilt on the disciplinary charge, and if success on the
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plaintiff’s section 1983 claim necessarily would imply the invalidity
of that finding, then Heck bars the claim until such time as its
requirements are satisfied.” (citations omitted)).
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the evidence used
against him in the disciplinary hearings was fabricated. If
established, that allegation would necessarily imply the invalidity of
the hearing officer’s decision. Thus, Plaintiff’s claims under § 1983
are barred until the Plaintiff can show that he successfully
challenged the decision in a state court or federal habeas
proceeding. See Chencinski v. Reeder, No. 12-CV-0817, 2013 WL
2383637, at *2 (S.D. Ill. May 30, 2013) (dismissing § 1983 claims as
Heck-barred where Plaintiff alleged prison officials issued a false
disciplinary ticket that resulted in demotion to C-grade,
segregation, and revocation of good time credit). Plaintiff’s
allegations that the hearing officer was impartial would also be
barred. See Lusz, 126 F.3d at 1022-23 (holding that allegation that
hearing officer was biased, if proven, would necessarily imply the
invalidity of the underlying finding because “convictions entered by
partial judges are always set aside.” (citations omitted)). Plaintiff
has not shown that the underlying decision by the hearing officer
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has been overturned, and, accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims under §
1983 are barred pursuant to Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(1994).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1)
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
This case is closed. The clerk is directed to enter a judgment
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58. All pending motions are denied
as moot.
2)
This dismissal shall count as one of the plaintiff's three
allotted “strikes” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g). The
Clerk of the Court is directed to record Plaintiff's strike in the
three-strike log.
3)
Plaintiff must still pay the full docketing fee of $350 even
though his case has been dismissed. The agency having
custody of Plaintiff shall continue to make monthly payments
to the Clerk of Court, as directed in the Court's prior order.
4)
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must file a notice
of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of
judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). A motion for leave to appeal in
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forma pauperis should set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to
present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff
does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $455 appellate
filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal.
ENTERED:
February 2, 2015
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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