Christ's v. Agostinelli et al
Filing
4
MERIT REVIEW OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 11/7/2014. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Any amendment to the Co mplaint would be futile because the allegations of Plaintiff's complaint are barred under Rooker-Feldman, Heck v. Humphrey, and the Illinois statute of limitations for personal injury actions, 735 ILCS 5/13-202. This case is, therefore, closed. The clerk is directed to enter a judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58. (DM, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 07 November, 2014 02:27:39 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JACOB EMMANUEL CHRIST’S,
Plaintiff,
v.
ROBERT AGOSTINELLI,
et al.,
Defendants.
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14-cv-2271-SEM-TSH
MERIT REVIEW OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, formerly in the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections, and currently out on mandatory
supervised release, proceeds pro se in this case. Plaintiff has filed §
1983 claims and has alleged prosecutorial misconduct which is
reviewed under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 91(1983).
Plaintiff’s complaint names defendants who likely have the defenses
of complete or qualified immunity available to them. They are
Judge Daniel Gould; Kankakee County Assistant State’s Attorney,
Joseph Anthony; Bradley Police Department Detective, Steve Coy;
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Public Defender, Ronal Gerts; Appellate Defender, Robert
Agostinelli and Attorney Jay Wiegman. Plaintiff alleges that the
various defendants caused him to be wrongfully convicted of
murder at the time of his 2/29/1996 jury trial.
The case is before the Court for a merit review pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the
factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff's
favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649-51 (7th Cir. 2103).
However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient.
Enough facts must be provided to "'state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.'" Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th
Cir. 2013)(quoted cite omitted).
ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff is currently on mandatory supervised release after
having been incarcerated almost 20 years on the murder conviction.
The complaint concerns the time period from his 10/4/1993 arrest
through his 11/7/1996 unsuccessful appeal. Plaintiff claims that
he was wrongfully convicted and seeks money damages, reversal of
his conviction and expungement of his record. Plaintiff alleges that
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defendants deprived him of: his rights to a speedy trial, effective
assistance of counsel, the right to offer exculpatory evidence, right
to due process, right to equal protection, and: that evidence against
him was seized without a warrant, that his Honda automobile was
wrongfully seized, that he had been unconstitutionally held at
Chester Mental Health Center as unfit to stand trial, and that the
defendants produced or allowed false evidence at the time of trial.
He also alleges, without any particulars, that he was beaten
while at Chester Mental Health Center and that he has glass in his
foot and has been denied surgery. Plaintiff’s claims which
potentially implicate First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, fail as they are barred under the RookerFeldman Doctrine1, the Rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
487 (1994), and are well outside the applicable Illinois state law
statute of limitations. 735 ILCS 5/13-202.
1
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman 460 U.S. 462
(1983).
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ANALYSIS
The subject-matter jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is limited
by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine2. Under Rooker-Feldman, a district
court lacks jurisdiction to review a state court judgment except to
the extent authorized in a habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
See Hadley v. Quinn, 524 Fed.App’x. 290, 293 (7th Cir. 2013),
(finding Rooker-Feldman barred district court’s review of Plaintiff’s
state court murder conviction), quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc.
481 United States 1, 25 (1987), (“Where federal relief can only be
predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is
difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance,
anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court
judgment.”)
In addition to Rooker-Feldman, Plaintiff has the additional
impediment of the rule articulated in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477, 487, (1994). Under Heck, a claim for damages may not be
pursued if the claim's success would necessarily imply the
invalidity of a criminal conviction or sentence. This is so unless the
sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive
2
“Except to the extent authorized by § 2254, only the Supreme Court of the United States may set aside a
judgment entered by a state court.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 465 (2006).
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order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. 512 U.S. 477 at 487. Heck
“is intended to prevent collateral attack on a criminal conviction
through the vehicle of a civil suit.” McCann v. Neilsen, 466 F.3d
619, 621 (7th Cir. 2006). An inmate must first seek to set aside
his conviction through habeas corpus before initiating a § 1983
action that necessarily calls that conviction into doubt. Id. at 487.
In reviewing the complaint the Court must determine whether
a judgment in plaintiff’s favor would necessarily imply the invalidity
of his conviction or sentence. In this case Plaintiff claims that he
was wrongfully convicted and requests money damages, reversal of
his conviction and expungement of his record. [ECF 1 p. 9]. It is
clear that a successful termination of Plaintiff’s claim would, of
necessity, result in his murder conviction and sentence being
invalidated. As a result, Plaintiff’s claims are Heck barred.
It would appear that Plaintiff’s appropriate remedy lies in a
habeas corpus proceeding. As Plaintiff is on mandatory supervised
release, he likely has habeas relief still available to him. See
Cochran v. Buss, 381 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2004), “It has long
been established that ‘custody’ does not require physical
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confinement….[T]he Supreme Court held that a person free on
parole was ‘in custody’ of the parole board for purposes of habeas
corpus.”; quoting Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963).
Even if this were not the case, courts have held that “… Heck
applies where a § 1983 plaintiff could have sought collateral relief at
an earlier time but declined the opportunity and waited until
collateral relief became unavailable before suing. Burd v. Sessler,
702 F3d. 429, 433 (7th Cir. 2012).
Plaintiff claims that the defendant prosecutors withheld
favorable or exculpatory evidence at the time of trial. A claim under
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) is properly brought as a due
process claim. Cherry v. Davis, No. 12-4070, 2013 WL 1628236 at
*2 (N.D. Ill. April 15, 2013). As a result, Plaintiff’s Brady claim is
subject to the Rooker-Feldman and Heck bars in the same manner
as his other § 1983 claims. See Blunt v. Becker No. 08-7157, 2010
WL 570489 at *2 (N.D. Ill Feb. 16, 2010), (finding Heck bar applied
to due process claim based on Brady violation).
The last area of consideration in this case is the applicable
statute of limitations. In § 1983 cases, the court is to apply the
statute of limitations determined by the law of the state in which
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the federal court sits. O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 321–22,
(1914). “[T]he Supreme Court held that the statute of limitations
borrowed from a state for purposes of a section 1983 action must
be the one that governs personal injury actions. Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261, 276, (1985). Illinois provides a two-year statute of
limitations for personal injury actions. 735 ILCS 5/13-202. All of
Plaintiff’s claims are well outside the statute of limitations and
subject to dismissal by this court.
The Court may consider the statute of limitations, normally
raised as an affirmative defense, if the complaint sets forth the
necessary information to show that the statute of limitations has
expired. Davenport v. Dovgin, No.13-1189, 2013 WL 6044294 (7th
Cir. Nov. 15, 2013). “The Seventh Circuit also has consistently
reaffirmed that a plaintiff may plead himself out of court by alleging
facts that are sufficient to establish a statute-of-limitations defense.
See Cancer Found., Inc. v. Cerberus Capital Mgmt., LP, 559 F.3d
671, 675 (7th Cir. 2009) (dismissal is appropriate where it is “clear
from the face of the amended complaint that it [was] hopelessly
time-barred”); Andonissamy v. Hewlett–Packard Co., 547 F.3d 841,
847 (7th Cir. 2008).
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Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed, with prejudice,
for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for failure to state a
claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
Any amendment to the Complaint would be futile because the
allegations of Plaintiff’s complaint are barred under RookerFeldman, Heck v. Humphrey, and the Illinois statute of limitations
for personal injury actions, 735 ILCS 5/13-202. This case is,
therefore, closed. The clerk is directed to enter a judgment
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58.
2.
This dismissal shall count as one of the plaintiff's three
allotted “strikes” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g). The Clerk
of the Court is directed to record Plaintiff's strike in the three-strike
log.
3.
Plaintiff must still pay the full docketing fee of $350 even
though his case has been dismissed. The agency formerly having
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custody of Plaintiff shall continue to make payments if any funds
remain available. If not, it is Plaintiff’s responsibility to make
monthly payments to the Clerk of Court, until the balance is paid,
as directed in the Court's prior order.
4.
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of
judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). A motion for leave to appeal in
forma pauperis should set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to present
on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose
to appeal, he will be liable for the $505 appellate filing fee
regardless of the outcome of the appeal.
ENTERED: November 7, 2014
FOR THE COURT:
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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