James III v. Dyer et al

Filing 35

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 7/1/16. Plaintiff's Motion for Status 33 is GRANTED insofar as it seeks a status, and DENIED as to any other relief requested. This Opinion resolves all outstanding motions and the case will be closed as detailed below. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 26 is GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All pending motions are denied as moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00 filing fee. (SW, ilcd)

E-FILED

Friday, 01 July, 2016 10:05:00 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
URBANA DIVISION
NED JAMES III,

v.
C/O DYER, et al.

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
)
)
)
Defendants. )

14-2283

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at
Menard Correctional Center, brought the present lawsuit pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a failure-to-protect claim arising from
his incarceration at Jerome Combs Detention Center. The matter
comes before this Court for ruling on the Defendants’ Motions for
Summary Judgment. (Doc. 26). The motion is granted.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the
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non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in
his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine” issue, there must be
more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
FACTS
At all times relevant, Plaintiff was an inmate at Jerome Combs
Detention Center (“JCDC” or “jail”). Defendants are both
correctional officer at JCDC.
Plaintiff arrived at JCDC on May 22, 2014 after being
transferred from Cook County Jail. According to Plaintiff, he and
other inmates were transferred because of their classifications as
violent individuals. (Doc. 8 at 5, ¶¶ 6-8) (Plaintiff and assailant
were extremely dangerous individuals). Upon arrival, JCDC officials
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classified Plaintiff as maximum risk and assigned him to a cell
block known as Max A. Prior to the incident in question, Plaintiff
had never had any type of altercation with his assailant, or his
assailant’s roommate. (Doc. 26-2 at 1, ¶ 2).
Max A contains ten (10) cells divided equally into an upper
and lower tier. The tiers are connected via a stairway, and the pod
houses a maximum of 20 inmates (two per cell). At certain times
during the day, inmates are allowed to enter the day room on the
lower level. Due to the limited amount of space, inmates are
allowed use of the day room in shifts—only about half of all inmates
are allowed into the day room at any given time. If not in the day
room, inmates remain in their cells.
On May 26, 2014, Plaintiff was watching television in the day
room. While doing so, Plaintiff got involved in an argument with
another inmate in a cell, presumably about television programming.
A video of the incident shows Plaintiff approach the other inmate’s
cell multiple times and return to his seat in front of the television.
At some point thereafter, the door to the other inmate’s cell was
opened and a fight ensued. The fight was broken up shortly
thereafter.
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The Defendants were the correctional officers responsible for
supervising Max A on May 26, 2014. Defendant Dyer opened the
other inmate’s cell door from the control booth prior to the fight.
According to Defendant Dyer, the other inmate’s cell mate had
advised of toilet problems and Defendant Dyer “popped” the cell
door to allow the cell mate to get the needed plumbing items.
Defender Dyer avers that he was unaware of any problems between
Plaintiff and the other inmate prior to the fight, and even Plaintiff
testified that he did not expect a fight to occur. Pl.’s Dep. 41:1-2
(Plaintiff said to the assailant while arguing, “[y]ou ain’t going to do
nothing and you ain’t going to do nothing and whatever.”); 42:16-17
(to assailant: “I’m not scared of you.”).
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee while housed at JCDC.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim arises under the Fourteenth Amendment,
rather than the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment. Mayoral v. Sheahan, 245 F.2d 934, 938 (7th
Cir. 2001). Despite this distinction, there exists “little practical
difference between the two standards.” Id. (quoting Weiss v. Cooley,
230 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2000)).
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To succeed on a failure to protect claim, a plaintiff must show
(1) “that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial
risk of serious harm,” and, (2) prison officials acted with “deliberate
indifference” to that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994). For purposes of satisfying the first prong, “it does not
matter whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple
sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an
excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all
prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” Id. at 843. A prison
official acts with deliberate indifference if he “knows of and
disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official
must both be aware of the facts from which the inference could be
drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must
also draw the inference.” Id. A plaintiff “normally proves actual
knowledge of impending harm by showing that he complained to
prison officials about a specific threat to his safety.” Pope v. Shafer,
86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting McGill v. Duckworth, 944
F.3d 344, 349 (7th Cir. 1991)). Liability attaches where “deliberate
indifference by prison officials effectively condones the attack by

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allowing it to happen….” Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 640 (7th Cir.
1996).
Prior to Plaintiff’s placement in Max A, prison officials had no
indication that the inmate who attacked Plaintiff posed a
substantial threat of harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff agreed that he had
no altercations with his assailant prior to May 26, 2014. There
existed no indications in Plaintiff’s file that he should be kept
separate from this particular inmate.
Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants should not have opened
his assailant’s cell door and, if they had not, the attack would not
have occurred. This may be true, but Plaintiff has not shown how
an argument over television programming alerted jail officials that
an attack was imminent—Plaintiff testified that inmates argue all
the time about small things. Pl.’s Dep. 40:9-12 (“Guys be locked
up, they get frustrated. You argue about the littlest thing.”).
By Plaintiff’s own admission, he did not believe that his
assailant would follow through with his threats of harm, and when
confronted, Plaintiff did not attempt to notify jail officials of a
problem—he prepared to fight. Id. 48:22-23 (“He came and
addressed the problem. Let’s get it.”); 50:1-3 (“Q: And when he said
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what you saying, he was a mad about something you had said to
him, right? A: Yeah. Man, let’s get it.”).
Defendant Dyer’s decision to open the cell door may not have
been the best decision in hindsight, but nothing in the record
suggests that he did so deliberately or with an intention that
Plaintiff get harmed. At best, the actions were negligent, but
negligence is not sufficient to attach constitutional liability.
Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 348 (1986) (“[T]he protections of
the Due Process Clause, whether procedural or substantive, are
just not triggered by lack of due care by prison officials.”).
Therefore, the Court finds that no reasonable juror could conclude
that Defendants Dyer and Littrell violated Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff’s Motion for Status [33] is GRANTED insofar as it
seeks a status, and DENIED as to any other relief
requested. This Opinion resolves all outstanding motions
and the case will be closed as detailed below.
2) Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [26] is
GRANTED. The clerk of the court is directed to enter
judgment in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All
pending motions are denied as moot, and this case is
terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs.
Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00 filing fee.
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3) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the
entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues
the Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in
determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See
Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164
F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given
an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for
appealing so that the district judge “can make a
reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker
v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that
a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person
could suppose…has some merit” from a legal perspective).
If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the
$505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of
the appeal.
ENTERED:

July 1, 2016

FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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