Simpson v. Thompson et al
Filing
9
MERIT REVIEW OPINION Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 8/1/16. Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis 7 is DENIED as moot. This Court granted Plaintiff's initial petition 3 in the text order entered June 3, 2016. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO: 1) Attempt service on Defendants pursuant to the standard procedures; 2) Set an internal court deadline 60 days from the entry of this order for the court to check on the status of service and enter scheduling deadlines; and, 3) Enter the Court's standard qualified protective order pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. (SW, ilcd)
E-FILED
Monday, 01 August, 2016 10:02:52 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
URBANA DIVISION
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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SGT. THOMPSON, et al.
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Defendants. )
DAVID L. SIMPSON,
16-2142
MERIT REVIEW OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at
Macon County Jail, brings the present lawsuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need and failure to protect from harm. The matter comes before
this Court for merit review under 28 U.S.C. §1915A. In reviewing
the complaint, the Court takes all factual allegations as true,
liberally construing them in Plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729
F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and
labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. U.S., 721
F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal citation omitted).
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ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff is a federal pretrial detainee incarcerated at the
Macon County Jail (“Jail”). Defendants are employed at the facility
in the following capacities: Defendant Amy was a nurse and
Defendant Thompson was a correctional officer.
Plaintiff alleges that while incarcerated at the jail, he began to
experience pain throughout his body. Plaintiff alleges that medical
staff at the jail, including Defendant Amy, refused to treat his
condition. Plaintiff alleges that his condition progressed to the
point where he could not walk, required use of a wheelchair, and
was eventually sent to an outside medical provider.
Plaintiff alleges also that he was attacked by his cellmate.
Plaintiff alleges that shortly before he was assigned to share a cell
with his alleged assailant, the assailant had attacked another
inmate. Plaintiff alleges, however, that jail officials either failed or
refused to discipline the assailant for this prior assault. Plaintiff
alleges he was injured during this assault.
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ANALYSIS
Medical Claims
Inmates are entitled to adequate medical care under the
Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).
Because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, however, his rights are
derived from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
rather than the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment. Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776, 784 (7th
Cir. 2015) (citing Pittman v. Cnty. of Madison, 746 F.3d 766, 775
(7th Cir. 2014)). The standards under the respective amendments
are essentially the same. Id. (citing Smego v. Mitchell, 723 F.3d
752, 756 (7th Cir. 2013)).
To prevail, a plaintiff must show that the prison official acted
with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Estelle, 429
U.S. at 105. Claims of negligence, medical malpractice, or
disagreement with a prescribed course of treatment are not
sufficient. McDonald v. Hardy, 821 F.3d 882, 888 (7th Cir. 2016)
(citing Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 408 (7th Cir. 2014), and
Duckworth v. Ahmad, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008)). Rather,
liability attaches when “the official knows of and disregards an
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excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
The exact nature of Plaintiff’s medical condition is not
disclosed, but his allegation that the pain progressed to the point
where he was unable to walk allows for an inference that Plaintiff
suffered from an objectively serious medical need. See King v.
Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 2012) (“An objectively serious
medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as
mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay
person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.”
(internal quotations omitted)).
Plaintiff alleges that medical staff refused to treat his
condition, but his Complaint later references that Defendant Amy
provided him with Tylenol. The latter allegation suggests that
Plaintiff received at least some treatment, but at which point such
treatment was administered is unknown. Plaintiff could plausibly
prevail if he shows that medical staff delayed or denied medical
treatment without justification. See Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663
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F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011). However, Plaintiff cannot prevail if he
merely disagreed with the course of treatment provided. See Snipes
v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1996). This determination
should await a more developed record. Therefore, the Court finds
that Plaintiff states a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need.
Failure-to-Protect Claim
To succeed on a failure to protect claim, a plaintiff must show
(1) “that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial
risk of serious harm,” and, (2) prison officials acted with “deliberate
indifference” to that risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994). For purposes of satisfying the first prong, “it does not
matter whether the risk comes from a single source or multiple
sources, any more than it matters whether a prisoner faces an
excessive risk of attack for reasons personal to him or because all
prisoners in his situation face such a risk.” Id. at 843.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Thompson housed Plaintiff
with an inmate who had previously assaulted another inmate and
escaped without repercussions. Liberally construed, Plaintiff is
alleging that jail officials housed him with another inmate with a
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known propensity for violence against other inmates and that jail
officials condoned the attack by failing to discipline the assailant for
past violent conduct. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
sufficiently alleged a claim for failure to protect against Defendant
Thompson.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Pursuant to its merit review of the complaint under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court finds the Plaintiff states a claim
for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need
against Defendant Amy, and a failure-to-protect claim
against Defendant Thompson. The remaining defendants
shall be dismissed. Any additional claims shall not be
included in the case, except at the Court’s discretion on
motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
2) Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis
[7] is DENIED as moot. This Court granted Plaintiff’s
initial petition [3] in the text order entered June 3, 2016.
3) This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is
advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants
before filing any motions, in order to give Defendants
notice and an opportunity to respond to those motions.
Motions filed before Defendants' counsel has filed an
appearance will generally be denied as premature.
Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the Court at this
time, unless otherwise directed by the Court.
4) The Court will attempt service on Defendants by mailing
each Defendant a waiver of service. Defendants have 60
days from service to file an Answer. If Defendants have
not filed Answers or appeared through counsel within 90
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days of the entry of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion
requesting the status of service. After Defendants have
been served, the Court will enter an order setting
discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
5) With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the
address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that
Defendant worked while at that address shall provide to
the Clerk said Defendant's current work address, or, if not
known, said Defendant's forwarding address. This
information shall be used only for effectuating service.
Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained
only by the Clerk and shall not be maintained in the
public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
6) Defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date
the waiver is sent by the Clerk. A motion to dismiss is not
an answer. The answer should include all defenses
appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and
subsequent pleadings shall be to the issues and claims
stated in this Order. In general, an answer sets forth
Defendants' positions. The Court does not rule on the
merits of those positions unless and until a motion is filed
by Defendants. Therefore, no response to the answer is
necessary or will be considered.
7) Once counsel has appeared for a Defendant, Plaintiff need
not send copies of his filings to that Defendant or to that
Defendant's counsel. Instead, the Clerk will file Plaintiff's
document electronically and send a notice of electronic
filing to defense counsel. The notice of electronic filing
shall constitute service on Defendants pursuant to Local
Rule 5.3. If electronic service on Defendants is not
available, Plaintiff will be notified and instructed
accordingly.
8) Counsel for Defendants is hereby granted leave to depose
Plaintiff at his place of confinement. Counsel for
Defendants shall arrange the time for the deposition.
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9) Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of
any change in his mailing address and telephone number.
Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing
address or phone number will result in dismissal of this
lawsuit, with prejudice.
10)
Within 10 days of receiving from Defendants’ counsel
an authorization to release medical records, Plaintiff is
directed to sign and return the authorization to
Defendants’ Counsel.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT THE CLERK IS DIRECTED TO:
1) Attempt service on Defendants pursuant to the standard
procedures;
2) Set an internal court deadline 60 days from the entry of
this order for the court to check on the status of service
and enter scheduling deadlines; and,
3) Enter the Court's standard qualified protective order
pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act.
Lastly, it is ordered that if a Defendant fails to sign and
return a waiver of service for the clerk within 30 days
after the waiver is sent, the court will take appropriate
steps to effect formal service through the U.S. Marshal’s
Service on that Defendant and will require that Defendant
to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
ENTERED this 1st day of August, 2016.
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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