Fogle v. Champaign County Sheriff's Office

Filing 9

MERIT REVIEW ORDER entered by Judge Joe Billy McDade on 6/25/2018. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1) Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiff shall hav e 30 days (7/25/2018) from the entry of this order in which to file a pleading designated as an Amended Complaint. It must contain all claims against all Defendants as piecemeal amendments are not accepted. Failure to file an amended complaint wil l result in the dismissal of this case, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim. If Plaintiff does not wish to proceed in this matter, he is to inform the Court within 14 days (7/9/2018.) The matter will be dismissed without prejudice and Plaintiff will not be assessed the filing fee. 2) Plaintiff's motion for recruitment of pro bono counsel 4 is DENIED with leave to reassert if he files an amended complaint. See full written Order. (VH, ilcd)

E-FILED

Monday, 25 June, 2018 11:22:01 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
STEVEN D. FOGLE

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Plaintiffs,
v.
CHAMPAIGN COUNTY SHERIFF’S
OFFICE,
Defendant.

No.: 18-cv-2062-JBM

MERIT REVIEW ORDER
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, asserts a § 1983 claim against the Champaign County
Sheriff’s Office (“Sheriff’s Office”). The case is before the Court for a merit review pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual allegations as
true, liberally construing them in Plaintiffs’ favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649-51 (7th
Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are insufficient. Enough facts must be
provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721
F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). While the pleading
standard does not require “detailed factual allegations”, it requires “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Wilson v. Ryker, 451 Fed. Appx. 588, 589 (7th
Cir. 2011) quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Plaintiff, a pretrial detainee held at the Champaign County Jail, names the Sheriff’s
Office as the sole Defendant and alleges that in an eight-month period, four pieces of “legal
mail” were opened outside of his presence. Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim is reviewed under the First
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thornburgh v. Abbott,
490 U.S. 401, 424-5, (1989) (the sender and recipient of personal correspondence has a First and
Fourteenth Amendment protection “against unjustified governmental interference with the
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intended communication. ...”. While the First Amendment generally governs a prisoner’s right
to send and receive mail, the Fourteenth Amendment is invoked where a Plaintiff claims that the
opening of his mail has affected his ability to defend or represent himself. See Guajardo-Palma
v. Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 802 (7th Cir. 2010) citing Dreher v. Sielaff, 636 F.2d 1141, 1143
(7th Cir.1980). “The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees meaningful access to courts, [and] ...
the opportunity to communicate privately with an attorney is an important part of that
meaningful access.” Guajardo-Palma at 802.
Plaintiff asserts that four pieces of his “legal mail” were opened by the Jail’s automated
machine, outside of his presence. Two were letters from the Champaign County Clerk dated
May 10, 2017, and June 1, 2017. Another was the January 20, 2018, correspondence from an
attorney’s office, forwarding Defendants’ answer to the civil complaint Plaintiff had filed against
them. The last was a letter Plaintiff had sent seeking counsel to represent him in the same civil
matter. The letter had been returned by the post office for unidentified reasons, and opened by
the automated mail system, prior to being delivered to Plaintiff.
ANALYSIS
While prisoners have First and Fourteenth Amendment rights as to their mail, prison
officials have the right to examine that mail to ensure that it does not contain contraband.
Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 2005)(internal citations omitted). An
inmate's legal mail, however, is entitled to greater protections because of the potential for
interference with his right of access to the courts. Id. at 686. “Thus, when a prison receives a
letter for an inmate that is marked with an attorney's name and a warning that the letter is legal
mail, officials potentially violate the inmate's rights if they open the letter outside of the
inmate's presence.” Id. (internal citations omitted). While legal mail is entitled to greater

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protections, this is so only if it is privileged and concerns plaintiff’s representation by counsel
or request for representation. Id. at 685-86.
While Plaintiff claims that the two letters from the Champaign County Clerk were “legal
mail,” to be afforded greater protection, this is not so. The Illinois Administrative Code
525.140(d), specifically identifies mail from clerks of courts as "non-privileged mail." See
Martin v. Brewer, 830 F.2d 76, 78 (7th Cir. 1987) (no privacy considerations in mail from the
court as these are public document which prison personnel could access by other means, if
they wanted). The answer to the complaint forwarded by opposing counsel was also a public
document, in which Plaintiff had no heightened privacy rights. Guajardo-Palma , 622 F.3d at
806 (“[b]ut as long as the prison confines itself to opening letters that either are public or if
private still are not of a nature that would give the reader insights into the prisoner's legal
strategy, the practice is harmless and may be justified…”)
The Court finds that the letters from the Champaign County Clerk, and the answer to the
complaint forwarded by defense counsel, were matters of public record to which jail personnel,
and others, had allowed access. As a result, they were not “legal mail,” required to be opened in
Plaintiff’s presence.
Plaintiff’s letter seeking legal representation, however, may be characterized as legal
mail. This letter was returned to Plaintiff opened but it is noteworthy that it was not opened
when it was presented as outgoing mail, but only opened after being returned to the prison as
incoming mail. This distinction is important as outgoing mail enjoys higher constitutional
protections, as it does not present the same security concerns as incoming mail. Koutnik v.
Brown, 396 F.Supp.2d 978, 984 (7th Cir. 2005). Furthermore, even though the letter was

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opened, this was done by a machine. Plaintiff does not claim that that the letter was read by jail
staff or was disclosed in a manner which caused him harm.
Here, Plaintiff identifies a single episode in which a letter he sent to an attorney was
opened outside of his presence. See Guajardo at 805-806 (finding it “unlikely that isolated
interferences with attorney-client communications in prisoner cases will block the prisoner's
access to meaningful justice.”) “[T]he Supreme Court made clear in Weatherford v. Bursey, 429
U.S. 545, 554-59, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977), that the interception of a criminal
defendant's confidential communications with his lawyer is subject to harmless-error analysis;
and this must be true, and is, in prisoners' civil litigation as well.” Guajardo at 805-806. See
also, Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 686. “The unjustified opening of mail from an attorney is actionable
only if it has hindered an ongoing claim. To the extent Kaufman claims that the opening of his
mail impeded his access to the courts, he offered no evidence that his ability to litigate any
matter was affected by the defendants' actions.”
Plaintiff has failed to allege that the opening of the letter affected his civil case or
hindered his meaningful access to the courts. As a result, he fails to state a cognizable claim and
his complaint is DISMISSED. He will be given an opportunity to replead, however, in the event
that he is able to articulate an actionable claim.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1)

Plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Plaintiffs shall have 30 days from the entry of this order
in which to file a pleading designated as an Amended Complaint. It must contain all claims
against all Defendants as piecemeal amendments are not accepted. Failure to file an amended
complaint will result in the dismissal of this case, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim. If

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Plaintiff does not wish to proceed in this matter, he is to inform the Court within 14 days. The
matter will be dismissed without prejudice and Plaintiff will not be assessed the filing fee.
2)

Plaintiff’s motion for recruitment of pro bono counsel [4] is DENIED with leave

to reassert if he files an amended complaint.

_6/25/2018
ENTERED

s/Joe Billy McDade
JOE BILLY McDADE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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