-CHE Ruffin v. Illinois Department of Corrections et al
Filing
251
OPINION: The plaintiff's motion for reconsideration 249 of the court's September 30, 2010 order granting summary judgment is denied. Entered by Judge Harold A. Baker on 7/25/2011. (MJ, ilcd)
E-FILED
Monday, 25 July, 2011 03:54:47 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
Johnny M. Ruffin, Jr.,
Plaintiff,
v.
05-3007
Illinois Department of Corrections, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION
Before the court are the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration [249] of the court’s order
granting summary judgment to the defendants and the defendants’ response [250]. The court
granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on September 30, 2010. The plaintiff
now asks the court to reconsider pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a), which allows
the Court to correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from an oversight or omission.
Plaintiff asserts that the court noted in its order granting summary judgment that plaintiff failed
to contest any of the material facts offered by the defendants as undisputed. Plaintiff advises the
court this is incorrect and that he did challenge those proposed undisputed facts. The court has
reviewed the record and finds that the plaintiff’s assertion is correct. Plaintiff’s Statement of
Contested Facts is docketed as number 233. However, after reviewing and considering the
plaintiff’s disputes, the court’s decision to grant summary judgment does not change.
The plaintiff disputed the following facts offered by the defendants:
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
Defendant Snyder did not receive or review any of Plaintiff’s letters or grievances
regarding medical care or treatment. (Doc. 179, Exh. B, ¶6).
Defendant Snyder did not receive or review any of Plaintiff’s letters or grievances
regarding retaliation or harassment by employees of the Illinois Department of
Corrections. (Doc. 179, Exh. B, ¶7).
Defendant Walker did not receive or review any of Plaintiff’s letters or grievances
regarding violations of the Rehabilitation Act at Lawrence Correctional Center or
Pinckneyville Correctional Center. (Doc. 179, Exh. B, ¶8).
Defendant Walker did not receive or review any of Plaintiff’s letters or grievances
regarding medical care or treatment. (Doc. 179, Exh. B, ¶8).
Defendant Walker did not receive or review any of Plaintiff’s letters or grievances
regarding retaliation or harassment by employees of the Illinois Department of
Corrections. (Doc. 179, Exh. B, ¶9).
In reply to Plaintiff’s response to Defendants’ Undisputed Material Facts 7, 8, 9, 10,
1
and 11, Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that although Defendants Walker and Snyder may not have
received Plaintiff’s letters and grievance appeals, Defendants were required by Illinois state law
to evaluate grievance appeals. However, 20 Illinois Admin. Code Section 504.805, which sets
forth the responsibilities of the Director of the Department of Corrections, “Unless otherwise
specified, the Director . . . may delegate responsibilities stated in this Subpart to another person .
. . or designate another person . . . to perform the duties specified.” 20 Illinois Admin. Code
Section 504.805. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot prove, as a matter of law, that Defendants Walker
or Snyder had any personal involvement with his claims, as required by 42 U.S.C. Section
1983, nor can Plaintiff prove that Defendants Walker or Snyder were required to personally
respond or investigate every inmate appeal.
27.
30.
31.
32.
Lawrence Correctional Center provides all offenders with equal access to the gym, as
well as equal access to available exercise and recreational equipment. (Doc. 179, Exh. S,
Boyd Affidavit, ¶3).
The Lawrence Correctional Center gyms have no architectural barriers to the weight
equipment. The gym is equipped as budgetary and security issues allow. The gym is an
open area in all respects and basketballs are available upon offender request at the
beginning of the gym period. (Exh. S, ¶5).
All offenders at Lawrence Correctional Center are given equal opportunity to attend gym
if they are in general population. Those offenders housed in segregation are subject to the
policies and procedures relating to segregation. (Exh. S, ¶6).
Both disabled and non-disabled inmates were prevented from playing pick-up basketball
games by other inmates. (Complaint, p. 13, ¶32).
Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ Material Facts 27, 30, 31, and 32, and claims that as a
disabled inmate, he was denied equal access to the gym at Lawrence Correctional Center.
Plaintiff cites to a Document 144 to support his response, as well as his Exhibit J. Document 144
in this matter was assigned to Defendants’ Motion for Enlargement and does not support the
plaintiff’s statement. He also cites to his affidavit attached to his Motion for Leave to File
Supplemental Document In Supporting of his Response to Both IDOC and HPL’s Motion For
Summary Judgments [216]. Plaintiff’s self-serving affidavit disputes that there were no
architectural barriers in the Lawrence Correctional Center’s gym, in direct contradiction with
Defendants’ Material Fact number 30, but Plaintiff has not supported his contradiction with any
corroborating evidence. Plaintiff also challenges the statement that he was given equal access to
the basketball courts at Lawrence Correctional Center, however, Plaintiff’s own statement in his
complaint demonstrates that all inmates, regardless of disability, were prevented from playing
basketball by other inmates, contradicting his argument that Defendants violated the
Rehabilitation Act.
33.
36.
When an inmate with a disability is transported out of Lawrence Correctional Center
pursuant to a writ, employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections accommodate the
inmate’s disability while complying with the writ. (Exh. S, ¶7).
Defendant Snyder did not deny Plaintiff the use of his prosthetic devices on court writs.
2
38.
39.
41.
42.
(Exh. A, pp. 32-33).
Defendant Walker did not deny Plaintiff the use of his prosthetic devices on court writs.
(Exh. A, p. 34, lines 7-15).
Defendant Pierce did not deny Plaintiff the use of his prosthetic devices on court writs.
(Exh. A, p. 34, lines 7-15).
Defendant Pulley did not deny Plaintiff the use of his prosthetic devices on court writs.
(Exh. A, p. 34, lines 1-3, Exh. E, ¶4).
Defendant Garnett did not deny Plaintiff the use of his prosthetic devices on court writs.
(Exh. A, p. 34, lines 16-19).
Plaintiff disputes Defendants’ Material Facts numbers 33, 36, 38, 39, 41, and 42,
material facts involving claims regarding his transportation for writs during his incarceration
at Lawrence Correctional Center. Plaintiff argues in his response that he suffered medical
complications as a result of the denial of his right-hand/arm and leg braces during writs, yet fails
to support his argument with medical evidence of any injury. To the extent that Plaintiff claims
Defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need when he did not have access
to the braces during his writs, Plaintiff fails to establish the personal involvement of the
Defendants to create liability under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Plaintiff claims he spoke to
Defendants Pierce and Garnett regarding his access to his braces, but he does not have evidence
that these defendants denied him the use of his prosthetic devices. Further, there is no evidence
in the record that Plaintiff had any restrictions issued by qualified medical personnel such that he
was required to be provided access to his right-hand/arm and leg braces during his writs.
43.
44.
45.
There was no policy or procedure in place at Lawrence Correctional Center for employees
of the Illinois Department of Corrections to deny inmates access to programs or activities
based on their disabilities. (Exh. F, ¶8).
Defendants Garnett and Pierce did not establish a custom or policy to deny Plaintiff
meaningful access to the gym at Lawrence Correctional Center. (Exh. F, ¶5, Exh. K, ¶5).
Defendants Garnett and Pierce did not establish a custom or policy to deny Plaintiff
reasonable accommodation to the use of his prosthetic devices on court writs. (Exh. F, ¶6,
Exh. K, ¶6).
Plaintiff’s response to Material Fact number 43 cites to his responses to Defendants’
Material Facts numbers 27 and 33. Plaintiff offers no evidence to refute Defendants’ Material
Fact number 43, and as such, cannot disprove Defendants’ Material Fact number 43. Plaintiff
cites to his response to Material Facts numbers 27 and 33 in response to Defendants’ Material
Facts numbers 44 and 45. In those responses, Plaintiff cites to his own affidavit in order to refute
Defendants’ statements about policies generally, including the general layout of the gym.
However, Plaintiff’s affidavit cannot refute Defendants’ statements that they did not establish a
custom or policy to deny Plaintiff meaningful access to the gym at Lawrence Correctional center
or a reasonable accommodation to the use of his prosthetic devices on court writs. Nor,
presumably, did Defendants build Lawrence Correctional Center.
3
47
58.
Plaintiff received medical care while he was incarcerated at Lawrence Correctional
Center. (Exh. A, p. 49, lines 8-11).
Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that on December 2, 2003, Dr. Gonzalez ordered
Plaintiff to strengthen his legs by walking. (Exh. R, ¶7).
Plaintiff does not refute Defendants’ Material Fact number 47, but instead offers
additional facts. Plaintiff incorrectly asserts that Defendants are liable for the alleged failure to
hire medical staff, specifically, a physical therapist and offers no evidence that Lawrence
Correctional Center was required to hire a physical therapist or that he was prescribed physical
therapy by a medical professional. Plaintiff does not refute Defendants’ Material Fact number
58, but instead offers additional facts. Plaintiff’s assertion that he was unable to walk during his
incarceration at Lawrence Correctional Center does not dispute Defendants’ Material Fact
number 47 that he was informed by a medical professional to strengthen his legs by walking.
60.
61.
Plaintiff refused this treatment during the December 8, 2003 to July 26, 2004 a total of 15
times. (Exh. R, ¶7).
On June 11, 2004, Plaintiff refused his appointment to ride the stationary bike in the
Health Care Unit and attempt to stand because he was sore from lifting weights in the
gym. (Exh. R, ¶2).
Plaintiff argues in response to Defendants’ Material Facts numbers 60 and 61 that
he intentionally refused exercise treatment, but had reasonable excuses for missing his
appointments. Plaintiff refutes that he was sore from lifting weights in the gym and attempts to
support his argument by citing to his medical records which refute his statement. Whether or not
Plaintiff’s refusal to attend treatment including ambulation, stretching exercises and riding
a stationary bike was reasonable, the fact that he was receiving treatment and refused to attend
indicates that he did not take his medical care seriously, and as such, Defendants cannot be held
liable as being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs when Plaintiff was provided
with access to treatment.
63.
64.
65.
66.
Defendant Brian did not have direct involvement in any decisions concerning medical
care for Plaintiff, and did not direct or approve a course of treatment for Plaintiff. (Exh. J,
¶6).
Defendant Walker did not deny Plaintiff access to medical care or treatment. (Exh. A, p.
48, lines 16-19).
Defendant Snyder did not deny Plaintiff access to medical care or treatment. (Exh. A, p.
48, lines 20-22).
Defendant Pulley did not deny Plaintiff access to medical care or treatment. (Exh. A, p.
48, lines 23-25).
Plaintiff cites to his response to Defendants’ Material Fact number 47 in an attempt
to refute Defendants’ Material Facts numbers 63, 64, 65, and 66. While Plaintiff asserted
in his response to Defendants’ Material Fact number 47 that Defendants failed to hire
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adequate medical staff, this does not disprove the facts that Defendant Brian did not have
direct involvement in Plaintiff’s medical care, or that Defendants Walker, Snyder, and
Pulley did not deny Plaintiff access to medical care or treatment.
68.
69.
75.
76.
77.
Plaintiff is suing Defendants Ray and Teverbaugh because they were Adjustment
Committee Members who found Plaintiff guilty of a disciplinary ticket. (Exh. A, pp.
52-53).
Defendants Ray and Teverbaugh did not retaliate against Plaintiff. (Exh. A, p. 53, lines
10-15).
Defendants deny that they retaliated against or harassed Plaintiff. (Exhs. C, ¶7, D, ¶7, E,
¶6, F, ¶11, G, ¶9, H, ¶7, I, ¶7, K, ¶8, L, ¶3).
Defendants did not file false or retaliatory disciplinary tickets against Plaintiff. (Exhs. C,
¶5, D, ¶5, E, ¶5, G, ¶5, L, ¶4).
Defendant McCorkle never ordered Plaintiff to leave the law library out of retaliation or
to harass Plaintiff. (Exh. L, ¶5).
Plaintiff cites to his own self-serving affidavit in support of his argument that Defendants
retaliated against him, or conspired to retaliate against him. Plaintiff cites no facts regarding a
conspiracy. He must makes the conclusory allegation. Plaintiff additionally cites to grievances
he filed, as well as interrogatories completed by Defendants. The filing of grievances by Plaintiff
does not lead to the conclusion that Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff.
79.
Defendants Garnett and Pierce did not review Plaintiff’s grievances or the final
determinations by their designees of the decisions regarding Plaintiff. (Exh. F, ¶4; Exh.
K, ¶4).
Plaintiff argues that Defendants Garnett and Pierce were obligated to review his
grievances and appeals. As Defendants stated in their reply to Plaintiff’s response to Material
Fact number 7, Defendants are entitled to delegate their responsibilities to designees, including
the review of grievances and final determinations. Plaintiff offers no evidence to prove that
Defendants Garnett and Pierce reviewed Plaintiff’s grievances or final determinations by their
designees.
80.
86.
88.
89.
Inmates housed in segregation at Pinckneyville Correctional Center have their
disciplinary tickets heard in the cell house where the inmate lives. (Exh. M, ¶4).
Defendants did not discriminate against Plaintiff due to his disability. (Exh. M, ¶5, Exh.
N, ¶6, Exh. Q, ¶5).
Defendant Evans did not establish a custom or policy at Pinckneyville Correctional
Center to deny Plaintiff meaningful access to the disciplinary proceedings. (Exh. O, ¶5).
Defendant Flagg did not deny Plaintiff meaningful access to the disciplinary proceedings
at Pinckneyville Correctional Center. (Exh. P, ¶3).
Plaintiff’s underlying argument in regards to the disciplinary proceedings that took place
5
in Pinckneyville Correctional Center’s segregation unit is that he was found guilty of
his disciplinary tickets because Defendants Deen and Davenport could not hear his defense. This
does not refute the fact that all inmates housed in segregation at Pinckneyville Correctional
Center have their disciplinary tickets heard in segregation, regardless as to whether or not they
are disabled. Plaintiff cannot support his claims of a violation of the Rehabilitation Act because
inmates, with or without a disability, have their disciplinary tickets heard in the segregation unit.
Therefore, Plaintiff was not denied a reasonable accommodation, nor does he have support for
his argument that he was denied a reasonable accommodation to disciplinary proceedings.
92.
95.
96.
97.
98.
Disabled inmates and non-disabled inmates are allowed to shower during day room time.
(Exh. A, p. 72, lines 6-12).
Plaintiff believes that fifteen minutes, in addition to the day room times when all inmates
are allowed to shower, is inadequate. (Exh. A, p. 72, lines 13-24).
Pinckneyville Correctional Center provided disabled inmates, including Plaintiff, with
time in excess of that allowed for non-disabled inmates to shower. (Exh. P, ¶4).
Defendant Flagg did not deny Plaintiff meaningful access to the shower area at
Pinckneyville Correctional Center. (Exh. P, ¶4).
Defendant Evans did not establish a custom or policy at Pinckneyville Correctional
Center for a discriminatory shower policy. (Exh. O, ¶4).
In response to Defendants’ Material Facts numbers 92, 95, 96, 97, and 98, Plaintiff claims
in his affidavit that he was only allowed fifteen minutes, total, to shower. This is contrary to
Plaintiff’s deposition testimony that disabled inmates were allowed to shower both fifteen
minutes before and after day room time, as well as during day room time from 12:30 to 2:30.
Therefore, disabled inmates were given time to shower in excess of that provided to non-disabled
inmates, and as such, Plaintiff cannot support his argument that he was denied equal access to the
shower facilities. Additionally, Plaintiff offers no evidence to refute the fact that Defendant
Flagg did not deny him meaningful access to the shower area, or that Defendant Evans did not
establish a discriminatory shower policy for disabled inmates housed at Pinckneyville
Correctional Center.
The court having reviewed Plaintiff’s disputes of Defendants’ Material Facts finds that
Plaintiff failed to prove Defendants violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Plaintiff has offered no evidence to prove that he was denied access to programs or activities
solely due to his disabilities while he was housed at Lawrence Correctional Center. Plaintiff
states in his Amended Response that Defendant admitted that the congestion in the gym at
Lawrence Correctional Center impacted all inmates, and that this statement refutes Defendants’
argument that they did not violate the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff is incorrect in his
interpretation of Defendants’ statement. Because the gym was congested, all inmates, not just
disabled inmates, were impacted by the congestion. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot prove that
Defendants violated the Rehabilitation Act based on the gym located at Lawrence Correctional
Center. As to Plaintiff’s right hand/arm brace, Plaintiff still cannot show that non-disabled
inmates received access to a program or activity, in this case, a prosthetic device, that was denied
6
to Plaintiff solely based on his disabilities, and his claim under the Rehabilitation Act must fail.
Plaintiff’s claims against Pinckneyville Correctional Center under the Rehabilitation act must
also fail. Plaintiff refutes his deposition testimony that disabled inmates had the opportunity to
shower prior to day room time, in addition to all inmates given the opportunity to shower during
day room time. Plaintiff was receiving a benefit not equal to, but in excess of, what non-disabled
inmates were receiving in regards to time allotted for showering, and as such, he cannot state a
claim for a violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Plaintiff also fails to support his argument that he
was denied equal benefits and access to the disciplinary proceedings at Pinckneyville
Correctional Center. Plaintiff attempts to assert that Defendants Deen and Davenport were
unable to hear his defense, and therefore, he did not have equal access to the disciplinary
proceedings. Plaintiff offers no evidence that Defendants Deen and Davenport were unable to
hear his defense. Additionally, all inmates housed in segregation had their disciplinary tickets
heard in segregation, meaning that Plaintiff had equal access to the disciplinary proceedings in
segregation as the other inmates housed in segregation.
Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to respond to Plaintiff’s argument that Defendant
Townley violated the Rehabilitation Act and the Constitution based on Defendant Townley’s
alleged retaliatory conduct following Plaintiff’s verbal and written grievances concerning
Defendant Townley. Plaintiff’s amended complaint did not assert that Defendant Townley
retaliated against Plaintiff due to his disability, but because Plaintiff opposed the shower policy at
Pinckneyville Correctional Center. Defendant Townley continues to assert that he did not
retaliate against Plaintiff due to grievances Plaintiff may have filed against him. (Doc. 179,
Exhibit Q, Townley Affidavit). Additionally, Plaintiff offers no direct evidence that Defendant
Townley was aware of any grievances filed against him to support his arguments of retaliation.
Based on the above and the court’s September 30, 2010 order, summary judgment in the
Defendants’ favor is the correct decision. Plaintiff has not proved the personal involvement of
Defendants Snyder, Walker, Garnett, and Pierce. Defendants Snyder, Walker, Garnett, and
Pierce had no personal involvement in Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff has offered no evidence that
Defendants Snyder, Walker, Garnett, or Pierce were informed of Plaintiff’s complaints through
letters and grievances. Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendants were obligated to review his
grievances and appeals is incorrect, as these duties may be delegated to a designee. Therefore,
Defendants Snyder, Walker, Garnett, and Pierce are entitled to summary judgment in this matter
for Plaintiff’s failure to prove their personal involvement as required by 42 U.S.C. Section 1983.
Plaintiff still fails to have proven an Eighth Amendment violation for deliberate
indifference. Plaintiff asserts that he proved an Eighth Amendment violation for deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs, yet provides no documentary support for his
assertion to either prove his argument, or to create a material issue of fact. A deliberate
indifference claim must satisfy two requirements. The first requirement is objective: the
plaintiff must show that “he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm.” Farmer v. Brennan 511 U.S. 825, 834; 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994). The
second requirement is subjective; the plaintiff must prove the prison official exhibited
7
deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s safety. Id. Plaintiff failed to show that Defendants’ actions
constituted a refusal to prevent harm or showed a total unconcern for the medical needs of
Plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants failed to provide a physical therapist during his
incarceration at Lawrence Correctional Center and failed to provide him access to his prosthetic
devices during court writs. However, Plaintiff cannot impose liability on Defendants Pierce,
Garnett, Snyder, and Walker. None of these Defendants had personal involvement in Plaintiff’s
claims and they are dismissed from this cause of action based on their lack of personal
involvement in Plaintiff’s claims. Personal involvement is required for liability under ' 1983.
"Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault;
thus, liability does not attach unless the individual defendant caused or participated in a
constitutional deprivation." Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 993 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting Sheik-Abdi
v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1248 (7th Cir.1994)); see also Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555,
561 (7th Cir.1995); Black v. Lane, 22 F.3d 1395, 1401 (7th Cir.1994). Additionally, Plaintiff has
failed to place any evidence in the record that shows he was medically prescribed physical
therapy. Therefore, he has not supported his claims of deliberate indifference on the part of these
non-medical Defendants for failure to provide Plaintiff with care he was not prescribed.
Likewise, there is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff was medically prescribed the use of his
prosthetic devices while on court writs, or that Plaintiff requested the use of the prosthetic
devices from a medical professional.
Plaintiff has not supported his argument that he was retaliated against or harassed by
Defendants. Plaintiff fails to support a claim for retaliation or harassment on the part of
Defendants. While Plaintiff has referenced several grievances he has filed against Defendants or
other employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections, he fails to allege or prove a
chronology of events that would create the inference of retaliation on the part of Defendants. A
majority of Plaintiff’s claims relate to the fact that he received disciplinary tickets, and was later
found guilty of those tickets. A claim for retaliation is stated when a prisoner sets forth “a
chronology of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.” Zimmerman v. Tribble,
226 F.3d 568, 573 (7th Cir. 2000)(quoting Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1143 n.6 (7th Cir. 1988)).
Plaintiff has not supported his claim of retaliation.
Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief. In Green v. Mansour 474 U.S. 64, (1986), the
United States Supreme Court held that injunctive relief is improper in suits where there is no
ongoing violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights. As the court has found no violations,
Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief.
Based on the foregoing, it is ordered:
1.
The plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration [249] of the court’s September 30, 2010 order
granting summary judgment is denied.
Entered this 25th day of July, 2011.
\s\Harold A. Baker
______________________________________
Harold A. Baker
United States District Judge
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