McCabe v. Blagojevich et al
Filing
104
OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 05/03/2012. SEE WRITTEN ORDER. (DM, ilcd)
E-FILED
Thursday, 03 May, 2012 05:13:49 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JERRY L. MCCABE,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
v.
LARRY J. PHILLIPS, et al.,
Defendants,
08-CV-3091
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
On August 31, 2011, Judge Baker dismissed Plaintiff’s claims under
the Americans with Disabilities Act and ruled that the only remaining
claim regards the alleged punitive conditions at Rushville Treatment and
Detention Center.1 In September, 2011, this case was transferred to this
Court. The case is before the Court to resolve several pending motions,
The Amended Complaint set forth claims challenging Plaintiff’s commitment
which were not specifically addressed in Judge Baker’s order. These claims are not
properly a part of this case because Plaintiff’s challenges to his detention must be
made in his state court proceedings or in a federal habeas action, after all state
remedies have been exhausted.
1
1
addressed in turn below.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Defendants’ motion to extend the summary judgment deadline
to June 15, 2012 is granted (d/e 103). If Defendants file a summary
judgment on June 15, 2012, the Court will deny as moot their prior
summary judgment motion already on file (d/e 80). If Defendants do not
file a summary judgment on June 15, 2012, the Court will rule on the
merits of Defendants’ summary judgment motion now on file (d/e 80),
but Plaintiff will have an opportunity to file a supplemental response by
July 16, 2012.
2) Defendant Quinn’s motion to extend his deadline for responding
to Plaintiff’s second set of interrogatories is granted (d/e 100). The Court
notes that those responses should have been provided by now, since the
requested extension has passed. Discovery otherwise remains closed.
3) Defendants’ motion to clarify the Court’s 12/7/11 text order
granting Plaintiff’s motion to compel is granted (d/e 97). Defendants’
correctly point out that the Court inadvertently did not address the
2
merits of their objections to Plaintiff’s discovery requests. The Court has
reviewed Plaintiff’s first set of interrogatories to Defendants Quinn and
Blaesing and the responses. The Court agrees with Defendants’
objections to those requests. The sole remaining claim in this case is the
alleged punitive conditions at the Rushville Treatment and Detention
Facility, which Plaintiff asserts violate his constitutional due process
rights and his right to the “least restrictive environment.”2 But see
Thielman v. Leean, 282 F.3d 478 (7th Cir. 2002)(similar law in
Wisconsin did not create a federal right to the “least restrictive
environment”). Plaintiff’s interrogatories about funding, grants, budgets,
expenses, complaints to the Governor, other lawsuits, appointments,
removals, and budgetary proposals are irrelevant to this claim and not
reasonably calculated to lead to any relevant, admissible information.
Similarly, Plaintiff’s interrogatories about repackaging frozen food, the
The contours of this claim remain murky. Exactly what restrictions Plaintiff
believes are too restrictive is not clear, even though Plaintiff has first hand knowledge
of those restrictions. The restrictions would need to be substantial in order to violate
the Constitution. See, e.g., Hargett v. Adams, 2005 WL 399300 (N.D. Ill. 2005)(not
reported in F.Supp.2d)(conditions at Joliet Treatment and Detention Center were
constitutional even though similar to a prison).
2
3
lack of educational and vocational opportunities, the reward point
system, and the lack of wages are not relevant to his punitive
environment claim because these conditions are not “punitive” in the
constitutional sense. See Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir.
1992)(prisoner has no constitutional right to a job in prison, nor a
constitutional right to compensation for work performed); Garza v.
Miller, 688 F.2d 480, 485 (7th Cir. 1982)(inmate has no constitutional
interest in educational or job opportunities); Elliott v. Baker, 2008 WL
4876871 *2 (N.D. Ill. 2008)(not published in F.Supp.2d)(“The federal
Constitution does not require state authorities to provide convicted
prisoners educational, rehabilitative, or vocational opportunities . . . . The
Court is unaware of any authority, nor does Elliott cite any, suggesting
that the rules are different for civilly committed persons.”). If these are
the conditions which Plaintiff believes violate the Constitution, then he
fails to state a claim.
4) In light of the discussion in paragraph three, the Court’s text
order of 12/7/11 is vacated to the extent that order applied to Plaintiff’s
4
first set of interrogatories to Defendants Quinn and Blaesing served in
September, 2011. Defendants’ objections to those requests are
sustained.
5) Plaintiff’s motion to compel filed on February 29, 2012 is denied
(d/e 98). The Court has reviewed all of Defendants’ responses attached
to the motion and finds those responses and objections appropriate. As
discussed above, information about expenses, audits, grants, and
vocational and educational programs are not relevant, nor is the
information reasonably calculated to lead to relevant, admissible
information. Prior lawsuits and complaints against Defendants are also
not relevant. The Court does not understand the relevance of the
questions about the Mental Health and Disabilities Code, since that
Code does not apply to the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center.
725 ILCS 207/50(b)(secure facility for sexually violent persons “shall not
be subject to the provisions of the Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities Code.”). In any event, the violation of a state law would not
amount to a Constitutional violation. Guarjardo-Palma v. Martinson,
5
622 F.3d 801, 806 (7th Cir. 2010)(“[A] violation of state law is not a
ground for a federal civil rights suit.”).
The Court notes that if Plaintiff’s punitive environment claim is
based on the failure of Defendants to treat him the same as a patient in a
state mental health facility, he fails to state a constitutional claim, either
under the due process clause or the equal protection clause. Plaintiff is
not similarly situated to persons confined for treatment in other state
mental health facilities. Plaintiff is in Rushville because he has been
"convicted of a sexually violent offense, . . .[and] suffers from a mental
disorder that makes it substantially probable that . . . he will engage in
acts of sexual violence." 725 ILCS 207/5(f). Persons confined in other
state mental health facilities may also be dangerous to themselves or
others, but they do not fit the statutory definition for sexually violent
persons. See Thielman v. Leean, 282 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir.
2002)("facilities dealing with those who have been involuntarily
committed for sexual disorders are ‘volatile' environments whose
day-to-day operations cannot be managed from on high.")(upholding
6
restraints used on sexually violent persons during transport and not on
other mentally ill patients). “[I]t is not unreasonable for the State to
believe that a person with a mental disorder of a sexual nature is
qualitatively more dangerous than another mental patient who
nonetheless threatens danger to himself or others.” Id. at 485.
ENTERED: May 3, 2012
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
7
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?