Rodgers v. White et al
Filing
89
OPINION denying 84 Motion in Limine. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 6/26/2012. (CT, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 26 June, 2012 08:55:32 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
MARK P. RODGERS,
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Plaintiff,
v.
JESSE WHITE, in his official capacity, )
DONNA MULCAHY FITTS, and
STEPHAN ROTH,
Defendants.
No. 08-3161
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OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
This cause is before the Court on the Motion in Limine (d/e 84)
filed by Defendants Jesse White, Donna Mulcahy Fitts, and Stephan
Roth. In the Motion, Defendants seek to bar Plaintiff from introducing
the Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award into evidence and to limit any
related testimony and/or argument at trial. For the reasons that follow,
the Motion in Limine is DENIED.
I. THE MOTION IN LIMINE
Defendants object to the introduction at trial of the Arbitrator’s
Opinion and Award and any testimony about the arbitration with the
exception of the following: (1) that the parties arbitrated Plaintiff’s
discharge; (2) different legal standards applied to the arbitration than are
applied in this case; (3) the Arbitrator found sufficient evidence regarding
the time-keeping issues but not the aerator incident and OIG
investigation; (4) the Arbitrator did not find that Defendants
discriminated against Plaintiff based on his race; and (5) Plaintiff was
reinstated with full back pay and benefits. Defendants also object to any
argument by Plaintiff that the Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award
establishes that: (1) Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff based on
his race; (2) Defendants did not honestly believe the charges against
Plaintiff; (3) any of the witnesses are not credible; or (4) there is no
evidence that Plaintiff engaged in the charged misconduct.
Defendants agree that while the basic facts regarding the existence
of the Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award may explain to the jury why
Plaintiff was reinstated and why he is not entitled to back pay and
benefits, the Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award is not relevant to any
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material issues of fact in the case.
First, Defendants argue that because the Arbitrator did not give full
consideration to or decide Plaintiff’s race discrimination claims, the
Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award does not tend to prove the material facts
at issue in the lawsuit. Second, Defendants assert that the Arbitrator did
not find that any of the Defendants did not honestly believe the charges
offered in support of Plaintiff’s discharge. Third, Defendants assert that
the burden of proof in this lawsuit (Plaintiff must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was discharged because of his
race) is different than the burden of proof before the Arbitrator (the
Secretary of State was required to establish, by clear and convincing
evidence, that Plaintiff engaged in the charged misconduct and that the
misconduct constituted just cause for discharge)
Defendants also assert that, even if relevant, the Arbitrator’s
Opinion and Award should not be admitted because any purported
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury. Specifically,
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Defendants assert that: (1) any argument by Plaintiff that the
Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award is evidence of race discrimination would
be misleading because the Arbitrator made no such finding; (2) the jury
may confuse the Arbitrator’s analysis of why he believed the Secretary of
State did not meet its burden with the issue of whether Plaintiff can meet
his burden; and (3) the Arbitrator’s opinions regarding witness credibility
and the weight of the evidence could have a prejudicial impact on the
jury’s own views of witness credibility and the weight of the evidence.
Finally, Defendants assert that the Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award
contains inadmissible hearsay.
Plaintiff responds that while the entire Arbitrator’s Opinion and
Award may not aid the jury in determining the issues, the following
evidentiary findings in the Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award should be
allowed: (1) the relevant evidence introduced at the arbitration
surrounding Plaintiff’s involvement with the aerator and the Arbitrator’s
findings based on that evidence; (2) the Arbitrator’s findings that
Rusciolelli was Plaintiff’s supervisor, that Rusciolelli instructed Plaintiff
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to keep the overtime records in a certain manner, and Rusciolelli
performed the same duties, but was not discharged; (3) information or
evidence in the Arbitrator’s decision that supports the proposition that
Plaintiff was treated differently from similarly situated non-AfricanAmerican workers; and (4) the Arbitrator’s findings after examination of
the contents of the OIG reports, which, according to Plaintiff, would
show that Defendants’ argument that they reasonably relied on the OIG
reports was merely pretext.
Plaintiff further argues that the Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award
should be admissible for purposes of impeachment and, if Defendants
admit any portion of the Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award, Plaintiff
should be allowed to introduce any other part of the award which in
fairness should be considered by the jury. See Fed.R.Evid. 106.
II. ANALYSIS
Whether to admit the Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award is a decision
within this Court’s discretion. Perry v. Larson, 794 F.2d 279, 284 (7th
Cir. 1986). Factors to be considered before admitted such evidence
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include: (1) “the existence of provisions in the collective-bargaining
agreement that conform substantially with Title VII”; (2) “the degree of
procedural fairness in the arbitral forum; (3) adequacy of the record with
respect to the issue of discrimination”; and (4) “the special competence of
particular arbitrators.” Alexander v. Garner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60
n. 21 (1974) (noting that an arbitration decision “may be admitted as
evidence and accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate”).
The Court agrees that the Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award may not
be relevant and admissible in its entirety. For instance, the Arbitrator
made no findings regarding race discrimination. See Perry, 794 F.2d at
284 (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
refusing to admit references to the arbitration hearing where the “issue of
political motivation was not sufficiently explored during the arbitration
proceeding” and, therefore, the proceeding “was not credible evidence on
the motivation issue”); Jackson v. Bunge Corp., 40 F.3d 239, 246 (7th
Cir. 1994) (finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by
refusing to admit evidence of the arbitrator’s decision at trial where the
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arbitrator admittedly relied on evidence that was “arguably inadmissible
hearsay” and where the arbitrator “never addressed the issue of whether
[the defendant] had a retaliatory motive in discharging the plaintiff, but
instead focused on whether [the plaintiff] was properly terminated
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement”). However, this Court
also agrees with Plaintiff that the Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award may be
admissible regarding: (1) the evidence introduced at the arbitration
surrounding Plaintiff’s involvement with the aerator and the Arbitrator’s
findings based on that evidence; (2) the Arbitrator’s findings that
Rusciolelli was Plaintiff’s supervisor, Rusciolelli instructed Plaintiff to
keep the overtime records in a certain manner, and Rusciolelli performed
the same duties but was not discharged; (3) information or evidence in
the Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award that supports the proposition that
Plaintiff was treated differently from similarly situated non-AfricanAmerican workers; and (4) the Arbitrator’s findings after examination of
the contents of the OIG reports, which, according to Plaintiff, would
show that Defendants’ “reasonable reliance on the OIG reports”
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argument was merely pretext. This Court further finds that the
Arbitrator’s Opinion and Award may be admissible for purposes of
impeachment and Federal Rule of Evidence 106.
In addition, the Court finds the probative value of the Arbitrator’s
Opinion and Award, at least as to the issues identified herein, outweighs
any potential prejudice. An appropriate limiting instruction will further
cure any potential prejudice.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendants’ Motion in Limine [84] is
DENIED. Plaintiff shall submit a proposed limiting instruction on or
before July 9, 2012. The case remains set for a final pretrial conference
on July 11, 2012 at 2:00 p.m. As the parties have submitted a proposed
Pretrial Order that contains only a couple of disputed jury instructions,
the pretrial conference may be conducted by telephone if the parties so
desire. The parties shall inform the Court by July 9, 2012 whether they
would like to conduct the final pretrial conference on July 11, 2012 in
person or by telephone.
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ENTER: June 25, 2012
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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