King v. Schieferrdecker et al
Filing
134
OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 7/6/2011. Schuyler County Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (d/e 101) is GRANTED. Summary judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant Don L. Schieferdecker and Thomas Kanoski on Count IV of Plaintiff's Verified Amended Complaint. Defendant Kanoski is DISMISSED from the case. (MAS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 06 July, 2011 04:55:25 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JERMAIN KING,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
SHERIFF OF SCHUYLER COUNTY )
DON L. SCHIEFERDECKER;
)
DEPUTY SHERIFF THOMAS
)
KANOSKI, et al.
)
)
Defendants.
)
No. 08-3213
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (Motion) (d/e 101) filed by Defendants Don L. Schieferdecker,
Sheriff of Schuyler County, and Thomas Kanoski, Deputy Sheriff
(collectively referred to as the Schuyler County Defendants). For the
reasons that follow, the Motion is GRANTED.
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning in May 2006, Plaintiff Jermain King worked as a
Security Therapy Aid at the Illinois Department of Human Services’
(IDHS) Rushville Sexually Violent Person’s Treatment and Detention
Facility (Facility). Plaintiff alleges he spoke out about the disparity in
treatment of African American staff by IDHS and also submitted
numerous written complaints. Plaintiff alleges IDHS and IDHS
employees conspired to retaliate against him in various ways, which
ultimately led to his discharge. As is relevant to the Schuyler County
Defendants, Plaintiff alleges that certain IDHS employees falsely
reported to the Schuyler County Sheriff’s Department that Plaintiff was
bringing drugs into the Facility. Plaintiff contends Sheriff Schieferdecker
and Deputy Kanoski thereafter subjected him to an illegal full body strip
search.1
In May 2009, Plaintiff filed an eight-count Verified First Amended
Complaint against the Schuyler County Defendants, IDHS, and 20
IDHS employees, pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Although Plaintiff alleges in Count IV that he was subjected to a “full body
and body cavity search,” his deposition testimony indicates he was told to remove his
clothing, squat, and cough. No one touched him. The term “strip search” refers to
the visual inspection of a naked person “without intrusion into the person’s body
cavities.” Peckham v. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections, 141 F.3d 694, 695 (7th
Cir.1998). Therefore, this Court will refer to the search as a “strip search.”
1
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3, 42 U.S.C. §1983, and state law. Following a
motion to dismiss, two claims remain against the Schuyler County
Defendants: (1) Count IV, which alleges the Schuyler County
Defendants violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by conducting
a strip search of Plaintiff when he was arrested on an outstanding arrest
warrant; and (2) Count VIII, a § 1983 municipal liability “Monell” claim
against the Sheriff’s Office and Sheriff Schieferdecker for liability for the
illegal strip search. See Monell v. Department of Social Services of City
of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (a local government is
responsible under § 1983 “when execution of a government’s policy or
custom . . . inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is
responsible”).
The Schuyler County Defendants now move for summary judgment
on Count IV of the Amended Complaint. The Schuyler County
Defendants assert: (1) Sheriff Schieferdecker was not present when
Plaintiff was searched at the Schuyler County Jail and had no personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; (2) Deputy Kanoski
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had an individualized reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff was carrying
contraband at the time he was arrested and searched; and (3) Deputy
Kanoski is entitled to qualified immunity.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction because Plaintiff’s claims
are based on federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States”). Venue is proper
because the events giving rise to the claim occurred in Schuyler County,
Illinois. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) (a civil action where jurisdiction is not
founded solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought in a judicial
district where a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to
the claim occurred).
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
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fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also,
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A moving party must show that no reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986); Gleason v. Mesirow Fin.,
Inc., 118 F.3d 1134, 1139 (7th Cir. 1997). Facts must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, and all reasonable
inferences must be drawn for the non-movant. See Trentadue v.
Redmon, 619 F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir. 2010).
IV. FACTS PERTAINING TO THE MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A.
Plaintiff’s Objections to the Statement of Undisputed Facts
Plaintiff objects to or challenges a number of the Schuyler County
Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts. One of the objections is
that the cited source of the facts was not an affidavit as required by 28
U.S.C. § 1746 and Rule 56(e) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. However,
on May 18, 2011, this Court entered a text order denying Plaintiff’s
motion to strike the affidavits on this basis. Therefore, those objections
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are overruled.
Plaintiff also attempts to incorporate by reference portions of his
Complaint and certain unidentified exhibits thereto as additional facts in
support of his Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment. On May 18, 2011, the Court denied Plaintiff’s request to
stand on his Complaint and be excused from filing a Statement of
Additional Facts as part of his response to the IDHS Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment. This Court noted “there is no reason why
Plaintiff cannot comprehensively set forth all materials relating to his
response in one single pleading.” The same reasoning applies here.
Finally, Plaintiff disputes the facts set forth by the Schuyler County
Defendants regarding the information Sheriff Schieferdecker received
prior to the traffic stop. Plaintiff’s objection centers primarily on alleged
differences between Sheriff Schieferdecker’s Affidavit in support of the
Motion as compared to his Answer to the Amended Complaint and
responses to Interrogatories. For example, in his Affidavit, Sheriff
Schieferdecker asserted that both Larry Phillips and Chris Clayton of
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IDHS contacted him and told him that several IDHS employees had
informed them that Plaintiff was bringing cannabis into the Facility.
Sheriff Schieferdecker’s Interrogatory answer only identified Clayton and
stated Clayton told Sheriff Schieferdecker that he obtained the
information from several sources, including several inmates.
On a
motion for summary judgment, “[a]ny discrepancies in the factual record
should be evaluated in the nonmovant’s favor.” Ledbetter v. Emery,
20099 WL 1871922, at *1 (C. D. Ill. 2009). Therefore, the facts
pertaining to the information Sheriff Schieferdecker received prior to the
traffic stop will be based on Sheriff Schieferdecker’s Answer to the
Complaint and the responses to Interrogatories. This Court also
considers Clayton’s Affidavit, which Plaintiff attached to his response to
the Motion.
B.
The Relevant Facts
Prior to December 4, 2007, Sheriff Schieferdecker received
information about Plaintiff from Chris Clayton, the Internal Security
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Investigator at the Facility.2 Clayton told Sheriff Schieferdecker that
Plaintiff had an outstanding arrest warrant from McDonough County
and that several sources had advised Clayton that Plaintiff was
transporting cannabis into the Facility. According to Sheriff
Schieferdecker:
Chris Clayton at IDHS contacted me at the
sheriff’s office in regard to information he had
received regarding [Plaintiff] transporting cannabis
into the facility. Mr. Clayton advised that he had
obtained this information from several sources,
including inmates at the facility. Mr. Clayton also
advised that [Plaintiff] was scheduled to work on
December 4, 2007[,] and at what time, the license
plate number of the vehicle in which he would be
traveling to work, and the expected route to the
facility. Myself and Dep. Kanoski waited en route
for the vehicle and once it was located initiated a
traffic stop and verified that [Plaintiff] was the
male passenger of the car.
In his Affidavit, Clayton stated that in October 2007, he had
In his Affidavit, Clayton states that, as an Internal Security Investigator, he
was responsible for investigating unusual incidents, suspected violations of criminal
law, and violations of rules alleged to have occurred by residents and staff. Clayton
also stated that since 1995 he was employed as a Deputy in the Schuyler County
Sheriff’s Department and was “currently available to the Sheriff’s Department on an
as needed basis.”
2
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received information from a “credible informant that [Plaintiff] had made
comments that he could and would bring drugs into the facility.” The
informant had “previously provided credible information in a previous
drug trafficking case involving an employee.” Clayton provided the
confidential source with access to call Internal Affairs through a
confidential number.
In light of the information that Plaintiff had an outstanding arrest
warrant, Sheriff Schieferdecker directed Deputy Kanoski to initiate the
traffic stop and arrest Plaintiff based on that warrant. In his Affidavit,
Deputy Kanoski stated that Sheriff Schieferdecker told Kanoski that he
had received a tip that Plaintiff was smuggling cannabis into the Facility.
On December 4, 2007, Deputy Kanoski stopped a vehicle in which
Plaintiff was a passenger and on his way to work. Sheriff Schieferdecker
assisted in the investigatory stop of the vehicle.
During the traffic stop, Deputy Kanoski conducted a pat down of
Plaintiff and arrested Plaintiff on the outstanding arrest warrant. Deputy
Kanoski transported Plaintiff to the Schuyler County Jail (Jail). Sheriff
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Schieferdecker searched the vehicle after obtaining consent from the
female driver. Plaintiff did not contest the arrest warrant’s validity. 3
After arriving at the Jail, Plaintiff was booked and processed by
Schuyler County Jail Administrator Steven Campbell. Campbell searched
Plaintiff in Kanoski’s presence. The search was conducted in a private
room with the door closed. No female officers were present. Plaintiff
was required to disrobe, squat, and cough. Campbell also searched
Plaintiff’s clothes and shoes after they were removed. Neither Campbell
nor Kanoski touched Plaintiff anytime during the search. The search
took two to three minutes. Kanoski told Plaintiff he was being searched
because IDHS had provided the Sheriff’s Department with information
that Plaintiff was trafficking cannabis into an IDHS facility.
Sheriff
Schieferdecker stated in his Affidavit that he knew Plaintiff needed to be
at his job that afternoon. Therefore, he instructed Campbell to “allow
Plaintiff to put on his street clothes after he was booked, processed[,] and
Plaintiff testified that the warrant for his arrest arose out of a traffic case in
Macomb, Illinois, due to his failure to appear.
3
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searched and to allow Plaintiff to wait outside the cell area, so that he
could make it to his job on time if he posted bond.” After Plaintiff’s
bond was paid, Plaintiff was released from the Jail.
V. ANALYSIS
The Schuyler County Defendants assert they are entitled to
summary judgment on Count IV because: (1) Sheriff Schieferdecker was
not present when Plaintiff was searched at the Jail and had no personal
involvement in the alleged constitutional violation; (2) Deputy Kanoski
had an individualized reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff was carrying
contraband at the time he was arrested and searched; and (3) Deputy
Kanoski is entitled to qualified immunity. Plaintiff responds that the
Schuyler County Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment
because: (1) the Affidavits in support of their Statement of Material Facts
do not comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); (2) the
memorandum of law fails to point out which particular set of facts and
documentary evidence in the record warrant summary judgment in their
favor; and (3) the Schuyler County Defendants failed to develop a legal
argument.
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This Court has already denied Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike the
Affidavits. See Text Order dated May 18, 2011. This Court found the
Affidavits satisfied the relevant statute. As for Plaintiff’s remaining
arguments, the Schuyler County Defendants point to specific facts in
support of their motion and provide legal argument with citation to
relevant legal authority as required by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and Local Rule 7.1(D)(1). Therefore, this Court will
address the merits of the Motion.
A.
Sheriff Schieferdecker
The Schuyler County Defendants argue that Sheriff Schieferdecker
is entitled to summary judgment because he was not present when
Plaintiff was searched and had no personal involvement in the alleged
constitutional violations. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument.
“Liability under § 1983 must be premised on personal involvement
in the deprivation of the constitutional right, not vicarious liability.”
Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1042 n. 15 (7th Cir.
1998); Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir. 1983) (“An
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individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or
participated in an alleged constitutional deprivation”) (emphasis in
original). However, a defendant need not directly participate in the
violation if (1) he “acts or fails to act with a deliberate and reckless
disregard of [the] plaintiff’s constitutional rights”; or (2) “the conduct
causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at [his] direction or with
[his] knowledge and consent.” Rascon v. Hardiman, 803 F.2d 269, 274
(7th Cir. 1986); see also Patterson v. Burns, 670 F.Supp.2d 837, 849 (S.
D. Ind. 2009).
Here, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
shows a genuine issue of material fact exists whether the alleged
constitutional deprivation occurred at the direction of Sheriff
Schieferdecker or with his knowledge. Sheriff Schieferdecker directed
Deputy Kanoski to initiate the traffic stop and arrest Plaintiff based on
the warrant. Sheriff Schieferdecker was not present when the strip search
occurred, and it is unclear whether he ordered the strip search. However,
Sheriff Schieferdecker directed Kanoski to investigate the tip regarding
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narcotics trafficking. In addition, Sheriff Schieferdecker instructed
Campbell to “allow Plaintiff to put on his street clothes after he was
booked, processed[,] and searched,” which suggests he knew Plaintiff
would be searched. Because genuine issues of material fact exist
regarding Sheriff Schieferdecker’s participation in the strip search,
summary judgment is inappropriate on this ground. See, e.g., Lessley v.
City of Madison, Ind., 654 F.Supp.2d 877, 899-900 (S. D. Ind. 2009)
(finding that the officer was personally responsible for strip searches even
though he did not perform them where he took the plaintiffs to the fire
station, caused another individual to be called to perform the searches,
and told the person who performed the searches that the plaintiffs had
consented to the searches).
B.
The Undisputed Facts Demonstrate the Schuyler County
Defendants Had Reasonable Suspicion
Although issues of material fact exist regarding Sheriff
Schieferdecker’s personal involvement in the alleged constitutional
violation, both he and Deputy Kanoski are entitled to summary
judgment on Count IV on the other grounds raised in the Motion. The
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undisputed facts, taken in the light most favor to Plaintiff, show that the
Schuyler County Defendants had reasonable suspicion that Plaintiff was
carrying contraband.
The Fourth Amendment requires that searches be reasonable under
the circumstances. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340
(1985)(“The fundamental command of the Fourth Amendment is that
searches and seizures be reasonable”). Determining reasonableness
requires balancing the need for the search against the invasion of private
rights. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). Moreover, a court
must consider “the scope of the particular intrusion, the manner in which
it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it
is conducted.” Id.
Plaintiff challenges only the justification for initiating the strip
search, not the scope, manner or place of the search. Strip searches of
arrestees can be conducted only if there is reasonable suspicion that the
arrestee is concealing weapons or contraband. Campbell v. Miller, 499
F.3d 711, 717 (7th Cir. 2007); Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723
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F.2d 1263, (7th Cir. 1983).
In evaluating whether suspicion was reasonable, the Court looks to
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the officer had
specific, articulable facts for suspecting legal wrongdoing. See United
States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); Thompson v. County of
Cook, 428 F.Supp.2d 807, 814 (N.D. Ill. 2006). To justify their search,
the officers must “point to specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the
intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Adrow v. Johnson, 623
F.Supp. 1085, 1089 (C.D. Ill. 1985).
When examining reasonable suspicion, this Court may consider the
collective knowledge of the officers involved. U.S. v. Barnes, 506 F.3d
58, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2007) (examining the collective knowledge of the
officers involved in the investigation when determining whether
reasonable suspicion existed to conduct a body cavity search); United
States v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d 725, 728 (7th Cir. 2003) (“when law
enforcement officers are in communication regarding a suspect . . . the
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knowledge of one officer can be imputed to the other officers under the
collective knowledge doctrine”). The officers’ subjective motivation is
irrelevant. See United States v. Bullock, 632 F.3d 1004, 1012 (7th Cir.
2011).
Reasonable suspicion can be based on an informant’s tip if the tip
bears a sufficient indicia of reliability. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143,
147 (1972) (unverified tip from a reliable informant provided sufficient
reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop); United States v. Ganser,
315 F.3d 839, 843 (7th Cir. 2003). An informant’s tip is evaluated based
on the totality of the circumstances, which includes the informant’s
veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge, and whether the information
the informant provided is corroborated by independent investigation.
Ganser, 315 F.3d at 843.
In this case, the information known to Clayton, Deputy
Schieferdecker, and Deputy Kanoski was individualized and bore an
indicia of reliability. This was not a case involving an anonymous tip.
With an anonymous tip, the informant’s reputation cannot be assessed,
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he cannot be held responsible if the allegation is fabricated, and the basis
of the informant’s knowledge cannot be discerned. Florida v. J.L., 529
U.S. 266, 270 (2000); see also United States v. Brown, 366 F.3d 456,
459 (7th Cir. 2004).
As the evidence shows, Clayton received information from a known
informant that Plaintiff had made comments that he could and would
bring drugs into the Facility. Clayton believed the informant was
credible because the informant had provided credible information in the
past regarding a drug trafficking case involving another employee of the
Facility. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that the informant
was an inmate or employee of the Facility, which would indicate the basis
for the informant’s knowledge. Clayton provided the information to
Sheriff Schieferdecker, who in turn provided information to Deputy
Kanoski. Deputy Kanoski stopped Plaintiff on the way to work and
conducted the strip search after arresting Plaintiff on an outstanding
warrant. Under these facts, the Schuyler County Defendants had
reasonable suspicion to believe that Plaintiff was hiding contraband and
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the strip search did not violate Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
C.
Qualified Immunity
Even if the facts were not sufficient to support reasonable suspicion,
the Schuyler County Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity protects governmental actors “from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Qualified immunity balances the interest of holding “public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly” with the interest in
shielding officials from “liability when they perform their duties
reasonably.” Pearson v. Callhan, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009).
“[Q]ualified immunity provides ‘ample room for mistaken judgments’
and protects government officers except for the ‘plainly incompetent and
those who knowingly violate the law.’” Saffell v. Crews, 183 F.3d 655,
658 (7th Cir. 1999), quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229
(1991).
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To determine whether defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity, a court must determine: (1) “whether the facts alleged show
that the officer's conduct violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights” and
(2) “whether the right was clearly established in light of the specific
context of the case so that a reasonable official would have understood
that his conduct would violate the right.” Patterson v. Burns, 670
F.Supp.2d 837, 847 (S.D. Ind. 2009), citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 201 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, 129 S. Ct. 808. The
Court may, in its discretion, address the second prong of the test first.
Pearson, 129 S.Ct. at 821.
Addressing the second prong of this test, this Court concludes the
Schuyler County Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. It is
clearly established that an arrestee may not be strip searched without
reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is hiding contraband. Campbell,
499 F.3d at 716-18. However, the Schuyler County Defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity if a reasonable officer could have rationally
believed that his conduct was constitutional in light of the clearly
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established law and the information the officer possessed at the time the
incident occurred. Saffell, 183 F.3d at 658 (finding customs inspector
entitled to qualified immunity for strip search at customs checkpoint).
Taking the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the
Schuyler County Defendants acted reasonably in believing that justifiable
suspicion existed to strip search Plaintiff after his arrest. See, e.g.,
Varrone v. Bilotti, 123 F.3d 75, 79-80 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding it was
objectively reasonable for the officer to believe he was acting on the basis
of reasonable suspicion). As noted above, an informant known to
Clayton, who had provided credible information before, told Clayton that
Plaintiff had made comments that he could and would bring drugs into
the Facility. Sheriff Schieferdecker stated that Clayton told him several
sources, including inmates from the facility, had advised Clayton that
Plaintiff was transporting cannabis into the facility. Plaintiff was arrested
on his way to work after a search of the vehicle apparently revealed no
drugs or cannabis. Because a reasonable officer could have believed that
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his conduct was constitutional in light of the clearly established law and
the information known to the Schuyler County Defendants, the Schuyler
County Defendants are also entitled to qualified immunity on Count IV.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Schuyler County Defendant’s Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment (d/e 101) is GRANTED. Summary
judgment is entered in favor of the Defendant Don L. Schieferdecker and
Thomas Kanoski on Count IV of Plaintiff’s Verified Amended
Complaint. Defendant Kanoski is DISMISSED from the case.
ENTERED:
July 6, 2011
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATE DISTRICT JUDGE
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