Sanders v. Illinois Department of Central Management Services
Filing
110
OPINION: Defendant's Second Motion in Limine (d/e 104) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. See written Opinion. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 5/2/2012. (MJ, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 02 May, 2012 01:34:41 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
MICHAEL A. SANDERS,
Plaintiff,
v.
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CENTRAL MANAGEMENT
SERVICES,
Defendant
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No. 09-3207
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
This cause is before the Court on Defendant Illinois Department of
Central Management Services’ Second Motion in Limine (d/e 104). For
the reasons that follow, the Second Motion in Limine is GRANTED IN
PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
In August 2009, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against Defendant
alleging that Defendant violated § 12112(d)(4)(A) of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A)1. Specifically,
Plaintiff alleged Defendant violated the ADA by requiring him to submit
to a psychological independent medical examination (IME), disciplining
him for refusing to submit to the IME, and discharging him for refusing
to submit to the IME.
Thereafter, in late 2011, Plaintiff filed a partial motion for
summary judgment and Defendant filed a motion for summary
judgment. In February 2012, this Court denied the motions for
summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of material fact
remained. See Opinion (d/e 74). In that Opinion, this Court noted that
neither party had addressed whether a nondisabled Plaintiff may bring a
claim for a violation of § 12112(d) of the ADA. See Opinion (d/e 74),
pp. 20-21.
In March 2012, Defendant filed a proposed Pre-Trial Order (d/e
85) identifying as a question of law whether Plaintiff had standing to
1
“A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not make
inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual with a
disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such examination or
inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity.”
Page 2 of 8
bring the § 12112(d)(4)(A) claim. Thereafter, on March 20, 2012, this
Court appointed counsel to represent Plaintiff. On March 26, 2012, this
Court directed Plaintiff’s counsel to advise the Court whether he was
proceeding under the theory that Plaintiff is a “qualified individual with
a disability” or on the basis that a nondisabled plaintiff can sue for a
violation of § 12112(d). See March 26, 2012 Text Order.
On April 1, 2012, in response to this Court’s Text Order, Plaintiff’s
counsel filed a Status Report indicating that Plaintiff was proceeding
under the theory that he is a qualified individual with a disability as
defined in § 121022 of the ADA. On April 3, 2012, Defendant filed the
Second Motion in Limine at issue herein.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Motions in limine are disfavored, as courts prefer to resolve
questions of admissibility as they arise. Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v.
Echostar Satellite Corp., 2005 WL 289967, at *1 (N. D. Ill. 2005);
2
Defining disability to include an individual with “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
individual”, or with “a record of such an impairment”, or “regarded as having such an
impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(1).
Page 3 of 8
Hawthorn Partners v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1398,
1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993). “Only evidence that is clearly inadmissible for
any purpose should be excluded pursuant to a motion in limine[.]”
Tzoumis v. Tempel Steel Co., 168 F. Supp. 2d 871, 873 (N.D. Ill.
2001). Denial of a motion in limine does not mean that the evidence
will be admitted at trial but means only that the court could not
determine admissibility in advance of trial. United States v. Connelly,
874 F.2d 412, 416 (7th Cir. 1989).
III. ANALYSIS
In the Second Motion in Limine, Defendant interprets Plaintiff’s
Status Report as an indication that Plaintiff intended to expand his
claim beyond a claim for a violation of § 12112(d)(4)(A). Defendant
objects to Plaintiff’s attempt to do so on the basis that (1) the only
allegation raised in the Complaint was that Defendant violated §
12112(d)(4)(A); and (2) Plaintiff did not indicate an expansion of his
claim beyond § 12112(d)(4)(A) in his initial disclosures or the discovery
process.
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Defendant also objects to Plaintiff’s attempt to introduce evidence
that he was a qualified individual with a disability. Defendant asserts
that Plaintiff’s Complaint did not give any notice that Plaintiff was going
to pursue a claim of disability. Defendant further argues that, given the
lack of disclosure to Defendant, it is unclear whether Plaintiff has
established a viable claim as a qualified individual with a disability.
According to Defendant, to allow Plaintiff to pursue such claim at this
late date would prejudice Defendant.
Plaintiff, in his response to the Second Motion in Limine (d/e
109)3 , first asserts that the request to bar Plaintiff from presenting
evidence supporting allegations beyond § 12112(d)(4)(A) of the ADA is
overly broad. Plaintiff admits that he only alleged that Defendant
violated § 12112(d)(4)(A) of the ADA. Plaintiff argues, however, that
barring Plaintiff from presenting any and all evidence that may support
other potential allegations beyond § 12112(d)(4)(A) would likely bar
evidence that is also relevant to Plaintiff’s allegation that Defendant
3
This Court notes that although Defendant was granted until April 30, 2012
to file a reply, Defendant did not do so.
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violated § 12112(d)(4)(A). Plaintiff states, however, that to the extent
Defendant seeks to bar evidence supporting allegations beyond §
12112(d)(4)(A) that is also wholly irrelevant to the allegation that
Defendant violated § 12112(d)(4)(A), Plaintiff does not object.
Plaintiff also states that he does not object to Defendant’s request
to bar Plaintiff from presenting evidence that he is a “qualified individual
with a disability.” Plaintiff does not dispute that he failed to specifically
plead in his Complaint that he was a “qualified individual with a
disability.” To the extent that Plaintiff’s Complaint did not provide
Defendant notice of Plaintiff’s intention to pursue a claim of disability,
Plaintiff does not object to Defendant’s request to bar Plaintiff from
presenting evidence that he is a qualified individual with a disability.
Plaintiff requests, however, that the Court allow him to proceed under
the alternative theory that a nondisabled individual can bring suit under
§ 12112(d) of the ADA.
The Court accepts Plaintiff’s concessions. Plaintiff only alleged in
his Complaint a violation of § 12112(d)(4)(A) of the ADA. Therefore,
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Plaintiff is not entitled, at this late date, to change the nature of his
claim to a claim of disability discrimination or any other claim beyond
that which he alleged in his Complaint. However, this Court cannot
determine at this point in the litigation whether all evidence that would
support a claim other than a claim under § 12112(d)(4)(A) should be
barred, as such evidence might also be relevant to Plaintiff’s §
12112(d)(4)(A) claim. Therefore, this Court does not, at this time, bar
all such evidence but will make that determination at trial.
This Court also accepts Plaintiff’s concession that Plaintiff be
barred from presenting evidence that he is a qualified individual with a
disability. Moreover, Plaintiff is allowed to proceed under the
alternative theory that a nondisabled individual can bring suit under §
12112(d) of the ADA. Nonetheless, the parties have never briefed the
issue of whether a nondisabled individual can bring suit under §
12112(d) of the ADA, and this Court is not deciding whether such claim
is viable. The Court is simply allowing Plaintiff to amend his Status
Report to indicate that he is proceeding under the theory that a
Page 7 of 8
nondisabled individual can bring suit under § 12112(d) of the ADA.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Defendant’s Second Motion in Limine (d/e
104) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
ENTER: May 2, 2012
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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