Suhadolnik v. United States of America

Filing 34

ORDER denying 32 Motion for Reconsideration ; ORDER DISMISSING CASE. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 7/1/2011. (CT, ilcd)

E-FILED

Friday, 01 July, 2011 03:14:29 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
MICHAEL F. SUHADOLNIK,

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Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant/Counterclaimant,
v.
MICHAEL F. SUHADOLNIK, and
JAMES A. YAGOW,
Counterclaim-Defendants.

10-3021

OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
The Court now considers Defendant/Counterclaimant United
States of America’s Supplemental Brief and Motion for Reconsideration
and/or Clarification (the “Motion”) (d/e 32). For the reasons stated
below, the Motion is DENIED.

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FACTS
On January 27, 2010, Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant Michael F.
Suhadolnik filed a Complaint against the Government for a $938.36 tax
refund pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6672. See d/e 1. On February 17, 2010,
the Government moved for summary judgment on Mr. Suhadolnik’s
claim. The Government also sought summary judgment on a
$263,628.71 counterclaim it filed against Mr. Suhadolnik, for his unpaid
taxes.
On June, 1, 2011, the Court entered summary judgment for the
Government as to Mr. Suhadolnik’s $263,628.71 tax liability. See
Opinion (d/e 31) at 23. However, because the Government presented no
evidence or argument as to the validity of the $938.36 refund claim, the
Court denied the Government’s attempt to gain summary judgment on
that claim.
On June 9, 2011, the Government filed the instant Motion, seeking
“reconsideration and/or clarification. The Motion is fully briefed and
ripe for ruling.

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STANDARD
Motions for reconsideration can be filed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)
or Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). A litigant who moves for reconsideration within
28 days of the entry of judgment has discretion to file under either
procedural rule. Compare Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) (imposing 28-day deadline)
and Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) (imposing deadline of not more than one year
after entry of judgment).
Rule 59(e) motions may not be used to cure defects that could have
been addressed earlier. See Sigsworth v. City of Aurora, Ill., 487 F.3d
506, 511-12 (7th Cir. 2007). A Rule 59(e) motion will be granted only if
there is a manifest error of law or fact, or newly discovered evidence. See
Bordelon v. Chicago School Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 529
(7th Cir. 2000). By comparison, Rule 60(b) motions are not meant to fix
legal errors. See Marques v. Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 286 F.3d
1014, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A legal error by the district court is not
one of the specified grounds for [a Rule 60(b)] motion. In fact it is a
forbidden ground”).

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Since the standard for obtaining relief under Rule 59(e) is
considerably less than the standard required by Rule 60(b), “it behooves
[a litigant] to indicate that [its] motion is under Rule 59(e).” See Ball v.
City of Chicago, 2 F.3d 752, 760 (7th Cir. 1993). In violation of Local
Rule 7.1(B)(1), the Government does not identify under which
procedural rule it is moving. See id. (“Every motion raising a question of
law . . . [must among other things] identif[y] the Rule under which the
motion is filed.”). Nevertheless, the Court will not only consider the
Government’s Motion, the Court will apply the more forgiving Rule
59(e) standard instead of the harsher Rule 60(b) standard.
ANALYSIS
The Government asserts: “[it] is unclear whether the Court’s
Opinion holds as a matter of undisputed fact that the Court has
jurisdiction over Mr. Suhadolnik’s claim, or whether it holds that Mr.
Suhadolnik’s allegations are sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact
regarding jurisdiction that needs to be resolved.” See Motion at 2.
Contrary to the Government’s assertion, the Court’s Opinion recited the

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necessary elements of a refund claim, stated the relevant facts, and then
held that the “factual allegations are sufficient to fulfill the jurisdictional
requirements of a [26 U.S.C. § 6672] refund claim.” See Opinion (d/e
31) at 15-16. As such, there is nothing that needs to be reconsidered or
clarified in that regard.
As a secondary matter, the Government asks the Court to
reconsider its refusal to grant the Government summary judgment as to
Mr. Suhadolnik’s refund claim. See Motion at 3. The Government
contends that summary judgment should have been entered in its favor
because: “. . . Mr. Suhadolnik [failed] to come forward with sufficient
evidence to support his jurisdictional allegations at the summary
judgment stage, as he has the burden of proof of those elements.” Id.
The Government seems to misunderstand that while Mr.
Suhadolnik—as the party seeking a refund—bore the burden at trial of
establishing his entitlement to a refund, the Government—as the party
seeking summary judgment—bore the burden of proving entitlement to
summary judgment on Mr. Suhadolnik’s refund claim. See Celotex Corp.

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v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (the party moving for summary
judgment bears the burden of establishing there is no genuine issue of
material fact and that judgment as a matter of law is proper). Instead of
presenting evidence proving that Mr. Suhadolnik was not entitled to a
refund, the Government’s summary judgment motion merely asserted
that Mr. Suhadolnik “has not introduced evidence” that he paid the
withholding tax. As a matter of record, Mr. Suhadolnik’s response brief
did argue that he paid the withholding tax. See Response By Michael
Suhadolnik, Pro Se, To the United States’s Motion for Summary
Judgment Against Defendant Michael Suhadolnik (d/e 28) at 40. The
Court’s Opinion noted that argument. See id. at 15-16.
In any event, the Government’s instant Motion concedes that Mr.
Suhadolnik was entitled to a $938.36 refund. Moreover, the
Motion—citing Exhibits 1a-1j of its summary judgment motion (d/e
28)—states for the first time that $938.36 was credited towards Mr.
Suhadolnik’s tax liability. Id. at 2.
In his response to the Government’s Motion, Mr. Suhadolnik states

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that if the $938.36 has been properly credited, devoting further attention
to this case would be “a waste of time and money”. The Court agrees.
Having reviewed the exhibits cited by the Government, and having
confirmed that the $938.36 was used to partially offset Mr. Suhadolnik’s
tax liability, the Court finds that the $938.36 has already been credited.
Since the refund issue could have been properly addressed in the
Government’s Rule 56(c) motion, the Court would not ordinarily be able
to resolve the $938.36 refund issue at this juncture. However, because
Mr. Suhadolnik has stated his willingness to forgo further contest if the
$938.36 is properly credited—and there is now confirmation that the
credit has been duly applied—the matter should not proceed for this
reason.
CONCLUSION
THEREFORE, Defendant/Counterclaimant United States of
America’s Supplemental Brief and Motion for Reconsideration and/or
Clarification is (d/e 32) DENIED. However, consistent with the Court’s
June 1, 2011, Opinion, Mr. Suhadolnik is liable for $263,628.71, plus

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interest from February 8, 2011. Mr. Suhadolnik is not entitled to any
offset or reduction. The case is CLOSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

July 1, 2011

ENTERED BY:

s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSOUGH
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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