Gekas v. Vasiliades et al
Filing
74
OPINION entered by Judge Richard Mills on 7/3/2013. The Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and to Enforce Settlement Agreement, d/e 68 is DENIED, as provided in this Order. Daniel Bluthardt is terminated as a party pursuant to the Suggestion of Death, d/e 72 . Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 7/3/2013. (MAS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Monday, 08 July, 2013 03:57:52 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
MARK GEKAS,
)
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Plaintiff,
)
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v.
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)
PETER VASILIADES, MARY
)
RANIELL, JOHN LAGATUTTA,
)
DANIEL BLUTHARDT, JOHN
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KRISKO, FRANK MAGGIO,
)
ROBERT J. SCHAFER, KAREN
)
SCHROCK, and ALLEN J. SHAPIRO, )
)
Defendants.
)
NO. 10-3066
OPINION
RICHARD MILLS, U.S. District Judge:
Pending before the Court is the Motion of the Defendants for Partial
Summary Judgment and to Enforce a Settlement Agreement.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On February 13, 2009, Plaintiff Mark Gekas filed a complaint in
Sangamon County Circuit Court against Michael T. McRaith, the Acting
Secretary of the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional
Regulation (“IDFPR” or “the Department”). The complaint alleged that
the Department failed to comply with the Illinois Freedom of Information
ACT (“FOIA”) by not producing certain information in response to a
December 9, 2008 FOIA request.
On March 3, 2010, the Plaintiff and his Counsel signed a settlement
agreement. Counsel for IDFPR signed the agreement on March 11, 2010.
The document, which is attached to the Defendants’ motion, is titled
“Settlement Agreement and General Release of Claim for Attorney’s Fees,
Costs and Expenses.” The “Recitals” portion of the settlement agreement
provides in part:
WHEREAS, the Plaintiff has subsequently filed a petition
for attorney’s fees, costs and expenses (hereinafter referred to as
“Petition”); and
WHEREAS, so as to avoid further expense and in
recognition of the positions of the parties to the above case, the
parties wish to settle and compromise the pending claim for
attorney’s fees, costs and expenses.
There is no language in the “Recitals” which expresses an intent to settle
the alleged “violations of rights protected by statute(s), regulation(s),
common law, the Constitution of the State of Illinois and/or the
Constitution of the United States,” as asserted in the complaint filed in
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Sangamon County Circuit Court.
The Plaintiff received $2,500 as part of the settlement agreement.
The Plaintiff also signed a release and waiver providing that:
The Plaintiff and his attorney agree to release, waive and
relinquish and hereby release and forever discharge the
Defendant in his individual capacities, the Illinois Department
of Financial and Professional regulation and the State of
Illinois, their agents, former and present employees, successors,
heirs and assigns and all other persons (hereinafter “Releases”)
from all actions, claims, demands, setoffs, suits, causes of
action, or rights to attorney’s fees, costs and expenses allegedly
incurred or due in the action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section
1988, or under any other statute, rule or common law provision
arising from the alleged failure of the Department to comply
with the Freedom of Information Act as set forth in the
Complaint.
The Plaintiff was represented by counsel and entered into the Agreement
“as a free and voluntary act with full knowledge of its legal consequences.”
On March 30, 2010, the Plaintiff and his attorney signed a stipulation
to dismiss the state court FOIA lawsuit. The stipulation was then signed
by counsel for the Defendant and filed on March 31, 2010. On April 2,
2010, the Sangamon County Circuit Court entered an agreed order and
dismissed the FOIA lawsuit with prejudice.
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On March 18, 2010, the Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this Court.
On February 8, 2011, the Plaintiff filed his Second Amended Complaint.
The Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, who are current and former
employees of the Department, retaliated against him in violation of the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution by, among other
things, refusing to comply with the FOIA and not adequately responding
to a December 9, 2008 FOIA request, which resulted in the 2009 lawsuit
in Sangamon County Circuit Court.
II. DISCUSSION
The parties dispute whether the settlement agreement which led to
the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s FOIA claim waives any claims related to his
FOIA claim. The Defendants claim that it does and seek partial summary
judgment as to that limited issue. The Court notes that the Defendants
raised this issue in the memorandum in support of their motion for
judgment on the pleadings.1 However, the issue was not ruled upon. The
The relevant portion states: “Additionally, as part of the
settlement agreement, Plaintiff gave up his right to sue under § 1983 for
any facts related to that case. This Court should therefore enforce the
settlement agreement and bar Plaintiff from suing based on the FOIA
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Plaintiff asserts that the key language in the settlement agreement releases
only claims for attorney’s fees and costs arising from the FOIA action.
A. Legal standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the motion is properly supported
and “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
Court construes all inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. See Siliven v. Indiana
Dept. of Child Services, 635 F.3d 921, 925 (7th Cir. 2011). To create a
genuine factual dispute, however, any such inference must be based on
something more than “speculation or conjecture.”
See Harper v. C.R.
England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
B. Settlement agreement and release
The Defendants first contend they are entitled to summary judgment
on the Plaintiff’s FOIA claim because he released and waived any right to
pursue it by signing the settlement agreement. Release and waiver are
affirmative defenses to a lawsuit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). There was no
case.” See Doc. No. 53, at 18.
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coercion in the execution of the settlement agreement.
Because a settlement agreement is a contract, its interpretation and
enforcement is governed by basic contract principles. See Gutta v. Standard
Select Trust Ins. Plans, 530 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2008).
When
interpreting a contract under Illinois law, courts attempt to construe the
document as the parties intended based on the terms of the written
agreement. See Lewitton v. ITA Software, Inc., 585 F.3d 377, 379 (7th Cir.
2009). A court first examines whether a contract is ambiguous. See id. An
ambiguous contract has terms which are indefinite or have a double
meaning. See id. If there is no ambiguity, a contract will be enforced as it
was written.
See id. at 380. Unless a contract is subject to multiple
interpretations, a court does not examine extrinsic evidence in determining
intent. See id.
At first glance, the applicable language in the release is somewhat
confusing.
It is not immediately apparent upon reading the language
whether the settlement agreement releases all known claims and/or causes
of action or whether it is limited to attorney’s fees. The key language is
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that the Plaintiff is releasing the IDFPR and State from:
all actions, claims, demands, setoffs, suits, causes of action, or
rights to attorney’s fees, costs and expenses allegedly incurred
or due in the Action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988, or
under any other statute, rule or common law provision arising
from the alleged failure of the Department to comply with the
Freedom of Information Act as set forth in the Complaint.
The Defendants assert that the release of a claim for attorney’s fees is only
one of the types of claims released in the waiver.
They contend the
Plaintiff also waived his right to pursue any and all other causes of action
related to the FOIA action. The Plaintiff alleges he is simply waiving any
claim, action, cause of action, suit, etc. for attorney’s fees arising from “the
Action,” which refers to the Sangamon County lawsuit.
The Defendants’ interpretation of the release might be plausible if the
document at issue was not titled “Settlement Agreement and General
Release of Claim for Attorney’s Fees, Costs and Expenses.” Moreover, on
page 1, the parties mention the Action and the petition for attorney’s fees,
costs and expenses and then recite the purpose of the settlement agreement:
“to avoid further expense and in recognition of the positions of the parties
to the above case, the parties wish to settle and compromise the pending claim
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for attorneys’s fees, costs and expenses.” The parties do not express an intention
to settle and compromise the Action.
Accordingly, the release does not serve to release all claims related to
the FOIA action.
Thus, the Court rejects the Defendants’ proposed
interpretation of the Settlement Agreement and General Release of Claims
for Attorney’s Fees, Costs and Expenses.
The Plaintiff points to other circumstances which appear to support
his interpretation of the release. The settlement agreement was executed
approximately three months after the Plaintiff filed a motion for attorney’s
fees, which followed the circuit court’s order that the Department was to
turn over documents to the Plaintiff pursuant to the FOIA lawsuit. The
motion sought an award of $2,963.17 in attorney’s fees and expenses.
Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the parties agreed the Department
would pay the Plaintiff $2,500.00 in consideration for the full and complete
settlement of the claim for attorney’s fees, costs and expenses. These
factors support the Plaintiff’s interpretation of the release.
Accordingly, the Defendants are not entitled to partial summary
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judgment based on the language of the release.
C. Rooker-Feldman doctrine
The Defendants next contend that Plaintiff’s FOIA action is barred
by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.2 The doctrine is a jurisdictional limitation
which “prevents lower federal courts from reviewing state-court judgments,
over which only the United States Supreme Court has federal appellate
jurisdiction.” Crawford v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 647 F.3d 642, 645
(7th Cir. 2011). It is a narrow doctrine which precludes federal courts from
hearing “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Commonwealth Plaza Condominium Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 693
F.3d 743, 745 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).
The complaint in the state court action alleges that on December 9,
The doctrine takes its name from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263
U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983).
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2008, the Plaintiff, through his attorney, sent a FOIA request to the
Department wherein he sought a number of documents. The letter from
counsel sought “[a]ll files of the Department of Financial and Professional
Regulation (including but not limited to the files of the past and present
Medical Coordinators and Dental Coordinators, and including but not
limited to files located both in Springfield and Chicago) pertaining to Dr.
Gekas.” The Plaintiff then listed fifteen separate files, documents, forms,
orders, rules, etc., while stating that the request was not limited to these
specified documents. The Plaintiff settled the case and signed a stipulation
to dismiss. On April 2, 2010, the Sangamon County Circuit Court entered
a final order and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Plaintiff did not
appeal.
In this case, paragraph 16 of the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint notes
that Plaintiff in 2009 filed suit under the FOIA in Sangamon County
Circuit Court to recover documents related to the various actions
undertaken by the Department and its employees. The documents were
ordered to be provided.
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Paragraph 27 of the Amended Complaint states, “The Defendants,
acting collectively, have repeatedly refused to respond to FOIA requests
made by Gekas. This included a request to the Defendants on December
9, 2008.”
Paragraph 28 of the Amended Complaint provides:
The reason for not providing the FOIA requests were a
continuing attempt on the part of the defendants to retaliate
against Gekas for exercising his First Amendment rights. Gekas
was forced to bring a lawsuit seeking the documents. Despite
its unavailability under the law, the defendants sought to take
discovery from Gekas in an attempt to ascertain his motivations
for wanting the documents he requested.
In paragraph 29, the Plaintiff appears to allege retaliation which began in
the summer of 2009. The alleged retaliation “was done solely to harass
Gekas for his previous acts of speaking out.”
The Court notes that the complaint filed in Sangamon County Circuit
Court was for declaratory and injunctive relief. In this case, the Plaintiff
appears to be alleging retaliation based on the exercise of his First
Amendment rights.
It does not appear that the Plaintiff in this case is requesting any
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documents that were part of the Sangamon County case. To the extent
that Plaintiff is seeking such documents, the Court concludes that such a
request is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine pursuant to the parties’
settlement and dismissal with prejudice.
However, this is a case wherein the Plaintiff seeks damages based on
the retaliatory conduct alleged in the Complaint, some of which at least
relates back to the time frame of the earlier case. Because the Plaintiff
sought equitable relief in the earlier case, the Court is unable to conclude
that the narrow Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars this action for damages. The
Plaintiff is not seeking review of the Sangamon County Circuit Court case.
These are two distinct matters. Accordingly, summary judgment is not
appropriate based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
D. Res Judicata
The Defendants further assert that this action is barred by the
doctrine of res judicata. Res judicata applies if there is (1) a final judgment
on the merits in an earlier action; (2) an identity of the causes of action;
and (3) an identity of parties or their privies. See River Park, Inc. v. City of
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Highland Park, 184 Ill.2d 290, 302 (1998).
The cause of action at issue here is similar, though not identical, to
the Sangamon County case.
That case sought the production of
documents. The alleged retaliation in this case is based, at least in part, on
the Plaintiff’s request for documents which was the subject of the earlier
case. Thus, most of the alleged retaliation appears to have occurred after
the complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief was filed–in conducting
discovery and/or to harass the Plaintiff for the exercise of his First
Amendment rights.
Because the Sangamon County Circuit Court case was an equitable
action which did not include a jury demand, the Court is unable to
conclude there was an identity between the causes of action. Accordingly,
all of the elements of res judicata are not present.
Ergo, the Defendants’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and to
Enforce Settlement Agreement [d/e 68] is DENIED, as provided in this
Order.
Pursuant to the Suggestion of Death of Defendant Daniel Bluthardt
[d/e 72], the Clerk is Directed to terminate Daniel Bluthardt as a party.
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ENTER: July 3, 2013
FOR THE COURT:
s/Richard Mills
s/Richard Mills
United States District Judge
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