O'Keefe v. Gist et al
Filing
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OPINION: The Court DENIES Defendants' Motion for Attorney's Fees as sanctions for an alleged Rule 11 violation. (d/e 26 ). Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 10/2/2012. (ME, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 02 October, 2012 05:24:46 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
PATRICK O’KEEFE,
Plaintiff,
v.
HAROLD GIST, in his capacity as
police officer, and THE CITY OF
GIRARD, ILLINOIS, an Illinois
municipal corporation,
Defendants.
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No. 10-cv-03149
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for
Attorney’s Fees brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
(d/e 26.) For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES Defendants’
Motion.
BACKGROUND
On June 24, 2010, Plaintiff, Patrick O’Keefe, filed a three-count
Complaint against the City of Girard and Sergeant Harold Gist of the
Girard Police Department. (d/e 1.) The Complaint included: (1) a 28
U.S.C. § 1983 action for an alleged denial of property without due
process of law; (2) a declaratory judgment action brought pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2201; and (3) a state law tort claim for conversion. The
Complaint stemmed from an incident where Sergeant Gist found
Plaintiff’s dog, but Gist gave it to another individual after he was unable
to identify the owner. (Compl. ¶ 16).
Magistrate Judge Cudmore issued a Report and Recommendation
in this matter that dismissed all three Counts for failure to state a claim.
(d/e 21.) See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff timely filed an objection
to the Report and Recommendation. (d/e 22.) Subsequently, this Court
adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. (d/e 24.)
Defendants now file a Motion for Attorneys Fees as sanctions for an
alleged violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. (d/e 26).
LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) requires attorneys to make a
reasonable inquiry into the facts and law prior to presenting any
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pleading, motion, or other paper before the court, so that the court may
certify that:
(1)
it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such
as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needlessly
increase the cost of litigation;
(2)
the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein
are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3)
the allegations and other factual contentions have
evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are
likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4)
the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the
evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably
based on a lack of information or belief.
Under Rule 11, a district court may impose sanctions if a lawsuit is
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“not well grounded in fact and is not warranted by existing law or a good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing
law.” Nat’l Wrecking Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 731, 990
F.2d 957, 963 (7th Cir. 1993). See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b), (c). The
court must “undertake an objective inquiry into whether the party or his
counsel should have known that his position is groundless.” Id. (quoting
CNPA v. Chicago Web Printing Pressmen’s Union No. 7, 821 F.2d 390,
397 (7th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted)).
ANALYSIS
This Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s reasons for dismissing
each Count for the following reasons. (d/e 24). First, Sergeant Gist
acted without authority. Therefore, Plaintiff needed, but failed to allege
in Count I that the post deprivation remedies in this case proved
insufficient. (Report & Recommendation, p. 11-13.) Second, the
Constitution only required Gist to visually inspect the dog to conform
with due process. Thus, Plaintiff failed to state a valid Monell claim
against Girard in Count I “even if Gist’s actions were somehow
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authorized by some alleged unwritten police policy or custom that
misinterpreted the ordinance.” (Report & Recommendation, p. 17); see
also Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Third,
Plaintiff did not state a claim for declaratory relief in Count II because
no actual controversy existed between the parties. Plaintiff has already
obtained his dog in a state replevin action. Further, the chance that
another injury could occur as a result of the same ordinance proved only
speculative in this case. (Report & Recommendation, p. 18.) Finally,
the Court lacked supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claim in
Count III. (Report Recommendation 19.) That result flowed from
Plaintiff’s inability to state a valid federal law claim in Counts I or II. 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 103 F.3d
1346, 1351 (7th Cir. 1997).
The Court notes, however, that an unsuccessful case does not
render Rule 11 sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees appropriate.
Khan v. Gallitano, 180 F.3d 829, 837 (7th Cir. 1999) (“There is a
significant difference between making a weak argument with little chance
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of success . . . and making a frivolous argument with no chance of
success.”).
First, Plaintiff adequately supported his claim in Count I for a
deprivation of property in violation of the due process clause. See e.g.,
Siebert v. Severino, 256 F.3d 648, 659 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding a
procedural due process violation for a seizure of horses); Porter v.
Diblasio, 93 F.3d 301, 306-07 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying a procedural
due process claim to a wrongful deprivation of horses). The Court
recognizes that these cases fail to directly answer the questions that were
at issue–whether Gist acted within his authority and whether Girard
maintained a constitutionally impermissible unwritten policy or practice.
(Report Recommendation 11-13, 17.) But Rule 11 does not call for
penalties where an attorney or party asserts novel arguments
extrapolated from valid legal authority. See Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d
452 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that “a court may impose sanctions on a
party for making arguments or filing claims that are frivolous, legally
unreasonable, without factual foundation, or asserted for an improper
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purpose.”). Rather, Rule 11 condones such activity. See Fed.R.Civ.P.
11(b) (calling for pleadings to be “warranted by existing law or by a
nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of
existing law or the establishment of new law”).
Second, Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201(a) was not frivolous. Specifically, Plaintiff argued that the
ordinance “purports to automatically transfer ownership of a specific
class of property–domestic pets–from whoever the original owner is to
whoever takes care of such pet . . . .” (d/e 15). Plaintiff cited authority
to support the contention that “an ongoing constitutional violation”
renders injunctive relief appropriate. See Perry v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 905 F.Supp. 465, 470 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (granting summary
declaratory relief where village ordinance violated due process).
The Court disagreed with Plaintiff’s arguments, finding a
continuing harm unlikely–most notably because Plaintiff lives fifteen to
twenty miles southwest of Girard. (Report Recommendation 3.) The
Court’s findings, however, do not render Plaintiff’s arguments frivolous.
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Finally, the Court dismissed the state law conversion claim because
the Court lacked jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (stating
requirements for supplemental jurisdiction). The Court lacked
jurisdiction because it dismissed the first two claims that included federal
questions. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (stating the requirements for federal
question jurisdiction). The dismissal of Count III bore no relation to
any potential frivolity in Plaintiff’s conversion claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court DENIES Defendants’ Motion
for Attorney’s Fees as sanctions for an alleged Rule 11 violation. (d/e
26).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: October 2, 2012
FOR THE COURT
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATE DISTRICT JUDGE
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