Chambers v. USA
Filing
43
ORDER AND OPINION Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 7/6/16. Chamber's Rule 60(b) motion (d/e 40 ) is DENIED. Due to the unique circumstances facing Chambers, however, the Court GRANTS Chambers a certificate of appealability to appeal to the Seventh Circuit this Court's denial of Chambers' Rule 60(b) motion.(SW, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 06 July, 2016 11:31:06 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
KEITH CHAMBERS,
Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Respondent.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
3:10-cv-3191
ORDER AND OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Keith Chambers is currently serving a 14-year sentence in
federal prison. He has filed a motion seeking relief under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) (d/e 40). For the reasons below, the
motion (d/e 40) is DENIED, but the Court GRANTS Chambers a
certificate of appealability. If Chambers appeals, the Seventh
Circuit may choose to consider whether Chambers may be entitled
to relief given the unique nature of his circumstances.
I.
Background
Chambers was sentenced to prison in 2008. He opened this
civil case in 2010, when he filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
claiming that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel
Page 1 of 19
during his sentencing hearing. The Court appointed a lawyer, Jon
Noll, under the Criminal Justice Act to represent Chambers in
connection with the Section 2255 motion. On September 21, 2012,
the Court denied the Section 2255 motion and declined to issue
Chambers a certificate of appealability.
On October 3, 2012, Noll filed a notice of appeal and told
Chambers that his responsibilities as Chambers’ CJA lawyer had
ended. Chambers then pursued his case as if he were a pro se
litigant. He requested and received hearing transcripts and began
drafting arguments in support of his request for a certificate of
appealability from the Seventh Circuit.
On December 7, 2012, after not receiving any information
regarding his case from the Seventh Circuit for more than two
months, Chambers reached out to Noll. Chambers asked Noll to
send him any documents Noll had received from the Seventh Circuit
and to send a copy of any order Noll had received from the district
court releasing Noll from his appointment as Chambers’ lawyer.
Noll responded that he had not received any documents from
the Seventh Circuit since early October and that he never receives
an order releasing him from a CJA appointment. After this letter,
Page 2 of 19
Chambers never heard from Noll again and was unable to contact
him.
Under the impression that he was now definitely a pro se
litigant, Chambers began directing his questions to the Seventh
Circuit’s Pro Se Clerk. Twice, Chambers explained his situation
and asked about the process for appealing and submitting a brief in
support of his request for a certificate of appealability. Both times
the Pro Se Clerk responded that because Noll was still Chambers’
attorney of record, Noll would handle all the filings and receive all
documentation regarding the case. See Williams v. United States,
805 F.2d 1301, 1307 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Once … judgment has been
entered in a federal habeas case, counsel may withdraw only upon
the approval of this court [the Seventh Circuit].”), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1039 (1987).
On March 30, 2013, Chambers wrote to this Court,
summarizing his circumstances in a letter the Court characterized
as a Motion to Request Counsel. Noll filed a response to the motion
explaining that Noll no longer represented Chambers, that Noll had
submitted his final billing, and that Noll was not authorized to
practice before the Seventh Circuit. Again, Chambers believed that
Page 3 of 19
this confirmed that he was now in a position to file a pro se brief in
support of his request for a certificate of appealability, and he again
asked the Seventh Circuit’s Pro Se Clerk how to do so. But on May
9, 2013, the Seventh Circuit notified Chambers that his request for
a certificate of appealability had been denied almost nine weeks
earlier, on February 28, 2013. Indeed, on February 28, 2013, the
Seventh Circuit had entered an order construing Chambers’ notice
of appeal as an “application for a certificate of appealability” and
denying the application. Order, Chambers v. United States, No. 123278 (7th Cir. Feb. 28, 2013) (“We find no substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right. … Accordingly, the request for a
certificate of appealability is DENIED.”); see also West v. Schneiter,
485 F.3d 393, 394 (7th Cir. 2007) (“A notice of appeal acts as a
request for a certificate whether or not the prisoner files a separate
application.”).
On March 20, 2015, Chambers filed with the Seventh Circuit a
Motion for Relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6). The
Seventh Circuit denied the motion on the grounds that the motion
was an impermissible second or successive habeas petition.
Chambers then attempted to argue in a Rule 59(e) Motion to Amend
Page 4 of 19
that his Rule 60(b)(6) motion was solely attacking a procedural
defect in his habeas proceedings, but the Seventh Circuit concluded
that it was not authorized to consider the motion to amend.
Now, Chambers has filed a motion asking for relief from this
Court under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). Chambers
argues that he was denied due process when the Seventh Circuit
deprived him of an opportunity to make a substantial showing of a
denial of his constitutional rights by not letting him file a brief in
support of his request for a certificate of appealability after this
Court denied his Section 2255 motion. Chambers’ Rule 60(b)
motion was initially filed in his criminal case, but the Court directed
the motion to be re-filed in this existing habeas proceeding. (See
Text order, United States v. Chambers, No. 08-30059 (C.D. Ill. Apr.
6, 2016).
II.
Rule 60(b) allows a court to relieve a habeas petitioner
from a final judgment in rare circumstances.
Rule 60(b) allows a court to relieve a party from a final
judgment. If a habeas petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion raises claims
challenging his conviction or sentence, the motion “should be
considered a disguised second or successive § 2255 motion” and
Page 5 of 19
must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. United States v.
Washington, 653 F.3d 1057, 1063 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132
S.Ct. 1609 (2012). But a habeas petitioner can, in rare
circumstances, appropriately use Rule 60(b) to challenge a
procedural defect in the integrity of his habeas case itself. See
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005) (“Rule 60(b) has an
unquestionably valid role to play in habeas cases.”); Ramirez v.
United States, 799 F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 2015) (prisoner may use
Rule 60(b) in “rare circumstances”); Washington, 653 F.3d at 106364 (motion “alleg[ing] a defect in the integrity of the federal habeas
proceedings … constitutes a legitimate Rule 60(b) motion”) (internal
quotation omitted).
Here, Chambers’ Rule 60(b) motion is not a back-door effort to
file a second or successive Section 2255 motion. Chambers’ Rule
60(b) motion does not directly attack his conviction or sentence, as
a Section 2255 motion would do. Rather, Chambers’ Rule 60(b)
motion is an effort to “reopen his existing section 2255 proceeding
and overcome a procedural barrier to its adjudication.” Ramirez,
799 F.3d at 850. The procedural barrier at issue is Chambers’
inability to file a brief in support of his request for a certificate of
Page 6 of 19
appealability from this Court’s denial of Chambers’ Section 2255
motion.
Rule 60(b) contains six subsections providing justifications for
relief, but the relevant subsections here are Rule 60(b)(4) and Rule
60(b)(6). Rule 60(b)(4) allows a court to relieve a party from a
judgment if the judgment is “void.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). Rule
60(b)(6) provides a catch-all, allowing a court to relieve a party from
a judgment for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 60(b)(6). Chambers’ motion cites Rule 60(b)(4), but Rule 60(b)(6)
could also apply, and courts construe pro se motions liberally.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (“[a] document filed pro
se is to be liberally construed”) (internal quotation omitted); United
States v. Woods, 169 F.3d 1077, 1079 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Captions do
not matter; the court must determine the substance of the
motion.”).
III.
Chambers is not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(4).
Rule 60(b)(4) allows a court to relieve a party from a judgment
if the judgment is “void.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4). The rule applies
“in the rare instance where a judgment is premised either on a
certain type of jurisdictional error or on a violation of due process
Page 7 of 19
that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.”
United States Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 271
(2010). If the litigant received certain fundamental procedural
protections, such as adequate notice and an opportunity to be
heard, then a violation of due process did not occur. West v.
Champion, 363 Fed.Appx. 660, 663-64 (10th Cir. 2010) (district
court’s application of procedural bar to petitioner’s claim did not
violate due process where petitioner conceded he received adequate
notice of procedural bar and chose not to oppose its application in
three different courts); Cothrum v. Hargett, 178 Fed.Appx. 855,
857-58 (10th Cir. 2006) (no merit to petitioner’s assertions that he
was denied “Access to Courts” and “Notice and [a] right to object”
when district court transferred petitioner’s 60(b) motion to the
Tenth Circuit because petitioner was able to present his motions to
district court and had opportunity to argue his position in his
motion and his reply brief).
Here, Chambers was denied an opportunity to be heard in the
Seventh Circuit to the extent he wished when he was prevented
from filing a brief in support of his request for a certificate of
appealability. Chambers says this denial of his opportunity to be
Page 8 of 19
heard constituted a violation of due process such that the judgment
against him in his habeas case is void, making relief under Rule
60(b)(4) appropriate.
Chambers’ argument has a degree of intuitive appeal. In order
for the Seventh Circuit to issue a certificate of appealability, a
petitioner must make a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right. West v. Schneiter, 485 F.3d 393, 395 (7th Cir.
2007). But Chambers was not able to file a brief in which to
present the case for why he had been denied a constitutional right.
Rather, Chambers was able to file only a notice of appeal, which the
Seventh Circuit has described as a “silent document.” Id. at 395 (“A
notice of appeal does not give reasons, and a silent document rarely
constitutes a ‘substantial showing’ of anything.”). Indeed, a
petitioner “who relies [solely] on his notice of appeal is hard put” to
make a showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Id. If a
notice of appeal is not supplemented with any reasoning or support,
what reason would the Seventh Circuit have to grant a certificate of
appealability? Chambers found himself caught in the odd position
of trying to make a substantial showing of what he considered to be
a denial of a constitutional right, but being blocked from doing so.
Page 9 of 19
Allowing Chambers to support his notice of appeal with some sort of
brief, Chambers says, was necessary for Chambers to have had a
meaningful opportunity to be heard on why the Seventh Circuit
should issue him a certificate of appealability. Therefore, Chambers
says, relief under Rule 60(b)(4) is justified.
But for Chambers to be entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(4),
his inability to file a brief with the Seventh Circuit must have
constituted a violation of due process such that the judgment
against him in his habeas case is “void.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4).
Here, the Court cannot conclude that Chambers’ inability to file a
brief with the Seventh Circuit in support of his request for a
certificate of appealability constituted such a violation of due
process.
First, the Court gave extensive consideration to Chambers’
Section 2255 motion and provided Chambers with a considerable
amount of “process” to begin with. The Court directed the
Government to respond to Chambers’ Section 2255 motion, rather
than summarily dismissing the motion. After the Government
responded, the Court appointed counsel to represent Chambers and
scheduled an evidentiary hearing on Chambers’ claims. At the
Page 10 of 19
hearing, both Chambers and his lawyer from the criminal case
testified. After the hearing, the Court allowed the parties to file
post-hearing briefs. Finally, after reviewing those briefs, the Court
issued a 76-page opinion denying Chambers’ Section 2255 motion.
Second, although Chambers was prevented from filing a brief
in support of his request for a certificate of appealability from the
Court’s denial of the Section 2255 motion, no statute or Rule
mandates that a Section 2255 petitioner be allowed to file such a
brief. At the district court level, the Rules Governing Section 2255
Proceedings impliedly authorize the district court to grant or deny a
certificate of appealability without any briefing. See Rule Governing
Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts 11(a)
(“the court may direct the parties to submit arguments on whether
a certificate should issue”) (emphasis added). Similarly, at the
appellate level, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b)(2)
contemplates that the Seventh Circuit may treat a notice of appeal
itself as a request for a certificate and rule on the request without
further briefing. See Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(2) (“If no express request
for a certificate is filed, the notice of appeal constitutes a request
…”).
Page 11 of 19
Absent some authority directing otherwise—which Chambers
has not cited and the Court has not found—the Court cannot find
under the circumstances that being prevented from filing a brief in
support of a request for a certificate of appealability from the
Seventh Circuit constituted a due process violation such that the
judgment against Chambers is void.
IV.
Chambers may be entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(6).
Rule 60(b)(6) allows a court to relieve a party from a judgment
for “any other reason [not enumerated in Subsections (b)(1) through
(b)(5)] that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Rule 60(b)(6) “is
a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular
case.” West v. Champion, 363 Fed.Appx. 660, 664 (10th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation omitted); see also Ramirez v. United States, 799
F.3d 845, 851 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Rule 60(b)(6) is fundamentally
equitable in nature.”). But in considering Rule 60(b)(6) motions,
courts must balance the prevention of injustice with the desirability
for finality of judgments. Henness v. Bagley, 766 F.3d 550, 553-54
(6th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S.Ct. 1708 (2015). Only
“extraordinary circumstances” justify re-opening a final judgment
under Rule 60(b)(6), and in the habeas context such extraordinary
Page 12 of 19
circumstances “will rarely occur.” Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 535;
Ramirez, 799 F.3d at 851 (“At the same time, however … ‘rarely’
does not mean ‘never.’”).
Attorney abandonment can constitute an extraordinary
circumstance justifying relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Ramirez v.
United States, 799 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 2015). In Ramirez, the
district court denied the petitioner’s Section 2255 motion, but the
petitioner’s lawyer failed to tell the petitioner and failed to request a
certificate of appealability. After learning that his lawyer had
abandoned him, the petitioner filed an untimely notice of appeal,
which the Seventh Circuit dismissed for lack of appellate
jurisdiction. The petitioner then filed with the district court a Rule
60(b)(6) motion, arguing that the lawyer had provided ineffective
assistance of counsel by causing the petitioner to miss the appeal
deadline. The district court denied the motion, finding that the
right to counsel did not extend to Section 2255 proceedings. On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit agreed with the petitioner that the
petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion was “not a disguised second or
successive motion under section 2255” because the petitioner was
“not trying to present a new reason why he should be relieved of
Page 13 of 19
either his conviction or his sentence,” but rather was “trying to
reopen his existing section 2255 proceeding and overcome a
procedural barrier to its adjudication.” Id. at 850. The Seventh
Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of the Rule 60(b) motion
and held that the petitioner’s argument was indeed “cognizable
under Rule 60(b).” Id. at 848, 856 (“The district court …
categorically denied Ramirez’s motion under Rule 60(b)(6) without
discussing how postconviction counsel’s performance affected the
integrity of the proceedings. We agree with Ramirez that this
amounted to an abuse of discretion.”). The Seventh Circuit
remanded, directing the district court to grant the Rule 60(b)
motion and to reopen the Section 2255 proceedings.
To be sure, Chambers’ circumstances are not as extreme as
the circumstances facing the Ramirez petitioner. In Ramirez, the
petitioner’s lawyer failed: (1) to tell the petitioner that the district
court had denied the Section 2255 motion; and (2) to file a notice of
appeal. Id. at 850 (“Most importantly, postconviction counsel
abandoned Ramirez on appeal, thus depriving him of the
opportunity to pursue his … claims.”). Here, Chambers’ lawyer did
tell Chambers about the denial of Chambers’ Section 2255 motion,
Page 14 of 19
and Chambers’ lawyer did file a notice of appeal.
But the two cases are substantively similar. In both cases, the
petitioners were prevented from presenting any argument to the
Seventh Circuit as to why they should be granted a certificate of
appealability—in Ramirez due to attorney abandonment and, for
Chambers, at least arguably due to attorney abandonment, as his
lawyer withdrew from representing Chambers without filing a
motion to withdraw as required by Williams v. United States, 805
F.2d 1301, 1307 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Once … judgment has been
entered in a federal habeas case, counsel may withdraw only upon
the approval of this court.”), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1039 (1987).
The Seventh Circuit described the Ramirez lawyer’s
abandonment of Ramirez as “depriv[ing] Ramirez of the ability to
press his … argument on appeal.” 799 F.3d at 854 (emphasis
added). Chambers was similarly deprived of the ability to press his
own arguments on appeal to the Seventh Circuit. Although
Chambers’ lawyer did file a notice of appeal as explained above, a
notice of appeal is a “silent document”—making it difficult, if not
impossible, for a notice of appeal to make a substantial showing of
the deprivation of a constitutional right. Schneiter, 485 F.3d at 395
Page 15 of 19
(“a petitioner who relies on his notice of appeal is hard put to …
ma[k]e a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right”)
(internal quotation omitted). Because Chambers was unable to
supplement his notice of appeal with any reasoning or support, the
Seventh Circuit had little reason to consider granting a certificate of
appealability.
The Court finds that Chambers’ inability to file a brief in
support of his request for a certificate of appealability mirrors the
circumstances facing the Ramirez petitioner enough to suggest, at a
minimum, that Chambers may have a cognizable claim for relief
under Rule 60(b)(6). Accord Mackey v. Hoffman, 682 F.3d 1247,
1253 (9th Cir. 2012) (relief available under Rule 60(b)(6) where
lawyer never told petitioner about habeas motion’s denial, neglect
“amounting to attorney abandonment”); see also Tanner v. Yukins,
776 F.3d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 2015) (reversing denial of Rule 60(b)(6)
motion where circumstances causing untimely filing of notice of
appeal were beyond petitioner’s control). Chambers was unable to
file a brief with the Seventh Circuit in support of his request for a
certificate of appealability from this Court’s denial of his Section
2255 motion because his lawyer withdrew without filing a motion to
Page 16 of 19
withdraw as required by Williams. Allowing Chambers to submit a
brief with the Seventh Circuit in support of his request for a
certificate of appealability from this Court’s denial of his Section
2255 motion would provide Chambers with the relief he seeks.
V.
The Court denies Chambers’ Rule 60(b) motion because
the motion asks the Court, in effect, to overrule the
Seventh Circuit.
As explained above, Chambers may have a cognizable claim
for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). But to grant Chambers relief under
Rule 60(b), the Court would have to direct the Seventh Circuit to
allow Chambers to submit to the Seventh Circuit a brief in support
of his request for a certificate of appealability from this Court’s
denial of his Section 2255 motion, and the Court does not have the
authority to enter such an order. A district court has no authority
to overrule a decision made by a superior court. Reiser v.
Residential Funding Corp., 380 F.3d 1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2004) (“In
a hierarchical system, decisions of a superior court are
authoritative on inferior courts. Just as the court of appeals must
follow decisions of the Supreme Court … so district judges must
follow the decisions of this court whether or not they agree.”), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 1147 (2005); United States v. Castellanos, 608
Page 17 of 19
F.3d 1010, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Absent instructions to hold
further proceedings, a district court has no authority to re-examine
an issue settled by a higher court.”) (internal quotation omitted).
Here, the Seventh Circuit already denied Chambers’ request for a
certificate of appealability from this Court’s denial of Chambers’
Section 2255 motion. Moreover, Rule 60(b) outlines the
circumstances under which a district court “may correct its own
errors”—not the alleged errors of a higher court. David G. Seykora,
Recall of Appellate Mandates in Federal Civil Litigation, 64 Cornell
L. Rev. 704 (1979).
In light of this procedural context, Chamber’s Rule 60(b)
motion (d/e 40) is DENIED. Due to the unique circumstances
facing Chambers, however, the Court GRANTS Chambers a
certificate of appealability to appeal to the Seventh Circuit this
Court’s denial of Chambers’ Rule 60(b) motion. West v. Schneiter,
485 F.3d 393, 394 (7th Cir. 2007) (petitioner must obtain certificate
of appealability before appealing denial of Rule 60(b) motion). If
Chambers appeals, the Court invites the Seventh Circuit to
consider whether Chambers may be entitled to some relief, either
directly from the Seventh Circuit or from this Court on remand.
Page 18 of 19
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER: July 6, 2016
FOR THE COURT:
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Page 19 of 19
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?