Walker v. Saddler et al
Filing
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OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 2/8/2013. The Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted, d/e 33 . All pending motions are denied as moot, d/e 44 , and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. All deadlines and settings on the Court's calendar are vacated. If the Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). (MAS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 08 February, 2013 03:44:16 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
RONALD WALKER,
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Plaintiff,
v.
MICHELLE SADDLER, et al.
Defendants,
11-CV-3056
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, is detained in the Rushville
Treatment and Detention Center. He pursues claims arising from
the application of the “black box” restraint to him on four
transports outside of the facility in 2010 and early 2011.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Plaintiff’s general challenge to the black box policy fails to state a
claim under Miller v. Dobier, 634 F.3d 412, 414-15 (7th Cir. 2011),
which held that the addition of the “black box” restraint during
transports on outside writs is not a constitutionally significant
deprivation. Further, Plaintiff does not sue the individuals
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personally responsible for allegedly incorrectly applying the
restraints.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
"The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). A movant may demonstrate the absence of a material
dispute through specific cites to admissible evidence, or by showing
that the nonmovant “cannot produce admissible evidence to
support the [material] fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(B). If the movant
clears this hurdle, the nonmovant may not simply rest on his or her
allegations in the complaint, but instead must point to admissible
evidence in the record to show that a genuine dispute exists. Id.;
Harvey v. Town of Merrillville, 649 F.3d 526, 529 (7th Cir. 2011).
“In a § 1983 case, the plaintiff bears the burden of proof on the
constitutional deprivation that underlies the claim, and thus must
come forward with sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of
material fact to avoid summary judgment.” McAllister v. Price, 615
F.3d 877, 881 (7th Cir. 2010).
At the summary judgment stage, evidence is viewed in the
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light most favorable to the nonmovant, with material factual
disputes resolved in the nonmovant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute of
material fact exists when a reasonable juror could find for the
nonmovant. Id.
FACTS
Plaintiff is detained in the Rushville Treatment and Detention
Center pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Act.
On March 10, 2010, Plaintiff received a notice to appear before
the “Behavior Committee” on charges of unauthorized movement.
According to the notice, Plaintiff had been observed entering
another resident’s room and leaving that room carrying something.
(3/10/10 Notice, d/e 34-1, p. 11.) Plaintiff contends that he did
not have a meaningful opportunity to defend himself at the
disciplinary hearing and that he had only retrieved his own property
from the resident’s room.
The Behavior Committee found Plaintiff guilty of unauthorized
movement, dropping Plaintiff in “grade status,” which meant the
loss of some privileges. Because the Committee classified the
offense as “major,” Plaintiff was required to wear a “black box” on
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trips outside the facility for one year, in addition to the regular
hand and leg restraints. A “black box” is a plastic, rectangular box
that is applied after the handcuffs are applied. The box is placed
between the hands and over the handcuff chain. Miller v. Dobier,
634 F.3d 412, 414 (7th Cir. 2011).
Plaintiff alleges that he had to wear the black box on four trips
outside the facility, each round trip lasting a total of 10-15 hours.
He alleges that the black box caused him severe pain, swelling, and
numbness. (Compl., p. 17.)
ANALYSIS
As Judge Baker explained in his merit review order, Seventh
Circuit precedent precludes a procedural due process challenge to
the application of the black box to Plaintiff. (6/2/11 Order, d/e 8.)
In Thielman v. Leean, 282 F.3d 478, 480 (7th Cir. 2002), the
Seventh Circuit held that a person detained under Wisconsin’s
sexually violent persons law had no constitutionally-protected
liberty interest in avoiding waist belt, leg chains and other
restraints, including the black box. More recently, the Seventh
Circuit held that a detainee at the Rushville Treatment and
Detention Center had no procedural due process claim because the
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deprivations he had suffered—demotion in status and application of
the black box for one year—were not the kind of “‘atypical and
significant’” deprivations that might trigger procedural due process
protections. Miller v. Dobier, 634 F.3d 412, 415 (7th Cir.
2011)(quoted cite omitted).
Judge Baker granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on a possible substantive due process challenge to the use
of the black box. However, Miller and Thielman foreclose a
substantive due process claim as well. If the black box is not an
atypical and significant deprivation, then its use offends neither
procedural nor substantive due process. See Levi v. Thomas, 2011
WL 2880766 * 2 (7th Cir. 2011)(unpublished)(Rushville resident’s
procedural and substantive due process challenge to application of
black box for a “major violation” could not succeed because the
resident had no constitutionally protected interest in avoiding black
box). To the extent Plaintiff seeks to distinguish his facts from the
facts in Miller and Thielman, Plaintiff presents no evidence that,
applied properly, the black box amounts to an atypical and
significant deprivation, either generally or in his specific case. See
Facility Directive 3.0006 (III)(A)(1)(“Security devices shall be applied
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to wrists, waist, and ankles in a secure manner, but so as not to
restrict circulation.”)(d/e 43-2, p. 6). In short, the use of the black
box is not considered “punishment” under constitutional standards.
This conclusion does not foreclose a claim based on the
improper application of the black box. For example, a claim might
arise if the black box were applied too tightly, causing pain and
injury, or if a resident had a medical condition precluding the use of
the black box restraint.
Plaintiff does allege that he suffered “sever[e] pain, swelling of
his wrist and hands, numbness, and los[s] of feeling in his hands”
each time he wore the black box. (Compl. p. 17.) However, Plaintiff
does not sue the individual officers who applied the black box to
him on the four occasions he traveled outside the facility. A
Defendant holding a supervisory position, like the Defendants here,
are not liable for a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct. Chavez
v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir. 2001)(no
respondeat superior liability under § 1983). Supervisors are liable
only if they were personally responsible for the constitutional
violation, meaning that they participated in, directed, condoned, or
turned a blind eye to the constitutional violation. Matthews v. City
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of East St. Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012)(“To show
personal involvement, the supervisor must ‘know about the conduct
and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of
what they might see.’”)(quoted cite omitted); Kuhn v. Goodlaw, 678
F.3d. 552, 555 (7th Cir. 2012)(Ҥ 1983 liability is premised on the
wrongdoer's personal responsibility”). Plaintiff presents no evidence
that the Defendants were personally responsible for an officer’s
improper application of the black box to Plaintiff. Accordingly,
summary judgment is mandated for Defendants.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted (d/e
33). The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in
favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All pending motions
are denied as moot (d/e 44), and this case is terminated, with
the parties to bear their own costs. All deadlines and settings
on the Court’s calendar are vacated.
2. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of
judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for leave to appeal
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in forma pauperis should identify the issues Plaintiff will
present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c).
ENTER:
February 8, 2013
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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