Lingle v. Kibby et al
Filing
236
OPINION: IT IS ORDERED: (1) Plaintiff's motions for the Court to appoint an expert are denied (d/e's 206 , 223 ). (2) The motions for summary judgment are denied (d/e 212 , 219 ). (3) Plaintiff's motion for an extension to respon d to the dispositive motions is granted (d/e 217 ). Plaintiff has filed his response. (4) Defendants' motions for extensions to file replies are granted (d/e's 226 , 227 ). The replies have been filed. (5)Defendant Jumper's motion to join the DHS Defendants' motion to strike is granted (d/e 233 ). (6) Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's reply filed as docket entry 230 is denied (d/e 231 ). (7)Plaintiff's motion for docket entries is granted (d/e [ 218]) to the extent Plaintiff seeks a copy of the docket sheet. (8)Plaintiff's motion for counsel is denied (d/e 223 ). (9) This case is referred to the Magistrate Judge to conduct a settlement conference. (10) By July 10, 2017, Plaintiff is di rected to file a notice with the Court setting forth in detail the injunctive relief he seeks (i.e., what he wants the Court to order Defendants to do) and stating whether he seeks money damages as well. The notice should be short and plain. (11) Th e clerk is directed to mail a copy of the docket sheet to Plaintiff. (12) The clerk is directed to notify the Magistrate Judge of the referral of this case for a settlement conference. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 6/30/17.
E-FILED
Friday, 30 June, 2017 12:08:04 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
LAWRENCE LINGLE,
Plaintiffs,
v.
ALFREDA KIBBY, et al.,
Defendants.
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No. 11-CV-3101
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This case began as a challenge to the restrictions on video
gaming systems and other electronic devices at the Rushville
Treatment and Detention Center, a facility housing individuals
pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Act.
This Court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The
Seventh Circuit reversed as to the ban on video gaming systems.
Lingle v. Kibby, 526 Fed. Appx. 665 (7th Cir. 2013). Thereafter, in a
different case, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the restriction on video
gaming consoles that have internet capability, but reversed as to a
claim challenging the restrictions on certain movies and video
games. Brown v. Phillips, 801 F.3d 849 (7th Cir. 2015). Discovery
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was reopened in this case, and the Court later defined the
remaining claim in this case as a challenge to the prohibitions on
certain movie and video games. (12/4/15 text order.)
Defendants have filed summary judgment motions on that
claim. The problem with Defendants’ summary judgment motions
is that Defendants do not grapple with the Seventh Circuit’s
concerns expressed in Brown. Brown can be read as requiring
objective data to support Defendants’ conclusion that the prohibited
movies and games might actually further security and rehabilitation
goals. Common sense is not enough. Brown, 801 F.3d at 854
(“some data is needed to connect the goal of reducing the recidivism
of sex offenders with a ban on their possessing legal adult
pornography.”); see also Payton v. Cannon, 806 F.3d 1109 (7th Cir.
2015)(affirming prison’s ban on sexually explicit materials primarily
because plaintiff offered no evidence to counter, but noting that
scientific analysis and data are the preferable basis to inform prison
policy, not warden’s impressions).
Dr. Jumper cites his consultations with unidentified
professionals and his education and experience, but his
conclusions still seem largely based on unsupported assumptions.
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He also cites various studies on pornography and sexual
aggression, which are not attached to the motion. He does not
adequately explain the basis for his conclusion that these studies
support restricting these particular movies and video games. For
example, the relevance of a study on violent pornography to the
prohibition on a game with “partial nudity, sexual themes,
simulated gambling” is not apparent. (“Dead or Alive Extreme
Beach Volleyball,” d/e 165-2, p. 15.) How do the studies on
pornography and aggression support the prohibition of the movie
“An Officer and a Gentleman” or “Horrible Bosses”? (d/e 264-3, p.
12.) The restricted list also states that “staff has the right to refuse
any movie that appears questionable to staff.” (d/e 264-3, p. 8.)
Who is authorized to exercise that discretion and how?
Dr. Jumper points out that a conditionally released resident
must abide by certain rules, including a rule against possessing
“material that is pornographic, sexually oriented, or sexually
stimulating, or that depicts or alludes to adult sexual activity or
depicts minors under the age of 18, . . . .” (Jumper Aff. ¶ 27.) He
concludes that the restricted movie and video game list helps
prepare residents for their possible conditional release. However,
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he does not explain why restricted access to some “sexually explicit”
material now would make it easier to comply with arguably much
broader restrictions on conditional release. Additionally, the
conditional release rules may themselves be without logical basis.
Brown, 801 F.3d at 854 (citing United States v. Taylor, 796 F.3d
788, 792–93 (7th Cir.2015) (vacating supervised release condition
prohibiting legal adult pornography); United States v. Siegel, 753
F.3d 705, 709 (7th Cir.2014)(allowing rapist to view legal
pornography might decrease recidivism)).
The concerns by Security Director Clayton about trading and
trafficking “sexually explicit materials” are also too conclusory.
Some of the movies and games that are allowed also likely contain
sexual content, and trading and trafficking concerns apply to all
property a resident owns.
In the end, Dr. Jumper’s conclusions still appear based on his
experience, common sense, and what other states and facilities are
doing, which is not enough under Brown. Without more, arguably
summary judgment should be granted to Plaintiff under Brown on
this claim. The Court is not saying that prohibiting some of the
games and movies might have scientific support, such as those
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portraying sexual violence such as rape. But the affidavits are still
too conclusory to draw even that conclusion.
On a separate issue, Defendants may have a good point that
Defendant Scott should be the only Defendant in this case, if
Plaintiff seeks only injunctive relief. Plaintiff will be asked to clarify
the relief he seeks.
Additionally, in reviewing the Plaintiff’s response, the Court
believes it was incorrect in determining that Brown necessarily
resolved Plaintiff’s claim about the ban on video gaming systems
and electronics. Plaintiff asserts that having a video game is
useless without the console to play the game. He contends that an
X Box 360 and an electronic tablet can be purchased without
internet capability but the facility will not allow this. He also
asserts that some kind of software could be installed to block
internet access. Plaintiff contends that these arguments and
evidence were not considered in Brown.
The Court believes, based on Plaintiff’s response, that it may
have been premature to conclude in this case that Brown disposed
of Plaintiff’s entire challenge to the electronics policy.
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At this point, the case will be referred for settlement. If
settlement is unsuccessful, a conference will be set to discuss how
the case will proceed.
IT IS ORDERED:
(1) Plaintiff’s motions for the Court to appoint an expert are
denied (d/e’s 206, 223). The Court cannot appoint an expert for
Plaintiff in this civil case. The Court does have the power to appoint
an independent, neutral expert for the Court under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 706, but at this point an expert does not appear
necessary to assist the Court in understanding the case.
(2) The motions for summary judgment are denied (d/e 212,
219).
(3) Plaintiff’s motion for an extension to respond to the
dispositive motions is granted (d/e 217). Plaintiff has filed his
response.
(4)
Defendants’ motions for extensions to file replies are
granted (d/e’s 226, 227). The replies have been filed.
(5)
Defendant Jumper’s motion to join the DHS Defendants’
motion to strike is granted (d/e 233).
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(6)
Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s reply filed as
docket entry 230 is denied (d/e 231).
(7)
Plaintiff’s motion for docket entries is granted (d/e 218)
to the extent Plaintiff seeks a copy of the docket sheet.
(8)
Plaintiff’s motion for counsel is denied (d/e 223). The
Court does not have the authority to require an attorney to accept
pro bono appointment on a civil case such as this. Pruitt v. Mote,
503 F.3d 647, 653 (7th Cir. 2007). In determining whether the
Court should attempt to find an attorney to voluntarily take the
case, the question is “given the difficulty of the case, does the
plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?" Pruitt, 503 F.3d at
654-55 (7th Cir. 2007). On this record, Plaintiff appears competent
to proceed pro se. He has litigation experience, and his pleadings
adequately convey the basis for his claims and cite to relevant legal
authority. Further, the claims still appear relatively
straightforward.
(9)
This case is referred to the Magistrate Judge to conduct a
settlement conference.
(10) By July 10, 2017, Plaintiff is directed to file a notice
with the Court setting forth in detail the injunctive relief he
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seeks (i.e., what he wants the Court to order Defendants to do)
and stating whether he seeks money damages as well. The
notice should be short and plain.
(11) The clerk is directed to mail a copy of the docket
sheet to Plaintiff.
(12) The clerk is directed to notify the Magistrate Judge of
the referral of this case for a settlement conference.
ENTER: June 30, 2017
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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