Lingle v. Kibby et al
Filing
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OPINION: 1. The clerk is directed to docket in this case the March 31, 2011,memo attached to the original complaint in case 11-3337 (d/e 1, p. 46).The clerk is further directed to send Plaintiff a copy of that memo.2. By January 6, 2012, Defendants a re directed to file a motion todismiss addressing whether Plaintiff states any federal claims.3. Discovery is stayed pending a ruling on Defendants' motion todismiss. 4. Plaintiff's motions to compel (d/e's 23, 24) and motion to addnew defendants (d/e 31) are denied, with leave to renew if his claimssurvive Defendants' motion to dismiss. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 12/7/2011. (CT, ilcd)
E-FILED
Wednesday, 07 December, 2011 09:09:53 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
LAWRENCE LINGLE,
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Plaintiff,
v.
ALFREDA KIBBY, EUGENE
McADORY, and SHAN JUMPER,
Defendants.
11-CV-3101
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff is currently detained in the Rushville Treatment and
Detention Center pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Act.
On May 19, 2011, Judge Baker granted Plaintiff’s petition for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, stating that “[t]he court cannot rule out a
constitutional claim regarding the alleged total ban on gaming and
electronic devices. The defendants may have a legitimate penological or
therapeutic reason for the ban, but the record must be developed before
that determination can be made.” (5/19/11 order). Defendants were
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served and discovery deadlines were set in August, 2011. The next
month the case was transferred to the undersigned, as a result of the
undersigned’s appointment as a U.S. District Judge in the Central
District’s Springfield division.
Now before this Court are Plaintiff’s motions to compel and
Plaintiffs motion to add three new defendants he believes are responsible
for the ban. However, a more serious problem exists with this case:
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not appear to state a federal claim.
This Court has already addressed the electronic/gaming console ban
in another case filed after this one, Schloss v. Ashby, 11-3337 (C.D. Ill.,
Judge Myerscough). Plaintiffs in Schloss are also Rushville residents. In
their original complaint the Schloss plaintiffs challenged, among other
things, the ban on gaming consoles. This Court ruled that Plaintiffs
stated no claim, writing:
Similarly, the Court discerns no claim regarding the ban
on gaming consoles, to the extent Plaintiffs are trying to
pursue such a claim. Humane treatment means the adequate
provision of life’s basic necessities, not luxuries such as
gaming consoles and other electronic equipment. See, e.g.,
Murphy v. Walker, 51 F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cir. 1995)(pretrial
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detainee had no constitutional right to television or
cigarettes); Roberts v. Cohn, 63 F.Supp.2d 921, 924 (N.D.
Ind. 1999)(“It is well established that prison inmates do not
have a constitutional right to use or possess typewriters and
word processors.”).
The only potential constitutional right implicated by the
gaming console ban might be the First Amendment, in the
sense that the consoles are the only means to view the
“speech” in the video games. See Brown v. Entertainment
Merchants Ass’n, 131 S.Ct 2729, 2733 (2011)(“video games
qualify for First Amendment protection”). Yet even if the
First Amendment might be implicated, a viable First
Amendment claim is not stated because the ban is reasonably
related to the legitimate security concerns of the facility. See
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)(setting forth legal
standard for analyzing First Amendment claims by prisoners).
The security concerns are set forth in the program director’s
memo attached to the complaint: “Advancements in
technology have lead to increased ability to obtain/store/trade
contraband and/or engage in unauthorized communications
and other deceptive practices. Such practices threaten the
safety and security of the facility and the community and
interfere with the facility’s therapeutic purposes.” (Ex. 1,
attached to complaint).
Plaintiffs assert in their complaint that the gaming
consoles are not capable of “do[ing] the thing this memo is
banning them for,” (complaint, p. 17), but Rushville
administrators are not required to individually test each
electronic device’s capability. They need only articulate a
“valid, rational connection” between the ban and the security
concern, which the memo does. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89. As
the memo states, the security concerns arise from the
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expanding ability of many different kinds of electronics to
obtain, store, and communicate information. Striking down
the ban would negatively impact guards’ ability to discover
contraband. As to the other Turner factors, Plaintiffs have
alternative ways to exercise their First Amendment rights,
such as by playing games that do not require a gaming
console, while the facility has no ready alternatives to avert
the security problem posed by the electronics other than
banning them. See Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 539
(7th Cir. 2010)(banning of fantasy role playing games was
rationally related to legitimate penological interests and
prisoner had alternative means of exercising right, such as
possessing other reading materials or playing allowable
games).
Though application of the Turner analysis is often
premature at the motion to dismiss stage, see Lindell v. Frank,
377 F.3d 655, 657-58 (7th Cir. 2004), here the legitimate
penological reasons for the rule are so obvious and well
established that dismissal at the pleading stage is proper. See
Williams v. Wisconsin, 336 F.3d 576, 582 (7th Cir.
2003)(discussing Turner and affirming dismissal for failure to
state a claim regarding parolee’s travel restrictions and their
incidental interference with his right to marry); Belton v.
Singer, 2011 WL 2690595 *12 (D.N.J. 2011) (unpublished)
(dismissing at pleading stage claim by sexually violent
detainee challenging confiscation of gaming consoles and
other electronics); Hedgespeth v. Bartow, 2010 WL 2990897
*7 (W.D. Wis. 2010)(unpublished)(on summary judgment,
finding that rule banning possession of video games and
gaming equipment by sexually violent detainee was rationally
related to legitimate security interests).
In short, the Court cannot hypothesize a plausible
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scenario under which the Constitution would require
Rushville to permit its residents to possess video gaming
consoles. Such an order would ignore the substantial
deference afforded the facility’s administrators in making
these kinds of decisions. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521,
528 (2006)(“[C]ourts owe ‘substantial deference to the
professional judgment of prison administrators.’”)(quoted cite
omitted).
Schloss v. Ashby, 11-3337 (C.D. Ill., Judge Myerscough)(10/11/11
order). The memo banning the electronic devices is not attached to
Plaintiff’s complaint as in Schloss, but the Court may consider the memo
because the memo is obviously central to Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff
references the memo in his allegations and assails its reasoning.
(Complaint, d/e 1, p. 5, ¶¶ 4-5).
Plaintiff alleges that the security reasons for the ban are “bogus”
because many of the devices cannot record and transmit data and
because these electronics have been permitted by the facility for the last
six years. However, as discussed above, federal courts will not second
guess rational security decisions by detention facility administrators.
Plaintiff also alleges that the ban violates his equal protection rights
because residents of Rushville must be treated the same as residents of
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any state mental facility. However, this Court rejected this argument in
the Schloss order as well, reasoning:
Plaintiffs are not similarly situated to persons confined for
treatment in other state mental health facilities. Plaintiffs are
in Rushville because they have been "convicted of a sexually
violent offense, . . .[and are] dangerous because [they] . . .
suffer[] from a mental disorder that makes it substantially
probable that . . . [they] will engage in acts of sexual violence."
725 ILCS 207/5(f). Persons confined in other state mental
health facilities may also be dangerous to themselves or
others, but they do not fit the statutory definition for sexually
violent persons. If they did, they would be in Rushville. See
Thielman v. Leean, 282 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir.
2002)("facilities dealing with those who have been
involuntarily committed for sexual disorders are ‘volatile'
environments whose day-to-day operations cannot be
managed from on high."). In short, there is no equal
protection claim because Plaintiffs are not similarly situated
to mentally ill persons held in other mental facilities.
Additionally, Plaintiffs’ alleged differential treatment is
rationally related to the fact that they are confined as sexually
violent persons. See Thielman, 282 F.3d at 485 (uphholding
restraints used on sexually violent persons during transport
and not on other mentally ill patients: “[I]t is not
unreasonable for the State to believe that a person with a
mental disorder of a sexual nature is qualitatively more
dangerous than another mental patient who nonetheless
threatens danger to himself or others.”).
Schloss, 11-3377 (10/11/11 order).
In this Court’s opinion, Judge Baker’s prior order did not
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definitively make any ruling. His order stated only that a claim could not
be ruled out and that Defendants’ input was needed for further
delineation. In any event, this Court has the authority to reconsider an
earlier ruling. Santamarina v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 466 F.3d 570 (7th
Cir. 2006)(law of case doctrine authorizes reconsideration for compelling
reasons). Accordingly, discovery in this case will be stayed until the
Court determines whether Plaintiff states any federal claims.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) The clerk is directed to docket in this case the March 31, 2011,
memo attached to the original complaint in case 11-3337 (d/e 1, p. 46).
The clerk is further directed to send Plaintiff a copy of that memo.
2) By January 6, 2012, Defendants are directed to file a motion to
dismiss addressing whether Plaintiff states any federal claims.
3) Discovery is stayed pending a ruling on Defendants’ motion to
dismiss.
4) Plaintiff’s motions to compel (d/e’s 23, 24) and motion to add
new defendants (d/e 31) are denied, with leave to renew if his claims
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survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
ENTERED:
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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