Hartman v. Foster et al
Filing
70
OPINION: Defendants' motions for summary judgment are GRANTED (d/e's 57 , 58 ). Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is DENIED (d/e 56 ). The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and against Pla intiff. All pending motions are denied as moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. All deadlines and settings on the Court's calendar are vacated. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 1/14/2014. (MJ, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 14 January, 2014 04:53:42 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
TRAVIS HARTMAN ,
Plaintiff,
v.
CRAIG FOSTER and
KURT SIMON,
Defendant,
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11-CV-3132
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, is currently detained in the
Jacksonville Correctional Center. He asserts that, during his
detention in the Montgomery County Jail from January 30, 2010, to
March 16, 2010, Defendants refused to provide him with anxiety
medicine which had been prescribed to Plaintiff before his arrest.
In particular, Plaintiff had been prescribed 10 milligrams of Lexapro
daily and .5 milligrams of Ativan twice daily by Plaintiff's doctor
before Plaintiff was arrested.
The Court denied Defendants' original summary judgment
motions, concluding that the record failed to answer material
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questions. (2/14/13 Opinion.) Defendants have filed second
motions for summary judgments which now answer those
questions.
The record now compels the conclusion that Captain Foster,
who was the Jail's Administrator, had no power over whether and
what kind of medication Plaintiff was prescribed. (Foster Aff. ¶ 38.)
Dr. Rayford was the one with that power. (Foster Aff. ¶ 39.) Dr.
Rayford exercised his professional discretion several times
throughout Plaintiff's stay at the Jail, concluding each time that
Plaintiff did not need Ativan or Lexapro. (Dr. Rayford Aff. ¶¶ 25, 27,
35.) Instead, Plaintiff was offered Vistaril, which, according to Dr.
Rayford, is a medically acceptable approach to treating anxiety.
(Dr. Rayford Aff. ¶ 13.) There is no evidence that Dr. Rayford's
determination was a "substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment," which Plaintiff would need to show in order
to prove deliberate indifference. Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 89495 (7th Cir. 2009).
At most, Plaintiff has evidence of a difference of opinion
between Plaintiff's doctor outside the Jail, who had prescribed
Ativan and Lexapro before Plaintiff's incarceration, and Dr. Rayford,
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who decided not to prescribe those medications. Different
professional approaches to treating a condition is not evidence of
deliberate indifference. Norfleet v. Webster, 439 F.3d 392, 396, 396
(7th Cir. 2006)(“[A] difference of opinion among physicians on how
an inmate should be treated cannot support a finding of deliberate
indifference”). And, even if there was evidence that Dr. Rayford was
deliberately indifferent, Dr. Rayford is not a Defendant. Captain
Foster cannot be held liable for what Dr. Rayford did. Ray v.
Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 706 F.3d 864, 866 (7th Cir. 2013)(no
vicarious liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Captain Foster was
entitled to rely on Dr. Rayford's professional judgment. Berry v.
Peterman, 604 F.3d 435, 440 (7th Cir. 2010)("[T]he law encourages
non-medical security and administrative personnel at jails and
prisons to defer to the professional medical judgments of the
physicians and nurses treating the prisoners in their care without
fear of liability for doing so.").
Defendant Kurt Simon, a mental health professional but not a
psychiatrist, did have the authority to recommend in favor of or
against the prescription of psychiatric medicines, though he could
not write the prescription himself. (Simon Aff. ¶ 7.) Simon only
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saw Plaintiff once and did not have Plaintiff's medical files for
reference before or during that visit. According to Simon, Plaintiff
did not mention needing Ativan or Lexapro during their meeting,
but Plaintiff did ask for Xanax and Valium. However, the Court
must credit Plaintiff's averment that Plaintiff did tell Simon about
Plaintiff's prescriptions for Ativan and Lexapro at their meeting.
Construing inferences in Plaintiff's favor, a juror could find that
Simon recommended that Plaintiff's requests be denied. (Simon Aff.
¶ 17, Ex. A.)
However, Plaintiff does not have evidence that Simon's refusal
to recommend Ativan and Lexapro for Plaintiff was deliberately
indifferent. No reasonable inference can be drawn based on
Simon's limited interaction with Plaintiff that Simon knew Plaintiff
had a serious, untreated psychiatric problem. In any event, Simon
had no authority to actually prescribe the medicine, nor was
Simon's recommendation required before Dr. Rayford could
prescribe psychiatric medicine. (Simon Aff. ¶ 7; Rayford Aff. ¶ 14.)
That authority and responsibility fell squarely on Dr. Rayford's
shoulders. Id. Simon cannot be held liable for Dr. Rayford's
professional treatment decisions. Finally, even if Simon bore some
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personal responsibility for Dr. Rayford's decision, no evidence
suggests that the Dr. Rayford's decision to offer Vistaril, rather than
Ativan or Lexapro, amounted to deliberate indifference. Summary
judgment must therefore be entered for Defendants.
IT IS ORDERED:
1.
Defendants' motions for summary judgment are granted
(d/e's 57, 58).
2.
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment is denied (d/e
3.
The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in
56).
favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All pending motions are
denied as moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear
their own costs. All deadlines and settings on the Court’s calendar
are vacated.
4.
If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of
judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for leave to appeal in
forma pauperis should identify the issues Plaintiff will present on
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c). If Plaintiff does choose to
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appeal, he will be liable for the $455.00 appellate filing fee
regardless of the outcome of the appeal.
ENTER: January 14, 2014
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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