Brown v. McAdory et al
Filing
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OPINION: 1) Plaintiff states two federal due process claims: 1) a claim against Defendant Kerr for Kerr's alleged refusal to allow Plaintiff to use the bathroom on a court writ; and, 2) a claim against Defendants McAdory, Williams, and Parson fo r confining Plaintiff for 11 days in a room with no mattress, cover, clothing or hygiene necessities. Plaintiff's petition to proceed in forma pauperis is accordingly granted (d/e 2). 2) The claims identified in paragraph one above are not prop erly joined in one action. Accordingly, by December 31, 2011, Plaintiff is directed to inform the Court in writing which claim he will pursue in this case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue both claims he must file, by December 31, 2011, a motion to se ver one of the claims into a separate lawsuit. Plaintiff will be required to post an additional bond of $100 in the separate lawsuit. If Plaintiff does not respond to this order by December 31, 2011, this case will be dismissed in its entirety, without prejudice. 3) Except for the claims and Defendants identified in paragraph one, all other claims and Defendants are dismissed for failure to state a claim. See written Opinion. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 12/2/2011. (MJ, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 02 December, 2011 10:20:43 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
BOBBY BROWN,
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Plaintiff,
v.
EUGENE MCADORY et al.,
Defendants.
11-CV-3195
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and currently detained in the Rushville
Treatment and Detention Center, seeks leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on several claims arising from unrelated incidents.
On July 19, 2011, Judge Baker ordered Plaintiff to post $100 as
security for the potential assessment of costs against him, given
Plaintiff’s litigation history.1 The case was transferred to this Court in
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During his imprisonment, Plaintiff earned more than three “strikes” under 28
U.S.C. Section 1915(g). However, he is not barred from bringing this action in
forma pauperis because he is no longer a “prisoner” as defined in that statute.
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September, 2011. On October 7, 2011, Plaintiff posted the $100
security.
The case is before this Court for a ruling on Plaintiff’s petition to
proceed in forma pauperis. The "privilege to proceed without posting
security for costs and fees is reserved to the many truly impoverished
litigants who, within the District Court's sound discretion, would remain
without legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them."
Brewster v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir.
1972). Additionally, a court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma
pauperis “at any time if the court determines that the action fails to state
a claim." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). Accordingly, this Court grants leave to
proceed in forma pauperis only if the complaint states a federal claim. A
hearing was scheduled to assist in this review, but the hearing will be
cancelled as unnecessary.
LEGAL STANDARD
To state a claim, the allegations must set forth a “short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief .”
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Factual allegations must give enough detail to
give “‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.’” EEOC v. Concentra Health Serv., Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th
Cir. 2007), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007)(add’l citation omitted). The factual “allegations must plausibly
suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility
above a ‘speculative level.’” Id., quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555.
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged . . . . Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,
do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), citing
Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555-56. However, pro se pleadings are
liberally construed when applying this standard. Bridges v. Gilbert, 557
F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009).
ANALYSIS
Before turning to Plaintiff’s allegations, the Court notes that
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Plaintiff has improperly joined unrelated claims in this case. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 20(a)(2) states in relevant part that “[p]ersons . . . may be joined in
one action as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against
them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out
of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or
occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all
defendants will arise in the action.” See George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605,
607 (7th Cir. 2007)(“A buckshot complaint that would be rejected if
filed by a free person—say, a suit complaining that A defrauded the
plaintiff, B defamed him, C punched him, D failed to pay a debt, and E
infringed his copyright, all in different transactions—should be rejected if
filed by a prisoner.”).
However, filing separate lawsuits would be futile if Plaintiff’s
allegations state no claims. Therefore, the Court will first determine
what federal claims, if any, are stated by Plaintiff’s allegations.
No federal claim is stated against Defendant Simpson for her
alleged failure to properly handle Plaintiff’s grievances. See Antonelli v.
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Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996)(“a state’s inmate grievance
procedures do not give rise to a liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause.”).
Nor is a claim stated against Defendants Kibby, the former
Director of Rushville, or Warden Gatez, the warden of Menard
Correctional Center. Administrators are not liable for their subordinates’
constitutional violations solely because those administrators are in
charge. See Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th Cir.
2001)(no respondeat superior liability under § 1983).
Additionally, Plaintiff states no access-to-courts claim because he
does not identify any actual prejudice he suffered. Lewis v. Casey, 518
U.S. 343, 351 (1996)(access to the courts claim only arises if Plaintiff
suffered an “actual injury” from the inability to pursue a nonfrivolous
claim). Nor do Plaintiff’s vague allegations of retaliation give rise to a
plausible inference that he was retaliated against for exercising protected
constitutional rights.
Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the false disciplinary reports and
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the inadequate notice of charges also state no claim. Procedural due
process protections are triggered only when the deprivation suffered is
constitutionally significant. Demotions in status and the loss of some
privileges are not the kind of significant deprivations that trigger
procedural due process protections. For example, the Seventh Circuit
has held that a Rushville resident’s demotion from general to
intermediate status, special management status, or close status does not
trigger procedural due process protections. Miller v. Dobier, 634 F.3d
412 (7th Cir. 2011). The restrictions attendant to those demotions are
“too limited to amount to a deprivation of constitutional liberty.” 634
F.3d at 415. Plaintiff’s attached behavioral committee reports indicate
that Plaintiff received either no changes in status, or the kind of
demotions in status that do not trigger procedural due process
protections. (Complaint, pp. 12, 17, 26, 36). Separation from the
general population is not, by itself, a significant deprivation. Id. at 414.
For the same reason, temporary placement in segregation pending review
of a disciplinary charge alleging threatening and intimidating behavior
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does not violate Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights. That
placement is rationally related to the facility’s legitimate security
concerns. See Holly v. Woolfolk, 415 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2005)(pretrial
detainee’s placement in segregation for two days without hearing did not
state claim for violation of due process rights); Higgs v. Carver, 286 F.3d
437 (7th Cir. 2002)(no procedural due process required if pretrial
detainee placed in segregation for managerial reasons).
Plaintiff also alleges that his constitutional rights were violated in
Menard Correctional Center when a committee chairperson and the
warden failed to sign a final summary report authorizing Plaintiff’s
punishment on disciplinary charges. However, no constitutional duty
requires persons to sign disciplinary decisions. Accordingly, Plaintiff
states no claim with regard to his disciplinary punishment at Menard.
This Court does see two possible claims. First, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Kerr refused to allow Plaintiff to use the bathroom while at
the Cook County Courthouse, despite Kerr’s alleged knowledge that
Plaintiff had a bladder infection. Plaintiff alleges that he was forced to
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urinate on himself because he could no longer hold his bladder. These
allegations state a potential due process claim, though the grievance
response attached to the complaint tells a different story. According to
the grievance response, Plaintiff had an opportunity to use the bathroom
when he first arrived at the Courthouse. When Plaintiff asked to use the
bathroom at 11:30 a.m., he was told he must wait until the juveniles
were finished using the bathroom. According to the grievance response,
Plaintiff then became irate, exposed himself, and urinated on the floor.
The grievance response also states that Plaintiff’s bladder infection had
cleared months before this occurrence. (Complaint, p. 47).
At this juncture, the Court cannot credit the grievance response
over Plaintiff’s allegations. However, Plaintiff should be aware that he
risks sanctions for bringing a frivolous and malicious claim if Defendants
are granted summary judgment on this claim.
The second possible claim arises from Plaintiff’s allegations that he
was deprived of a mattress, cover, clothing, and hygiene necessities for
11 days in March, 2011, after being placed in segregation. Plaintiff is
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entitled to humane conditions, including adequate clothing, shelter, and
hygiene necessities. Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 893 (7th Cir. 2008).
The Court concludes that dismissal of this claim would be premature.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1)
Plaintiff states two federal due process claims: 1) a claim
against Defendant Kerr for Kerr’s alleged refusal to allow Plaintiff to use
the bathroom on a court writ; and, 2) a claim against Defendants
McAdory, Williams, and Parson for confining Plaintiff for 11 days in a
room with no mattress, cover, clothing or hygiene necessities. Plaintiff’s
petition to proceed in forma pauperis is accordingly granted (d/e 2).
2)
The claims identified in paragraph one above are not properly
joined in one action. Accordingly, by December 31, 2011, Plaintiff is
directed to inform the Court in writing which claim he will pursue in this
case. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue both claims he must file, by December
31, 2011, a motion to sever one of the claims into a separate lawsuit.
Plaintiff will be required to post an additional bond of $100 in the
separate lawsuit. If Plaintiff does not respond to this order by December
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31, 2011, this case will be dismissed in its entirety, without prejudice.
3)
Except for the claims and Defendants identified in paragraph
one above, all other claims and Defendants are dismissed for failure to
state a claim.
ENTERED: December 2, 2011
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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