Taylor v. Williamson et al

Filing 65

OPINION (See Written Opinion): 1) Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied (d/e 54 ).2) Plaintiff's motions for summary judgment are denied (d/e's 43 , 58 ). 3) The merit review order is hereby amended to: 1) clarify that Plaintiff's religious discrimination allegations are part of his First Amendment free exercise claim; and 2) add the possibility of an equal protection claim based on the arbitrary denial of Plaintiff's religious diet requests. 4) Discove ry is reopened and closes on January 31, 2013. 5) Plaintiff's motion to compel his medical records from Sangamon County Jail is denied (d/e 59 ), with leave to renew if his discovery requests to Defendants for the records are unsuccessful. 6) Dispositive motions are due February 28, 2013. 7) A final pretrial conference is scheduled for July 1, 2013 at 1:30 p.m.. Plaintiff shall appear by video conference. Defense counsel shall appear in person. The parties are directed to submit an a greed, proposed final pretrial order at least fourteen days before the final pretrial conference. 8) Jury selection and the jury trial are scheduled for August 6, 2013 at 9:00 a.m., by personal appearance of the parties before this Court in Springfield, Illinois. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 9/11/2012. (VM, ilcd)

E-FILED

Tuesday, 11 September, 2012 03:54:15 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
FRANCHOT B. TAYLOR,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
v.
NEIL WILLIAMSON,
Defendant.

11-CV-3224

OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, pursues claims arising from the denial of a
religious diet during his six-month detention at the Sangamon County Jail. Both
sides have moved for summary judgment.
The parties agree that Plaintiff is a member of the Hebrew Israelite religion.
They also agree that Plaintiff’s requests for a vegetarian or kosher diet were
denied.
Defendants do not explain why Plaintiff’s requests were denied. Instead,
they argue that the denials did not substantially burden Plaintiff’s ability to practice
his religion because Plaintiff was able to eat around food which did not comply
with his religious tenets—primarily the meat, which was not kosher. He was also
1

able to trade food with other inmates. Defendants assert that Plaintiff has no
evidence of malnutrition or weight loss.
Prisoners have a First Amendment right to reasonable opportunities to
practice their religion, subject to the legitimate penological concerns of the prison.
Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709 (7th Cir. 2011); Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669
(7th Cir. 2009). In Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 879 (7th Cir. 2009), the Seventh
Circuit held that denying an inmate a non-meat religious diet during Lent and on
Fridays substantially burdened the inmate’s right to practice his religion because
the evidence showed that Plaintiff was required to forgo adequate nutrition on
those days. A dietitian in that case had testified that the regular diet “‘probably
was insufficient if all meat were skipped.’” Id.
This case is analogous to Koger, though the plaintiff in Koger had more
evidence of malnutrition. As in Koger, the plaintiff here had to forgo eating all
meat. Defendants provide no dietitian’s affidavit stating that the meals provided to
Plaintiff were nutritionally adequate if Plaintiff consumed no meat. Whether
protein was substituted for the meat is unknown. Plaintiff’s fortuitous ability to
trade food did not lessen the substantial burden on his religious practice or alleviate
Defendants’ responsibility of providing a nutritionally adequate diet consistent
with Plaintiff’s religious beliefs. Whether Plaintiff lost weight is not necessarily
2

determinative of whether his diet was nutritionally adequate. Accordingly,
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment will be denied.
Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment will also be denied. Plaintiff does
offer evidence that the denial of his requests were not related to legitimate
concerns such as cost and security. Maddox , 655 F.3d at 719 (7th Cir.
2011)(“[P]rison restrictions that infringe on an inmate's exercise of his religion are
permissible if they are reasonably related to a legitimate penological objective,
such as security and economic concerns.”). According to an unsigned response to
one of Plaintiff’s grievances, Plaintiff’s requests were denied because a Rabbi
brought kosher meals only for Jewish inmates, not Hebrew Israelites. (9/7/10
inmate request form, d/e 59, p. 7.) This is hearsay as to the truth of statement, but
might be admissible to show the reason given for the denial and the inconsistency
in Defendants’ purported reasons for denial over the course of Plaintiff’s
incarceration. For example, in another grievance, Plaintiff asked to be allowed to
purchase vegetarian meals with his own money as he believed other inmates were
permitted. The response states, “At this time your request is denied because we do
not do kosher meals. If you can give us a better reason and proof to back it up we
will reconsider your request.” (2/23/11 inmate request form, d/e 59, p. 12). This
response is signed by Defendant Sergeant Clemons. Clemons purportedly signed
3

another denial on March 7, 2011, in response to Plaintiff’s attempt to verify his
religion. The response is not completely legible but appears to state that Plaintiff
would need more than proof from the IDOC to verify his religion. (3/7/11
response to inmate grievance, d/e 59, p. 12). Requiring outside verification of an
inmate’s religion before accommodating a religious diet request could amount to a
substantial burden on one’s religious exercise. See Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789,
798 (7th Cir. 2008)(clergy verification requirement substantially burdened inmate’s
religious exercise because inmate had no practical way to satisfy requirement).
While this evidence works in Plaintiff’s favor, the evidence demonstrates only the
possible existence of a material disputed fact, not the absence of one.
Too many questions remain. For example, which Defendants were
personally responsible for denying Plaintiff’s requests? Who wrote the unsigned
response to Plaintiff’s inmate request? What is the Jail’s policy on providing
religious diets? Who is responsible for devising and implementing that policy?
What is the procedure for handling requests for religious diets? Do some inmates
receive kosher, vegetarian, or other diets for religious reasons? Why were
Plaintiff’s requests denied? If an inmate eats no meat on the regular diet, would he
receive adequate nutrition?
The Court has a responsibility to ensure that a trial is necessary and that the
4

case is thoroughly prepared for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(4). Neither
requirement is met on this record.
Additionally, an aspect of Plaintiff’s claim has not been developed. He
essentially alleges in his Complaint that other religions were treated more
favorably than his religion. “Prisons cannot discriminate against a particular
religion ‘except to the extent required by the exigencies of prison administration.’”
Maddox , 655 F.3d at 719-20. The Court’s merit review order concluded that
Plaintiff stated a claim for the violation of his First Amendment right to practice
his religion, which arguably encompasses his allegations of religious
discrimination. Conyers v. Abitz, 416 F.3d 580, 586 (7th Cir. 2005)(“[F]ree
exercise claim arises under the First Amendment and gains nothing by attracting
additional constitutional labels” like equal protection.); Reed v. Faulkner, 842 F.2d
960 (7th Cir. 1988)(religious discrimination claim falls under First Amendment,
“leaving for the equal protection clause only a claim of arbitrariness unrelated to
the character of the activity allegedly discriminated against.”). However, Plaintiff
may be intending to bring some sort of equal protection claim based on a “class of
one” theory or otherwise. In the interests of fully resolving the claims in this case
and developing the factual record, discovery will be reopened. A trial date will be
set to keep the case on track.
5

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is denied (d/e 54).
2) Plaintiff’s motions for summary judgment are denied (d/e’s 43, 58).
3) The merit review order is hereby amended to: 1) clarify that Plaintiff’s
religious discrimination allegations are part of his First Amendment free exercise
claim; and 2) add the possibility of an equal protection claim based on the arbitrary
denial of Plaintiff’s religious diet requests.
4) Discovery is reopened and closes on January 31, 2013.
5) Plaintiff’s motion to compel his medical records from Sangamon County
Jail is denied (d/e 59), with leave to renew if his discovery requests to Defendants
for the records are unsuccessful.
6) Dispositive motions are due February 28, 2013.
7) A final pretrial conference is scheduled for July 1, 2013 at 1:30 p.m..
Plaintiff shall appear by video conference. Defense counsel shall appear in person.
The parties are directed to submit an agreed, proposed final pretrial order at least
fourteen days before the final pretrial conference.
8) Jury selection and the jury trial are scheduled for August 6, 2013 at 9:00
a.m., by personal appearance of the parties before this Court in Springfield,
Illinois.
6

ENTERED: September 11, 2012
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

7