Hughes v. Aramark Correctional Services LLC et al
Filing
88
OPINION: The motion for summary judgment by Defendant Simpson is granted 59 . This case is referred to the Magistrate for a settlement conference. The motions for summary judgment by Defendants Dredge, Blaesing, McAdory, Simpson, Ashby, and S cott are denied ( 61 , 64 ), with leave to renew 30 days after the settlement conference is held, if no settlement is reached. Defendants' motion to strike Plaintiff's response is denied as moot 82 . However, Plaintiff is advised that he must follow Local Rule 7.1(D)(2) when he responds to the renewed summary judgment motions. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION) Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 2/16/2017. (GL, ilcd)
E-FILED
Thursday, 16 February, 2017 04:09:35 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
MICHAEL HUGHES,
Plaintiff,
v.
STEVE DREDGE, et al.
Defendants.
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11-CV-3320
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
Plaintiff proceeds pro se from his detention in the Rushville
Treatment and Detention Center pursuant to the Illinois Sexually
Violent Persons Act. He pursues a constitutional claim that the
facility provided him inedible food by serving mechanically
separated chicken which arrived in boxes marked “for further
processing only.” He also pursues a constitutional claim arising
from the alleged unsanitary food storage, preparation, and serving
practices at the facility.
Before the Court are Defendants’ motions for summary
judgment. On this record, summary judgment is warranted for
Defendant Simpson, the grievance examiner. The other Defendants’
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motions are denied with leave to renew because the Court needs
more information and briefing.
Background
On December 20, 2010, four residents detained in the
Rushville Treatment and Detention Center filed a purported class
action challenging, as is relevant to this case, the serving of
mechanically separated chicken from boxes marked “for further
processing only.” Smego v. Ill. Dept. of Human Serv., 10cv3334
(C.D. Ill.). On June 2, 2011, the plaintiffs’ motion for class
certification in that case was denied because they were pro se.
(10cv3334, d/e 43, p. 2.) A flood ensued of over 60 additional cases
filed by some 80 other residents regarding the same issues.
The additional plaintiffs were joined into the original case, and
Plaintiff Richard Smego was designated as spokesperson. Id. d/e
336. The Court was eventually able to recruit pro bono counsel,
but only for the plaintiffs in the original case. The claims of the rest
of the plaintiffs were severed and stayed, with the hopes that the
resolution of the original case might resolve the other cases or help
guide the Court in resolving the other cases.
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Summary judgment was denied in the original case, and then
the original case settled in July 2014. Part of the settlement was an
agreement that the mechanically separated chicken labeled “for
further processing only” would no longer be served at the facility.
After the original case settled, the plaintiffs in the other cases
were given an opportunity to file an amended complaint if they still
wished to proceed with their claims. Six of those cases remain,
including this one, which is now at the summary judgment stage.
Legal Standard Applicable to Civil Detainee’s Claim
The Fourteenth Amendment due process clause governs rather
than the Eighth Amendment because Plaintiff is a civil detainee, not
a prisoner serving a sentence. The Supreme Court stated in
Youngberg v. Romeo that "[p]ersons who have been involuntarily
committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and
conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of
confinement are designed to punish." 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982).
This difference was reiterated by the Seventh Circuit in Hughes v.
Scott, 816 F.3d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 2016); see also McGee v. Adams,
721 F.3d 474, 480 (7th Cir. 2013)(citing Youngberg but noting that
“the Supreme Court has not determined how much additional
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protection civil detainees are entitled to beyond the protections
afforded by the Eighth Amendment bar on cruel and unusual
punishment.”); Rice ex rel. Rice v. Correctional Medical Services,
675 F.3d 650, 664 (7th Cir. 2012)( "[T]he Supreme Court has not
yet determined just how much additional protection the Fourteenth
Amendment gives to pretrial detainees.").
In application, the Fourteenth Amendment standard thus far
appears indistinguishable from the Eighth Amendment standard on
conditions of confinement claims. For example, the Seventh Circuit
has stated that a conditions of confinement claim by a civil detainee
requires an objectively serious deprivation and deliberate
indifference by the defendant. Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894
(7th Cir. 2008). This is the same standard governing an Eighth
Amendment conditions of confinement claim by a prisoner. The
Seventh Circuit more recently confirmed in Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d
304, 310 (7th Cir. 2015), that “[w]e have held that there is little
practical difference, if any, between the standards applicable to
pretrial detainees and convicted inmates when it comes to
conditions of confinement claims, and that such claims brought
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under the Fourteenth Amendment are appropriately analyzed under
the Eighth Amendment test.”
However, the Seventh Circuit has also recently acknowledged
the difficulty of defining the legal standard applicable to detainees,
noting the “shifting sands of present day case authority.” Werner v.
Wall, 836 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 2016). In Smith v. Dart, even
though confirming the appropriateness of relying on Eighth
Amendment cases, the Seventh Circuit stated in dicta that the
subjective element requires a “‘purposeful, a knowing, or a possibly
reckless state of mind,’” arguably a lower hurdle than deliberate
indifference. 803 F.3d 304 n. 2 (quoted cite omitted). That dicta
was ultimately referring to the Supreme Court case of Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015), which held that a
defendant’s subjective state of mind in a pretrial detainee’s
excessive force claim was relevant only to the extent that the
defendant’s actions were “purposeful or knowing.” After Kingsley,
though, the Seventh Circuit has continued to rely on the deliberate
indifference standard to pretrial detainees’ claims for lack of
medical care. See, e.g., Daniel v. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728, 73233 (2016).
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This case may require the Court determine what “additional
protections” are afforded a civil detainee as compared to a prisoner
in relation to conditions of confinement. The question might be
avoided as to the Defendants employed by the State if they are
entitled to qualified immunity, but Defendant Dredge, an employee
of a private contractor, does not appear to be entitled to assert
qualified immunity. See Zaya v. Sood, 836 F.3d 800, 807 (7th Cir.
2016)(“The Supreme Court has held that employees of privately
operated prisons may not assert a qualified-immunity defense. . . .
We have construed that holding to extend to employees of private
corporations that contract with the state to provide medical care for
prison inmates.)(citations omitted). Defendants will be directed to
address this issue in more detail in their renewed motions for
summary judgment, addressing not only cases in this Circuit but
also any cases on point in other Circuits.
Summary Judgment Motions
At the summary judgment stage, evidence is viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant, with material factual
disputes resolved in the nonmovant's favor. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute of
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material fact exists when a reasonable juror could find for the
nonmovant. Id.
Plaintiff claims that entrées containing mechanically separated
chicken marked “for further processing only” made him feel queasy
and suffer loose bowels, sometimes diarrhea. (Pl.’s Dep. 42, 95.)
The extent and frequency of this reaction was enough to make
Plaintiff avoid eating the food altogether. Plaintiff also testified in
his deposition that the food trays are not properly washed and
dried, that he has found bug parts once or twice on a tray, that the
trays are wet, and that food which is supposed to be hot is
consistently cold. (Pl.’s Dep. 51, 53, 102-03.) He also testified that
the residents who prepare and serve the food are not properly
trained and supervised. Some have not washed, do not wear gloves
or hair nets, and “scratch[] their behinds” while working and then
touch food or food trays. (Pl.’s Dep. 126.)
The only Defendant to whom the Court can grant summary
judgment on this record is Defendant Simpson, the grievance
examiner. Defendant Simpson had no control over the food service,
as Plaintiff admits in his deposition. (Pl.’s Dep. 38, 57.) Plaintiff’s
complaint against Defendant Simpson is that she did not
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investigate or respond to his grievances about the problems. (Pl.’s
Dep. 13, 57.)
Defendant Simpson did respond to one of Plaintiff’s grievances
about the food quality. Simpson’s response indicated that she had
talked to the dietary manager about Plaintiff’s concerns and that
the concerns were groundless or were being addressed. (Grievance
Resp., d/e 59-3, p. 3.) Defendant Simpson also gave a response to
Plaintiff’s grievance claiming that Defendant Dredge was carrying
cheese slices in his bare hands to give to two residents. (Grievance
Resp., d/e 59-4, p. 4.) The response stated that Plaintiff’s grievance
appeared to involve what happened to other residents, not to
Plaintiff personally, and directed Plaintiff begin the complaint
process with an “attempt to resolve” form.
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Simpson did not respond to
other grievances that Plaintiff filed about the food service and that
Defendant Simpson did nothing to look into or solve the problem.
However, Plaintiff admits in his deposition that the people who
could arguably do something about the problem were already on
notice of the residents’ complaints about the food service, including
the facility director. (Pl.’s Dep. 25, 36, 125, 145.) This is not a case
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like Hughes v. Scott, 816 F.3d 955 (7th Cir. 2016), in which the
grievance officer allegedly insulted Plaintiff for filing a grievance and
warned that Plaintiff’s “life . . . would go better if he stopped
complaining . . . .”
Summary judgment is, therefore, granted to Defendant
Simpson. The other Defendants’ motions are denied because the
Court needs more information on the division of responsibilities
between DHS and Aramark regarding the food service. Additionally,
the Court needs more information on the procedures, training, and
supervision in place to ensure that food is prepared, served, and
stored in a sanitary manner. The Court also needs extensive
briefing on the legal standard debate discussed above. Defendants
will be given an opportunity to renew their motions with this
information.
Plaintiff is advised that his current response to the summary
judgment motions does not comply with Local Rule 7.1(D). When
Plaintiff responds to the renewed motions for summary judgment,
he must separately address each proposed fact, citing to evidence to
support a dispute of the proposed fact. Pointing to the allegations
in the Amended Complaint and making arguments in a brief are not
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enough at this stage. Plaintiff should submit an affidavit stating
under penalty of perjury what he personally experienced with
regards to the sanitation problems and with eating the mechanically
separated chicken marked “for further processing only.”
Additionally, the exhibits Plaintiff submits should be relevant to the
claims proceeding in this case, not to other claims.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
(1) The motion for summary judgment by Defendant Simpson
is granted (59).
(2) This case is referred to the Magistrate for a settlement
conference.
(3) The motions for summary judgment by Defendants
Dredge, Blaesing, McAdory, Simpson, Ashby, and Scott are denied
(61, 64), with leave to renew 30 days after the settlement conference
is held, if no settlement is reached.
(4) Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s response is denied
as moot (82). However, Plaintiff is advised that he must follow Local
Rule 7.1(D)(2) when he responds to the renewed summary judgment
motions.
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(5) The clerk is directed to notify the Magistrate Judge of
the referral.
(6) The clerk is directed to send Plaintiff a copy of Local
Rule 7.1(D).
ENTER: February 16, 2017
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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