Litterly v. Springfield Clinic
Filing
25
OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 03/07/2012. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 17 is GRANTED. Plaintiff's request to amend her complaint to add a state law claim is DENIED. Plaintiff's pending motions [5,7,9] are DENIED AS MOOT. CASE CLOSED. (DM, ilcd)
E-FILED
Thursday, 08 March, 2012 10:39:05 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
YVONNE LITTERLY,
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Plaintiff,
v.
SPRINGFIELD CLINIC,
Defendant.
No. 11-3352
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on Defendant Springfield Clinic’s
Motion to Dismiss (d/e 17). For the reasons that follow, the Motion to
Dismiss is GRANTED.
In September 2011, Plaintiff Yvonne Litterly,filed pro se a
Complaint against Defendant. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant released
Plaintiff’s personal health information to Plaintiff’s employer without
authorization in violation of various regulations promulgated pursuant to
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). See
42 U.S.C. §1320d-1320d-8; 45 C.F.R. § 164.502 (providing that a
“covered entity may not use or disclose protected health information,
except as permitted or required by this subpart or subpart C of part 160
of this subchapter”); 45 C.F.R. § 164.530(c) (providing that “[a] covered
entity must have in place appropriate administrative, technical, and
physical safeguards to protect the privacy of protected health
information”).
In January 2012, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Defendant
asserts that HIPAA does not provide for a private right of action and,
therefore, the Complaint must be dismissed.
Plaintiff responded to the Motion to Dismiss. See d/e 23 (filed
under seal because it contains confidential medical information). In the
response, Plaintiff asserts that the lawsuit is not “just about [Defendant]
sending these faxes” but is also “about the lack of diagnosis and
treatment [Plaintiff has] received from [Defendant] since July of 2009.”
Id. at p. 4. Plaintiff asks that the “lawsuit be changed to a malpractice
lawsuit.” Id. at p. 5.
Page 2 of 5
This Court finds that Defendant is correct that HIPAA does not
provide for a private right of action. See Carpenter v. Phillips, 419
Fed.Appx. 658, 2011 WL 1740102 (7th Cir. 2011) (unpublished
disposition) (finding that HIPPA does not furnish a private right of
action); Doe v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 429 F.
Supp. 2d 930, 944 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (“Every court to have considered the
issue . . . has concluded that HIPAA does not authorize a private right of
action”); see also Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 570-71 (5th Cir. 2006);
Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010); Seaton v. Mayberg,
610 F.3d 530, 533 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied 131 S. Ct. 1534 (2011);
Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1267 n. 4 (10th Cir. 2010)
(noting that “[a]ny HIPAA claim fails as HIPAA does not create a private
right of action for alleged disclosures of confidential medical
information”). Instead, “HIPPA limits enforcement of the statute to the
Secretary of Health and Human Services.” Acara, 470 F.3d at 571; see
also 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(a)(1) (providing the penalties “the Secretary
shall impose on any person who violates a provision of this part”).
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Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action.
To the extent that Plaintiff seeks to amend her Complaint to add a
malpractice claim, that request is denied. Because this Court is
dismissing Plaintiff’s purported federal claim, this Court would decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law malpractice
claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (providing that a district court may
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under
subsection (a) if “the district court has dismissed all claims over which it
has original jurisdiction”); Kennedy v. Schoenberg, Fisher & Newman,
Ltd., 140 F.3d 716, 727 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting general rule that “when
all federal claims are dismissed before trial, the district court should
relinquish jurisdiction over pendent state-law claims rather than resolving
them on the merits’” (quoting Wright v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d
1244, 1251 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Moreover, nothing in Plaintiff’s pleading suggests this Court would
have diversity jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law malpractice claim.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (providing that the district courts have original
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jurisdiction over civil actions in which the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000 and the controversy is between citizens of different states).
For the reasons stated, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (d/e 17) is
GRANTED. Plaintiff’s request to amend her complaint to add a state
law claim is DENIED. Plaintiff’s pending motions (d/e 5, 7, and 9) are
DENIED AS MOOT. CASE CLOSED.
ENTER: March 7, 2012
FOR THE COURT:
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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