James v. Godinez et al

Filing 58

OPINION granting 45 Motion for Summary Judgment entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 10/31/2013. Judgment to be entered in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiff. All pending motions are denied as moot, d/e 50 , and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. All deadlines and settings on the Court's calendar are vacated. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $455.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal. (MAS, ilcd)

E-FILED

Thursday, 31 October, 2013 06:00:56 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JULIUS JAMES,
Plaintiff,
v.
SALVADOR GODINEZ, et al.,
Defendant,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 11-CV-3389

OPINION GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
Plaintiff, incarcerated and proceeding pro se, claims a violation
of his right to equal protection arising from the differential
treatment of "unassigned" inmates housed in general population as
compared to unassigned inmates housed in segregation.
"Unassigned" inmates are inmates who have not been assigned
work.
Unassigned inmates housed in the general population receive
$10 in State pay monthly. In contrast, unassigned inmates housed
in segregation receive no state pay. Plaintiff, an unassigned inmate,

Page 1 of 5

challenges Defendants' refusal to pay him during his stints in
segregation over the years.
"In the prison context, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires inmates to be treated equally,
unless unequal treatment bears a rational relation to a legitimate
penal interest." May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876, 882 (7th Cir. 2000).
The record shows that Plaintiff's placement in segregation over the
years has been for disciplinary infractions. (Pl.'s Disciplinary Card
detailing Plaintiff's prison disciplinary record, d/e 49, pp. 10-15;
d/e 49-1, pp. 1-11.) Therefore, Plaintiff is not similarly situated to
unassigned inmates in general population. Unassigned inmates in
general population are not being punished for disciplinary
infractions. Further, Plaintiff's disciplinary infractions supply the
legitimate reason for terminating Plaintiff's monthly pay. The Court
agrees with Defendants that "[t]ermination of state pay to inmates
in segregation serves the legitimate penal interest of deterring
inmates from engaging in prohibited behavior." (Defs.' Memo., d/e
46, p. 5.) Rewarding inmates in disciplinary segregation with state
pay would decrease the incentive of all inmates to follow the rules.
Defendants' policy does not violate Plaintiff's equal protection rights
Page 2 of 5

because the policy is rationally related to a legitimate penal interest
encouraging rule compliance.
Plaintiff contends that the termination of his pay is not
permitted by the Illinois Administrative Directive cited by
Defendants, which provides:
2. An inmate absent from his assignment due to nondocumented illness, family visits, furlough, release on
writ (including temporary transfers to writ facilities), or
segregation placement will receive no monetary
compensation for the time of his absence.
Ill. Admin. Dir. Section 05.03.103A(II)(G)(2)(d/e 46-1, p. 21).
Plaintiff argues that this Directive applies only to assigned inmates,
not to unassigned inmates. Under Plaintiff's interpretation,
assigned inmates housed in segregation would receive no pay while
unassigned inmates housed in segregation would still receive pay.
Plaintiff's interpretation of this directive is strained and
illogical. The Court does not read this directive as requiring state
pay for unassigned inmates in disciplinary segregation. The
interpretation of this directive is also irrelevant because even if the
directive required Plaintiff to be paid in segregation, the violation of
a state directive does not violate the U.S. Constitution. "The
Constitution does not require states to ensure that their laws are
Page 3 of 5

implemented correctly." Simmons v. Gillespie, 712 F.3d 1041, 1044
(7th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff argues that the written punishment he received did
not mention the loss of state pay as part of his punishment.
However, the Constitution does not require Defendants to spell out
every privilege lost by Plaintiff because his misconduct. Plaintiff
has no constitutionally protected interest in receiving state pay, so
he is not entitled to notice before that pay is terminated. Vanskike
v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 1992)(prisoner has no
constitutional right to a job in prison, nor a constitutional right to
compensation for work performed).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted (d/e 45).
The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of
Defendants and against Plaintiff. All pending motions are
denied as moot (d/e 50), and this case is terminated, with the
parties to bear their own costs. All deadlines and settings on
the Court’s calendar are vacated.
2. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of
Page 4 of 5

judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for leave to appeal
in forma pauperis should identify the issues Plaintiff will
present on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c). If Plaintiff
does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the $455.00
appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of the appeal.
ENTER:

October 31, 2013

FOR THE COURT:

s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Page 5 of 5