Nieman v. Grange Mutual Casualty Company et al

Filing 127

OPINION (See Written Opinion):The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims[d/e 92 ] is ALLOWED. The Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File a Sur-reply [d/e 109 ] is ALLOWED. The Plaintiff's Third Motion to Compel Dis covery Responses and Second Motion for Discovery Sanctions [d/e 90 ] is DENIED. The Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Sworn Verifications as to Previously Submitted Interrogatory Responses [d/e 124 ] is DENIED. The Plaintiff's Affidavit in support of his Summary Judgment Opposition [d/e 126 ] is STRICKEN. The Defendants' Motions for Sanctions and to Supplement their Motions for Sanctions [d/e 62 , 118 ] are ALLOWED. The Defendants shall within 14 days of the entry of this Order supplement the record with their detailed billing records since September 4, 2012. The Plaintiff may respond 14 days thereafter.Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 4/02/2013. (VM, ilcd)

E-FILED

Tuesday, 02 April, 2013 04:22:36 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
JASON LEE NIEMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
GRANGE MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY and INTEGRITY
MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Defendants.

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No. 11-3404

OPINION
RICHARD MILLS, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff Nieman warned the Defendants of a “firey [sic] pit of legal
process” which could result in a “catastrophic” outcome if Defendants were
unwilling to meet his demands.
The Plaintiff followed through and indeed delivered a “firey [sic] pit
of legal process,” consisting of conduct that was harassing, contumacious
and in bad faith, which has subjected him to sanctions.
We conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact.
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Jason Nieman has filed suit against Defendants Grange
Mutual Insurance Company (“Grange”) and Integrity Mutual Insurance
Company (“Integrity” or collectively, “the Defendants”), asserting a number
of claims for age discrimination (Counts I and VII) and retaliation (Counts
II, V and VIII). The Defendants contend they are entitled to summary
judgment on all claims.
II. FACTS1
A. Defendants’ background and executive structure
Grange and Integrity provide insurance services for multiple lines of
insurance coverage, including workers compensation coverage. Integrity
provides insurance services in Wisconsin, Minnesota and Iowa, and has its
headquarters in Appleton, Wisconsin.

Grange’s headquarters are in

Columbus, Ohio.
1

These facts are taken from the Defendants’ alleged material facts that are
properly supported. The Court notes the Plaintiff’s response to most of these facts.
In most cases, however, instead of relying on evidence in the record, the Plaintiff
purports to dispute the allegation on the basis of his own subjective speculation
and/or that Defendants cannot be believed, which is not sufficient to create a genuine
issue of material fact to oppose summary judgment. In his Response to the
Defendants’ Motion, the Plaintiff does not cite any additional material facts.

2

Integrity has approximately 110 employees and a seven person
executive team consisting of President & CEO, Vice President of Sales and
Marketing, Vice President of Claims, Vice President of Human Resources
and Administration, Vice President of Personal Lines and Vice President of
Commercial Lines, and Director of Finance.2
Cindy Heindel was Integrity Vice President of Human Resources from
June 2007 to July 2011 and has been Integrity’s Vice President of Human
Resources and Administration since July 2011. The Plaintiff claims that
this is a disputed material fact, based on conflicting information provided
in the depositions of Heindel and another witness regarding the nature of
Heindel’s duties and/or knowledge. However, the Plaintiff does not point
specifically to any information in the record. Joe DiMartino has been
Integrity’s President since May 23, 2010, and its President and CEO since
February 14, 2011. The Plaintiff states that he has no direct knowledge of
this assertion, though he claims it appears to be a disputed material fact

2

The Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact, while also stating that he has no
personal knowledge to confirm or deny. He notes that the Defendants’ EEO-1 report
of September 2010 indicated 113 employees total.

3

based on his allegation that Defendants have consistently lied or
contradicted themselves.
B. Vice President of Claims Search
Integrity began a search for Vice President of Claims (“VP of Claims”)
in February 2009, which concluded with the selection of Christian Martin
in June 2011.

During the search period, Sue Frantzen, a Grange

management employee, filled the Integrity Claims leadership position on
an interim basis. She commuted from her northern Illinois residence.
Frantzen was asked whether she would be willing to accept the Integrity
claims leadership position on a permanent position. Frantzen, who was
born in 1961 and thus was approximately 48 in 2009, stated that she
declined the offer because she did not want to relocate to Appleton,
Wisconsin.3
Integrity solicited candidates by a job posting that remained
substantially the same throughout the search. Resumes and/or applications

3

Without pointing to any contrary evidence in the record, the Plaintiff disputes
each of these facts. He claims that Defendants have continuously lied or
contradicted themselves.

4

for the VP of Claims position were submitted by 133 candidates. Except
for a maternity leave of absence in Spring 2009, Cindy Heindel managed
the VP of Claims search and conducted all initial phone screens. The
Plaintiff disputes these allegations, claiming once again that the Defendants
have lied and contradicted themselves throughout this litigation. Heindel’s
phone screens generally followed a standard format.

They typically

concluded with three questions specifically designed for interviews of Vice
President level candidates, including a question concerning corporate
metrics.

Heindel testified that she might not ask each of the three

questions if she concluded that a candidate was no longer under
consideration.
Twelve of the 133 candidates received phone interviews by Integrity’s
CEO, a fact which the Plaintiff disputes based on the Defendants’ alleged
history of lies and misrepresentations.

Twelve of the 133 candidates

received face to face interviews. The Defendants allege that ten of the
twelve candidates who received phone interviews with the CEO were older
than age 42. Moreover, nine of the twelve candidates who received face to

5

face interviews were older than age 42. Heindel stated that she based this
information on college graduation dates or information she researched and
obtained from either recruiters or company files after November 4, 2011.
The Plaintiff disputes these facts, claiming it does not appear to be
verifiable. He further asserts that Defendants have shifted positions as to
whether college graduation dates could be used to estimate the age of
individuals.
In May 2009, the VP of Claims job was offered to Jim Blair.4 Blair,
who was 57 at the time, declined the offer because he did not want to
relocate to Appleton, Wisconsin.
In June 2011, Christian Martin was 39 when he was offered the VP
of Claims position. The Plaintiff disputes this allegation on the basis that

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The Plaintiff purports to dispute this fact, stating:
This is a disputed material fact. This statement appears to be
true but the Plaintiff has no way to verify it. Based upon Defendants’
prior false statements and evidence of spoliation of evidence by the
Defendants, the Plaintiff cannot stipulate to this as an undisputed fact.
The Defendants’ records show that Mr. Blair was offered the position
while Darin Kath was President/CEO. (Candidate 2; records at
Defendants’ Bates D 287 to 304). The strongest evidence of
discrimination and retaliation is noted in the record after DiMartino
was named present [sic] (and older officer Mary Jo Buchberger, was
refused the position, then choosing to “retire.”)

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he has no way to verify it. Moreover, he claims that “Heindel has been
shown to have falsely sworn and/or pled repeatedly throughout the
litigation and as such her affidavit cannot be deemed reliable as to this
item.”
The Defendants allege Heindel added the following as additional
recruiting sources after March 1, 2010: (1) six executive recruiters; (2) three
job search websites; and (3) Integrity’s website. The Plaintiff claims that
this fact is immaterial and unverifiable. Candidate number 15 (out of 133)
on Exhibit F was Plaintiff Jason Nieman. The Plaintiff disputes this only
regarding the total number of applicants.
C. Plaintiff Jason Nieman’s Phone Interview and Candidacy
According to her notes, Cindy Heindel phone screened the Plaintiff
on February 11, 2010, for less than one hour. The Plaintiff disputes this
on the basis that he did not time the interview. The Plaintiff further states
that he should have received at least a “CEO telephone” interview based
upon the statistical trends of who was interviewed after the phone interview
and the number of pages (5) of handwritten notes that Heindel took as to

7

his interview, when compared to the number she took as to other
candidates (between 1 and 4 pages). The Plaintiff was born in 1967 and
was 42 at the time of the phone screen.
The Defendants allege Cindy Heindel rejected the Plaintiff’s
candidacy during the phone screen and did not complete all three questions
normally asked of vice president candidates, including the question
regarding corporate metrics. She testified that any response to such a
question would have been recorded in a particular spot in her interview
notes.

The Plaintiff disputes this allegation, claiming he can find no

evidence that he was disqualified during the phone interview. He further
asserts that Heindel’s notes reflect that the three questions normally asked
of vice president candidates were indeed asked of him. Moreover, the
Defendants have not disputed the Plaintiff’s allegation that at the
conclusion of the phone interview, Heindel promised that she would follow
up with him.
The Defendants claim Heindel disqualified the Plaintiff because he:
(1) was long winded in his answers; (2) talked over (i.e., interrupted

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Heindel), (3) gave “snickety-snack time” as an example of corporate impact
for one employer, and (4) gave providing “headsets” as an example of
corporate impact at another employer. Heindel testified:
Q. . . . Where in this whole process did you decide that you
were gonna disqualify this candidate [the Plaintiff]?
A. . . . It probably was at some point when I realized how much
you [the Plaintiff] were rambling on and on, not answering my
questions, talking over me. At the point that – you know, most
candidates can kind of get a sense of the flow of the interview,
what I’m asking for, because I’ll ask follow-up questions in there
to try to move things along a little bit more quickly, and most
candidates – many candidates can pick up on that. You didn’t
pick up on that. And so somewhere within that time frame
where I clearly felt that you were just talking on and on so
much, I likely determined that I wasn’t gonna consider you
further.
***
So I very clearly had decided within that hour that I was not
considering you further.
See Heindel Dep. 99-102.
The Plaintiff disputes these proffered reasons.

Although the

Defendants’ first alleged fact above consists of one sentence, the Plaintiff’s
response is more than eleven pages. The Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’

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reasons for disqualifying him are subjective, uncorroborated and have
shifted; Heindel has testified falsely and her testimony is contradicted by
other witnesses; the Defendants have pled or sworn falsely; and the asserted
reasons were not the true reasons why the Plaintiff’s candidacy was not
further considered. The Plaintiff further contends he believes Heindel’s
purported handwritten notes are not genuine and/or have been altered since
they were created. The Plaintiff asserts that the record shows he was still
under consideration in October 2010, several months after the phone
interview.

It was on October 6, 2010, that Recruiter Jeff Gipson

telephonically contacted Heindel, less than an hour after Gipson had talked
to the Plaintiff. Although it is not known what was discussed between
Gipson and Heindel, the Plaintiff speculates they discussed his continued
interest and that he remained under consideration for the VP of Claims
position.
As for Heindel’s testimony, the Plaintiff disputes the allegations to the
extent that Defendants are offering it as proof of anything other than
Heindel gave such testimony at her deposition. The Plaintiff cites many of

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the same reasons, contending that Heindel’s reasons had shifted by the
time of her deposition. Moreover, her reasons for disqualifying the Plaintiff
were uncorroborated and inconsistent with her notes and initial
explanation. The Plaintiff further asserts that based on the number of
pages of notes Heindel took during the Plaintiff’s interview, as compared
with other candidates, he should have received more consideration.
The Defendants allege Heindel took five pages of handwritten notes
during her phone interview with the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff disputes this
fact, though he acknowledges he was presented with five pages that
purportedly are Heindel’s notes. The Plaintiff states he cannot verify the
legitimacy of the statement or the documents. Moreover, based on the
Defendants’ conduct throughout this litigation, the Plaintiff suggests that
the documents may have been manufactured or altered. At his deposition,
the Plaintiff could not recall anything in Heindel’s notes that he believed
to be inaccurately recorded. Her notes specifically refer to “snickety-snack
time” and “headsets,” as well as saying “long winded” and “talks over you.”
The Plaintiff acknowledges that accurately reflects the items which purport

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to be Heindel’s interview notes. However, he claims that she cannot be
trusted. Moreover, the Defendants’ “story” has changed several times.
The Defendants allege Cindy Heindel was the only person involved
in the decision to disqualify the Plaintiff. They cite the Declarations of
Heindel and Joe DiMartino in supporting the assertion. The Plaintiff
contends others were involved in considering candidates. He further alleges
that he was still under consideration several months after the phone
interview. The Plaintiff suggests that the Court’s rulings precluding him
from contacting non-party Jeff Gipson have prevented him from further
discovery as to this issue.
The Defendants allege Cindy Heindel relied solely upon her phone
interview with the Plaintiff to disqualify him from further consideration for
the Vice President of Claims position. Heindel testified as follows:
In my telephone interview, there were a number of things that
you [the Plaintiff] did not satisfactorily answer, including there
are a number of times that you talked over me, you interrupted
me, so I was very uncomfortable with your communication
skills. The quality of your responses was very weak in some
instances, not strategic at all. You know, at this level of
position, I’m really looking for someone that is a broad big
picture thinker that’s going to contribute at a vice president
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level, and the answers that you gave, such as snickety-snack
time, such as referencing your biggest impact to the company
was headsets was very weak, was really at, what I would
consider, maybe a response a manager level candidate may give,
but certainly not the quality of response that a VP level
candidate would give.
***
. . . based on how the telephone interview went, I didn’t feel
comfortable that I could put you in front of a board of
directors.
***
So I very clearly had decided within that hour that I was not
considering you further.
See Heindel Dep. 71-72. The Plaintiff strongly disputes this assertion for
the reasons previously noted and because he alleges Heindel has a history
of contradictions and falsehoods and cannot be deemed credible.
The Defendants allege that when debriefing recruiter Jeff Gipson
about the Plaintiff’s phone screen, Heindel told Gipson that Plaintiff was
long winded, talked over Heindel, and that “I could never put him in front
of my Board of Directors.” The Plaintiff disputes this assertion for many
of the reasons previously given, including his belief as to Heindel’s veracity.

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The Plaintiff further states that Gipson’s sworn testimony and records
contradict these statements.
The Defendants allege that after sending Heindel a thank-you letter
on February 11, 2010, the Plaintiff never communicated with Heindel again
during the remaining 16-month search for the VP of Claims. The Plaintiff
asserts this mis-characterizes the record. He alleges that he followed up
with Gipson and other recruiters, in addition to through Integrity’s online
job system and Heindel and others at Integrity. Moreover, Heindel’s
deposition confirms she was aware of the Plaintiff’s continuing interest but
did not advise him he had been disqualified until July 2011.
D. Continued Search for VP of Claims
The Defendants allege Jeff Gipson sent Heindel an email on March
15, 2010, which listed five candidates by rank. The email read in part:
Per our discussion on Friday I am sending you a grading of each
of the candidates that I submitted over the last week or so for
the VP of Claims position. I have others to submit but an [sic]
hesitant to do [so]. If I think any of them are superstars I will
go ahead and forward to you.
The Plaintiff’s name was not on the list. The Plaintiff claims that the

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alleged fact is immaterial and is disputed to the extent it is offered as proof
of the Plaintiff’s status as of March 15, 2010. The email refers only to
candidates that Gipson submitted in the last week. The Plaintiff notes that
his phone interview was approximately one month earlier. The Plaintiff
further asserts Gipson testified Heindel never told him that Plaintiff was
disqualified when they talked after the phone interview. Moreover, Gipson
considered the Plaintiff to be a viable candidate long after Heindel
suggested he was.
In September 2010, Cindy Heindel asked Jeff Gipson to confirm the
availability of three candidates who she had not previously interviewed.
The Plaintiff disputes the allegation, especially to the extent that
Defendants are suggesting that he was not one of the top three candidates
or still being considered at the time. The Plaintiff asserts Gipson called him
on October 6, 2010, and asked if he was still interested and available.
Gipson called Heindel 45 minutes after he talked to the Plaintiff. It is
unknown what, if anything, was discussed in this phone call that lasted
1:06. Based on this evidence and the affidavit of the Plaintiff’s wife, the

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Plaintiff alleges it can be inferred that Gipson called the Plaintiff at
Heindel’s request on October 6, 2010 to confirm the Plaintiff’s continued
availability and interest in the position.
The Defendants allege Heindel never referred the Plaintiff to Integrity
CEO Joe DiMartino for consideration.

The Plaintiff disputes this

allegation. He asserts the Defendants have admitted to destroying an email
from Heindel to DiMartino dated September 22, 2010. The Plaintiff
believes that his resume was attached to the email. Moreover, the Plaintiff
claims the Defendants’ statement that their sent folder emails are destroyed
after 30 days is unsupported and incredible.

He further alleges that

Defendants have been shown to intentionally damage and destroy material
documents.
E. Allegation of Internet Search as to Candidates
The Defendants allege Cindy Heindel neither conducted nor utilized
an internet search for any VP of Claims candidate, including the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff claims the allegation is unresolved and disputed, and that
additional discovery is needed. The Plaintiff believes Heindel has testified

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falsely regarding her internet searches.

He believes she has accessed

Linkedin.com5 profiles of candidates and otherwise used the internet to
access information about candidates, such as the Plaintiff. Moreover, he
contends that research shows that most hiring managers and human
resources personnel use the internet to research candidates.
The Defendants further allege that during phone screenings, Heindel
asked candidates the date on which the candidate graduated from college.
Heindel explained:
It’s an interview technique that I use. I don’t really care at all
what year they graduated. What I’m trying to do is . . . to
confirm that, yes, they did indeed graduate, and then more so
I’m trying to determine whether or not there’s any information
that’s missing from their resume. So my next line of
questioning then says, so after you graduated, where’d you go
to work. And so I’m trying to determine . . . if there is anything
missing on the resume.
See Heindel Dep. 85. The Plaintiff disputes the statement, to the extent
that Defendants are offering it as evidence or that it is even believed by
Heindel and/or the Defendants. The Plaintiff asserts Heindel provided no
5

LinkedIn describes itself as the “World’s Largest Professional Network,” with
over 200 million members in over 200 countries and territories. See
www.linkedin.com/about-us.

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support for the technique that she uses and suggests she made it up on her
own. He contends that her testimony is unreliable, when this technique is
considered with what the Plaintiff alleges is evidence of widespread age, race
and gender discrimination by the Defendants. The Defendants claim that
graduation dates are an unreliable measure of age as reported by the United
States Census Bureau, which notes that in 1995, 38% of males enrolled in
college were 25 or older. The Plaintiff disputes the allegation.
The Defendants allege Heindel has never had a LinkedIn account nor
used LinkedIn. The Plaintiff does not believe the assertion to be true. He
states that he is hopeful after further research by LinkedIn Corporation that
he will be provided with documentation as to who at Grange and/or
Integrity have viewed his profile and/or communicated about him from July
2009 to present.
In a July 25, 2012 letter to the Plaintiff’s then-Counsel, in response
to a subpoena, LinkedIn stated affirmatively that Heindel has never had a
LinkedIn Account. Citing no authority, the Plaintiff disputes this material
fact. The Plaintiff states he has learned from an intellectual property lawyer

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that when a LinkedIn user deletes his or her profile, the data remains for six
months and is then permanently deleted. LinkedIn is able to determine
who has viewed an individual’s profile back to March 2011. The Plaintiff
contends this is a question of credibility.
Joe DiMartino never heard of the Plaintiff until receiving his August
4, 2011 demand letter. The Plaintiff disputes this assertion, though he
offers nothing in support other than his own speculation and his contention
that Defendants have lied and destroyed documents.
The Plaintiff sued a prior employer in 2009. The Defendants allege
Heindel first learned about the Plaintiff’s lawsuit against a prior employer
when the Plaintiff sent a demand letter to DiMartino on August 4, 2011.
They cite Heindel’s Declaration in support of the allegation. The Plaintiff
disputes the assertion, citing only his subjective belief and his consistent
claim that Heindel and the Defendants have not been forthcoming. He
further speculates that “Defendants followed the industry norm and used
the Internet to research the Plaintiff, discovered his protected conduct, and
then quietly and abruptly disqualified him in October 2010.”

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F. Additional Alleged Reasons why Plaintiff is not Qualified
The Defendants have presented several additional reasons why they
allege the Plaintiff is unqualified for the VP of Claims. These reasons are
based on information obtained during discovery.
The Plaintiff admitted in his deposition on June 27, 2012, that he
had no worker’s compensation management experience in Wisconsin,
Minnesota, or Iowa. In other words, the Plaintiff acknowledged that to the
best of his recollection, he was never “in charge of a complete claim being
resolved” nor did he “manag[e] other people who were responsible for a
complete claim being resolved” in Wisconsin, Minnesota, or Iowa. See
Nieman Dep. Tr. 55-57. The Plaintiff argues this is a disputed immaterial
fact. It is immaterial because the Defendants have never offered worker’s
compensation experience as a reason for his disqualification from
consideration. The allegation is disputed because the Plaintiff disagrees
with the Defendants’ definition of worker’s compensation management
experience.
The Plaintiff disclosed during his deposition that he used his current

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employer’s LEXIS, WESTLAW, and computer systems to perform work on
his personal lawsuits without his employer’s express consent. Moreover, he
works on his personal lawsuits during work hours without his employer’s
express consent. The Plaintiff contends these alleged facts are immaterial
and disputed. He contends the allegations are neither admissible nor
relevant and are prejudicial. The Plaintiff has his employer’s permission to
do online case research that relates to his work duties.

The Plaintiff

appears to acknowledge that he sometimes does research during business
hours that relates to his personal lawsuits, though he claims the research
increases his knowledge with respect to topics relevant to his work duties.
The Plaintiff states that he has never been disciplined or admonished
regarding any improper use of work resources. He further states, “Such
personal, non-material deviations are permitted by his employer’s code of
conduct so long as they do not interfere with his duties in any way, which
they do not.” See Doc. No. 106, at 53.
The Defendants allege that the Integrity IT Acceptable Use Policy
prohibits unreasonable personal use of Integrity’s IT systems.

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Such

unreasonable personal use is subject to discipline, up to and including
discharge. The Plaintiff asserts this allegation is immaterial because he
neither was nor is an Integrity employee and is not bound by its policies.
He further contends that if the alleged fact is true, it represents a shift
regarding the Defendants’ justifications for his purported disqualification
which may be a pretext for the real reason.
G. Integrity’s Selection for VP of Claims
Based on Cindy Heindel’s Declaration, the Defendants allege that
Christian Martin had superior communication skills and excellent strategic
skills. The Plaintiff contends the allegations are immaterial based on the
Defendants’ statement that Plaintiff was disqualified long before Martin
interviewed for the position. The Plaintiff disputes these assertions based
on their high level of subjectivity. In disputing the alleged superiority of
Martin’s communication skills, the Plaintiff also points to Sue Frantzen’s
Interview Evaluation Form, wherein she states that she had “trouble getting
specific detailed answers from [Martin], he gave high level generic responses
to jurisdiction specific technical questions. Minimal metrics in place to

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manage current department’s results.”

The Plaintiff uses his own

interactions with Martin in disputing that he had excellent strategic skills.
Moreover, because they had essentially the same job duties in their previous
positions at another insurance company, the Plaintiff states that if Martin’s
strategic experience was “excellent,” then the same would also be true of the
Plaintiff.

However, it appears that Defendants are referring to the

individuals’ strategic skills, not their respective experience.
The Integrity VP of Claims job description includes the following
requirements: (1) excellent written and verbal communication skills; (2)
strong interpersonal skills and the ability to interact with all levels in the
organization; (3) demonstrated leadership ability; and (4) a visionary. The
Plaintiff disputes this assertion, claiming there have been a number of
different versions of the job description between the various insurance
recruiters, Integrity’s own website, and as to the version provided by the
Defendants in discovery. Moreover, he contends that Defendants have also
attempted to use these items to justify their conduct, which lacks any
objective basis for the Plaintiff’s disqualification.

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Integrity described Martin as follows: (1) professional and calm
demeanor; (2) good communication skills; (3) great personality and
demeanor – would seem to be a good fit; (4) good communication and
depth to responses . . . he would be a good fit with leadership team; (5)
supports overall objectives; (6) understands how to support agents; (7) has
claims management experience; (8) has a number of experiences that
demonstrate his strategic thinking and drive for results; (9) his answers to
the situational leadership questions were great; and (10) understands a
business case.
The Plaintiff contends the description of Martin consists of disputed
immaterial facts. He questions the lengthy delay between Martin’s phone
interview and his second interview if he possessed the foregoing attributes.
Although these comments are in forms provided to the Plaintiff by the
Defendants, the Plaintiff questions their legitimacy. He further alleges that
one or more forms appears to have been manufactured by the Defendants
and/or Cindy Heindel after the Plaintiff filed an EEOC charge. Moreover,
the Plaintiff asserts that Heindel’s apparent actions in negligently or

24

intentionally destroying emails and/or her own handwritten notes raise
further questions.
Cindy Heindel explained why she considered Martin a viable
candidate based on his phone screen:
I kept holding onto it [Martin’s candidacy] because there were
a lot of things about his telephone interview that I really liked.
His communication skills were very sound — were very strong,
he did a great job in watching my questions, answering the
questions that I was asking with a lot of depth, the quality of
his responses were very high, comparable to what would be a VP
level, so I kept coming back to him.
See Heindel Dep. Tr. 80.

While acknowledging this was Heindel’s

testimony, the Plaintiff disputes it to the extent that it is used to establish
that Martin was a superior candidate or that the statements accurately
explain the eight-month delay between Martin’s first and second interviews.
The Plaintiff alleges the statements establish pretext and suggest that
evidence was altered and/or manufactured by the Defendants or one of the
agents.
H. Recruiters Gipson and Tingley
The Defendants allege Recruiter Jeff Gipson disclaimed any

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knowledge of discriminatory intent by Integrity. Except for acknowledging
that Gipson offered such testimony, the Plaintiff claims this is a disputed
immaterial fact. Moreover, Gipson stopped working on this job before the
final phases.
The Defendants allege that Recruiter Mike Tingley disclaimed any
knowledge of discriminatory intent by Integrity. Except for acknowledging
that Tingley offered such testimony, the Plaintiff claims this is an
immaterial fact. Moreover, the Plaintiff asserts that Tingley said that some
employers are committing age discrimination and are “speaking in code” as
part of those efforts. However, the Plaintiff acknowledges that Tingley was
not speaking about Integrity or Grange as engaging in such a practice.
Cindy Heindel testified that she never asked Recruiter Jeff Gipson to
contact the Plaintiff again after he was allegedly disqualified on February
11, 2010. Gipson testified that he did not recall Heindel asking him to
contact the Plaintiff after that date. The Plaintiff maintains that Gipson
called him on October 6, 2010, in order to ask if he was still interested in
the position and available.

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The Defendants allege that Recruiter Jeff Gipson confirmed worker’s
compensation management experience was an extremely important
qualification. Gipson testified there was not an emphasis on worker’s
compensation at the beginning of the process. He was not aware of the
importance of worker’s compensation experience at the time of the
Plaintiff’s interview. The Plaintiff contends this is further evidence of
pretext in that the qualifications for the position changed over time. The
Defendants further allege Recruiter Mike Tingley confirmed worker’s
compensation management experience was an extremely important
qualification. According to Tingley, candidates without strong experience
in that arena were eliminated. The Plaintiff disputes the allegation for the
same reason and asserts it is further evidence of pretext for a discriminatory
reason.
Jeff Gipson and Mike Tingley controlled the manner in which they
found and submitted candidates to Integrity.

The Defendants allege

neither Gipson nor Tingley had the authority to affect their legal
relationships with third parties. The Plaintiff claims these assertions are

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immaterial. Although claiming the allegations are disputed, the Plaintiff
acknowledges he has no basis to confirm or deny their veracity. Jeff Gipson
and Mike Tingley worked on a contingency basis and received no
compensation unless they successfully placed a candidate.
The Plaintiff admitted during his deposition that he does not have
direct evidence of age discrimination. He further acknowledged that he
does not have direct evidence of retaliation and his claim is based on
supposition.
III. DISCUSSION
The Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot establish, through
direct or indirect evidence, that Cindy Heindel disqualified him for the VP
of Claims position because of his age or his prior protected activity. They
allege his age discrimination claims fail for several reasons, one of which is
that Christian Martin is approximately the same age. The Defendants
further assert that Plaintiff’s retaliation claims fail for a number of reasons,
primarily because Heindel never had knowledge of any protected activity.
Because they contend that Plaintiff has offered only speculation and

28

conclusory assertions, the Defendants allege they are entitled to summary
judgment as to all claims.
The Plaintiff contends there are material facts which preclude the
entry of summary judgment. The Plaintiff further asserts that procedural
defects preclude a grant of summary judgment. He alleges that Defendants
have violated evidentiary rules by introducing attacks on his character, in
addition to presenting evidence of settlement negotiations. The Plaintiff
contends that Defendants have destroyed material evidence. He further
alleges that discovery must be reopened.
A. Legal standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the motion is properly supported
and “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
Court construes all inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. See Siliven v. Indiana
Dept. of Child Services, 635 F.3d 921, 925 (7th Cir. 2011). To create a
genuine factual dispute, however, any such inference must be based on
something more than “speculation or conjecture.”

29

See Harper v. C.R.

England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
Because summary judgment “is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit,”
a “hunch” about the opposing party’s motives is not enough to withstand
a properly supported motion. See Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479, 484
(7th Cir. 2008). Ultimately, there must be enough evidence in favor of the
non-movant to permit a jury to return a verdict in its favor. See id.
B. Age Discrimination
In attempting to withstand summary judgment in discrimination
cases, a plaintiff may proceed under the direct method or indirect method.
See Fleishman v. Continental Casualty Co., 698 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir.
2012).
(1) Direct Method
A plaintiff may meet his burden under the direct method by
presenting direct evidence or circumstantial evidence. See id. Under the
direct method, a plaintiff may produce direct evidence, such as an
admission by the employer, or circumstantial evidence that “points directly
to a discriminatory reason for the employer’s action.” See id. (citations

30

omitted). A plaintiff seeking to create a genuine issue of material fact with
circumstantial evidence “must connect the circumstantial evidence to the
employment action such that a reasonable juror could infer the employer
acted for discriminatory reasons.” Id.
The Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he does not have any
direct evidence of age discrimination. “A plaintiff’s concession that he lacks
evidence to support his case is binding.” See Best v. City of Portland, 554
F.3d 698, 700 (7th Cir. 2009).

Accordingly, the Court will consider

whether the Plaintiff presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of age
discrimination under the direct method to create a genuine issue of material
fact.
The Court concludes the evidence here shows that no age
discrimination occurred.

Based on Cindy Heindel’s Declaration, the

evidence establishes that ten of the twelve candidates who were referred for
phone interviews with the CEO were older than age 42. Moreover, nine of
the twelve candidates who received face to face interviews were older than
age 42. Although the Plaintiff claims to dispute these assertions and

31

questions how Heindel determined the age of the candidates, he provides
no evidence creating a factual dispute or casting any doubt on either
allegation.
The evidence further shows that Sue Frantzen, age 50, the interim VP
of Claims, was asked by Joe DiMartino whether she would accept the VP
of Claims position on a permanent basis, but she declined because she did
not wish to relocate to Appleton, Wisconsin. In support of these assertions,
the Defendants rely on the Declarations of Frantzen and DiMartino. The
Plaintiff purports to dispute the allegations. However, he provides no
evidence in support of his position, except to argue that Defendants have
provided false information and have placed their credibility at issue.
Because the Defendants have properly supported their allegations, the
Plaintiff’s bare denials are not enough to create a factual dispute at this
stage.
The evidence further establishes that Jim Blair, age 57, was offered the
VP of Claims position but declined because he did not wish to relocate.
The Defendants cite Heindel’s Declaration in support of the assertion. The

32

Plaintiff acknowledges that the statements appear to be true, though he has
no way to verify them. He claims the facts are disputed but provides no
support for the assertion, except to argue that the statement cannot be
considered true because of the Defendants’ alleged prior false statements
and spoliation of evidence. This bare denial is not sufficient to create a
factual dispute.
The evidence further establishes that Christian Martin, who
ultimately accepted the VP of Claims position, when hired was
approximately three years younger than the Plaintiff was when the Plaintiff
interviewed for the position. Martin was 39 when he was offered the
position in June 2011. The Plaintiff was 42 when he was phone screened
on February 11, 2010. Although the Plaintiff admits to his own age, he
claims that he has no way to verify Martin’s age. The Plaintiff’s bare denial
and accusation of false testimony is not enough to create a factual dispute.
The Court concludes the undisputed material facts establish that age
did not play a role in Cindy Heindel’s decision to reject the Plaintiff’s
candidacy for the VP of Claims position.

33

The Court further concludes that Heindel’s asserted basis for asking
a candidate’s college graduation date is reasonable and has a business
justification. Such an inquiry is an obvious method of determining if the
information on a resume is accurate or if there is a gap in a candidate’s
work history.6
Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff has not presented any
circumstantial evidence that points directly to a discriminatory reason for
the employment decision. The Plaintiff’s hunches about the Defendants’
motives are not enough to proceed.

See Springer, 518 F.3d at 484.

Therefore, using the direct method of proof, the Plaintiff has not created a
factual dispute regarding whether his candidacy was rejected due to age
discrimination.
(2) Indirect Method
Under the indirect method, a plaintiff may present a prima facie case
6

The Defendants again allege graduation dates are an unreliable measure of
age, according to the United States Census Bureau. This is certainly true because
many people do not enter college immediately after high school. However, it is
equally true that a candidate who graduated from college 20 or more years ago is
probably over the age of 40. Therefore, an individual’s college graduate date can in
some circumstances be used to estimate that he is subject to the protections of the
laws prohibiting age discrimination.

34

by showing that he (1) was a member of a protected class; (2) sought a
position for which he was qualified; (3) was not hired; and (4) a
substantially younger person who was similarly situated was hired. See
Sembos v. Philips Components, 376 F.3d 696, 700 (7th Cir. 2004).
The Defendants allege that Plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie
case because (1) he was not qualified for the VP of Claims position; (2)
Christian Martin is not substantially younger than the Plaintiff; and (3)
Martin is not similarly-situated to the Plaintiff.
The Defendants note that the job description required the successful
candidate to have excellent written and verbal communication skills. They
contend that Plaintiff’s interview demonstrated that he was long-winded
and talked over others. Moreover, the job description required strong
interpersonal skills and the ability to interact with all levels in the
organization. The Defendants allege the Plaintiff’s interview demonstrated
that he lacked these skills because of his tendency to interrupt the
interviewer.

The successful candidate was expected to demonstrate

leadership ability. The Defendants state that Plaintiff’s examples of having

35

a corporate impact by organizing “snickety-snack time” and obtaining
headsets for other employees were not the answers that Integrity expected
of a successful candidate for VP of Claims.
The Plaintiff disputes the reasons provided by Cindy Heindel as to
why he was disqualified.

He further claims that Heindel’s purported

interview notes are not genuine, her reasons have evolved, and he believes
she has testified falsely.
The record establishes that Plaintiff had whatever basic qualifications
Integrity required to be interviewed for the position.

However,

employment decisions are often about more than educational or technical
requirements. Although the Plaintiff dismisses some of Heindel’s asserted
reasons for disqualifying him as subjective, it is “entirely appropriate” for
an employer to subjectively analyze the “varying traits of each applicant.”
See Blise v. Antaramian, 409 F.3d 861, 868 (7th Cir. 2005).
Based on Heindel’s interview notes, it appears that Integrity had
legitimate reasons to disqualify the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has disputed
some of these justifications and contends that Heindel’s interview notes are

36

not genuine.7

The Defendants provided four reasons, including the

Plaintiff’s long-windedness, as to why the Plaintiff was disqualified. Parts
of the record appear at least to support the Defendants’ proffered
justification that Plaintiff is long-winded. The Plaintiff’s response to the
Defendants’ one-sentence allegation alleging the reasons for disqualification
is almost eleven pages. Moreover, the Plaintiff’s initial memorandum in
opposition to the Defendants’ 29-page memorandum in support of
summary judgment is 321 pages.8

After his initial memorandum was

stricken, the Plaintiff submitted a 90-page memorandum in compliance
with the Court’s Order.
Additionally, based on the Plaintiff’s responses to certain questions,
Integrity determined that Plaintiff did not have the skills it was looking for

7

The Court has no reason to doubt that the notes were made at the time of the
interview. Moreover, Heindel’s assertion that Plaintiff is long-winded is consistent
with Jeff Gipson’s February 11, 2010 note regarding the Plaintiff’s telephone
interview.
8

Although not known by Integrity at the time of the employment decision, the
Defendants allege that Plaintiff has subsequently demonstrated that he is unqualified
because he admitted he uses his employer’s LEXIS and WESTLAW accounts for his
personal lawsuits. This would be a basis for discharge if the Plaintiff were an
Integrity employee. They also allege that Plaintiff does not have the requisite
worker’s compensation claims management experience.

37

as to strategic and visionary thinking, in addition to previous corporate
impact. The Plaintiff does not dispute that he answered the questions as
alleged by the Defendants. Certainly, Integrity was entitled to use such
criteria in assessing the various traits of the candidates for VP of Claims.
The Court does not sit as a super-personnel department, assessing the
wisdom of an employer’s decision. See Metzger v. Illinois State Police, 519
F.3d 677, 685 (7th Cir. 2008).
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s age discrimination
claim fails because he is unqualified.
The Plaintiff’s age discrimination claim fails for the additional reason
that Integrity did not hire a substantially younger person. The requirement
that the comparator be substantially younger is based on the simple premise
that “an inference [of age discrimination] cannot be drawn from the
replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger.”
Hoffman v. Primedia Special Interest Publications, 217 F.3d 522, 524 (7th Cir.
2000) (quoting O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308,
313 (1996)). The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

38

has defined “substantially younger” as generally ten years younger. See
Balderston v. Fairbanks Morse Engine Div. of Coltec Industries, 328 F.3d 309,
322 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Hartley v. Wisconsin Bell, Inc., 124 F.3d 887, 893
(7th Cir. 1997)).
The Plaintiff was 42 when he was rejected for the Integrity VP of
Claims position on February 11, 2010, while Christian Martin was 39 when
he was hired for that position. The Seventh Circuit has held the three-year
age gap between a 42-year old and 39-year old was insufficient to establish
the required element for a prima facie case. See Hoffman, 217 F.3d at 525.
In other cases, larger gaps were held to be presumptively insubstantial. See
Richter v. Hook-SupeRx, Inc., 142 F.3d 1024, 1029 (seven year age
difference); Hartley, 124 F.3d at 893 (six-to-seven year age difference).
Although a plaintiff may allege a triable claim upon pointing to other
evidence, see Hartley, 124 F.3d at 893, the Plaintiff offers nothing more
than his own speculation.
Based on the three-year age gap between the selected candidate and
the Plaintiff at the time of his interview, the Court concludes that Plaintiff

39

cannot make out a prima facie case of age discrimination. The Defendants
are entitled to summary judgment because the Plaintiff is not qualified for
the position and because Christian Martin was not significantly younger
than the Plaintiff when he was hired as VP of Claims.9
C. Retaliation
In order to establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff may proceed under
the direct or indirect methods of proof. See Milligan v. Board of Trustees of
Southern Illinois University, 686 F.3d 378, 388 (7th Cir. 2012).
(1) Direct Method
To establish retaliation under the direct method, a plaintiff must show
that: (1) he engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) he suffered an
adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between
the protected activity and the adverse action. See Coleman v. Donahoe, 667
F.3d 835, 859 (7th Cir. 2012).

The Plaintiff admitted during his

deposition that he does not have direct evidence of retaliation and that his

9

It is also worth noting that Sue Frantzen, who is substantially older than the
Plaintiff, performed the VP of Claims job on an interim basis before being offered the
position. Additionally, Jim Blair was 57 at the time he was offered the position in
May 2009.

40

claim is based on supposition. Therefore, the Court will consider whether
the Plaintiff has presented circumstantial evidence of retaliation under the
direct method.
The Plaintiff can establish causation at this stage by showing that his
protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor” why he was
disqualified for the position. See Milligan, 686 F.3d at 388. A plaintiff may
present a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence” that would permit
a court to draw an inference of retaliation. Id. (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Such evidence may consist of:
(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous statements oral or written,
behavior toward or comments directed at other employees in
the protected group, and other bits and pieces from which an
inference of causation might be drawn, (2) evidence showing
that the employer systematically treated other, similarly
situated . . . employees better, or (3) evidence that . . . the
employer’s justification [for the adverse action was] pretextual.
Id. at 389 (internal quotation marks omitted). The appropriate focus is
“whether the evidence points directly to a discriminatory reason for the
employer’s action.” Id.
There can be no causal connection between the protected activity and

41

the Plaintiff’s disqualification from consideration if the Defendants were
not aware of the protected activity. Cindy Heindel testified she had no
knowledge of the Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Nationwide until his demand
letter, 18 months after she claims he was disqualified as a candidate. In
response to the assertion, the Plaintiff states in pertinent part:
The Plaintiff believes this to be a material false statement by
Heindel and the Defendants, one of a great many that they
have provided in this case verbally, or by way of sworn
documents and/or pleadings. Evidence provided in this
pleading prior thereto, shows that the greatest probability is
that the Defendants followed the industry norm and used the
Internet to research the Plaintiff, discovered his protected
conduct, and then quietly and abruptly disqualified him in
October 2010. Defendants have refused to respond or refute
these allegations as to their computer systems and ephemeral
data, and this item remains at issue in the currently pending
third motion to compel.
See Doc. No. 106, at 49-50. The Plaintiff’s speculation that Defendants
researched him simply because he believes that most employers research
candidates for employment is not enough to create a genuine factual
dispute at this stage of the litigation. Heindel’s testimony about when she
first learned of the Plaintiff’s Nationwide lawsuit was corroborated by Joe
DiMartino’s testimony.
42

The Plaintiff theorizes that he remained under consideration for
several months after the interview, until October 2010 when Heindel
learned of his protected activity and abruptly disqualified him. This is
inconsistent with the contemporaneous evidence, which supports the
Defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff was disqualified after the telephone
interview.
The Plaintiff places great emphasis on telephone records which reflect
calls between Jeff Gipson’s business, James Allen Co., and Cindy Heindel
at the approximate time that Plaintiff theorizes he was disqualified from
consideration for the VP of Claims position. He notes that the records
from September 16, 2010 to October 15, 2010, reveal a total of seventeen
calls from Gipson’s company to Heindel. In particular, the Plaintiff points
to a call on October 6, 2010, that lasted 1:06. According to the Plaintiff,
Gipson’s brief call to Heindel was made 45 minutes after Gipson had
telephoned him to inquire if he was still interested. The telephone records
further provide Gipson’s telephone call to Heindel on October 11, 2010,
lasted 18:00. Apparently, the Plaintiff theorizes that his continued interest

43

and his candidacy was discussed at this time.
Even assuming for a moment the Plaintiff’s theory that he was
disqualified at a later time, it is still quite a leap to suggest the reason was
his prior protected conduct. The Plaintiff has little other than his own
speculation to support that contention. See Sauzek v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc.,
202 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Speculation based on suspicious
timing alone . . . does not support a reasonable inference of retaliation.”).
There may be an exception to the general rule when the adverse action
occurs “on the heels of the protected activity.” See Mobley v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 531 F.3d 539, 549 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
If Cindy Heindel or another Integrity official had followed up or
requested another interview and thereafter canceled and informed the
Plaintiff that he was no longer being considered, then there might possibly
be a reasonable inference of retaliation. However, that did not happen
here.

Neither Heindel nor anyone else from Integrity contacted the

Plaintiff after his telephone interview. There is no evidence that Heindel
took action based on whatever Jeff Gipson told her about the Plaintiff or

44

anyone else in any phone conversations in October 2010. There is nothing
in the record tending to show that Heindel was still interested in the
Plaintiff as a potential candidate for VP of Claims. In addition to the
contemporaneous notes of Heindel and Gipson, these undisputed facts
suggest that Plaintiff was not given further consideration. The fact that
Plaintiff alleges he advised employment recruiters of his continuing interest
in the position is largely irrelevant.
The Plaintiff has no support for his theory that Heindel conducted
research and learned of his prior protected activity eight months after his
telephone interview. It seems highly unlikely that a hiring official would
conduct such research on a candidate after having no contact with him in
the eight months between February and October. In attempting to create
a genuine issue of material fact, the Plaintiff makes two inferences which
appear to be based on speculation – that Heindel or another Integrity
official discovered his protected activity in October 2010 and he was
subsequently disqualified from consideration. The Plaintiff’s belief he was
disqualified at that time, without then being notified, is not alone enough

45

to create a genuine issue of material fact on his retaliation claims. At this
stage, the Plaintiff’s speculative inferences and unsupported theories are not
enough to survive summary judgment.

See Harper, 687 F.3d at 306.

Moreover, the Plaintiff’s consistent and conclusory assertion that Heindel
or others have lied throughout these proceedings is not enough to create a
factual dispute regarding whether there was a causal connection between his
prior protected activity and the decision to disqualify him.
The Court concludes that because the undisputed material facts, when
viewed in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, show that there is no causal
connection between the Plaintiff’s lawsuit against Nationwide and Cindy
Heindel’s decision to disqualify him, the Plaintiff is unable to establish
evidence of retaliation under the direct method.
(2) Indirect Method
Under the indirect method, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case
of retaliation by showing that: (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected
activity; (2) he met the employer’s legitimate expectations; (3) he suffered
an adverse employment action; and (4) he was treated less favorably than

46

similarly situated employees who did not engage in protected activity. See
Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656, 666 (7th Cir. 2006).
For the reasons previously discussed, the Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s retaliation claim based on the indirect
method. The Plaintiff’s retaliation claim fails under the indirect method
because the evidence demonstrates that he was not qualified for the VP of
Claims position. Christian Martin was not similarly situated to the Plaintiff
because Martin was qualified for the position. Therefore, the Plaintiff is
unable to show that similarly situated individuals who did not engage in
protected activity were treated more favorably.
The Plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case of retaliation
under the indirect method. Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to
summary judgment on the Plaintiff’s retaliation claims.
D. State Law Claims
In Counts VII and VIII, the Plaintiff asserts state law claims for age
discrimination and retaliation, pursuant to the Illinois Human Rights Act.
“In analyzing employment discrimination actions brought under the

47

Human Rights Act, [the Illinois] Supreme Court has adopted the analytical
framework set forth in United States Supreme Court decisions addressing
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act.”

Lalvani v. Illinois Human Rights

Comm’n, 324 Ill. App.3d 774, 789-790 (1st Dist. 2001) (citing Zaderaka v.
Illinois Human Rights Commission, 131 Ill.2d 172, 178 (1989)).
Having determined that Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on the Plaintiff’s federal age discrimination and retaliation claims,
the Court concludes summary judgment is warranted in favor of the
Defendants on the Plaintiff’s state law claims.
E. Additional Matters
Discovery closed on October 10, 2012. The Plaintiff has sought
multiple extensions of the discovery period. These motions have been
denied. The Court declines to revisit these rulings or extend the discovery
period. The Plaintiff has attempted to get around these Orders by ignoring
them or pursuing subpoenas in other jurisdictions.
The Plaintiff has filed a motion for discovery sanctions under Rule 37

48

of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, based on the Defendants’ refusal to
verify interrogatory responses as required by Rule 33(B)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Because discovery has closed in this case, the
Court concludes that Plaintiff has waived this argument. See In re Sulfuric
Acid Antitrust Litig., 230 F.R.D. 527, 533 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (party waived
discovery objection by bringing it after close of discovery).
Most recently, the Plaintiff has filed an Affidavit to supplement his
opposition to the Defendants’ summary judgment motion. Because the
Affidavit was filed several months after briefing on the summary judgment
motion concluded, the Plaintiff’s Affidavit will be stricken as untimely.
F. Motion for Sanctions and Supplement
(1)
On August 7, 2012, the Defendants filed a motion for sanctions. On
August 16, 2012, the Court held a hearing on that motion. In an Order
entered on August 31, 2012, this Court stated that it appeared part of the
Plaintiff’s legal strategy was “to use the threat of criminal liability and/or
ethical sanctions in the hope of obtaining a favorable settlement.” See Doc.

49

No. 74, at 7. The Court held any sanctions in abeyance, while warning the
Plaintiff that he would be sanctioned if he continued to engage in
inappropriate litigation tactics or “conduct that is particularly harassing,
contumacious, or for any action which is taken in bad faith.” See Doc. No.
74, at 15.

The Plaintiff was specifically warned that sanctions could

include “the assessment of attorney’s fees and costs which are incurred as
a result of such conduct.” See id.
On February 6, 2013, the Defendants filed a motion to supplement
their motion for sanctions. The Plaintiff filed a response on the following
day. In support of their motion, the Defendants allege that since the
Court’s August 31, 2012 Order, the Plaintiff’s litigation tactics have
included the following:
(1) sending Defendants or their counsel more than 200 letters
or emails with threats of extensive litigation costs, absurd
settlement demands, references to insurance coverage, lengthy
legal arguments, and legal predictions that directly contradict
this Court’s order; (2) repeatedly attempting to harass thirdparty witness Jeff Gipson by seeking court permission to reconvene Gipson’s deposition, file an EEOC Charge against
Gipson, and file a federal lawsuit against Gipson in direct
contradiction of this Court’s repeated orders; (3) threatening to
contact the U.S. Attorney’s Office, EEOC, IDHR, OCRC,
50

Illinois ARDC, and Wisconsin OLR to “supplement” his
previous filings which this court has already deemed harassing;
(4) attempting to proceed with depositions of third-party
witnesses that this court explicitly prohibited, including a failed
pursuit to enforce subpoenas in the Eastern District of
Wisconsin; (5) explicitly disobeying Magistrate Judge
Cudmore’s order limiting the topics on which Grange’s Vice
President, Peter McMurtrie, could be deposed; (6) attempting
to enlarge discovery through frivolous motions to compel,
requests to Defendants, and proceedings in related litigation in
contradiction of this Court and Magistrate Judge Cudmore’s
orders; (7) filing an oppressively large response to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment that was stricken by the Court;
(8) attempting to appeal this Court’s Order on the parties’
cross-motions to dismiss to the Seventh Circuit, despite
recognizing that no final order has issued and a Rule 54(b)
motion was likely to fail; (9) filing a Notice of Appeal and
Docketing Statement along with approximately 600 pages of
exhibits seeking Seventh Circuit review of this Court’s orders in
relation to Gipson; and (10) threatening to commence and
actually commencing additional litigation against Defendants
and third parties.
See Doc. No. 118, at 2-3.
The Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s purpose in pursuing this
litigation has been to escalate defense costs through numerous filings in the
hope that he could turn baseless claims into a large settlement. In an
August 4, 2012 email to Defense Counsel which is attached to the
Defendants’ Memorandum, the Plaintiff suggested that Counsel did not
51

appear to be particularly knowledgeable about the relevant law and hinted
at a lengthy battle, which included the potential for damages to their
reputation and criminal liability.

Indeed, before the first motion for

sanctions was filed, the Plaintiff sent an email to Counsel predicting a “firey
[sic] pit of legal process,” which would include a “tremendous amount of
pleading, time, expense and stress for myself and my family.” See Doc. No.
119, Ex. 1. With those words, the Plaintiff appeared to reveal his strategy.
Two days later, the Plaintiff followed up with another email wherein
he advised Counsel of the relevant balancing of interests inquiry in
determining whether settlement would be appropriate from a Defense
perspective.
Of course, the August 2012 email communications were before the
Hearing and the Court determined it would hold sanctions in abeyance.
A review of the record shows that Plaintiff has continued to employ similar
litigation tactics since August 31, 2012.
(2)
In their motion to supplement, the Defendants allege that the

52

overriding theme in the more than 200 letters or emails that Plaintiff has
sent Defense Counsel since September 12, 2012 is that unless they settle,
the Defendants and Defense Counsel will subject themselves to sanctions,
disbarment and the continued escalation of defense costs. In his response
to the Defendants’ supplemental motion for sanctions, the Plaintiff does
not directly address these tactics.
Notably, in a December 23, 2012 email to Counsel, the Plaintiff
promised to appeal should the Court grant the Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. The Plaintiff opined that the Court’s future Order
would have “between five and ten points” of “material error,” even though
that Order referred to is only now being entered more than three months
later.
In a letter dated December 31, 2012, the Plaintiff provided his
commentary on how this case and the related litigation he had initiated was
proceeding. The Plaintiff stated that if any case were to be dismissed, he
would promptly appeal and expects a favorable ruling from the reviewing
court. He then opined that the “winners” in this litigation have been the

53

law firms, stating that he believes “many thousands of dollars of legal
expense” have been invoiced or soon will be by the Defendants in
connection with this case.

The Plaintiff predicted that the “defense

attorneys will continue to bill tremendous amounts” and that settlement
was in their best interest.
The Plaintiff’s running commentary as to this and related litigation
along with the threats that typically accompany such correspondence is the
type of harassing communication that Plaintiff was directed by this Court
to cease. The Plaintiff has not been deterred.
In a January 17, 2013 email, the Plaintiff recommends to Counsel for
the Defendant how they should respond to his motion for final judgment
under Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. According to the
Plaintiff, the Defendants should not oppose his motion. He then offers this
thoughts on how the Seventh Circuit will view the conduct of Counsel, the
Defendants and that of related parties the Plaintiff has brought in to – or
sought to – add to this litigation. The Plaintiff claims that among other
acts of misconduct and retaliation, there has been perjury, withholding of

54

evidence and the destruction of evidence. The Plaintiff further opines on
the likelihood of eventual review in the United States Supreme Court. He
concludes by stating, “The facts as to the Defendants conduct, and that of
their agents and attorneys seems so utterly egregious that these cases may
well become textbook examples of what not to do, serving as a warning and
lesson for Defendants for many years to come.” See Doc. No. 119, Ex. 9.
In a letter dated January 27, 2013, the Plaintiff wrote to Counsel for
the Defendants. The Plaintiff noted the several litigation fronts he was
pursuing, which included: (1) this initial litigation; (2) the Ohio litigation
against the Defendants’ in-house counsel; (3) the second litigation in this
Court involving the same parties; (4) his request to sue Jeff Gipson in
Missouri; and (5) his pursuit of a charge with the EEOC alleging the
Defendants retaliated against him by filing a counterclaim, even though the
Court already dismissed his retaliation claim. In the letter, the Plaintiff
generally summarized the status of each matter, assessed his chances for
success, and stated his intention to pursue the matters further in the event
of an unfavorable ruling. He also made a settlement demand.

55

In a letter dated February 6, 2013, the Plaintiff again made what he
described as “an attempt to conclude a legal dispute.” As is his custom, the
Plaintiff discussed the several matters pending. He predicted what he
thought might occur and stated what he would do if the matter were not
resolved in his favor. The Plaintiff noted one appeal that is now pending
and further stated in part:
[M]y Docketing Statement contains a full history of the case,
including Orders which I fell [sic] will likely not withstand
appellate review, which show the Defendants and their
attorneys to be the aggressors (and not the victims they attempt
to portray themselves as). Additionally, given the well
documented (and mostly undisputed) history of apparent false
pleadings, false swearing, spoliation of evidence, and/or other
apparent misconduct, such a review allows the appellate court
to consider whether or not the district court appears to have
allowed any sort of bias to creep into its decision-making,
and/or if the appellate court should act sua sponte to sanction the
Defendants and/or their attorneys under Rule 11, Rule 37, §
1927 and/or the inherent authority of the court(s) for what
could reasonably [be] argued as having “defiled” the “temple of
justice,” if the appellate court agrees that one or more frauds
have been practiced upon the district court and/or the Plaintiff,
by the Defendants and/or their attorneys.
***
As you know I also reached out to EEOC this morning as to
check on the status of charge number 440 2013 00137. EEOC
56

advised that they will send me a copy of the right to sue on that
matter so as to complete the documentary history as to the
charge related to the subsequent retaliatory action of filing what
appears to be completely frivolous counterclaims, likely
intended as an act of harassment and/or intimidation (an “abuse
of process”) rather than as a legitimate cause of action.
Assuming the causes are revived by the appellate, I will likely
seek leave to amend and to add abuse of process causes to our
action. It is hard to imagine that the court could deny such a
request in light of its ruling and justification on the Defendants’
(Counterclaim Plaintiffs’) counterclaim.
See Doc. No. 119, Ex. 19.
The foregoing communications demonstrate that Plaintiff did not take
the Court seriously when he was placed on notice of the possibility of
sanctions if his harassing litigation tactics and intimidation continued.
While the Plaintiff may label his correspondence as attempts to amicably
resolve a dispute, the letters are typically condescending and sometimes
include criminal and ethical accusations.
(3)
There is evidence that Plaintiff has ignored the Court’s Orders in an
effort to harass witnesses.

In its August 31, 2012 Order, the Court

determined that Plaintiff had intimidated third-party witness Jeff Gipson

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in a “rather blatant attempt to persuade [Mr. Gipson] to change his
testimony.” See Doc. No. 74, at 8, 10-11. The Plaintiff was directed to
stop this harassment. The Plaintiff filed a motion to re-depose Mr. Gipson,
which was denied. The Plaintiff was barred from any contact with Mr.
Gipson and from filing any further discovery motions related to him. On
two more occasions in a three-month period, the Plaintiff sought leave to
pursue a lawsuit against Gipson and his company. On February 4, 2013,
the Court denied the Plaintiff’s most recent motion and determined that
“[b]ased on the Plaintiff’s flagrant disregard of its Orders, it appears that
sanctions may now be appropriate.”
On October 17, 2012, Magistrate Judge Cudmore held that Grange’s
Vice President, Peter McMurtrie, could be deposed but the deposition
would be limited “to his knowledge of events related to the hiring process
for the Position before August 4, 2011.” See Doc. No. 87, at 22. Three
days later, the Plaintiff wrote to Counsel and stated that he believes “Judge
Cudmore is misinterpreting prevailing precedent on this issue.” See Doc.
119, Ex. 13. Therefore, the Plaintiff asked Counsel not to insist upon strict

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compliance with the prohibition on questions regarding events occurring
after August 4, 2011. Counsel stated that they would be requiring strict
compliance. Instead of limiting the deposition as directed, the Plaintiff in
an email sent on October 29, 2012, suggested he would be asking questions
outside the scope of the Court’s Order, and threatened “sanctions and/or
a contempt of court finding” if the Defendants protested. See Doc. No.
119, Ex. 4.

The Defendants allege the Plaintiff spent most of Mr.

McMurtrie’s deposition asking questions well outside the scope of the
October 17, 2012 Order, including questions regarding McMurtrie’s
subordinates’ settlement authority and his knowledge of 2012 job postings.
The Defendants further allege that Plaintiff set up his personal video
camera for the deposition in order to record Mr. McMurtrie and Counsel
both during the deposition and off the record.

In response to the

Defendants’ objection, the Plaintiff explained that although the Court “may
or may not” permit him to use such a recording, the purpose of the video
recording was to “keep everyone in line.” This could be interpreted as a
further attempt at intimidation.

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In his response to the motion to supplement, the Plaintiff does not
specifically address his disregard of Court Orders which has been apparent
throughout this litigation.
(4)
The Defendants allege that Plaintiff sent subpoenas and emails to
Sheri Treu and Mary Jo Buchberger, who are former employees of the
Defendants, seeking to depose them after the close of discovery.

On

October 17, 2012, Judge Cudmore denied the Plaintiff’s motion to extend
discovery and his request to depose Treu and Buchberger.
The following day, the Plaintiff moved for the issuance of the
subpoenas for Treu and Buchberger in the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
On November 9, 2012, the Court issued an Order denying the Plaintiff’s
second motion to compel in its entirety, thereby denying again his request
for depositions of Treu and Buchberger. In the Order Judge Cudmore
stated, “Nieman is ordered to withdraw any subpoenas he may have secured
or served for his proposed additional depositions.” See Doc. No. 96, at 1-2.
The Defendants claim that when Plaintiff did not move to withdraw

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his subpoenas for Sheri Treu and Mary Jo Buchberger, they informed the
Eastern District of Wisconsin of this Court’s November 9, 2012 Order
directing him to do so. Although a less litigious litigant might then have
determined it would be prudent to comply with the Court’s Order, the
Plaintiff still did not withdraw his subpoenas.
On November 14, 2012, the Plaintiff filed with the Eastern District
of Wisconsin his Supplemental Response and Opposition to Quash
Subpoenas of Mary Jo Buchberger and Sheri Treu. In support of that
motion, the Plaintiff states: (1) “the Defendants have not provided any
legitimate reason to oppose these depositions,” see Doc. No. 119, Ex. 15, at
6; (2) “if the Plaintiff moved to depose witnesses Treu and Buchberger, in
light of the current discovery status in the Central Illinois action, it is most
probable that he would be precluded from admitting them into evidence,
either as a sanction, or because such evidence would have been deemed to
have been first secured outside of the confines of the Scheduling Order,” see
Ex. 15, at 7; (3) “As previously noted, Ms. Buchberger and Ms. Treu will
not speak to the Plaintiff and their refusal specifically seems to be related

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to control by and/or fear of the Defendants and/or their attorneys,” see Ex.
15, at 9; (4) “But the question as to whether or not he will be permitted to
do so, and will be permitted to introduce such evidence into the record in
the Central Illinois action(s) is far from resolved,” see Ex. 15, at 10; (5)
“The [Eastern District of Wisconsin] could choose to do nothing and leave
the subpoenas intact. The Plaintiff has promised not to serve them and not
to set depositions unless the Court in Illinois approves this action as part
of discovery in the pending action(s). The Plaintiff has done nothing to
give this Court reason to doubt his word.” Id.
Although the Plaintiff claims that he took no further action on the
matter after Judge Cudmore denied his motion to compel on November 9,
2012, the Plaintiff’s supplemental response and opposition to the
Defendants’ motion to quash subpoenas of Treu and Buchberger was filed
in the Eastern District of Wisconsin on November 14, 2012. Thus, the
Plaintiff decided it was appropriate to file a 12-page supplemental response
when the Defendants advised the court in Wisconsin of Judge Cudmore’s
ruling.

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These actions suggest that Plaintiff will go to extraordinary lengths in
attempting to find ways around this Court’s Orders. Moreover, the actions
provide support to the Defendants’ assertion that part of the Plaintiff’s
litigation strategy is to escalate this litigation and drive up defense costs in
an attempt to obtain a favorable settlement.
The Eastern District of Wisconsin granted the Defendants’ motion to
quash, finding in part, “it appears that Plaintiff is seeking to circumvent the
trial court’s order by conducting discovery after the time to do so has
expired.” See Doc. No. 119, Ex. 16.
The Defendants further allege that despite the close of discovery, the
Plaintiff has flagrantly disregarded Court Orders in seeking discovery of the
Defendants’ employees’ LinkedIn accounts.10 The Plaintiff continues to
pursue a subpoena in the Northern District of California for LinkedIn

10

The Plaintiff’s theory appears to be that an individual can set up a LinkedIn
account, anonymously search profiles and subsequently delete his or her own account
and information. Based on the typical LinkedIn profile, the individual may then be
able to use information learned from the search to determine a person’s race, gender,
national origin, associations, undergraduate and other graduation dates, in addition
to other items. While acknowledging this probably was not LinkedIn’s intent, the
Plaintiff claims that the business model “has created a set of circumstances that is
tailor made for discrimination and abuse.” See Doc. No. 119, Ex. 18.

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records related to the Defendants’ employees or former employees. In an
email to counsel for LinkedIn, the Plaintiff lists thirteen current and former
employees whose LinkedIn information he seeks. Apparently, he believes
that these individuals – most of whom were not involved in any
employment decision involving the Plaintiff – viewed his Linked In profile
and determined he is over the age of 40 and/or has filed previous lawsuits.
There are no legitimate reasons to seek any of this information after
the close of discovery.

Regardless of whether his motive is to harass

individuals who are not involved in this litigation or to escalate Defense
costs, the Plaintiff’s continued disregard of Court Orders has subjected him
to sanctions.
(5)
In support of the motion to supplement, the Defendants claim that
not only is the Plaintiff continuing to assert claims that have been
dismissed, it is apparent he intends to multiply the litigation by adding new
counts, claims, and charges.

They allege the Plaintiff has filed a

supplemental charge with the EEOC in relation to the retaliation claims

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dismissed on January 16, 2013. In an email sent to EEOC officials, the
Plaintiff requested an update on whether a Right to Sue Letter would issue
and whether the Defendants would be required to submit a position
statement. The Plaintiff also sent a copy of the Court’s Order on the
Parties’ cross-motions to dismiss to the EEOC, wherein he included legal
argument in the body of the email as to why he believes the Court’s ruling
was wrong.
The Defendants believe that Plaintiff is playing a game with the court
system.

They allege he has not taken the Court’s previous warnings

seriously. It appears that Plaintiff believes he is immune from sanctions.
The Defendants further allege they will be greatly prejudiced if the
Plaintiff’s resources are inequitably distributed if he is sanctioned in any of
his other lawsuits. They note that Chief Judge Shadid is considering an
attorney’s fees sanction award against the Plaintiff in Nieman v. RLI Corp.,
et al., 1:12-CV-1012.
The Defendants further assert that Plaintiff is not like most pro se
litigants, as this Court has observed. Based on his job as a litigation and

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claims manager, the Plaintiff has significant federal court experience. The
Court has noted that he appears to be familiar with federal court procedure
and the law that is applicable to his cases.
The Defendants further allege that Plaintiff has significant resources.
He testified that his current salary is $119,000. The Plaintiff also testified
he is allowed to use WESTLAW and LEXIS to work on his personal
lawsuits during business hours.
For all of these reasons, the Defendants ask the Court to grant
sanctions against the Plaintiff and Order him to pay the Defendants’
attorney’s fees incurred since August 16, 2012, the date of the hearing on
their motion for sanctions. The Defendants further request that the Court
enter a permanent injunction prohibiting the Plaintiff from filing any
additional claims, counts, complaints, or charges with any federal, state or
administrative court or agency against the Defendants, the Defendants’
employees or agents, including their attorneys.
(6)
The Plaintiff’s litigation conduct in recent months appears to be an

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attempt to make good on his prediction in early August 2012 of a “firey
[sic] pit of legal process.” In his response to the Defendant’s motion, the
Plaintiff alleges he has been severely restricted in discovery and there are
factual questions that preclude the entry of summary judgment. He further
suggests that Defendants and their attorneys have attempted to destroy the
Plaintiff and his family financially and perhaps emotionally. The Plaintiff
does not really respond to the Defendants’ allegations which pertain to his
litigation conduct. His litigation strategy is apparent from his own words.
The Plaintiff’s litigation strategy is evident from his pleadings and
some of the more than 200 letters and emails that Plaintiff has sent to
Counsel in the last six months. The Plaintiff’s correspondence includes
threats of extensive litigation, outrageous settlement demands, predictions
of success in his several cases, and numerous threats of sanctions and
criminal liability. These are the Plaintiff’s own words, which he does not
dispute. The Plaintiff’s conduct and words make clear his intention is to
harass the Defendants to such an extent that they will pay him to stop. It
is time for his sordid litigation scheme to end.

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Although the “American Rule” prohibits the shifting of fees in most
cases, there are a few instances in which courts have the inherent power to
assess attorney’s fees. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45
(1991). One example is that a court may assess attorney’s fees for the
“willful disobedience of a court order.” Id. (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). The Court has cited multiple examples of such willful
disobedience by the Plaintiff, including his conduct during the deposition
of Peter McMurtrie and his continuous pursuit of subpoenas for Sheri Treu
and Mary Jo Buchberger. He has continued to willfully disobey the Court’s
previous Order on sanctions.
A court may also assess attorney’s fees when a party has “acted in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”

Id. at 45-46

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This is an appropriate
description for much of the Plaintiff’s conduct throughout this litigation.
In his correspondence, the Plaintiff has all but told the Defendants that he
would not be deterred until they paid him to go away. The Plaintiff’s
scheme has included, inter alia, vexatious filings and communications, the

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harassment and intimidation of non-parties, the pursuit of discovery in
other courts, threats of legal liability and/or ethical sanctions, including
Counsel’s disbarment.
Based on the Plaintiff’s bad faith and abuse of process, the Court
concludes that an award of attorney’s fees is warranted in this case.
It was on August 31, 2012 that the Court entered an Order Denying
in Part the Defendants’ Motion for Sanctions, while holding the motion it
in abeyance.

The Court will consider imposing an award of the

Defendants’ reasonable attorney’s fees. The Defendants will be directed to
supplement the record with their detailed billing records since September
4, 2012, which is the first business day after the Court entered its previous
Order. The Defendants shall supplement the record within 14 days. The
Plaintiff may respond within 14 days of the Defendants’ filing.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff has not properly disputed the material facts offered in
support of the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The Plaintiff’s
hunches about the Defendants’ motives and baseless accusations about the

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conduct of the Defendants, their employees and their attorneys are not
enough at to proceed at this stage of the litigation, which is “the put up or
shut up moment in a lawsuit.”

See Springer, 518 F.3d at 484.

The

Plaintiff’s age discrimination claims fail for a number of reasons. His
retaliation claims were based entirely on speculation. Accordingly, the
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.
Finally, the Plaintiff’s flagrant disregard of Court Orders and his
harassing and contumacious conduct in the hope of obtaining a settlement
has subjected the Plaintiff to sanctions.
Ergo, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment as to all claims
[d/e 92] is ALLOWED.
The Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File a Sur-reply [d/e 109] is
ALLOWED.
The Plaintiff’s Third Motion to Compel Discovery Responses and
Second Motion for Discovery Sanctions [d/e 90] is DENIED.
The Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Sworn Verifications as to Previously
Submitted Interrogatory Responses [d/e 124] is DENIED.

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The Plaintiff’s Affidavit in support of his Summary Judgment
Opposition [d/e 126] is STRICKEN.
The Defendants’ Motions for Sanctions and to Supplement their
Motions for Sanctions [d/e 62, 118] are ALLOWED.
The Defendants shall within 14 days of the entry of this Order
supplement the record with their detailed billing records since September
4, 2012. The Plaintiff may respond 14 days thereafter.
ENTER: April 2, 2013
FOR THE COURT:
s/Richard Mills
s/Richard Mills
United States District Judge

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