Wheatley v. Factory Card and Party Outlet
Filing
34
OPINION: The Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration 32 is DENIED. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION). Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 12/16/2014. (GL, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 16 December, 2014 08:47:16 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
LORA J. WHEATLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
FACTORY CARD AND PARTY
OUTLET, a division of AMSCAN
HOLDINGS, INC.,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Civil No. 11-3414
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Before the Court is Defendant Factory Card & Party Outlet’s
Motion for Reconsideration the Court’s Opinion Denying the
Defendant Summary Judgment (d/e 32). Because the Defendant
raises no new issues in the motion, and instead addresses previous
arguments that that Court has already rejected, the motion is
DENIED.
In the Seventh Circuit,
It is well established that a motion to reconsider is only
appropriate where a court has misunderstood a party,
where the court has made a decision outside the
adversarial issues presented to the court by the parties,
where the court has made an error of apprehension (not
of reasoning), where a significant change in the law has
occurred, or where significant new facts have been
discovered.
Broaddus v. Shields, 665 F.3d 846, 860 (7th Cir. 2011), overruled
on other grounds by Hill v. Tangherlini, 724 F.3d 965, 967 n.1 (7th
Cir. 2013). “These grounds represent extraordinary circumstances,
and the granting of a motion to reconsider is to be granted only in
such extraordinary circumstances. Motions to reconsider are not at
the disposal of parties who want to ‘rehash’ the same arguments
that were originally presented to the court.” U.S. S.E.C. v. Nat’l
Presto Indus., Inc., No. 02-C-5027, 2004 WL 1093390, at *2 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 28, 2004). In other words, motions to reconsider should
only be filed “‘to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to present
newly discovered evidence.’” Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v.
CBI Indus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1269 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting Keene
Corp. v. Int’l Fid. Ins. Co., 561 F. Supp. 656, 665 (N.D. Ill. 1982)).
FCPO’s motion for reconsideration does not meet this
standard. Instead, FCPO primarily disagrees with how the Court
viewed the evidence in ruling on FCPO’s motion for summary
judgment. FCPO makes three main arguments in its motion: (1) the
Court wrongly held that Wheatley did not bear the burden to prove
Page 2 of 6
that she was a qualified individual with a disability in responding to
FCPO’s motion for summary judgment; (2) the Court incorrectly
found that there was sufficient evidence to create a question of
material fact as to whether Wheatley was a qualified individual; and
(3) the Court should have found that Dr. Fleischli’s July 8, 2009
Attending Physician Statement defeated Wheatley’s claim. The
Court will take these arguments in turn.
First, FCPO is incorrect that the Court erred by holding that
Wheatley did not bear the burden to prove that she was a qualified
individual at the summary judgment stage. See Motion to
Reconsider, d/e 32 at 6-7. The authority cited by FCPO actually
supports the Court’s finding that Wheatley only needed to produce
evidence sufficient to create a question of material fact as to
whether she was a qualified individual, not to prove that she was a
qualified individual. See Basden v. Prof’l Transp., Inc., 714 F.3d
1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 2013) (“In response to an employer’s motion
for summary judgment, it is the plaintiff's burden to produce
evidence sufficient to permit a jury to conclude that she would have
been able to perform the essential functions of her job with a
reasonable accommodation.”) (emphasis added). Wheatley would
Page 3 of 6
have to conclusively prove that she was a qualified individual if she
were moving for summary judgment on that point, but in
responding to FCPO’s motion for summary judgment, she only had
to raise a question of material fact that she was a qualified
individual. As the Court held in the opinion denying FCPO’s
motion, Wheatley creates this question with the statements in her
affidavit regarding her ability to work and Dr. Senica’s and Dr.
Bohan’s releases. See Opinion, d/e 31 at 14.
On that point, despite FCPO’s continued objections to the
Court’s consideration of Wheatley’s belief about her ability to work,
Wheatley’s belief that she could have worked with a boot was
relevant to the Court’s findings because it was supported by what
Dr. Fleischli allegedly told her after he examined her. Dr. Fleischli’s
statement about Wheatley’s ability to work is not admissible to
prove Wheatley could work, but it does provide some foundation for
Wheatley’s belief, distinguishing her belief from the
“unsubstantiated” beliefs rejected by the courts in the cases cited
by FCPO. See Motion to Reconsider, d/e 32 at 7 (quoting Crowley
v. Rockford Hous. Auth., 1 F. App’x 499, 501 (7th Cir. 2001);
Cleveland v. Porca Co., 38 F.3d 289, 295 (7th Cir. 1994)).
Page 4 of 6
Furthermore, while Dr. Senica’s and Dr. Bohan’s releases do not
prove that Wheatley could work on July 11, 2009, again, the Court
need only find that there exists some outstanding material question
of fact regarding Wheatley’s ability to work for summary judgment
to be improper. Two physicians found that Wheatley could work,
and then, with no evidence in the record that Wheatley’s condition
worsened, a third ostensibly found that she could not—though
more on that below. Those doctors’ competing findings create a
question of material fact.
Most importantly, FCPO is incorrect in continuing to argue
that Dr. Fleischli’s July 8, 2009 Attending Physician Statement is
fatal to Wheatley’s claim. Dr. Fleischli’s recommendation of
“immobilization” may have meant that Wheatley’s foot needed to be
immobilized in a boot, not that Wheatley needed to be completely
immobilized and consequently would have been unable to work
even with a reasonable accommodation. Wheatley stated in her
affidavit that the Attending Physician Statement was only created
after FCPO employees told her that she would not be allowed to
return to work in a boot and she relayed that information to Dr.
Fleischli. Therefore, if Dr. Fleischli did find that Wheatley’s foot
Page 5 of 6
needed to be immobilized in a boot, he likely would have considered
what FCPO told Wheatley about whether she could come to work in
a boot in completing the form. In that case, Dr. Fleischli could have
written that Wheatley was unable to work because he knew that
FCPO would not let her work if she had to wear a boot. However,
that would not necessarily mean that Wheatley was unable to work
under the ADA, as allowing her to work with the boot may have
constituted a reasonable accommodation. Deposition or trial
testimony from Dr. Fleischli will be necessary to clarify what he and
Wheatley told each other regarding the possibility that Wheatley
could have gone back to work in a boot, and what Dr. Fleischli
meant by “immobilization” in the Attending Physician Statement.
For those reasons, the Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration
(d/e 32) is DENIED.
ENTER: December 16, 2014
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Page 6 of 6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?