Dooley v. Kibby et al
Filing
123
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION: The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 105 is GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. Clerk is directed to dismiss Defendants Haage, McAdory, Angel, Zimmerman, Keller, Parsons, Reardon, and Maloney with prejudice . A final pretrial conference is scheduled for August 3, 2015 at 3:00 p.m. The clerk is to issue a writ for the Plaintiff's participation in the video conference. The Plaintiff and Defendants shall appear in person at trial. A jury trial is scheduled for September 1, 2015 through September 3, 2015 at 9:00 a.m. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION) Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 6/12/2015. (GL, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 12 June, 2015 09:10:28 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
CHARLES DOOLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.
ALFREDA KIBBY, et al.
Defendants.
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12-3006
SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and civilly committed at Rushville
Treatment and Detention Facility, brought the present lawsuit
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Fourteenth Amendment
violations for excessive force, inhumane conditions-of-confinement,
and procedural due process. The matter is before the Court for
ruling on the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
105). For the reasons discussed below, the motion is denied in
part, and granted in part.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on January 5, 2012. The Court
conducted a merit review screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A
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and found that Plaintiff stated the following claims: (1) an excessive
force claim against Defendants Haage, Chenoweth, Angel,
Zimmerman, Keller, Teel, and Maloney; (2) an inhumane
conditions-of-confinement claim against Defendants McAdory and
Haage; and, (3) a procedural due process claim against Defendant
McAdory. (Doc. 14). After a period of discovery, Defendants filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 105). In support of their
motion, Defendants filed a DVD video that depicted the events on
the day in question. The Court subsequently entered an Order
directing the Defendants to file a supplemental brief disclosing the
identities of the security staff seen in the video. (Doc. 120).
Defendants have complied with that Order. (Doc. 121).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is civilly committed at the Rushville Treatment and
Detention Facility (“Rushville” or “TDF”) pursuant to the Illinois
Sexually Violent Persons Act. On July 9, 2011, Plaintiff declined
several requests from staff to work in the kitchen because it was his
day off. An exchange between Plaintiff and staff occurred and, as a
result of the raised voices and alleged foul language, Plaintiff was
offered a two hour cool-down period. During these cool down
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periods, TDF residents are confined to their rooms. Staff members
periodically check on the residents throughout the cool-down
period.
A short time later, when staff observed another resident
sliding a pen underneath Plaintiff’s door, a lockdown ensued.
Defendant Haage, a Security Therapy Aide (“STA”), went to
investigate. The parties disagree on the exact nature of the
exchange, but, either way, the tactical team was called to perform a
cell extraction.
Doors to the residents’ rooms at Rushville have a small
opening, commonly referred to as a “chuckhole.” The opening
allows security staff to handcuff residents before unlocking and
opening the resident’s door. To do so, the resident must cooperate
by standing with his back to the door and placing his hands and
wrists through the chuckhole. Defendants Teel, Chenoweth, Angel,
Keller, and Reardon, all members of the tactical team at Rushville,
responded to Defendant Haage’s request for a cell extraction.
A video of the incident shows the following: Defendant Keller
asked Plaintiff to “cuff up,” meaning to stand with his back to the
door while placing his hands through the chuckhole. Plaintiff
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complied, though not without some verbal commentary.
Defendants Teel and Chenoweth approached Plaintiff’s door with a
pair of handcuffs. At this point, only the backs of Defendants Teel
and Chenoweth are visible, but the clicking noise of handcuffs can
be heard, as can Plaintiff’s cry of pain. When the camera is moved
and Plaintiff’s hands appear on video, his right wrist is cuffed and
held in place by Defendant Chenoweth. Defendant Teel then
secured the cuffs to Plaintiff’s left wrist. Defendant Chenoweth
escorted Plaintiff to Infirmary Room 5, where Plaintiff was stripped
down to his boxer shorts. The mattress in the room was removed
moments prior to Plaintiff entering the room. Plaintiff remained in
the room wearing only his boxer shorts.
As a result of this incident, Plaintiff’s right wrist was examined
several times. The results of those examinations showed Plaintiff
suffered torn ligaments and other injuries in his right wrist. (Doc.
110-11 at 7-12). During these examinations, Plaintiff stated he
experienced ongoing pain in his wrist and numbness in two of his
fingers. Id.
Plaintiff remained in Infirmary Room 5 from July 9, 2011 until
July 12, 2011. Plaintiff did not receive a mattress because Plaintiff
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would not allow Defendant Parsons to place him (Plaintiff) in
handcuffs so staff could bring the mattress into the room.
Plaintiff’s requests for another STA to secure the handcuffs were
denied. Plaintiff alleges that the sink did not have running water,
the toilet did not work, and his requests for toilet paper were
denied. Plaintiff states he made several requests for toilet paper
and plumbing maintenance to several STAs, none of whom are
defendants in this lawsuit.
For the duration of his time in Infirmary Room 5, Plaintiff was
placed on Temporary Special status, the most restrictive resident
status at the TDF. Residents are placed on Temporary Special
status as a matter of course while an investigation into their alleged
conduct takes place, or when perceived as a danger to themselves
or others. While on Temporary Special status, residents must eat
their meals in their rooms and have limited telephone and property
access. Residents may leave their rooms only with approval of the
Security Director.
On July 11, 2011, at approximately 8:53 a.m., Plaintiff
received written notice of a disciplinary hearing scheduled for July
12, 2011 between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. (Doc.
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106-2). The notice advised Plaintiff of the potential rules violations
and the incident in question. A disciplinary hearing was held and
Plaintiff’s status was changed from Temporary Special to Close
Management status. Close Management status is less restrictive
than Temporary Special status, but more restrictive than the
general status of residents at the TDF. While classified on Close
Management status, residents are permitted to spend
approximately 4-5 hours per day outside their rooms, are allowed to
attend treatment programs as approved, purchase items from the
commissary, have visitors for one-hour sessions, make outgoing
calls, take showers every other day, and are provided with a change
of clothes every 3 days. Plaintiff remained classified in Close
Management status for 30 days.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in
his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
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“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
248 (1986). A material fact is ‘genuine’ “if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id. at 245.
ANALYSIS
As a resident of Rushville, Plaintiff’s claims arise under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, rather than the
Eighth Amendment. Despite this distinction, there exists “little
practical difference between the two standards.” Mayoral v.
Sheahan, 245 F.2d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Weiss v.
Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir. 2000)). “The Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process provides at least as much, and
probably more, protection against punishment as does the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.” Forrest v.
Pine, 620 F.3d 739, 744 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Lewis v. Downey, 581
F.3d 467, 475 (7th Cir. 2009)).
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Excessive Force Claims
Plaintiff alleged claims for excessive force against defendants
Haage, Chenoweth, Angel, Zimmerman, Keller, Teel, Parsons, and
Reardon.
In claims for excessive force, the relevant inquiry is “whether
force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (citation
omitted); see DeWalt v. Carter, 224 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 2000)
(applying Hudson). In making this determination, the court may
examine several factors, “including the need for an application of
force, the relationship between that need and the force applied, the
threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officers, the efforts
made to temper the severity of the force employed, and the extent of
the injury suffered by the prisoner.” Dewalt, 224 F.3d at 619.
Significant injury is not required, but “a claim ordinarily cannot be
predicated on a de minimis use of physical force.” Id. at 620 (citing
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9-10). “Thus, not every push or shove by a
prison guard violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Id.
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Plaintiff alleges that while being handcuffed, members of the
tactical team bent his wrist in such a way that it caused pain and
torn ligaments in his hand. Defendants argue that any force used
was necessary to secure the Plaintiff and reasonable in light of the
circumstances. In support, Defendants submitted a video of the
events of July 9, 2011.
The manner in which Defendants Teel and Chenoweth secured
the handcuffs on Plaintiff’s right wrist is not shown on the video.
Given the sounds of clicking handcuffs and Plaintiff’s immediate
cries of pain, a reasonable juror could conclude that the amount of
force used was unnecessary and applied solely for the purposes of
causing pain. The medical records showing Plaintiff suffered torn
ligaments, pain, and numbness in his right wrist as a result of this
incident lend support to this conclusion. As it relates to
Defendants Teel and Chenoweth, the Court finds that a genuine
issue of material fact exists as to whether these defendants used
excessive force against the Plaintiff on the day in question. As to
the remaining defendants, the video clearly shows they did not
participate in the application of the alleged force. Therefore, the
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remaining defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law
regarding the excessive force claims.
Conditions-of-Confinement
The standard for analyzing a conditions-of-confinement claim
in the prison context is well-established: a prison official is liable for
denying a prisoner of his or her basic human needs, but only if the
official is aware of and deliberately indifferent to an objectively
serious risk of harm. Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 773 (7th
Cir.2008). The court must first determine whether the conditions at
issue were “sufficiently serious” such that “a prison official's act or
omission result[ed] in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 832, 834 (1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gillis v. Litscher, 468
F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir.2006). Prison conditions may be
uncomfortable and harsh without violating the Eighth Amendment.
See Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir.1997). “The
Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither
does it permit inhumane ones[.]” Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586,
590 (7th Cir.1996) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832). Therefore,
“extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-ofPage 10 of 16
confinement claim.” Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 849, 845 (7th
Cir.1999) (quoting Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9).
Plaintiff was placed on Temporary Special status following the
events on July 9, 2011. While in Infirmary Room 5, Plaintiff did not
have a mattress and was not provided toilet paper for a few days.
Plaintiff also alleges that he had no running water and the toilet did
not work. However, even assuming these facts are true, and that
Plaintiff suffered the requisite deprivation, Plaintiff has not shown
that Defendants McAdory and Haage were deliberately indifferent.
Deliberate indifference is more than negligence, but does not
require the plaintiff to show that the defendants intended to cause
harm. Mayoral, 245 F.3d at 938. Liability attaches when “the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health
or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm
exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). According to Plaintiff, he did not see
Defendants Haage and McAdory while he was in Infirmary Room 5.
Plaintiff stated in his deposition that he spoke only to STAs
Reinhart and Kelly about the plumbing issues. As neither Reinhart
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or Kelly are named defendants in this action, Plaintiff has not
provided any evidence that Defendants Haage and McAdory were
aware of the alleged conditions that give rise to Plaintiff’s
conditions-of-confinement claim. Therefore, the Court finds that no
reasonable juror could find that Defendants Haage and McAdory
were deliberately indifferent.
Procedural Due Process
Plaintiff alleges a procedural due process claim against
Defendant McAdory related to the discipline he (Plaintiff) received as
part of the June 9, 2011 incident. Regardless of whether the
confinement is civil or criminal, “[d]isciplinary measures that do not
substantially worsen the conditions of confinement of a lawfully
confined person are not actionable under the due process clause.”
Miller v. Dobier, 634 F.3d 412, 414-15 (7th Cir. 2011).
There was probable cause to believe that Plaintiff had violated
a TDF rule, and placement on Temporary Special status pending
the review of those allegations does not offend the due process
clause as legitimate security interests exist in not allowing one
suspected of such to roam free within the facility. See Holly v.
Woolfolk, 415 F.3d 678, 680 (7th Cir. 2005) (analogizing temporary
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segregation for an alleged violation of a disciplinary rule to an arrest
without a warrant pending a probable cause hearing). Plaintiff
remained on Temporary Special status in Infirmary Room 5 for
approximately three days before he was provided a disciplinary
hearing. Given these facts, the Court cannot find that Plaintiff’s
due process rights were violated while Plaintiff was on Temporary
Special status.
As it relates to Plaintiff’s placement on Close Management
status, there is no evidence to suggest that Plaintiff was subjected
to conditions harsher than those typically experienced by residents
on Close Management status. In addition, Plaintiff was provided
24-hour written notice of his disciplinary hearing, and he was
allowed to present testimony in his defense. From these facts, no
reasonable juror could conclude that placement on Close
Management status substantially worsened Plaintiff’s conditions of
confinement.
Qualified Immunity
Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “government officials
performing discretionary functions are immune from suit if their
conduct could reasonably have been thought consistent with the
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rights they are alleged to have violated.” Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d
742, 746 (7th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). To determine if
qualified immunity applies, the court conducts a two-prong
analysis: (1) whether “the disputed conduct, as alleged, violates a
constitutional right;” and, (2) “whether that right was ‘clearly
established’ at the time of the alleged conduct.” Id. (citing Wernsing
v. Thompson, 423 F.3d 732, 742 (7th Cir. 2005)). In analyzing these
two prongs, the courts are “permitted to exercise their sound
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified
immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
As discussed above, Plaintiff has raised a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the force used by Defendants Teel and
Chenoweth and, therefore, the Court cannot grant summary
judgment on qualified immunity grounds with respect to these
defendants. See Lewis, 581 F.3d at 477. The Court does not
address the qualified immunity issue as it relates to the remaining
defendants as the Court has already concluded those defendants
are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:
1) The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [105] is
GRANTED in part, and DENIED in part. Defendants’
Motion is DENIED as it relates to the excessive force
claims against Defendants Teel and Chenoweth, and
GRANTED as to all other claims and Defendants. Clerk
is directed to dismiss Defendants Haage, McAdory,
Angel, Zimmerman, Keller, Parsons, Reardon, and
Maloney with prejudice.
2) A final pretrial conference is scheduled for
August 3, 2015 at 3:00 p.m.
. The Plaintiff
shall appear by video conference and the Defendants’
attorney(s) shall appear in person before the court
sitting in Springfield, Illinois. The clerk is to issue a
writ for the Plaintiff’s participation in the video
conference.
3) The Court will send out proposed jury instructions and
intends to ask the standard voir dire questions
published on the Court’s website
(ilcd.uscourts.gov/local rules and orders/orders and
rules by Judge/Judge Myerscough/General Voir Dire
Procedure). By July 20, 2015 , the parties shall file:
1) an agreed proposed pretrial order; 2) alternate or
additional jury instructions (no duplicates); 3) motions
in limine; and, (4) additional voir dire questions (not
duplicative of the Court’s). All proposed instructions
shall be clearly marked, identifying the party, the
number, and whether the instruction is additional or
alternate (i.e., Pl.'s 1, additional; Pl.'s 2, alternate to
Court's 3).
4) The Plaintiff and Defendants shall appear in person at
trial. Residents of Rushville Treatment and Detention
Facility who are not parties to this case shall appear by
video conference and Rushville TDF employees who are
not parties may also appear by video conference at trial.
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Other nonparty witnesses may appear by video at the
court’s discretion. Therefore, the proposed pretrial
order must include: (1) the name, resident number and
place of incarceration for each inmate to be called as a
witness; (2) the name and place of employment for each
Department of Human Services employee to be called as
a witness; and, (3) the names and addresses of any
witnesses who are not residents or employees for whom
a party seeks a trial subpoena. The party seeking the
subpoena must provide the necessary witness and
mileage fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
45.
5) A jury trial is scheduled for
September 1, 2015
through September 3, 2015
at 9:00 a.m. at the U.S.
Courthouse in Springfield, Illinois. No writs to issue at
this time.
ENTERED:
June 12, 2015
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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