Smith v. State of Illinois et al
Filing
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OPINION: See written Opinion. Plaintiff's claims challenging the procedures that led to his guilty finding and punishment are dismissed, without prejudice. Plaintiff's procedural due process claim arising from his lack of notice of the secu rity threat group charge is dismissed for failure to state a federal claim upon which relief may be granted. All pending motions are denied as moot (d/e 4), and this case is closed. This dismissal shall count as one of the plaintiff's three allo tted "strikes" pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g). 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) requires Plaintiff to pay the full docketing fee of $350 in installments even though his case has been dismissed. The agency having custody of Plaintiff shall continue to make monthly payments to the Clerk of Court, as directed in the Court's order of January 31, 2012. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a). Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 2/2/2012. (MJ, ilcd)
E-FILED
Thursday, 02 February, 2012 01:57:32 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
AARON SMITH,
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Plaintiff,
v.
STATE OF ILLINOIS and
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
Defendants.
12-CV-3027
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and currently incarcerated in Pontiac
Correctional Center, challenges disciplinary action taken against him
during his incarceration in Western Illinois Correctional Center.
Plaintiff alleges that contraband was found during a shakedown of
his cell and that he was subsequently charged with possessing dangerous
contraband and drugs. He further alleges that an additional charge of
“security threat group” was added to the disciplinary ticket without
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notice to him. However, the attachment to his Complaint reflects that
this additional charge was deleted. (Complaint, p. 8).
Plaintiff was found guilty and lost six months of good conduct
credit, along with other punishment. He asserts that this punishment
was excessive. He also appears to allege that the guilty finding is
undermined by procedural irregularities in how the shakedown was
conducted and by false information provided by staff. He seeks
compensatory damages and expungement of the disciplinary report.
Plaintiff’s claims go to the validity of the length of his sentence
because of his loss of good conduct credits. In Edwards v. Balisok, 520
U.S. 641, 648 (1997), the Supreme Court held that claims which
"necessarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of . . . [an inmate's]
good-time credits" are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 until the
prison disciplinary decision has otherwise been invalidated, for example
by expungement, a state court order, or a writ of habeas corpus. See
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). "[G]ood-time credits
reduce the length of imprisonment, and habeas corpus is available to
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challenge the duration as well as the fact of custody." Waletzki v.
Keohane, 13 F.3d 1079, 1080 (7th Cir. 1994), citing Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973)(other citations omitted). This rule
"serve[s] the practical objective of preserving limitations on the
availability of habeas remedies." Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749,
751 (2004). “[T]he Heck requirement is an essential element of a §
1983 claim; indeed, the [§ 1983] claim does not arise until the
requirement is met.” Dixon v. Chrans, 101 F.3d 1228, 1230 (7th Cir.
1996), citing Rooding v. Peters, 92 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff’s allegations necessarily challenge the loss of his good
time. If his punishment were excessive in the constitutional sense, or if
significant exculpatory evidence were not considered, or if the guilty
finding were based on insufficient evidence, then Plaintiff arguably
should not have lost six months of good conduct credit. However,
Plaintiff must first seek return of his good time through state remedies
and a federal habeas corpus action before he can state a § 1983 claim on
these allegations.
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The alleged lack of notice of the security threat group charge
presents a more complicated analysis. Lack of notice may be
immediately actionable under § 1983 if the deprivation suffered
implicates a constitutionally-protected liberty interest. See Clayton-El v.
Fisher, 96 F.3d 236, 243-44 (7th Cir. 1995)(failure to give written notice
of disciplinary hearing and charges was immediately cognizable as §
1983 action ); Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 608 (7th Cir. 2005)(“a
prisoner's liberty interest, and incumbent entitlement to procedural due
process protections, generally extends only to freedom from deprivations
that ‘impose[ ] atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’”)(quoting Sandin v.
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 (1995)).
Thus, Plaintiff’s claim about the lack of notice of the security
threat charge may not be barred by Heck. However, even if Heck does
not bar this challenge, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a procedural due
process violation. Procedural due process protections are triggered only
when a constitutionally-protected liberty interest is at stake. Lekas, 405
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F.3d at 608. Here, no plausible inference arises that Plaintiff suffered
any constitutional deprivation as a result of the security threat group
charge. According to the Administrative Review Board letter attached to
the Complaint, the security threat charge was deleted, so Plaintiff
suffered no punishment at all from that charge. The punishment he
received was based on the two remaining charges for which Plaintiff did
receive notice. See also Morrissette v. Peters, 45 F.3d 1119, 1123 (7th
Cir. 1995)(“There is no denial of due process if the error the inmate
complains of is corrected in the administrative appeal process.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff states no federal claim based on the alleged lack of
notice of the security threat group charge.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Plaintiff’s claims challenging the procedures that led to his guilty
finding and punishment are dismissed, without prejudice, as barred by
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 484-87 (1994) and progeny.
2) Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim arising from his lack of
notice of the security threat group charge is dismissed for failure to state
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a federal claim upon which relief may be granted.
3) All pending motions are denied as moot (d/e 4), and this case is
closed.
4) This dismissal shall count as one of the plaintiff's three allotted
“strikes” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(g). The Clerk of the Court
is directed to record Plaintiff's strike in the three-strike log.
5) 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) requires Plaintiff to pay the full
docketing fee of $350 in installments even though his case has been
dismissed. The agency having custody of Plaintiff shall continue to
make monthly payments to the Clerk of Court, as directed in the Court's
order of January 31, 2012.
6) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this dismissal, he must file a notice
of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed.
R. App. P. 4(a). A motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis should
set forth the issues Plaintiff plans to present on appeal. See Fed. R. App.
P. 24(a)(1)(C). If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for
the $455 appellate filing fee irrespective of the outcome of the appeal.
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Plaintiff may also be assessed another “strike” by the Court of Appeals if
his appeal is dismissed for one of the reasons stated in § 1915(g).
ENTERED: February 2, 2012
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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