Shull v. DeWitt County

Filing 10

OPINION: Defendant's Motion d/e 20 is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Motion is GRANTED with respect to Counts I and III and those Counts are DISMISSED. The Motion is DENIED with respect to Count IV. This matter is referred back to Judge Cudmore for further pre-trial proceedings. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 6/5/2012. (ME, ilcd)

E-FILED

Tuesday, 05 June, 2012 04:30:15 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
DEBRA L. SHULL,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEWITT COUNTY,
Defendant.

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No. 12-3046

OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
(Motion) (d/e 6). For the reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motion is
granted in part and denied in part.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 10, 2012, Plaintiff Debra L. Shull filed a four-count
Complaint against Defendant DeWitt County. See d/e 1. Count I
alleges a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)
(42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.), Count II alleges an equal protection claim

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under the Fourteenth Amendment, Count III alleges false imprisonment,
and Count IV alleges breach of contract.
On April 16, 2012, Defendant filed its Motion to Dismiss in which
it argued that Counts I, III, and IV of the Complaint should be
dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The Motion is fully briefed.
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE
The federal questions posed by Plaintiff’s Title VII claim gives this
Court subject-matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §1331. The Court has
jurisdiction over the state law claims pursuant to its supplemental
jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Personal jurisdiction and venue
requirements are satisfied because the relevant acts occurred in this
judicial district. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (personal jurisdiction exists where a defendant
“purposefully avail[ed] [himself or herself] of the privilege of conducting
activities” in the forum state); see 28 U.S.C. §1391(b) (venue in nondiversity cases is proper in a judicial district where any defendant resides,
if all defendants reside in the same State).

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III. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard
Under Rule 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper where a complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a complaint must
provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That statement
must be sufficient to provide the defendant with “fair notice” of the
claim and its basis. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th
Cir. 2008); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.
Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929, 940 (2007). This means that (1)
“the complaint must describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the
defendant ‘fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests” and (2) its allegations must plausibly suggest that the
plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility above a “speculative
level.” EEOC v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776
(7th Cir. 2007). While detailed factual allegations are not needed, a

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“formulaic recitation of a cause of action’s elements will not do.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S. Ct. at 1965, 167 L. Ed. 2d at 940.
Conclusory allegations are “not entitled to be assumed true.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868, 885 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)). “In ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions,
the court must treat all well-pleaded allegations as true and draw all
inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” In re marchFIRST Inc.,
589 F.3d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Tamayo, 526 F.3d at 1081).
B. Count I–Plaintiff’s Title VII Claim
In Count I, Plaintiff alleges that from 1998 until February 10,
2011, she was employed by Defendant. On February 10, 2011, she
served in the position of Emergency Services Disaster Agency
Coordinator. She performed all of the essential function of her positions
with Defendant.
On February 10, 2011, Plaintiff attended the meting of the Public
Safety Committee of the County Board of the County of DeWitt (Public
Safety Committee). During this meeting, David Taylor, a member of the

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Public Safety Committee, advised Plaintiff that her employment was
going to be terminated as a result of her performance review. She was
told to resign or be terminated. Plaintiff refused to resign and was
thereafter terminated. According to the Complaint, this was in violation
Defendant’s personnel policies that set forth the procedure for
termination.
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or
discipline an employee because of that person's race or sex, among other
grounds. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Title VII also forbids an employer from
discriminating against an employee who has “opposed any practice”
made unlawful by Title VII or who “has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding,
or hearing under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant discriminated against her
or that Defendant discharged her based on an animus prohibited by Title
VII. Instead, Plaintiff has simply alleged that she was fired by
Defendant in violation of the Defendant’s personnel policies. Plaintiff

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has not sufficiently alleged a claim under Title VII.
C. Count III–Plaintiff’s False Imprisonment Claim
The allegations in Plaintiff’s state law false imprisonment claim are
as follows. On February 10, 2011, after the close of normal business
hours, Plaintiff attended the meeting of the Public Safety Committee.
During the course of the meeting, Taylor advised Plaintiff that her
performance had been reviewed and that she was going to be required to
resign or she would be terminated. After informing Plaintiff of this,
Taylor told Plaintiff that she needed to go to a room in the Defendant’s
facility and remain there until she was prepared to resign in writing.
Taylor indicated to Plaintiff that she would not be allowed to leave
Defendant’s facility unless and until she signed a document stating that
she was resigning her position with Defendant. According to Plaintiff,
Defendant, by and through the acts of Taylor, restrained and impaired
Plaintiff’s individual liberty to leave the premises of Defendant outside
of ordinary business hours and under threat that, in the event she did
leave without Taylor’s permission, her employment with Defendant

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would be terminated. These actions violated Defendant’s personnel
regulations.
“A person commits false imprisonment when he or she
unreasonably restrains another’s liberty against his or her will.” Carey v.
K-Way, Inc., 728 N.E.2d 743, 746 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000). The essential
elements of a cause of action for false imprisonment are “that plaintiff
was restrained or arrested by the defendant, and that the defendant
acted without having reasonable grounds to believe that an offense was
committed by the plaintiff.” Meerbrey v. Marshall Field & Co., 564
N.E.2d 1222, 1231 (Ill. 1990).
Voluntary consent to confinement nullifies a claim of
false imprisonment. (Citation omitted.) Moreover, consent
is not invalidated even if an employee is threatened with
discharge. (Citation omitted.) The restraint that results
merely from a plaintiff's fear of losing his job or belief that he
would be fired immediately if he left the room is insufficient
as a matter of law to make out a claim of false imprisonment.
(Citation omitted.) Furthermore, “it is not enough for the
plaintiff to have felt ‘compelled’ to remain in the” room in
which the false imprisonment allegedly occurred. (Citation
omitted.)
Hanna v. Marshall Field & Co., 665 N.E.2d 343, 349 (Ill. App. Ct.

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1996).
As stated above, Plaintiff has alleged that her liberty to leave the
premises of Defendant was restrained by the threat that her employment
would be terminated if she did so before resigning her job. As stated in
Hanna, the fear of losing a job is insufficient as a matter of law to make
out a claim of false imprisonment. Therefore, Count III, Plaintiff’s false
imprisonment claim, will be dismissed.
D. Count IV–Plaintiff’s Breach of Contract Claim
In Count IV of her Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that she was
employed by Defendant from March 24, 1998, until February 10, 2011.
Plaintiff accepted employment with the Defendant on the terms and
conditions promised to her upon her hiring. During her entire period of
employment, Plaintiff was properly performing all the essential functions
of her positions and performed her obligations under the personnel
policies. Also during the entire time of Plaintiff’s employment,
Defendant had personnel policies governing personnel matters, including
but not limited to discipline of employees. Plaintiff was required to sign

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an acknowledgment of receipt of the policies. The policies contained
standards of conduct, to which she adhered. Defendant violated the
terms of its own policies setting forth the procedure for termination of
employment. As a result of Defendant’s breach, Plaintiff suffered
damages for lost wages.
Under Illinois law, a plaintiff looking to state a colorable breach of
contract claim must allege four elements: “(1) the existence of a valid
and enforceable contract; (2) substantial performance by the plaintiff;
(3) a breach by the defendant; and (4) resultant damages.” Reger
Development, LLC v. National City Bank, 592 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir.
2010) (quoting W.W. Vincent & Co. v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 814
N.E.2d 960, 967 (2004)).
In a light most favorable to Plaintiff, Count IV alleges a claim for
breach of contract. Her allegation that she accepted employment with
the Defendant on the terms and conditions promised to her upon her
hiring alleges the existence of a contract. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges
Defendant’s personnel policies are part of that contract. Plaintiff has

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also alleged that she performed her obligations under the contract, that
Defendant breached the contract by not following its own policies, and
the she was damaged by Defendant’s breach. This is sufficient to state a
claim for breach of contract.
Defendant has argued that Plaintiff “fails to prove the existence of
a valid and enforceable employment contract.” However, at the pleading
stage, the issue is not whether Plaintiff has proven the existence of a
valid and enforceable contract. The issue is whether she has stated a
claim for breach of contract. Accepting as true all well-pleaded
allegations and drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, this Court finds Plaintiff has plausibly stated a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff’s Count IV will be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
THEREFORE, Defendant’s Motion (d/e 20)is GRANTED IN
PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Motion is GRANTED with
respect to Counts I and III and those Counts are DISMISSED. The

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Motion is DENIED with respect to Count IV. This matter is referred
back to Judge Cudmore for further pre-trial proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER: June 4, 2011.
FOR THE COURT:
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
United States District Judge

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