Stanbridge v. Ashby
Filing
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OPINION entered by Judge Colin Stirling Bruce on 1/6/14. Court grants 11 Motion to Withdraw and therefore 9 Motion to Dismiss is Withdrawn. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss 16 is GRANTED. Petitioner's Petition Under 28 USC Section 2 254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody 1 and Supplemental Petition 5 are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. A certificate of appealability is DENIED and this case is terminated. See written Opinion. (Copy to pro se plaintiff through Rushville e-filing project.) (KM, ilcd)
E-FILED
Monday, 06 January, 2014 11:42:23 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
URBANA DIVISION
___________________________________________________________________________
KEVIN STANBRIDGE,
Petitioner,
v.
GREGORY SCOTT,1
Respondent.
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Case No. 12-CV-3067
OPINION
On February 28, 2012, Petitioner, Kevin Stanbridge, filed a pro se Petition Under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (#1), with attached
exhibits. The case was assigned to United States District Judge Sue Myerscough. On April 27,
2012, Petitioner paid the $5.00 filing fee. On January 30, 2013, Judge Myerscough entered a
text order and directed Petitioner to file his § 2254 petition using the proper form. On March 18,
2013, Petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition (#5), with attached exhibits, using the proper form.
Respondent was ordered to file an answer or responsive pleading by June 10, 2013. On May 31,
2013, Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (#9). On June 3, 2013,
Respondent filed a Motion to Withdraw the Motion to Dismiss (#11). Respondent asked the
court to allow him to withdraw the earlier Motion to Dismiss and permit the filing of the attached
Motion to Dismiss, which was essentially identical to the earlier motion but which stated that
it was brought pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United
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Gregory Scott has replaced Forrest Ashby as the Director of the Rushville Treatment
and Detention Facility. The clerk will be directed to change the name of the Respondent on the
docket.
States District Courts. On June 10, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Response to Motion to Dismiss (#12).
In the Motion to Dismiss, Respondent noted that “[i]n April 2013, counsel for respondent
informed this Court’s chambers that Judge Myerscough sat on the appellate court panel that
affirmed the dismissal of postconviction relief in case No. 4-08-0956.” On November 1, 2013,
Judge Myerscough entered an Order (#13). She stated that Respondent had notified her that she
sat on the Illinois Fourth District Appellate Court panel that dismissed Petitioner’s case on
postconviction appeal, a decision which did not address the merits of Petitioner’s claims. Judge
Myerscough stated that the question was whether she should recuse herself from the case. Judge
Myerscough asked the parties to file a response addressing this issue. Both Petitioner and
Respondent filed a Response (#14, #15). Petitioner stated that he did not believe Judge
Myerscough should recuse herself in this case. However, Respondent stated that, although he
did not doubt Judge Myerscough’s impartiality, he believed the case should be transferred to a
different judge to avoid all appearance of impropriety.
On December 6, 2013, Judge
Myerscough entered a text order and stated that she did not “believe that recusal is necessary in
this habeas corpus matter based on [her] presence on the Illinois Fourth District Appellate Court
panel that dismissed Petitioner Kevin Stanbridge’s state post-conviction appeal on procedural
grounds.” She stated that, nonetheless, she recused herself.
On December 9, 2013, the case was assigned to this court. This court has carefully
reviewed the arguments of the parties, the exhibits filed in this case and pertinent case law.
Following this careful and thorough review, this court rules as follows: (1) Respondent’s Motion
to Withdraw (#11) is GRANTED and the clerk is directed to file the attached Motion to Dismiss
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as document #16; (2) Respondent’s original Motion to Dismiss (#9) is withdrawn; (3)
Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (#16) is GRANTED; and (4) Petitioner’s Petition Under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (#1) and Supplemental
Petition (#5) are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
On November 16, 2001, a jury in the circuit court of Adams County found Petitioner
guilty of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, a Class 2 felony. On January 9, 2002, the trial court
sentenced him to a term of seven years in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC).
Petitioner appealed, and the Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, reversed the conviction and
remanded the case for a new trial. People v. Stanbridge, 810 N.E.2d 88 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)
(finding that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of an uncharged crime). A new trial was
subsequently held and, on April 20, 2005, a jury again found Petitioner guilty of aggravated
criminal sexual abuse. On May 3, 2005, the trial court sentenced him to a term of seven years
in the IDOC, to be followed by two years of mandatory supervised release (MSR). Petitioner
appealed, and the Appellate Court affirmed. People v. Stanbridge, No. 4-05-0585 (July 14,
2007) (unpublished order). The Illinois Supreme Court denied Petitioner’s petition for leave to
appeal (PLA) on September 26, 2007.
In May 2005, during the pendency of Petitioner’s appeal, the State filed a petition to
involuntarily commit him as a sexually violent person under the Sexually Violent Persons
Commitment Act (Sexually Violent Persons Act), 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/1 et seq. (West 2004).
See In re Detention of Stanbridge, 980 N.E.2d 598, 602 (Ill. 2012). According to Petitioner, he
was served with the petition on May 5, 2005, and was released from the IDOC on May 10, 2005.
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He was then taken into the custody of the Illinois Department of Human Services, which was
located at Joliet, Illinois, at that time. On May 10, 2007, while the civil commitment case was
still pending, Petitioner completed his term of MSR and was discharged from IDOC’s custody.
Petitioner had been released from prison on May 10, 2005, and the two-year period of MSR
expired on May 10, 2007. See People v. Stanbridge, Case No. 4-10-0565, 2012 WL 7008728
(March 8, 2012) (unpublished order).
Following a trial on the State’s commitment petition, in October 2007, a jury found
Petitioner to be a sexually violent person as defined by section 5(f) of the Sexually Violent
Persons Act, 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/5(f) (West 2004). Stanbridge, 980 N.E.2d at 602. In
February 2008, the trial court ordered Petitioner committed to a secure facility for institutional
care and treatment until such time as he is no longer a sexually violent person. Stanbridge, 980
N.E.2d at 602-03. Petitioner’s commitment was affirmed on direct appeal. In re Kevin S., No.
4-08-0163 (2008) (unpublished order).2
On March 20, 2008, Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief in the circuit court
of Adams County. Petitioner alleged that, in his second trial for aggravated criminal sexual
abuse, the trial court erroneously prevented him from presenting evidence of prior misconduct
by the victim. On December 4, 2008, the court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the
postconviction petition. Petitioner appealed, and the Appellate Court affirmed. People v.
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On November 29, 2012, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the trial court
properly denied Petitioner’s petition for discharge because the court properly concluded that
Petitioner “had not presented a plausible account that he was ‘no longer a sexually violent
person.’” In re Detention of Stanbridge, 980 N.E.2d 598, 618 (Ill. 2012). The court stated that
“[w]ithout some evidence of progress or other relevant changed circumstances, [Petitioner’s
expert’s] opinion was insufficient to establish probable cause.” Stanbridge, 980 N.E.2d at 618.
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Stanbridge, Case No. 4-08-0956 (June 23, 2010) (unpublished order). The Appellate Court
concluded that Petitioner had no statutory right to file a postconviction petition. The court found
that, because he had fully served his sentence before filing his petition, the Post-Conviction Act
afforded him no remedy. Stanbridge, Case No. 4-08-0956, at p.3. The court rejected
Petitioner’s argument that an amendment to section 15(e) of the Sexually Violent Persons Act,
which went into effect on January 1, 2007, tolled the running of his term of MSR so he was still
deprived of liberty based on his criminal conviction. Stanbridge, Case No. 4-08-0956, at p.6-7,
citing 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 207/15(e) (West 2008). The court concluded that the amendment
could not be given retroactive effect and did not apply to Petitioner. Stanbridge, Case No. 4-080956, at p.6-7. The court then stated that “[i]t follows that the term of mandatory supervised
release was expired when defendant filed his postconviction petition; therefore he was not within
the class of persons entitled to seek a remedy under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act.”
Stanbridge, Case No. 4-08-0956, at p.7; see also People v. Bethel, 975 N.E.2d 616, 623 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2012) (tolling provision of Sexually Violent Persons Act does not apply retroactively);
People v. Steward, 940 N.E.2d 140, 150 (Ill. App. 3d 2010) (tolling provision of Sexually
Violent Persons Act did not apply to the defendant, who was placed on MSR nine months before
the effective date of the provision).
On June 1, 2010, while Petitioner’s appeal of the dismissal of his first postconviction
petition was still pending, Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction
petition. In his proposed successive postconviction petition, Petitioner claimed to possess
evidence of a conspiracy between the trial court and the prosecutor to retaliate against him. The
trial court entered an order denying leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Petitioner
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appealed, and the appellate court concluded that Petitioner was barred by collateral estoppel from
relitigating his argument that section 15(e) should be considered to have tolled his MSR. People
v. Stanbridge, Case No. 4-10-0565, 2012 WL7008728 (March 8, 2012) (unpublished order).
Petitioner’s PLA was denied by the Illinois Supreme Court on May 30, 2012.
ANALYSIS
Petitioner filed his original Petition (#1) in this case on February 28, 2012, and his
Supplemental Petition (#5) on March 18, 2013. In his Supplemental Petition (#5), Petitioner
stated that he was challenging his conviction of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. He raised the
following issues: (1) the prosecutor improperly retaliated against Petitioner following the
appellate court’s reversal of his first conviction by authoring a prejudicial letter to the Illinois
Attorney General; (2) at the bond hearing on remand following the appellate court’s reversal, the
prosecutor improperly mentioned that Petitioner was a potential candidate for civil commitment;
(3) media coverage was prejudicial and deprived Petitioner of a fair trial; (4) the prosecutor made
prejudicial and improper closing arguments; (5) the prosecutor and trial court engaged in ex parte
communications; (6) his appellate counsel was ineffective for dismissing Petitioner’s appeal
from his unsuccessful petition for relief from judgment; and (7) the trial court committed
multiple errors when it dismissed Petitioner’s first postconviction petition.
In his Motion to Dismiss (#16), Respondent contends that this court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this case because, when Petitioner filed this habeas petition challenging his
Adams County criminal conviction, he was no longer in custody on that judgment, having
completed his term of MSR on May 10, 2007. In his Response to the Motion to Dismiss,
Petitioner argues that his SVP civil commitment was the anticipated collateral consequence and
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purpose of his conviction and sentence. Petitioner argues that his “parole may have expired for
the purposes of IDOC records on May 10, 2007, but [he] remained in continuous physical
custody for the sexually violent offense conviction and pursuant to the SVP Act.”
Section 2254 provides that “a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of
habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Respondent is correct that the United States Supreme Court has
explained that “[t]he federal habeas statute gives the United States district courts jurisdiction to
entertain petitions for habeas corpus relief only from persons who are ‘in custody in violation
of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’” Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 490
(1989), quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (emphasis in original); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
The Supreme Court has interpreted this “in custody” language to require that the petitioner be
in custody on the conviction or sentence under attack at the time the petition is filed. Maleng,
490 U.S. at 490-91, citing Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 238 (1968). A person is not “‘in
custody’ under a conviction when the sentence imposed for that conviction has fully expired at
the time his petition is filed.” Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491 (emphasis in original); see also Brown
v. Walker, 2006 WL 1156869, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2006). Furthermore, the collateral consequences
of an expired conviction are not sufficient to render a person “in custody” for the purposes of a
habeas attack upon it. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491; see also Brown, 2006 WL 1156869, at *1.
In this case, Petitioner is challenging his Adams County conviction, raising numerous
arguments regarding why his rights were violated. Petitioner has not contested the fact that he
is no longer “in custody” for that conviction. In fact, his MSR term expired on May 10, 2007
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and he did not file his original Petition until February 28, 2012. Instead, Petitioner has argued
that he has remained in custody under the Sexually Violent Persons Act and that this custody
“was the anticipated collateral consequence” of his Adams County conviction and sentence.
This court agrees with Respondent that the law is clear that this court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this case because, when Petitioner filed this habeas petition challenging the
Adams County criminal judgment, he was no longer in custody on that judgment. See Maleng,
490 U.S. at 490-91. This court agrees with Respondent that Maleng clarified that a petitioner
cannot claim that he is “in custody” for a conviction that has fully expired simply because that
conviction was used to enhance the terms of his current custody. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491-93.
Instead, when a subsequent sentence or custody is imposed, it is pursuant to that judgment alone
that the petitioner is “in custody” for purposes of federal habeas review. Maleng, 490 U.S. at
492-93. Therefore, Petitioner cannot attack his Adams County criminal judgment on the ground
that it provided a basis for his current civil commitment. Because Petitioner is not “in custody”
as is required by 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), this court does not have
subject matter jurisdiction to hear his Petition. See Brown, 2006 WL 1156869, at *2.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Proceedings, this court denies a
certificate of appealability in this case. “When the district court denies a habeas petition on
procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional claim,” which has
happened here, “a COA [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at
least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
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district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(emphasis added). This court concludes that jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether
this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Petitioner’s Petition and Supplemental Petition.
This court also concludes that jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether Petitioner’s
Petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Therefore, this court
concludes that a COA is unwarranted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
(1) The clerk is directed to change the name of the Respondent to Gregory Scott, who
is now the Director of the Rushville Treatment and Detention Facility.
(2) Respondent’s Motion to Withdraw (#11) is GRANTED and the clerk is directed
to file the attached Motion to Dismiss as document #16.
(3) Respondent’s original Motion to Dismiss (#9) is withdrawn.
(4) Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss (#16) is GRANTED.
(5) Petitioner’s Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a
Person in State Custody (#1) and Supplemental Petition (#5) are dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
(6) A certificate of appealability is DENIED.
(7) This case is terminated.
ENTERED this 6th day of January, 2014
s/COLIN S. BRUCE
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
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