Thogmorton et al v. Reynolds et al
Filing
87
OPINION: The Plaintiffs' Rule 23(b)(2) Motion for Class Certification (d/e 80 ) is ALLOWED. This case is referred to United States Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins for the purpose of determining whether additional discovery is necessary and entering a scheduling order. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 10/17/2014. (MJ, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 21 October, 2014 04:48:46 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
BEVERLY THOGMORTON, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Lincoln Correctional Center Former
Assistant Warden REYNOLDS in his
individual capacity, et al.,
Defendants.
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NO. 12-3087
OPINION
RICHARD MILLS, U.S. District Judge:
Pending before the Court is the Plaintiffs’ Motion pursuant to Rule
23(b)(2) for Class Certification. The Defendants have not responded to the
motion.
I.
This action was initiated as a putative class action on March 20, 2012
and relates to actions taken on March 31, 2011, by employees of the
Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) at the Lincoln Correctional
Center in Lincoln, Illinois. The Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive
relief.
On July 29, 2013, the Court granted the Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) “Damages Class.” Although it denied
certification of the “Injunctive Relief Class,” the Court granted leave to the
Plaintiffs to amend their complaint and file a new motion for class
certification. The Sixth Amended Complaint is the operative complaint
now before the Court.
The Damages Class is comprised of female inmates who were
subjected to a humiliating and degrading public group strip search
performed during an IDOC Training Academy “cadet training exercise” on
March 31, 2011. The Plaintiffs now seek certification of a Rule 23(b)(2)
class so that they may obtain injunctive relief on behalf of themselves and
all women at Logan Correctional Center.
Previously, the Plaintiffs proposed two classes:
Class I (“Damages Class”): All individuals who were subjected
to the March 31, 2011 public group strip search at Lincoln
Correctional Center.
...
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Subclass A, consisting of: All individuals who were
subjected to the March 31, 2011 public group strip search
at Lincoln Correctional Center, and who remain in the
custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections since
that time.
Subclass B, consisting of: All individuals who were
subjected to the March 31, 2011 public group strip search
at Lincoln Correctional Center, and who were
subsequently released from the custody of the Illinois
Department of Corrections.
...
Class II (Injunctive Relief Class): All women who are currently
incarcerated at Lincoln Correctional Center, and all women who
will be incarcerated at Lincoln Correctional Center in the
future.
In its Order of July 29, 2013, as to Class I, the Court found that the
numerosity requirement under Rule 23(a)(1) had been met, as there were
over 100 women who were subjected to the strip search on March 31,
2011. The Court further determined under Rule 23(a)(2) that because the
Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that class members have suffered the same core
injury, the case presented common questions fact and law. Upon reviewing
the declarations, the Court concluded pursuant to Rule 23(a)(3) that the
experiences of the named parties were fairly typical of the proposed class.
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Finally, in considering adequacy-of-representation, the Court noted under
Rule 23(a)(4) that it was satisfied with the competency of class counsel,
and has no reason to doubt that “the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.”
Based on all of the unique circumstances of the case, the Court found
“that the questions of law [and] fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and
efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
The Court declined to certify Class II, which consisted of women
then-incarcerated at Lincoln Correctional Center and women who will be
incarcerated at that facility in the future. Because women were no longer
incarcerated at Lincoln Correctional Center and there were no future plans
to house women at the facility, the Court determined that the proposed
class was a class of zero and the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1)
could not be satisfied.
II.
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According to the Plaintiffs’ current motion, the women who had been
incarcerated at Lincoln Correctional Center were transferred out of the
facility, primarily to Logan Correctional Center, after Lincoln Correctional
Center was converted to an all-male prison.
The Plaintiff now seeks to certify the following class pursuant to Rule
23(b)(2):
Class II (Injunctive Relief Class): All women who are currently
incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center, and all women who
will be incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center in the future.
Under Rule 23(b)(2), a class action may be maintained where “the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
The Plaintiffs contend that all of the requirements of Rule 23(a) have
been met. Rule 23(a)(1) (the “numerosity prong”) requires that the class
be so numerous that it would be impracticable to join all of the members
in a single action.
The named Plaintiffs have attached to their
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memorandum declarations from 43 other inmates who “endured the cadet
training exercise.” Moreover, Logan Correctional Center’s own records
show that approximately 230 women were subjected to the October 31,
2013 public group strip search and its inmate population is approximately
2,000 women.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Class II
satisfies the Rule 23(a)(1) numerosity requirement.
The Plaintiffs further allege that Class II satisfies the commonality
and typicality requirements. Under Rule 23(a)(2), there must be questions
of law or fact common to the class. All that is required under Rule 23(a)(2)
is a single common question among the class members. See Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556 (2011).
However,
“[c]ommonality demands more than a showing that the class members have
all suffered a violation of the same provision of law at the hands of the
same defendant.” Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 755 (7th
Cir. 2014). “Where the same conduct or practice by the same defendant
gives rise to the same kind of claims from all class members, there is a
common question.” Id. at 756.
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The Plaintiffs assert the claims here are almost identical and thus
completely common among the class members. Each of the putative class
members was strip searched during a “cadet training exercise,” in the same
manner and under the same circumstances. Each individual will rely on the
same core unlawful conduct: being forcibly strip searched in groups of two
or more in full view of male corrections officers, IDOC administrators and
cadets, as well as corrections officer, cadets and civilians not involved in the
strip search. The Plaintiffs allege the core conduct is common to both the
March 31, 2011 Lincoln Correctional Center “cadet training exercise” and
the October 31, 2013 Logan Correctional Center “cadet training exercise.”
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have met the
commonality requirement. Each putative class members’ claims derive from
the same conduct or practice by the same Defendants. There is a common
core experience that was shared by all, which took place on different dates
at two different correctional centers.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have
demonstrated commonality among the class members.
Under Rule 23(a)(3), the Plaintiff must demonstrate that the
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experiences of the named parties are fairly typical of the proposed class. To
satisfy the typicality requirement, “there must be enough congruence
between the named representative’s claim and that of the unnamed
members of the class to justify allowing the named party to litigate on
behalf of the group.” Spano v. The Boeing Co., 633 F.3d 574, 586 (7th
Cir. 2011).
A finding of commonality usually results in a finding of
typicality. See Gen Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 158
n.13 (1982) (“The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a)
tend to merge.”).
Upon reviewing the declarations attached to the
Plaintiffs’ memorandum, the Court concludes the Plaintiffs have
sufficiently alleged that Named Class Members Ieshia Brown and Sandra
Brown were subjected to the same course of conduct as other class members
during the cadet training exercises. Accordingly, those individuals bring the
same cause of action as the other class members.
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that pursuant to Rule
23(a)(3), the experiences of the named parties are fairly typical of the
proposed class.
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Under Rule 23(a)(4), the class representatives and their counsel must
“fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a)(4). “[A]dequacy of representation is composed of two parts: the
adequacy of the named plaintiff’s counsel, and the adequacy of
representation provided in protecting the different, separate, and distinct
interest of the class members.” Retired Chicago Police Ass’n v. City of
Chicago, 7 F.3d 584, 598 (7th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). The class representative must possess the same interest
and suffer the same injury as other class members.
See Uhl v.
Thoroughbred Technology and Telecommunications, Inc., 309 F.3d 978,
985 (7th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, the Court must determine there is no
inconsistency between the named parties and the class members. See id.
Based on the information in the record, the Court finds that the class
representatives have the same interest and suffered the same injury as other
class members. The Court is aware of no inconsistencies between the
named parties and class members.
In its July 29, 2013 Order, the Court approved class counsel’s
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representation of the Plaintiffs. According to the memorandum in support
of the current motion, the Plaintiffs’ Counsel has represented the Plaintiffs
in multiple class action suits, including suits involving strip searches. The
Court has no basis for finding that any of the class representatives are
antagonistic to any absent class member or that they do not have a
sufficient interest to vigorously pursue the claims.
As was the case before, the Court is satisfied with the competency of
class counsel. Pursuant to Rule 23(a)(4), the Court has no basis to doubt
that “the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.”
III.
If the requirements of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, a class action may be
maintained if “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a
whole.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
Citing Amchem Prods v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), the Plaintiffs
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note that actions seeking relief to prevent future alleged illegal deprivations
of civil rights are a “prime example” of a proper Rule 23(b)(2) class. See id.
at 614.
“The key to the (b)(2) class is the indivisible nature of the
injunctive or declaratory relief warranted–the notion that the conduct is
such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only as to all of the class
members or as to none of them.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557 (internal
quotation marks anc citation omitted). The relief sought “must perforce
affect the entire class at once.” Id. at 2558. The Seventh Circuit has
observed that “Rule 23(b)(2) operates under the presumption that the
interests of the class members are cohesive and homogeneous such that the
case will not depend on adjudication of facts particular to any subset of the
class nor require a remedy that differentiates materially among class
members.” Lemon v. Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, 216 F.3d 577,
580 (7th Cir. 2000).
The Plaintiffs note that Class II, comprised of all women incarcerated
at Logan Correctional Center, seeks certification under Rule 23(b)(2) in
order to ensure that Defendants are prevented from organizing any mass
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public group strip searches in the future, either as part of IDOC “training
exercises” or in the facility at large. Each class member’s claim depends on
the Defendants’ standardized conduct. Class certification is appropriate
under Rule 23(b)(2) “only when a single injunction or declaratory judgment
would provide relief to each member of the class.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct.
at 2557. Because each class member is seeking the same injunction, the
Court concludes the Plaintiffs have met the standard for maintaining a class
action for equitable relief.
IV.
For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs’
motion satisfies the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) and the requirements of
Rule 23(b)(2). Accordingly, the motion to certify the class will be Allowed.
Class II, the Injunctive Relief Class, is certified as follows: “All women
who are currently incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center, and all women
who will be incarcerated at Logan Correctional Center in the future.”
The Named Plaintiffs–Beverly Thogmorton, Delores Henry, Patricia
Phillips, Jacqueline Hegwood, Sandra Brown and Ieshia Brown–shall be
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representatives of the Class.
Loevy & Loevy are appointed as Counsel for the Class.
Ergo, the Plaintiffs’ Rule 23(b)(2) Motion for Class Certification [d/e
80] is ALLOWED.
Class II is hereby certified under Rule 23(b)(2), as provided in this
Order.
The Named Plaintiffs are appointed as representatives of Class II.
Counsel for the Named Plaintiffs, Loevy & Loevy, are appointed as
Counsel for Class II.
This case is referred to United States Magistrate Judge Tom SchanzleHaskins for the purpose of determining whether additional discovery is
necessary and entering a scheduling order.
ENTER: October 17, 2014
FOR THE COURT:
s/Richard Mills
Richard Mills
United States District Judge
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