Anderson v. Commissioner of Social Security
Filing
13
OPINION BY BYRON G. CUDMORE, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE: Defendant Acting Commissioner of Social Security's Motion for Summary Affirmance (d/e 11 ) is ALLOWED and Plaintiff's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 10 ) is DENIED. The decision of the Acting Commissioner is AFFIRMED. All pending motions are denied as moot. THIS CASE IS CLOSED. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered on 4/24/2013. (MJ, ilcd)
E-FILED
Thursday, 25 April, 2013 04:07:11 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
TIMOTHY ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
CAROLYN COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.
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No. 12-cv-3167
OPINION
BYRON G. CUDMORE, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
Plaintiff Timothy Anderson appeals the denial of his applications for
Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income
(collectively Disability Benefits) under Titles II and XVI of the Social
Security Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 216(i), 223, 405(g), 1381a, 1382c, and 1383(c).
Anderson has filed a Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(d/e 10) (Anderson Motion), and Defendant Acting Commissioner of Social
Security (Commissioner) has filed a Motion for Summary Affirmance
(d/e11).1 The parties consented, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), to
proceed before this Court. Consent to Proceed Before a United States
1
The Court takes judicial notice that Carolyn Colvin is now Acting Commissioner of Social Security.
Colvin is, therefore, automatically substituted in as the Defendant in this case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d).
Page 1 of 34
Magistrate and Order of Reference, entered October 31, 2012 (d/e 9). For
the reasons set forth below, the Decision of the Commissioner is
AFFIRMED.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Anderson was born on September 1, 1971. He completed high
school and two years of college, but did not receive a degree. Answer to
Complaint (d/e 6), attached Certified Transcript of Proceedings before the
Social Security Administration (R.), at 53-54. Anderson previously worked
in the software industry as a quality assurance tester, engineer, and project
supervisor. R. 139. He last worked in November 2001. R. 53, 292. He
alleged that he became disabled on June 1, 2006. Anderson suffers from
major depressive disorder, panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder,
and a history of polysubstance abuse, in remission. R. 34.
On April 24, 2006, Anderson saw Dr. Timothy Jacobs, D.O., at an
ambulatory care facility in Quincy, Illinois, requesting a blood work up to
check his cholesterol. Anderson also reported to Dr. Jacobs that he had
suffered from a panic disorder for several years. R. 232. Anderson
reported that he had tried several medications for panic and depression,
but nothing helped. Dr. Jacobs referred him to Dr. M. Nassery, M.D.
R. 229.
Page 2 of 34
On April 25, 2006, Anderson saw Dr. Nassery’s nurse practitioner
Elizabeth Stumpf, CNP. R. 229-31. Anderson reported that he had
experienced depression and panic attacks for seven years. He described
the panic attacks as a choking and nausea, accompanied by shakiness and
sweating. R. 229. Anderson also reported problems with insomnia.
Stumpf observed that Anderson was anxious during the examination.
R. 230. Stumpf diagnosed an adjustment disorder with anxiety, prescribed
Lexapro, and referred Anderson to Transitions of Western Illinois
(Transitions) for evaluation. R. 230-31.
On May 9, 2006, Anderson saw Stumpf again. Anderson reported
that his insomnia improved and the number of daily panic attacks had
decreased. He still felt irritable and had trouble concentrating. Anderson
denied having feelings of hopelessness, guilt, or helplessness; and denied
having homicidal or suicidal thoughts. Anderson had started seeing a
counselor at Transitions, David Edwards, LCPC, and was scheduled to see
a psychiatrist in July 2006. Stumpf continued the Lexapro. R. 227; see
R. 261.
On June 20, 2006, Anderson saw Stumpf again. Anderson reported
seeing counselor Edwards on a weekly basis at Transitions. Anderson
reported fewer panic attacks. Anderson reported that the Lexapro was only
Page 3 of 34
mildly helping. Stumpf diagnosed Anderson with generalized anxiety
disorder with panic attacks. R. 225.
On July 31, 2006, Anderson saw a psychiatrist at Transitions,
Dr. Salvador Sanchez, M.D., for a psychiatric evaluation. R. 276.
Anderson reported that his depression and anxiety worsened when his
mother died two years earlier in California. Anderson was living in
California with his mother at the time of her death. Anderson thereafter
moved from California to live with his grandparents in Plainville, Illinois.
Anderson reported “recurrent, frequent, and intense panic attacks occurring
daily and all day long.” R. 276. He reported that he was unable to function
due to the panic attacks. R. 276. He reported that his symptoms had
improved since he started seeing his counselor Edwards. R. 276.
Anderson reported to Dr. Sanchez that he was withdrawn, isolated,
and unable to sleep. He had poor memory, attention, and concentration,
but he noticed improvement with his current treatment. Anderson reported
one hospitalization in the past for a suicide attempt. Anderson had a
history of drug abuse, but reported no current illegal drug use. Anderson
had symptoms of depression and anxiety. Dr. Sanchez’s mental status
examination indicated that Anderson was not in acute distress. Anderson
had rapid fluttering of the jaw and some shaking due to anxiety. Anderson
Page 4 of 34
denied any hallucinations or suicidal or homicidal ideations; however, he
stated that he sometimes had fleeting death wishes. R. 227-28.
Dr. Sanchez diagnosed major depressive disorder, moderate, recurrent,
without psychotic features; panic disorder without agoraphobia; generalized
anxiety disorder; and history of polysubstance abuse, in remission. He
gave Anderson a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 55.
R. 276-78. Dr. Sanchez prescribed Zoloft and Clonazepam, and continued
counseling sessions with Edwards. R. 278.
On September 12, 2006, Anderson saw Stumpf again. R. 223.
Anderson reported that the medications prescribed by Dr. Sanchez seemed
to be working. Stumpf recommended that Anderson “get out and exercise
and to consider finding some employment . . . .” R. 223.
On February 27, 2007, Anderson saw Stumpf again. Anderson
reported that his grandmother died in January 2007, and he was having
financial problems. Stumpf assessed “anxiety and depression, coupled
with grief.” R. 221. Stumpf noted that Anderson’s mood was stable.
R. 221.
On January 24, 2008, Anderson saw counselor Edwards at
Transitions. Anderson reported having low energy. He was stressed about
his grandfather undergoing surgery. He was in good compliance with his
Page 5 of 34
medications. His sleep was improved. He reported no suicidal or
homicidal ideations. R. 279-80.
On April 24, 2008, Anderson saw Edwards at Transitions. Anderson
reported that his sleep was good and his depression was manageable.
Anderson denied having suicidal or homicidal thoughts, but he reported
having auditory hallucinations. R. 281.
On July 24, 2008, Anderson saw Edwards at Transitions. Anderson
reported that he wanted to go back to school or work. Edwards noted that
Anderson’s medications were effective. R. 284.
On September 18, 2008, Anderson saw Edwards at Transitions.
Edwards noted that Anderson’s panic attacks were under control.
Anderson’s sleep was good and he again denied any suicidal or homicidal
ideations. R. 287.
On November 25, 2008, Edwards prepared an Adult Mental
Health/DD Assessment of Anderson. Edwards noted that Anderson began
receiving treatment at Transitions for anxiety and depression in May 2006.
Anderson’s main concern at the beginning was anxiety and panic attacks,
but more recently, Anderson’s main concern was depression. R. 262.
Anderson reported that he sometimes heard voices and sounds, such as
footsteps or movements. Anderson reported that the auditory
Page 6 of 34
hallucinations did not “bother” him, but that the hallucinations were
“annoying to him at times.” R. 262. Edwards reported that Anderson made
considerable progress in reducing symptoms of depression over the past
year. R. 262. Anderson continued to make progress to control his
symptoms of depression and anxiety. R. 264. Anderson’s symptoms had
been reduced over the past year. R. 274. Anderson was taking Zoloft,
Trazodone, and Neurontin at the time and was compliant with those
medications. R. 265, 274.
Anderson reported to Edwards that he was interested in television,
cars, computers, writing, video games, movies and music. Anderson
reported that he wanted to pursue several goals, including going back to
school, working, and leading a more productive life. R. 270. Edwards
stated that Anderson had problems of self-esteem/efficacy and lack of
motivation. R. 270.
On examination, Edwards observed Anderson’s mental status was
within normal limits, but Edwards observed that Anderson had a blunted
affect and depressed mood. Anderson’s memory was intact and he had
good insight. R. 271. Edwards diagnosed major depressive disorder,
severe, recurrent, with psychotic features and generalized anxiety disorder.
R. 272. Edwards assessed a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF)
Page 7 of 34
score of 61. R. 272. Edwards stated that Anderson did not meet the
criteria for mental health related serious impairment. R. 272. Edwards
recommended continuing outpatient psychiatric and therapy/counseling
services. Edwards recommended that the primary focus should be on
reducing symptoms of depression and monitoring progress with anxiety.
R. 274. Edwards stated that Anderson was more appropriately diagnosed
with generalized anxiety disorder rather than panic disorder because of the
infrequency of his panic attacks and his more generalized anxious
disposition. R. 274.
On March 19, 2009, Anderson went to see a nurse Amy Anderson, at
Transitions for a medication check. R. 339. Anderson reported that his
sleep was good. Anderson reported he was anxious all the time and had
fleeting suicidal thoughts. Anderson reported no psychosis. Anderson
reported that the effect of his medications was poor, and he requested an
increase in the dosage. Anderson reported that he argued with his
grandfather frequently and had financial and vocational stressors. R. 33940. On March 24, 2009, Dr. Sanchez increased the dosage of Anderson’s
Zoloft and Neurontin. R. 340.
On April 17, 2009, Anderson completed a Function Report. R. 15865. Anderson stated that his “day is strongly determined by mood.”
Page 8 of 34
R. 158. Anderson stated that he could take care of his personal hygiene
and do household chores, although he sometimes neglected dressing and
hygiene. He did not need special reminders to take care of his personal
needs and grooming. Anderson washed dishes, did household repairs,
took out the trash, and cleaned up after his dog. Anderson also cooked his
own meals. He reported that he did chores as necessary. He also cared
for his dog, including walking the dog. Anderson reported that he lived with
his grandfather; was unable to drive a car, attend gatherings, associate
with people at length, or relax; and could not pay bills because of the stress
it causes. R. 158-61. Anderson stated that he had difficulty dealing with
others, including family members. He described his temper as “shot” and
his tolerance as “non-existent.” R. 163. Anderson said that he could
concentrate for an hour at a time. He had no problems following written
instructions and, usually could follow spoken instructions without much
trouble. He stated that he could get along with authority figures, except, “If
the authority figure is a jerk then I won’t get along at all.” R. 164. Anderson
stated that he could handle changes in routine, but did not handle stress
well at all. R. 164. Anderson stated that sometimes he could not get out of
bed because of his depression. At those times, all he wanted to do was
sleep and not have to deal with the world. R. 165.
Page 9 of 34
On April 27, 2009, state agency psychologist Dr. Frank Froman,
Ed.D., performed a consultative psychological examination of Anderson.
R. 291-95. Anderson reported that he dropped out of college after two
years because of depression that he suffered after his mother died.
R. 291. Anderson reported that he was a patient in a psychiatric unit in
2003 or 2004. R. 291. He had a history of drug and alcohol abuse, but no
current problems. R. 292. Anderson had no current physical problems.
R. 291. Anderson reported that he never tried to commit suicide, but he
had suicidal thoughts before. Dr. Froman observed that Anderson related
in a manner that suggested slight anxiety. Anderson had good ability to
relate. Anderson’s speech was “extraordinarily abundant but clear and
easy to understand.” R. 292.
Anderson told Dr. Froman that he no longer socialized due to his
depression. He had problems sleeping and indicated he was gaining
weight. Anderson reported that he drank eight to ten cups of coffee a day.
Anderson did not relate feeling anxious to his consumption of coffee.
Anderson reported that he watched television, got on the computer, and
played video games during the day. Anderson also reported that he was
able to perform household chores and care for his personal hygiene.
R. 292.
Page 10 of 34
Dr. Froman’s mental examination showed that Anderson was
properly oriented and in good contact with reality. Anderson had a good
memory and was able to perform calculations. Dr. Froman estimated that
Anderson’s IQ was at least in the average range or better. R. 293.
Dr. Froman noted that Anderson’s anxiety might be stimulated by caffeine.
R. 293. Dr. Froman noted that Anderson stayed by himself and was
reluctant to participate in life. Dr. Froman found that Anderson’s greatest
problem was his depression. Dr. Froman gave Anderson a GAF score of
50. R. 295.
Dr. Froman diagnosed major depressive disorder, panic disorder with
agoraphobia, caffeine dependence, generalized anxiety disorder, and a
history of polydrug and alcohol abuse, in full remission. R. 293.
Dr. Froman stated, “Restarting his life will take significant effort, likely more
than he is able to mount, given the episodic nature of the helping process
which he is receiving.” R. 294. Dr. Froman opined that Anderson could
perform simple one and two-step assemblies at a competitive rate; could
relate minimally but adequately to coworkers and supervisors; could
understand oral and written instructions; could manage his own benefits;
and could withstand the stress associated with modest levels of
employment. R. 294.
Page 11 of 34
On May 18, 2009, state agency psychologist, Dr. Donald Henson,
Ph.D., completed a Psychiatric Review Technique Form (PRTF) and a
Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment (MRFCA). R. 296-313.
Dr. Henson opined that Anderson had an affective disorder, generalized
anxiety disorder, and substance addiction disorder, which resulted in
moderate restrictions in activities of daily living and maintaining social
functioning, and mild difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or
pace. R. 300, 310. Dr. Henson opined that Anderson’s mental
impairments, “would adversely affect his ability to perform satisfactorily
detailed activities of a somewhat complicated nature.” R. 298. Dr. Henson
also opined that Anderson’s “adaptive behaviors [were] adequate for
vocational involvement.” R. 298.
On June 15, 2009, Anderson went to see Nurse Anderson at
Transitions for medication monitoring. Anderson reported feeling more
depressed. He also felt hopeless and helpless, and overwhelmed to have
to do things on his own. Anderson denied having any suicidal or homicidal
ideation. R. 341-42.
On August 20, 2009, Anderson saw Edwards at Transitions.
Anderson reported that his mood was average. Anderson denied any
hopeless or helpless feelings. R. 344-45. Anderson’s sleep was also
Page 12 of 34
good, and Anderson denied any suicidal or homicidal ideations. R. 345.
Anderson reported that his mood was not any different and his energy was
low. R. 344-45.
On November 2, 2009, state agency psychologist Dr. Linda Lanier,
Ph.D., reviewed the record evidence and affirmed Dr. Henson’s PRTF and
MRFCA. R. 387-88.
On February 1, 2010, another Adult Mental Health/DD Assessment
was prepared. R. 351-67. The signatures on the form are illegible, but do
not appear to be those of either Edwards or Dr. Sanchez, or the new
counselor that Anderson later saw at Transitions in November 2010, Ty
Carlson. Anderson appears to have filled out part of the form himself, and
a representative of Transitions appears to have completed parts of the
form. Anderson reported that he has been able to cope with his panic
attacks, but his depression was causing isolation and socialization
problems. R. 351. Anderson reported issues in social adjustment, work,
and self-care/ daily living skills. R. 352. He was taking Zoloft, Trazodone,
and Clonazepam. R. 355. The mental status examination showed normal
findings except that Anderson had a depressed mood. R. 362. Anderson
did not have any delusions, paranoia, or feelings of helplessness or
Page 13 of 34
worthlessness. Anderson did not report any hallucinations. Anderson
reported that his biggest barriers were depression and social anxiety.
R. 351. The Transitions employee completing the form gave Anderson a
GAF score of 55 and noted serious impairments in social group and
employment. R. 363.
On September 13, 2010, Anderson saw nurse Judy Christner at
Transitions for medication monitoring. At the time, Anderson was
compliant with his medications and the medications were effective. R. 372.
Christner stated that Anderson had some anxiety and low energy.
Anderson reported that his sleep was good. Anderson denied having any
suicidal or homicidal ideations. Christner recommended that Anderson
exercise fifteen to twenty minutes a day. R. 373.
On November 17, 2010, Anderson saw counselor Ty Carlson at
Transitions. R. 376-77. Carlson noted, “While [Anderson] was able to
report great success with his anxiety attacks, he felt his depression is only
getting worse from living in Illinois.” R. 377. Anderson reported that he felt
trapped in his current situation. R. 377. Carlson and Anderson discussed
Anderson’s desire to move out of his grandfather’s house. Carlson noted
that Anderson was depressed and had “lost confidence in the ability to
Page 14 of 34
change.” R. 376. Carlson gave Anderson a GAF score of 42 on November
17, 2010. R. 368.
On December 1, 2010, Anderson met with Carlson at Transitions.
Anderson “discussed his disdain” for where he lives. R. 378. Carlson
suggested pursuing hobbies such as writing. Carlson also suggested
“getting out more and engaging other people but [Carlson] stated a lack of
people to engage and a difference in personalities.” R. 378. Carlson
suggested finding tasks in which Anderson’s interests overlapped with
others in the area. Carlson suggested that Anderson’s “interest in botany
being put towards a garden.” R. 378. Anderson was not interested.
Carlson noted that Anderson responded to his suggestions with “’I don’t
really want to.’” R. 378. Carlson opined, “This lack of willingness to
commit is reinforcing an attitude of helplessness.” R. 378.
On December 23, 2010, Anderson went to Transitions for medication
monitoring. R. 379-81. The form does not identify the staff member with
whom he met. Anderson reported poor communication with Transitions
staff. He also reported that he went without his medications for two weeks.
He reported that he felt depressed. He reported that his appetite was
good, his sleep was fair, and his energy was low. He denied any suicidal
or homicidal ideations. R. 380.
Page 15 of 34
On January 19, 2011, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) held an
evidentiary hearing by video conference. R. 49-71. The ALJ presided in
Chicago, Illinois. Anderson and his attorney appeared in Hannibal,
Missouri. A vocational expert, Amy Kutschbach, appeared by telephone.
R. 51.
Anderson testified first. He testified that he last worked in November
2001. R. 53. Anderson testified that his panic attacks prevented him from
working. He would have a panic attack at work and would stop whatever
he was doing at work. R. 64.
He first received psychological care in 2003 while he was living in
California. In late 2003, he was hospitalized after it was determined that he
was a danger to himself. R. 55. Anderson testified that he was currently
receiving mental health care from Transitions. He testified he went to
Transitions in July 2006 to treat his panic disorder. He was suffering from
panic attacks “day and night.” R. 55. He testified that he had about eight
attacks a day and each lasted for an hour. R. 56. Anderson testified that
since he started receiving treatment at Transitions, the frequency of the
attacks had gone down. He testified that after several months he was
down to one or two attacks a day. R. 57.
Page 16 of 34
He testified that at the time of the hearing, he had panic attacks about
three times a week, with each attack lasting about thirty minutes. He
testified that panic attacks could be triggered by pain or increased heart
rate caused by caffeine or other sources. R. 59.
Anderson testified that he still felt anxiety even with the reduced panic
attacks. He described his anxiety, “It’s a feeling of restlessness,
nervousness and includes lack of concentration and physical nausea.”
R. 57. He testified that his thoughts “go wild on their own.” He testified that
he would be watching television, but stop paying any attention to what he
was watching. R. 58.
Anderson testified that he got nervous in public places. He testified
that he got really nervous if he was around of group of three or more
people. R. 60.
Anderson testified that his depression has not improved at all since
he started receiving treatment at Transitions in 2006. He testified that, “I
am feeling hopelessness, listlessness, inability to concentrate. I sleep too
much or not enough.” R. 60. He said he had good days and bad days
with his depression. He testified that he had bad days “at least 90 percent
of the time.” R. 61. On bad days he testified that he felt “really blue.”
Page 17 of 34
R. 61. He focused on how terrible his life was. He tended to lie in bed
trying to sleep, but being unable to. R. 61. He testified that he had
thoughts of suicide three or four times a week. R. 61-62. Anderson
testified that his counselors at Transitions are trying to help him with his
depression. R. 62.
Anderson testified that he had trouble dealing with other people. He
said that he felt he could not give other people what they want. He testified
that his attempts at friendships have failed because the other person did
not want to deal with his depression. R. 63.
Anderson testified that he took Trazadone to help him sleep. He
testified that the medication helped about half of the time. He testified that
about two to three times a week he felt rested when he woke up in the
morning. The rest of the time he woke up during the night with racing
thoughts about his life and his situation. R. 65-66.
The vocational expert Kutschbach then testified. The ALJ asked
Kutschbach,
So he’s 35. And he has two years of college. And he’s able to
perform one and two-step assemblies, able to relate minimally
but adequately to coworkers and supervisors and can withstand
the stress of moderately stressful work. Now, can that person
do any of those past jobs?
R. 67. Kutschbach said no. R. 67.
Page 18 of 34
Kutschbach testified that such a person could perform other jobs,
such as laundry worker with 270 to 350 such jobs in the region, 10,000 in
the state, and 890,000 in the nation; repack crew worker, with 250 to 300
such jobs in the region, 48,000 in the state, and 470,000 in the nation; and
sorter, with 300 to 350 such jobs in the region, 12,000 in the state, and
500,000 in the nation. R. 68-69.
That ALJ asked Kutschbach to assume for one-third of the workday,
the person could not carry out instructions, maintain regular attendance, or
interact with the general public. Kutschbach opined that such a person
would be unemployable. R. 68.
On examination by Anderson’s attorney, Kutschbach opined that the
laundry worker job would not require the person to be around three or more
people. He opined that the job was performed in groups of two. R. 70.2
Kutschbach also opined that a person would not be employable if the
person had to take a break of thirty minutes to an hour on an unscheduled
basis approximately three times a week. R. 70-71.
2
Part of Kutschbach’s testimony was inaudible at this point. R. 70. The ALJ’s opinion indicates that
Kutschbach stated that the person’s ability to perform the sorter job would also be unaffected by a
limitation that the person not be required to work around three or more people. R. 44.
Page 19 of 34
THE DECISION OF THE ALJ
The ALJ issued her decision on January 27, 2011. R. 30-44. The
ALJ followed the five-step analysis set forth in Social Security
Administration Regulations (Disability Analysis). R. 31-32. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920. Step 1 requires that the claimant not be currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b),
416.920(b). If true, Step 2 requires the claimant to have a severe
impairment. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c).
If true, Step 3 requires a determination of whether the claimant is so
severely impaired that he is disabled regardless of the claimant's age,
education and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). To
meet this requirement at Step 3, the claimant's condition must meet, or be
medically equivalent to, one of the impairments specified in 20 C.F.R. Part
404 Subpart P, Appendix 1 (Listing). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d),
416.920(d). If the claimant’s impairments, combination of impairments, do
not meet or equal a Listing, then the ALJ proceeds to Step 4.
Step 4 requires the claimant not to be able to return to his prior work
considering his age, education, work experience, and Residual Functional
Capacity (RFC). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The ALJ must
determine the claimant’s RFC in order to perform this analysis. If the
Page 20 of 34
claimant cannot return to his prior work, then Step 5 requires a
determination of whether the claimant is disabled considering his RFC,
age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f),
416.920(f).
The claimant has the burden of presenting evidence and proving the
issues on the first four steps. The Commissioner has the burden on the
last step; the Commissioner must show that, considering the listed factors,
the claimant can perform some type of gainful employment that exists in
the national economy. Briscoe ex rel. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345,
352 (7th Cir. 2005); Knight v. Chater, 55 F.3d 309, 313 (7th Cir. 1995).
The ALJ also stated if the claimant was disabled, then she must
determined whether the disability continued through the date of her
decision. R. 32. The ALJ stated that she would follow the Commission’s
eight-step analysis to make this determination (Medical Improvement
Analysis). 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594 and 416.994.3 Step 1 requires that the
claimant not be currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1594(f)(1), 416.994(b)(5). If true, the ALJ must determine at
Step 2 whether the claimant has an impairment or combination of
impairments at the time of the decision that medically equal a Listing. If so,
3
The Supplemental Security Income regulations omit the first step in the Medical Improvement Analysis.
The other seven steps, however, apply to both types of Disability Benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.994(b)(5).
Page 21 of 34
the claimant continues to be disabled and the Medical Improvement
Analysis ends. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(f)(2) and 416.994(b)(5)(i).
If the person’s impairments do not equal a Listing at the time of the
decision, the ALJ must determine at Step 3 whether medical improvement
occurred. Medical improvement is any decrease in the medical severity of
the claimant’s impairments. If medical improvement has occurred, the
Medical Improvement Analysis continues to Step 4. If no medical
improvement has occurred, the claimant continues to be disabled and
Medical Improvement Analysis skips Step 4 and goes to Step 5. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1594(b)(1) & 416.994(b)(1)(i).
At Step 4, the ALJ must determine whether the medical improvement
increased the claimant’s ability to perform work activities, and specifically
whether the claimant’s RFC has increased. If so, the ALJ proceeds to
Step 6 of the Medical Improvement Analysis. If not, the ALJ proceeds to
Step 5 of the Medical Improvement Analysis. 20 C.F.R. 404.1594(b)(3) &
(f)(4), and 416.994(b)(1)(iii) & (b)(5)(iii).
At Step 5, the ALJ must determine whether an exception to medical
improvement applies. If one set of exceptions apply, the Medical
Improvement Analysis continues to Step 6. If a second set of exceptions
apply, the claimant disability ends and the Medical Improvement Analysis
Page 22 of 34
ends. If no exception applies, the claimant’s disability continues and the
Medical Improvement Analysis ends. 20 C.F.R. §§ 1594(f)(5), and
416.994(b)(5)(iv).
At Step 6, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant’s current
impairments or combination of impairments after medical improvement are
still severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 1594(f)(6) and 416.994(b)(5)(v). If the claimant’s
current impairments are not severe, the claimant is no longer disabled and
the Medical Improvement Analysis ends. If the claimant’s current
impairments are severe, the Medical Improvement Analysis continues to
Step 7.
At Step 7, the ALJ must determine the claimant’s RFC after medical
improvement, and then determine whether the claimant could now perform
his past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(f)(7) and 416.994(b)(5)(vi).
If so, the claimant is no longer disabled and the Medical Improvement
Analysis ends. If not, the Medical Improvement Analysis continues to
Step 8.
At Step 8, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant can perform
a significant number of jobs that exist in the national economy considering
his age, education, work experience, and current RFC after medical
improvement. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(f)(8) and 416.994(b)(5)(vii). If so,
Page 23 of 34
then the claimant’s disability ends. If not, the claimant’s disability
continues.
The ALJ found that Anderson met his burden at Steps 1 and 2 of the
Disability Analysis. The ALJ found that Anderson had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since June 1, 2006, the alleged onset date. The
ALJ also found that Anderson suffered from severe impairments of major
depressive disorder, panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and
history of polysubstance abuse, in remission. The ALJ found that
Anderson suffered from these severe impairments at all times relevant to
the decision. R. 34.
At Step 3 of the Disability Analysis, the ALJ found that Anderson’s
impairments or combination of impairments did not meet or equal a Listing.
R. 34. The ALJ considered Listing 12.04 for affective disorders such as
depression and Listing 12.06 for anxiety related disorders. R. 34-35.
At Step 4 of the Disability Analysis, the ALJ determined that from
June 1, 2006, to November 25, 2008, Anderson had the RFC to perform
light work except that he would need to take unscheduled breaks of up to
an hour a few times a week. R. 35. The ALJ relied on the treatment notes
and diagnoses from Stumpf, Edwards, and Dr. Sanchez to support this
finding. The ALJ found that Anderson’s panic attacks would require the
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unscheduled breaks on a weekly basis. R. 35-36. Based on this RFC, the
ALJ found that Anderson could not perform his past relevant work during
this time period. The ALJ relied on vocation expert Kutschbach’s opinions
to support this finding. R. 36-37.
At Step 5 of the Disability Analysis, the ALJ determined that June 1,
2006, to November 25, 2008, Anderson could not perform any other jobs
that existed in the national economy. The ALJ relied on the MedicalVocational Guidelines, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, and the
opinions of vocational expert Kutschbach. R. 37-38.
The ALJ then began the Medical Improvement Analysis. The ALJ
had previously determined the issue at Step 1, that Anderson was not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 1, 2006. R. 34. The ALJ
found at Step 2 of the Medical Improvement Analysis that Anderson’s
impairments did not meet a Listing on or after November 26, 2008. The
ALJ relied on the initial finding under the Disability Analysis that his
impairments did not meet a Listing. R. 38.
At Step 3 of the Medical Improvement Analysis, the ALJ found that
medical improvement occurred as of November 26, 2008. The ALJ relied
on Edwards’ November 25, 2008, assessment that as a result of his
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treatment at Transitions and his medications, Anderson’s panic attacks
were controlled and his depression had improved. R. 38.
The ALJ found at Step 4 of the Medical Improvement Analysis that
the medical improvement related to work activities. R. 43. The ALJ
determined that after medical improvement, Anderson had the RFC to
perform light work that was limited to one and two-step assemblies.
Anderson’s RFC was further limited because Anderson was only able to
relate minimally but adequately to coworkers and supervisors and because
he could only withstand the stress of moderately stressful work. R. 38.
The ALJ relied on the treatment and assessment records from Transitions
that indicated that the panic attacks were under control after the Edwards
November 25, 2008, assessment, and that Anderson’s main problems
seem to be motivational. The ALJ also relied heavily on the opinions of
Drs. Froman and Henson. R. 41.
The ALJ found that Anderson’s testimony about the severity of his
symptoms was not credible. The ALJ found that the testimony was
inconsistent with the treatment notes from Transitions which generally
showed that the medication was effective, that his panic attacks were under
control, that he was sleeping well, that Anderson was setting goals of going
back to school and working; that, with one exception on March 19, 2009,
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Anderson denied having any suicidal or homicidal ideations; and that after
November 25, 2008, Anderson did not report any psychosis such as
auditory hallucinations. R. 38-43.
The ALJ skipped Step 5 of the Medical Improvement Analysis
because she found that medical improvement occurred and the
improvement related to work activities. The ALJ had also already made the
relevant finding for Step 6 of the Medical Improvement Analysis when she
found that at all times Anderson continued to suffer from major depressive
disorder, panic disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and history of
polysubstance abuse, in remission. R. 34.
At Step 7 of the Medical Improvement Analysis, the ALJ found that
beginning on November 26, 2008, Anderson could not return to his past
relevant work even with the medical improvement. The ALJ relied on her
RFC determination after medical improvement and the opinion of
vocational expert Kutschbach. R. 43.
At Step 8 of the Medical Improvement Analysis, the ALJ found that
beginning on November 26, 2008, Anderson could perform a significant
number of jobs that exist in the national economy. The ALJ relied on the
finding of the RFC after medical improvement and Kutschbach’s opinions
that such a person could perform the laundry worker, repack room worker,
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and sorter jobs. R. 43-44. The ALJ further relied on Kutschbach’s opinion
that the laundry worker and sorter jobs were performed in groups of one or
two people as further support that Anderson could perform these jobs.
R. 44.
Anderson appealed the decision of the ALJ. On April 24, 2012, the
Appeals Council denied Anderson’s request for review. The ALJ’s decision
then became the decision of the Commissioner. R. 1. Anderson then filed
this action for judicial review.
ANALYSIS
This Court reviews the Decision of the Commissioner to determine
whether it is supported by substantial evidence. In making this review, the
Court considers the evidence that was before the ALJ. Wolfe v. Shalala,
997 F.2d 321, 322 n.3 (7th Cir. 1993). Substantial evidence is “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate” to
support the decision. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
This Court must accept the findings if they are supported by substantial
evidence, and may not substitute its judgment. Delgado v. Bowen, 782
F.2d 79, 82 (7th Cir. 1986). This Court will not review the credibility
determinations of the ALJ unless the determinations lack any explanation
or support in the record. Elder v. Astrue, 529 F.3d 408, 413-14 (7th Cir.
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2008). The ALJ must articulate at least minimally his analysis of all
relevant evidence. Herron v. Shalala, 19 F.3d 329, 333 (7th Cir. 1994).
The ALJ must “build an accurate and logical bridge from the evidence to his
conclusion.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000).
The ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. Anderson
does not challenge the ALJ’s Disability Analysis, so the Court will not
address that analysis directly. The ALJ’s Medical Improvement Analysis is
supported by substantial evidence. Anderson was not engaged in
substantial gainful activity, he suffered from panic disorder, generalized
anxiety disorder, depression, and polysubstance abuse in remission. None
of his impairments equaled a Listing. These findings are undisputed.
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that medical
improvement occurred by November 26, 2008. The Edwards November
25, 2008, assessment states that Anderson’s panic attacks were under
control and his depression had improved. Subsequent treatment notes
from Transitions indicate that Anderson’s sleep had improved and his
medications were generally effective. The notes from Transitions show no
suicidal or homicidal ideations except on one occasion, March 19, 2009.
The notes from Transitions show no hallucinations after November 25,
2008. This evidence provides substantial support for the finding.
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The ALJ further found at Step 4 of the Medical Improvement Analysis
that the medical improvement related to work activities and increased his
RFC. The increased RFC finding is supported by the opinions of Drs.
Froman and Henson, as well as Anderson’s April 17, 2009, Function
Report in which Anderson stated that he could maintain concentration for
an hour at a time, follow both written and spoken instructions, and relate to
authority figures as long as they were not “jerks.” R. 164. At Step 6, the
ALJ found that Anderson continued to suffer from his severe impairments.
The ALJ stated that he suffered from those impairments at all times
relevant to the decision. R. 34.
The ALJ’s RFC finding at Step 7 that Anderson could not return to his
past relevant work even after his medical improvement is supported by the
opinions of Drs. Froman and Henson and the increased RFC after medical
improvement.
The ALJ’s finding at Step 8 of the Medical Improvement Analysis is
supported by the opinions of vocational expert Kutschbach that a person of
Anderson’s age and with his education, experience, and increased RFC
could perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy. The decision, thus, is supported by substantial evidence.
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Anderson argues that the ALJ erred by failing to properly apply the
Medical Improvement Analysis. The Court respectfully disagrees. The ALJ
also did not repeat Steps 1 and 6 because she already made those findings
in the Disability Analysis and indicated that those findings continued
throughout the entire period. R. 34. The Court can track the ALJ’s use of
the Medical Improvement Analysis and the reasoning and determinations
that she reached.
Anderson argues that the ALJ failed to determine whether medical
improvement occurred. Again, the Court respectfully disagrees. The ALJ
found that Edwards’ November 25, 2008 report showed that medical
improvement occurred. The November 25, 2008, report clearly stated that
Anderson “has been able to gain greater control” of his panic and anxiety
disorder. R. 274. The improvement with his anxiety and panic disorders
made Anderson more aware of his depression. Edwards also stated,
however, that “[Anderson] had made considerable progress reducing
symptoms of depression over the past year.” R. 264. The statements by
Edwards in the report support the ALJ’s findings of medical improvement.
The opinions of Drs. Froman and Henson also support this finding.
Anderson argues that the ALJ improperly relied on evidence that
Anderson could perform daily activities such as caring for himself and
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household chores. Anderson properly notes that the ALJ generally cannot
rely solely on a claimant’s ability to perform daily activities to contradict a
claim of disability. See e.g., Zuwarski v. Halter, 245 F.3d 881, 887 (7th Cir.
2001). The ALJ did not rely solely on Anderson’s ability to perform daily
activities. The ALJ relied on the reports of healthcare professionals such
as counselor Edwards, and the opinions of consultative experts such as
Drs. Froman and Henson. The Court sees no error on this point.
Anderson next argues that the record does not support the showing
of medical improvement. The Court again respectfully disagrees. As
explained above Edwards’ November 25, 2008, assessment shows
medical improvement in Anderson’s panic disorder, anxiety disorder, and
depressive disorder. The subsequent notes from Transitions show that
Anderson’s medication was generally effective. Anderson did not again
report any hallucinations after November 25, 2008, and did not report any
thoughts of suicide or homicide, except for one report of fleeting suicidal
thoughts to a nurse in March 2009. He also generally reported that his
sleep was good at most of his appointments at Transitions. This
information provides substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s findings.
The records also contain substantial evidence to support the finding
of medical improvement related to work activities. The opinions of Drs.
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Froman and Henson provide substantial evidence for this. Dr. Froman was
clearly skeptical of Anderson’s ability to restart his life, but that skepticism
related to the episodic treatment Anderson had received in the past.
Dr. Froman still opined that Anderson had the ability to work at the level
found by the ALJ in the RFC determination. These opinions provide
substantial evidence for the finding.4
Anderson next argues that the ALJ’s credibility finding was not
supported by substantial evidence. Anderson argues that the ALJ only
recited boiler plate language. The Court strongly disagrees. The ALJ
recited language from the Commission’s rulings and regulations regarding
its findings. See R. 38-39; cf. SSR 96-7p. The ALJ then explained the
basis for those findings. The ALJ found that Anderson was not credible
because his testimony was inconsistent with his medical records and not
consistent with the opinions of Dr. Froman and Henson. Anderson’s
testimony about his symptoms was inconsistent with the other evidence in
the record. For example, Anderson testified that his depression had not
improved at all since he started treatment at Transitions in 2006. R. 60.
This directly contradicts Edwards’ November 25, 2008, assessment. See
4
Anderson attempted to support his argument, in part, with evidence of medical treatment that occurred
after the ALJ issued her decision. See Anderson Motion, at 9-10. Anderson does not seek a remand
under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The evidence of treatment after the issuance of the decision is
therefore irrelevant. Eads v. Secretary of Dept. of Health and Human Services, 983 F.2d 815, 817-18
(7th Cir. 1993). The Court cannot and has not considered this evidence.
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R. 262. Anderson testified that he had thoughts of suicide three to four
times a week. R. 61-62. The medical records from Transitions show that
he reported no thoughts of suicide after November 25, 2008, except for one
reference on March 19, 2009, to fleeting thoughts of suicide. See e.g.,
340, 341-42, 345, 380. Anderson testified that he had trouble sleeping.
R. 61. The medical records from Transitions generally showed that he
reported sleeping well. See R. 340, 345, 373. Anderson testified that he
had difficulty concentrating. R. 58. Anderson stated in the April 2009
Function Report that he could concentrate on one thing for an hour at a
time. See R. 164. These inconsistencies in the record support the ALJ’s
credibility finding. The Court will not disturb the credibility finding.
WHEREFORE Defendant Acting Commissioner of Social Security’s
Motion for Summary Affirmance (d/e11) is ALLOWED and Plaintiff’s Brief in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 10) is DENIED. The
decision of the Acting Commissioner is AFFIRMED. All pending motions
are denied as moot. THIS CASE IS CLOSED.
ENTER:
April 24, 2013
s/ Byron G. Cudmore
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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