Bruce v. Guernsey et al
Filing
123
OPINION: IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendant Derek Guernsey's First Motion in Limine (d/e 104 ), Second Motion in Limine (d/e 105 ), Third Motion in Limine (d/e 106 ), Fourth Motion in Limine (d/e 107 ), and Sixth Motion in Limine (d/e 109 ) are ALLOWED. Defendant Guernsey's Fifth Motion in Limine (d/e 108 ) is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part. Bruce's counsel may not indicate to the jury that Guernsey has a burden of proof or a burden to present evidence before Bruce has presen ted evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Motion 108 is otherwise DENIED. Plaintiff Falyn Bruce's First Motion in Limine (d/e 116 ), and Plaintiff Bruce's Second Motion in Limine (d/e 117 ) are DENIED. Entered by Magistrate Judge Tom Schanzle-Haskins on 5/14/2018. (ME, ilcd)
E-FILED
Monday, 14 May, 2018 05:25:47 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
FALYN BRUCE,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEREK GUERNSEY,
Defendant.
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No. 12-cv-3198
OPINION
TOM SCHANZLE-HASKINS, U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE:
This matter comes before the Court on the parties’ Motions in Limine.
Defendant Derek Guernsey filed his First Motion in Limine (d/e 104)
(Motion 104), Second Motion in Limine (d/e 105) (Motion 105), Third Motion
in Limine (d/e 106) (Motion 106), Fourth Motion in Limine (d/e 107) (Motion
107), Fifth Motion in Limine (d/e 108) (Motion 108), and Sixth Motion in
Limine (d/e 109) (Motion 109). Plaintiff Falyn Bruce filed her First Motion in
Limine (d/e 116) (Motion 116) and Second Motion in Limine (d/e 117)
(Motion 117). The parties have consented to proceed before this Court.
Notice, Consent, and Reference of a Civil Action to a Magistrate Judge and
Reference Order entered November 30, 2017 (d/e 112).
Plaintiff Bruce has no objection to Guernsey’s Motions 104, 105, 106,
107, and 109. These Motions are allowed. Bruce opposes Motion 108,
Page 1 of 7
and Guernsey opposes Motion 116 and 117. For the reasons stated below
Motion 108 is allowed in part, and Motions 116 and 117 are denied.
I.
Motion 108, Defendant’s Fifth Motion in Limine
Guernsey asks the Court in Motion 108 to bar Bruce’s attorney from
indicating to the jury that (1) Guernsey might present certain evidence at
trial, or (2) that Guernsey has the burden of proof.1 Guernsey argues that
he has no burden to present any evidence at trial until Bruce makes out a
prima facie case. Therefore, Bruce should not be allowed to give the jury
the impression that Guernsey has the burden to present any evidence in
his opening statement or otherwise until he makes out a prima facie case
and withstands a motion for directed verdict.
Bruce’s attorney agrees that he may not indicate to the jury that
Guernsey has a burden of proof on any issue before Bruce successfully
makes out a prima facie case. This portion of Motion 108 is allowed.
Bruce’s attorney, however, may present to the jury a roadmap of the
evidence that he reasonably believes the jury is likely to hear, including
evidence that Guernsey is likely to present. See Jordan v. Binns, 712 F.3d
1
Motion 108 has a third paragraph numbered as if it were a third item for the motion. The paragraph,
however, sets forth Defendant’s argument for the Motion, not a third item of evidence to be barred in
limine.
Page 2 of 7
1123, 1134 (7th Cir. 2013).2 Moreover, the Court will instruct the jury that
opening statements and closing arguments are not evidence. The Court
will also instruct the jury on the burden of proof. The Court will not bar in
limine Bruce’s attorney from mentioning evidence that Guernsey may
present in the trial. Guernsey’s counsel may object at trial to any comment
by Bruce’s counsel that she believes is improper, and the Court will
address such matters then. Motion 108 is ALLOWED in part and DENIED
in part as stated above.
II.
Motion 116, Plaintiff’s First Motion in Limine
Bruce asks the Court to bar Guernsey from presenting evidence
pertaining to the “collective knowledge doctrine”3 until after Guernsey has
testified and established what information he actually knew at the time of
Bruce’s alleged seizure. The Court denies the Motion.
The question of whether Guernsey seized Bruce is a contested issue
of fact. At summary judgment, Bruce and her father testified that Guernsey
seized her without cause and compelled her go with him to St. John’s
Hospital (St. John’s) in Springfield, Illinois as a suicide risk even though
2
Unlike a criminal case, this civil proceeding does not implicate rights against self-incrimination and
presumptions of innocence. See e.g., Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit (2012
ed.), Pattern Instruction 1.03 (presumption of innocence and burden of proof), and Pattern Instruction
2.05 (defendant’s failure to testify or present evidence). The jury will decide civil liability, not criminal guilt.
3
Motion 116 mistakenly refers to the “collective action doctrine. See Motion 116, at 4. The Plaintiff is
discussing the collective knowledge doctrine referred to in United States v. Williams, 627 F.3d 247, 252
(7th Cir. 2010).
Page 3 of 7
Guernsey had no basis to believe Bruce was at such risk. Guernsey
testified that Bruce’s father stated that he would take Bruce to St. John’s,
but Bruce argued with her father and refused to go with her father.
Guernsey testified that Bruce’s father eventually told Guernsey to take her
and left the scene. According to Guernsey, Bruce voluntarily went with him
to St. John’s. See Report and Recommendation entered November 27,
2017 (d/e 110) (R&R), at 17-20.
The testimony from Bruce’s classmates, school employees, and other
officers may be relevant to the jury’s evaluation of the parties’ conflicting
version of events. The deposition testimony of the classmates and school
employees presented at summary judgment contradicted some of the
deposition testimony by Bruce, Bruce’s father, and some officers. See
R&R, at 5-16. The conflicting testimony may aid the jury in deciding which
version of the events is more likely true than not.
In addition, Guernsey may present evidence of information that other
officers learned about Bruce. If Guernsey seized Bruce, he may try to
prove that he properly based his actions on information learned by other
officers under the collective knowledge doctrine. The collective knowledge
doctrine states that the collective knowledge of other officers is imputed to
the officer whose actions are challenged. The doctrine applies if (1) the
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officer acted in objective reliance on the information received from other
officers; (2) the other officers had information supporting the level of
suspicion required under the circumstances; and (3) the officer’s actions
were no more intrusive than would have been permissible for the other
officers who gleaned the information. See United States v. Williams, 627
F.3d 247, 252 (7th Cir. 2010). Guernsey only had to know that one of his
fellow officers told him to take Bruce to St. John’s. He did not need to know
the basis of that instruction as long as the other officer or officers had an
adequate basis. The other officers with whom Guernsey worked on this
matter needed sufficient information to justify the seizure, if any seizure
occurred.
Guernsey may present the evidence of the other officers’ knowledge,
his relationship, and his communications with the other officers to prove the
elements of the collective knowledge doctrine. Based on the summary
judgment submissions, the other officers may testify that they learned that
Bruce was a suicide risk from Bruce’s father, her classmates, and school
employees. See R&R, at 8-16. Guernsey, therefore, may present this
evidence to establish his claim that he was entitled to base his actions on
the collective knowledge doctrine.
Page 5 of 7
The Court will not require Guernsey to present evidence on the
collective knowledge doctrine in a particular order. At summary judgment,
Guernsey testified that the police dispatcher and/or other officers indicated
that Bruce was a suicide risk and to take Bruce to St. John’s. See R&R, at
8-9, 19. That is sufficient for Guernsey to establish the required knowledge
under the collective knowledge doctrine. Bruce will not be prejudiced if
Guernsey presents evidence regarding the other elements of the collective
knowledge doctrine before he testifies on these points. Motion 116 is
DENIED.
III.
Motion 117, Plaintiff’s Second Motion in Limine
Bruce asks the Court to bar Guernsey from presenting any evidence
or argument suggesting that Guernsey’s alleged seizure of Bruce was
justified by the subsequent opinions of the physicians at St. John’s.
Guernsey agrees that he may not present these subsequent opinions for
this purpose.
The Court, however, will not bar the evidence in limine because the
evidence may be relevant for other purposes. Bruce concedes in her
Motion that medical opinion evidence may be relevant to damages. Motion
117, at 1. The Court has not bifurcated the trial of liability and damages.
Page 6 of 7
Guernsey can present this evidence for this purpose at least.4 Should this
evidence be admitted for a limited purpose, the Court would entertain a
request for an appropriate limiting instruction. Motion 117 is DENIED.
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT Defendant Derek Guernsey’s
First Motion in Limine (d/e 104), Second Motion in Limine (d/e 105), Third
Motion in Limine (d/e 106), Fourth Motion in Limine (d/e 107), and Sixth
Motion in Limine (d/e 109) are ALLOWED. Defendant Guernsey’s Fifth
Motion in Limine (d/e 108) is ALLOWED in part and DENIED in part.
Bruce’s counsel may not indicate to the jury that Guernsey has a burden of
proof or a burden to present evidence before Bruce has presented
evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case. Motion 108 is otherwise
DENIED. Plaintiff Falyn Bruce’s First Motion in Limine (d/e 116), and
Plaintiff Bruce’s Second Motion in Limine (d/e 117) are DENIED.
ENTER: May 14, 2018
s/ Tom Schanzle-Haskins
TOM SCHANZLE-HASKINS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
4
The Court does not decide whether factual or opinion evidence from St. John’s personnel might be
relevant and admissible for other purposes. If such evidence is relevant for other limited purposes, the
Court will again entertain a request for an appropriate limiting instruction.
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