Bruce v. Guernsey et al
Filing
19
OPINION: Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (d/e 13 , 15 ) are GRANTED without prejudice and with leave for Plaintiff to replead by May 10, 2013. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 4/19/13. (ME, ilcd)
E-FILED
Monday, 22 April, 2013 11:47:52 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
FALYN BRUCE,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEREK L. GUERNSEY, TROY M.
SWEENEY, JUSTIN HARRIS,
SANGAMON COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
and ROCHESTER POLICE
DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
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12-cv-3198
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ 12(b)(6) Motions
to Dismiss (d/e 13, 15). Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Count I against
Rochester Police Officer Justin Harris, Count II against Sangamon
County Deputy Derek L. Guernsey, and Count III against Sangamon
County Deputy Troy M. Sweeney are GRANTED because Plaintiff has
failed to plead the factual content to permit a plausible inference that
Officer Harris, Deputy Guernsey, or Deputy Sweeney unreasonably
seized Plaintiff. Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
against Sangamon County (Count V) and the Rochester Police
Department (Count VI) are also GRANTED because Plaintiff has not
adequately alleged that Sangamon County or the Rochester Police
Department were deliberately indifferent to a need to train employees in
order to avoid a deprivation of constitutional rights. Finally, Plaintiff
agrees to the dismissal of her due process claim against Deputy Guernsey
(Count IV). Plaintiff will be given an opportunity to file an amended
complaint.
I.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
When considering a motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded factual
allegations are accepted as true and all reasonable inferences are
construed in the plaintiff's favor. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074,
1081 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). The well-pleaded
factual allegations in this case are as follows.
On September 5, 2011, Plaintiff Falyn Bruce, then age 17, was
talking to her former boyfriend, a minor, B.S., at his home in Riverton,
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Illinois. The two began to argue. Plaintiff tried to leave, but B.S.
attempted to physically prevent Plaintiff from doing so. Plaintiff was
eventually able to leave.
After leaving B.S.’s home, Plaintiff contacted a friend, D.F., a
minor, who picked Plaintiff up and took Plaintiff to D.F.’s home in
Rochester, Illinois. The two arrived at D.F.’s home at approximately
11:50 p.m. on September 5, 2011.
At about 8:00 a.m. on September 6, 2011, Plaintiff talked with her
father and told him that she was with D.F. She also told her father that
she was fine but did not feel like going to school. Plaintiff’s father, her
custodial guardian, said he understood and that he would contact the
school to let them know.
Later on the morning of September 6, 2011, B.S. supposedly told
Plaintiff’s friends that Plaintiff had attempted to kill herself the night
before at B.S.’s home. Plaintiff refutes that she ever attempted to kill or
harm herself.
Plaintiff’s friends spoke with the guidance counselor at Riverton
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High School about what B.S. had told them. At about 8:45 a.m. on
September 6, 2011, the guidance counselor contacted the Riverton Police
Department.
Riverton Police Officer, Andrew Landgrebe, responded to the
guidance counselor’s report. He was advised that other students had
expressed concern about Plaintiff’s suicidal behavior the previous
evening. However, Plaintiff’s father told Officer Landgrebe that Plaintiff
was fine and that there was no need for concern.
At approximately 8:59 a.m. Officer Landgrebe contacted Sangamon
County about Plaintiff. At around 10:17 a.m., Sangamon County
contacted Rochester Police Officer Justin Harris. Officer Harris
proceeded to D.F.’s house at 4430 Passfield, Rochester, Illinois.
Officer Harris arrived at D.F.’s residence and spoke with Plaintiff.
Plaintiff demonstrated no signs of physical, mental, or emotional distress
at the time. Officer Harris radioed Sangamon County to advise that no
emergency medical services were required.
Next, Officer Harris told Plaintiff that she needed to leave D.F.’s
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house and wait outside until Sangamon County arrived to pick her up.
Plaintiff questioned why she needed to go outside. Officer Harris
responded by saying, “if you want to ask questions I can just handcuff
you and take you out myself.” See d/e 1 at ¶ 27. After Officer Harris’
response, Plaintiff felt she had no choice but to go outside with Officer
Harris.
Once outside, Plaintiff and her friends continued to ask why
Plaintiff needed to wait outside. Officer Harris only told Plaintiff that
she could not leave. During this exchange between Officer Harris and
Plaintiff, Officer Harris never witnessed any behavior nor obtained any
information to suggest Plaintiff required detention or hospitalization.
At 10:26 a.m. a Sangamon County dispatcher contacted Plaintiff’s
father and told him that he could pick Plaintiff up at 4430 Passfield,
Rochester, Illinois. Plaintiff’s father went to the address and arrived at
about 10:54 a.m. Sangamon County Deputy Derek Guernsey also
arrived around this time. Officer Harris left the Rochester, Illinois home
at 10:56 a.m.
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Deputy Guernsey told Plaintiff she needed to get in his police car.
Plaintiff’s father said he could take Plaintiff because she was fine.
However, Deputy Guernsey told Plaintiff she had to go with him and
that Plaintiff’s father could follow. At 11:05 a.m. Deputy Guernsey,
followed by Plaintiff’s father, took Plaintiff to St. John’s Hospital,
Springfield, Illinois. Deputy Guernsey took Plaintiff to the hospital even
though Deputy Guernsey never personally saw behavior suggesting
Plaintiff was a danger to herself or others or in need of hospitalization.
Further, Deputy Guernsey never asked Plaintiff or her friends about
Plaintiff’s emotional well-being.
Plaintiff and Deputy Guernsey arrived at St. John’s Hospital at
about 11:22 a.m. Only one minute earlier, Sangamon County Deputy
Troy Sweeney had also arrived at the Hospital. Plaintiff states that
Deputies Sweeney and Guernsey maintained custody of Plaintiff until
about 11:58 a.m. when hospital staff admitted Plaintiff. Between 11:21
a.m. and 11:58 a.m., Deputy Sweeney observed no action or behavior by
Plaintiff that suggested she needed hospitalization.
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Additionally, while Deputies Sweeney and Guernsey held Plaintiff
prior to her being admitted, Deputy Guernsey signed a document for an
emergency inpatient admission permitted under 405 ILCS 5/3-600. This
statutory provision, however, only applies to the admission of individuals
eighteen years and older.
Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Guernsey made three knowingly false
statements in the petition for involuntary judicial admission including
that:
[Plaintiff] was a person who, unless she was treated on an
inpatient basis was likely to cause physical injury to herself or
to another person;
[Plaintiff] was in need of immediate hospitalization; and
That a physician had been consulted and that [Guernsey] was
attaching a copy of the physician’s medical examination
demonstrating that [Plaintiff] was in need of immediate
hospitalization.
See d/e 1 at ¶ 51.
Plaintiff further alleges that Deputy Guernsey had received no
information that indicated Plaintiff required hospitalization and no
physician had found Plaintiff required hospitalization. Therefore,
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Plaintiff alleges Deputy Guernsey had no basis for completing and
submitting the petition.
According to Plaintiff, because of Officer Harris and Deputies
Guernsey and Sweeney, Plaintiff was admitted to a mental health
institution without reason. Plaintiff asserts that this was against her and
her parents’ wishes and violated her Fourth Amendment rights.
Finally, Plaintiff states that the Illinois Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code governs emergency admission of adults
and youth. Plaintiff contends that the Rochester Police Department and
Sangamon County have an obligation to teach law enforcement
personnel their obligations and citizens’ rights pursuant to the Code.
II.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed her Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on
July 30, 2012. See d/e 1. Count I alleges that Rochester Police Officer
Justin Harris violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by detaining
Plaintiff without probable cause. Plaintiff also alleges the same Fourth
Amendment claims against Deputy Derek L. Guernsey (Counts II) and
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Deputy Troy M. Sweeney (Count III). Count IV alleges that Deputy
Guernsey violated Plaintiff’s due process rights. Counts V and VI allege
that Sangamon County and the Rochester Police Department failed to
properly train their law enforcement officers on the proper methods for
taking custody of individuals under the Illinois Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code. Plaintiff further states, that had the
officers been trained, Plaintiff would never have been unlawfully
detained.
On August 27, 2012, Deputy Guernsey, Deputy Sweeney, and
Sangamon County filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. See
d/e 13. On September 11, 2012, Officer Harris and the Rochester Police
Department also filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. See d/e
15. Officer Harris and the Rochester Police Department adopted the
arguments in the Memorandum filed by Deputy Guernsey, Deputy
Sweeney, and Sangamon County. See d/e 16 at 1.
On September 28, 2012, Plaintiff submitted her Consolidated
Response in Opposition to the Defendants’ Motions. See d/e 18. In the
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Response, Plaintiff agrees to dismissal of her due process claim against
Deputy Guernsey (Count IV), but Plaintiff argues that she has stated
claims in Counts I, II, III, V, and VI of her Complaint. See d/e 18.
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint are now before the
Court for review.
III.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Plaintiff pursues a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Federal courts
have subject matter jurisdiction over cases brought under federal statute.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Further, the actions giving rise to Plaintiff’s Complaint occurred in
Sangamon County, Illinois. Therefore, venue is also proper in the
Central District of Illinois, Springfield Division. See 28 U.S.C. §
1391(b).
IV.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the
complaint. Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir.
2007). Under the federal notice pleading standards, “a plaintiff's
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complaint need only provide a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, sufficient to provide the
defendant with fair notice of the claim and its basis.” Tamayo, 526 F.3d
at 1081. When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
the court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff; all well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true; and all
reasonable inferences are construed in the plaintiff's favor. Id. However,
a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face” to survive a motion to dismiss. Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929
(2007). For a claim to have facial plausibility, a plaintiff must plead
“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009).
“[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Further, factual
allegations required to state a plausible claim for relief depend on the
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complexity of the legal theory alleged. Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of
Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008).
V.
ANALYSIS
Defendants argue in the Motions to Dismiss that the Fourth
Amendment claims against Officer Harris (Count I), Deputy Guernsey
(Count II), and Deputy Sweeney (Count III) should be dismissed
because Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate that the Officer and Deputies
acted reasonably when they seized Plaintiff. See d/e 14 at 3-8; d/e 16 at
2-4. Officer Harris and Deputies Guernsey and Sweeney also argue that
they are entitled to qualified immunity. See d/e 14 at 10; d/e 16 at 1.
However, the qualified immunity argument is undeveloped and need not
be addressed. Finally, Defendants contend that Plaintiff has failed to
allege claims against Sangamon County (Count V) or the Rochester
Police Department (Count VI) for failure to train because Plaintiff has
not pleaded that Sangamon County or the Rochester Police Department
were deliberately indifferent to a need to train employees in order to
avoid constitutional violations. See d/e 14 at 11-13; d/e 16 at 4.
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A.
Plaintiff Has Not Pleaded Factual Content to Allow a Plausible
Inference that Officer Harris, Deputy Guernsey, or Deputy
Sweeney Unreasonably Seized Plaintiff
Plaintiff alleges first that Officer Harris (Count I), Deputy
Guernsey (Count II), and Deputy Sweeney (Count III) unreasonably
seized Plaintiff in violation of Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. For
Plaintiff to state a claim for relief under the Fourth Amendment, she
must allege that she was seized and that the seizure was unreasonable.
Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1010 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing
Donovan v. City of Milwaukee, 17 F.3d 944, 948 (7th Cir. 1994)). For
the purposes of the instant Motions, Plaintiff is presumed to have
adequately alleged that Officer Harris and Deputies Guernsey and
Sweeney seized her.
To support her argument that her seizure was unreasonable,
Plaintiff alleges that Officer Harris and Deputies Guernsey and Sweeney
never witnessed any actions by Plaintiff that would warrant taking her to
the hospital for a mental health evaluation. See d/e 18 at 18. Plaintiff
also argues that she has not alleged Riverton Police Officer Landgrebe
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told Sangamon County Dispatch that Plaintiff had made suicidal threats.
See d/e 18 at 10. This, Plaintiff contends, further supports her claims
that Officer Harris and Deputies Guernsey and Sweeney seized Plaintiff
without reason. Plaintiff also asserts that because she has not pleaded
that Officer Landgrebe told Sangamon County Dispatch about Plaintiff’s
alleged suicide threats, that all reasonable inferences regarding what
Officer Landgrebe actually reported must be construed in her favor. See
d/e 18 at 10.
Plaintiff is correct that all reasonable inferences must be construed
in her favor at this stage of the litigation. See Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
547. However, Plaintiff has not supplied factual content to allow a
plausible inference that Officer Harris, Deputy Guernsey, or Deputy
Sweeney seized Plaintiff unreasonably. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.
Specifically, Plaintiff has alleged that neither Officer Harris nor
Deputies Guernsey or Sweeney ever received information that Plaintiff
had threatened to kill herself. Plaintiff has also alleged that Deputy
Guernsey made knowingly false statements in the petition to admit
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Plaintiff at St. John’s Hospital including that:
[Plaintiff] was a person who, unless she was treated on an
inpatient basis was likely to cause physical injury to herself or
to another person;
[Plaintiff] was in need of immediate hospitalization; and
That a physician had been consulted and that [Guernsey] was
attaching a copy of the physician’s medical examination
demonstrating that [Plaintiff] was in need of immediate
hospitalization.
See d/e 1 at ¶ 51.
However, Plaintiff’s conclusion that Officer Harris and Deputies
Guernsey and Sweeney were not told of Plaintiff’s purported attempts to
kill herself contradicts her own allegations. Plaintiff alleges a chain of
events that starts with reports to the Riverton High School Guidance
counselor and ends with what appears to be the officers’ reactions to
those reports that consisted of detaining Plaintiff and taking her to the
hospital for a professional evaluation. Based on the chain of events
alleged, the Court cannot plausibly infer that Officer Harris and Deputies
Guernsey and Sweeney received no information that Plaintiff had
threatened to kill herself. The chain of events alleged by Plaintiff also
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negates a plausible inference that Deputy Guernsey had no reason to fill
out the petition, or that Deputy Guernsey made false statements in the
petition. The only plausible inference here is that the officers took action
in response to information that Plaintiff had threatened to kill herself.
Further, Plaintiff does not attach the petition for admission that
Deputy Guernsey completed. By law, the petition requires:
a detailed statement of the reason for the assertion that the
respondent is subject to involuntary admission on an
inpatient basis, including the signs and symptoms of a mental
illness and a description of any acts, threats, or other behavior
or pattern of behavior supporting the assertion and the time
and place of their occurrence.
405 ILCS 5/3-601(b).
The petition must also:
be accompanied by a certificate executed by a physician,
qualified examiner, psychiatrist, or clinical psychologist which
states that the respondent is subject to involuntary admission
on an inpatient basis and requires immediate hospitalization.
[if no certificate can be obtained] no person detained for
examination . . . on the basis of a petition alone may be held
for more than 24 hours unless within that period a certificate
is furnished to or by the mental health facility.
405 ILCS 5/3-602, 604. Plaintiff has also failed to attach this certificate
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or state why she has not.
Without the factual content that the admission petition or
physician’s certificate would provide, Plaintiff has not alleged facts to
permit a plausible inference that Officer Harris, Deputy Guernsey, or
Deputy Sweeney unreasonably seized Plaintiff. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at
1949. Additionally, the facts as pleaded, lead to the plausible inference
that Officer Harris and Deputies Guernsey and Sweeney reacted to
information they had received about suicide threats by Plaintiff. As a
result, Plaintiff has not stated claims under the Fourth Amendment
against Officer Harris, Deputy Guernsey, or Deputy Sweeney. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s claims against Officer Harris and Deputies Guernsey and
Sweeney are dismissed without prejudice and with leave to replead.
B.
Plaintiff Has Not Alleged that Sangamon County or the Rochester
Police Department Had Actual or Constructive Notice that a
Failure to Train Would Lead to Constitutional Violations
Sangamon County and the Rochester Police Department also move
to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims that Sangamon County (Count V) and the
Rochester Police Department (Count VI) failed to properly train their
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employees. First, Defendant Sangamon County notes that it may not be
the proper Defendant for a failure to train claim. See d/e 14 at 11.
Sangamon County, however, does not explain why it is not a proper
Defendant and the Court will not develop this argument for Sangamon
County.
Sangamon County and the Rochester Police Department then
assert that a failure to train claim requires a plaintiff to allege that the
municipality has demonstrated deliberate indifference to the need for
training despite knowing that a failure to train will result in a
constitutional deprivation. See d/e 14 at 11; d/e 16 at 4-5. Sangamon
County and the Rochester Police Department argue that Plaintiff fails to
allege deliberate indifference in her Complaint. See d/e 14 at 11; d/e 16
at 4-5.
In City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, the Supreme Court held that a
municipality’s failure to train its employees can form the basis for § 1983
liability if the failure rises to the level of policy or custom. 489 U.S. 378,
388-89, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989). A failure to train can
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constitute a permanent well-settled custom if “in light of the duties
assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different
training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the
violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can
reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need.” Id.
at 390.
A municipality evinces deliberate indifference to the rights of its
citizens where it fails to train its employees “with respect to a clear
constitutional duty implicated in recurrent situations that a particular
employee is certain to face.” Robles v. City of Fort Wayne, 113 F.3d
732, 735 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
municipality also exhibits deliberate indifference if “after learning of a
pattern of constitutional violations” the municipality fails to train its
employees properly to avoid those constitutional violations. Id. Under
either scenario, the finding of deliberate indifference is derived from the
municipal entity’s failure to act in the face of actual or constructive
notice that such a failure would likely result in constitutional
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deprivations. Id.
Here, Plaintiff, in a conclusory manner, contends that Sangamon
County and the Rochester Police Department had “a duty and an
obligation to train [their] law enforcement officers as to the proper
methods for taking custody of individuals under the Illinois Mental
Health and Developmental Disabilities Code,” and that “[h]ad the
[Officer and Deputies] been properly trained under the [Code they]
would not have taken custody of [Plaintiff].” See d/e 1 at ¶¶ 79-80, 8485.
However, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Sangamon County or the
Rochester Police Department had actual or constructive notice that a
failure to train employees regarding the Illinois Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code would result in a constitutional
deprivation. See Robles, 113 F.3d at 735. Therefore, Plaintiff has not
alleged that Sangamon County or the Rochester Police Department were
deliberately indifferent in failing to train their employees. See City of
Canton, Ohio, 489 U.S. at 390. As a result, Plaintiff has failed to state
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failure to train claims against Sangamon County (Count V) or the
Rochester Police Department (Count VI) so Counts V and VI are
dismissed without prejudice and with leave to replead.
VI. CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint (d/e 13, 15)
are GRANTED without prejudice and with leave for Plaintiff to replead
by May 10, 2013.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER: April 19, 2013
FOR THE COURT:
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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