Bruce v. Guernsey et al
Filing
28
OPINION (See Written Opinion): Defendants' Motions to Dismiss Counts I through V of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint (d/e 21 , 24 ) are GRANTED and Counts I through V of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint are DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to replead. Plaintiff shall file her second amended complaint on or before January 14, 2014. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 1/02/2014. (VM, ilcd)
E-FILED
Thursday, 02 January, 2014 12:41:29 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
FALYN BRUCE,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEREK L. GUERNSEY, TROY M.
SWEENEY, JUSTIN HARRIS,
SANGAMON COUNTY, ILLINOIS,
and ROCHESTER POLICE
DEPARTMENT,
Defendants.
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12-3198
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Deputy Derek L.
Guernsey’s, Deputy Troy M. Sweeney’s, Officer Justin Harris’s,
Sangamon County’s, and the Rochester Police Department’s Motions to
Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (d/e
21, 24). Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED and Counts I
through V of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint are DISMISSED without
prejudice and with leave to replead. Plaintiff Falyn Bruce has pleaded
facts that demonstrate Defendant Sweeney did not personally violate
Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment Rights. Plaintiff has also pleaded facts
that demonstrate Defendants Harris and Guernsey seized Plaintiff under
the reasonable belief that she presented a threat of harm to herself or
others. Moreover, Defendant Guernsey is entitled to qualified immunity
even if he seized Plaintiff without probable cause to do so. Because
Plaintiff has alleged facts that demonstrate she cannot state plausible
claims for relief against Defendant’s Harris, Guernsey, and Sweeney, her
claims that Defendants Sangamon County and the Rochester Police
Department failed to properly train their officers must also be dismissed.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On Monday, September 5, 2011, Plaintiff Falyn Bruce, then age
17, was with her former boyfriend, B.S., a minor, at B.S.’s home in
Riverton, Illinois. The two began arguing, and Plaintiff tried to leave. At
first, B.S. physically prevented Plaintiff from leaving. However, Plaintiff
was eventually able to leave B.S.’s home. Plaintiff alleges that she
remained calm during this encounter with B.S. and that she made no
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threats to harm herself or others while in B.S.’s presence.
After leaving B.S.’s home, Plaintiff contacted a friend, D.F., a
minor, who picked Plaintiff up and took Plaintiff to D.F.’s home at 4430
Passfield, Rochester, Illinois, which is 14.5 miles from Riverton, Illinois.1
The two arrived at D.F.’s home at approximately 11:50 p.m. on Monday,
September 5, 2011, and Plaintiff spent the night at D.F.’s home.
At about 8:00 a.m. on Tuesday, September 6, 2011, Plaintiff called
her father James Bruce and told him that she was with D.F. Plaintiff also
told her father that she was fine but did not feel like going to school.
Plaintiff’s father said he understood and that he would contact the school
to let them know.
Later that morning, B.S. allegedly told Plaintiff’s friends at Riverton
High School that Plaintiff had attempted to kill herself the night before
by placing a belt around her neck and tightening the belt. Plaintiff
asserts that she did nothing of the sort. None of Plaintiff’s friends were
1
A court may take judicial notice of undisputed facts without converting a motion to
dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Ennenga v. Starns, 677 F.3d 766, 77374 (7th Cir. 2012). According to Google Maps, the city center of Riverton, Illinois is
14.5 miles from D.F.’s residence at 4430 Passfield, Rochester, Illinois.
Page 3 of 28
at B.S.’s the previous evening when Plaintiff allegedly tried to commit
suicide. However, her friends were concerned and voiced that concern to
the Riverton High School Guidance Counselor. At approximately 8:45
a.m., the guidance counselor contacted the Riverton Police Department
about the reports that Plaintiff had tried to commit suicide.
Riverton Police Officer Andrew Landgrebe responded to the reports
and arrived at Riverton High School that morning. He was advised that
other students had said that Plaintiff had tried to commit suicide the
previous evening. Meanwhile, Plaintiff’s father, Mr. Bruce, went to the
school. When Mr. Bruce arrived, Mr. Bruce told Officer Landgrebe that
Mr. Bruce knew where Plaintiff was, that Plaintiff was fine, and that
there was no need for concern. Despite Mr. Bruce’s assurances, Officer
Landgrebe contacted Sangamon County Dispatch at 8:59 a.m. and told
the dispatcher that Plaintiff was “possibly” suicidal and suggested she
should be checked.
At 10:17 a.m., Sangamon County Dispatch contacted Defendant
Harris of the Rochester Police Department and told Defendant Harris
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Plaintiff’s location and that Plaintiff was possibly suicidal. In response to
this call, Defendant Harris proceeded to D.F.’s home at 4430 Passfield,
Rochester, Illinois. When Defendant Harris arrived, he knocked on the
door and eventually spoke with Plaintiff. At this point, Defendant Harris
radioed Sangamon County to advise that no emergency medical services
were required.
Afterward, Defendant Harris entered D.F.’s home and instructed
Plaintiff to wait outside for a Sangamon County official. Plaintiff asserts
that she asked Defendant Harris why she needed to go outside.
Defendant Harris allegedly told Plaintiff that if she wanted to ask
questions he could just handcuff Plaintiff and take her outside himself.
Plaintiff asserts that she felt she had no choice but to go outside
with Defendant Harris where he made Plaintiff wait in the driveway of
D.F.’s home. While in the driveway, Plaintiff alleges that she and her
friends repeatedly questioned Defendant Harris’s reasons for making
Plaintiff wait outside. Additionally, Plaintiff asserts that during the
exchange between Defendant Harris and Plaintiff, Defendant Harris
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neither witnessed behavior nor obtained any information that indicated
Plaintiff was a threat to herself or others.
Plaintiff alleges that at 10:26 a.m., a Sangamon County dispatcher
contacted Plaintiff’s father, Mr. Bruce, and told him that his daughter
was fine. The dispatcher also told Mr. Bruce that he could pick Plaintiff
up at 4430 Passfield, Rochester, Illinois. Plaintiff’s father proceeded to
the address and arrived at 10:54 a.m. Defendant Guernsey of the
Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department also arrived at D.F.’s home at
about this time. Defendant Harris left D.F.’s home at 10:56 a.m. after
having been there for approximately thirty-nine minutes.
Upon arriving, Defendant Guernsey told Plaintiff that she needed
to get into his police car. Plaintiff asserts that both she and her father
told Defendant Guernsey that Plaintiff was fine and that she would leave
with her father. However, according to Plaintiff, Defendant Guernsey
told Plaintiff and her father that Plaintiff had to go with him and that
Defendant Guernsey intended to take Plaintiff to St. John’s Hospital in
Springfield, Illinois.
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When Defendant Guernsey took Plaintiff to the hospital,
Defendant Guernsey had information that Plaintiff might need medical
attention and that Plaintiff was possibly suicidal. However, Plaintiff
asserts that Defendant Guernsey had already received information from
Sangamon County Dispatch that Plaintiff was okay. Furthermore,
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Guernsey did not personally observe any
action or behavior by Plaintiff indicating she presented a danger to
herself or others and that Defendant Guernsey did not ask Plaintiff
whether she needed medical attention. At 11:05 a.m., Defendant
Guernsey left Rochester, Illinois with Plaintiff in the police car and drove
to St. John’s Hospital in Springfield, Illinois.
Plaintiff and Defendant Guernsey arrived at St. John’s Hospital at
11:22 a.m. Only one minute earlier, Defendant Troy Sweeney of the
Sangamon County’s Sheriff’s Department had also arrived at the
Hospital. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Sweeney and Guernsey
maintained custody of Plaintiff until 11:58 a.m. when hospital staff
admitted Plaintiff to the hospital. Plaintiff further alleges that between
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11:21 a.m. and 11:58 a.m., Defendant Sweeney observed no action or
behavior by Plaintiff indicating Plaintiff was a threat to herself or others.
While at the Hospital, Defendant Guernsey signed a document for
an emergency inpatient admission pursuant to 405 ILCS 5/3-600. This
provision of the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities
Code applies to the emergency admission of individuals eighteen years
and older. In the petition, Defendant Guernsey checked boxes regarding
his knowledge of and the purported basis for Plaintiff’s need for medical
care and that he had attached a certificate of examination by a physician:
Falyn W. Bruce is: a person with mental illness who because
of his or her illness is reasonably expected, unless treated on
an inpatient basis, to engage in conduct placing such person
or another in physical harm or in reasonable expectation of
being physically harmed;
****
[Falyn W. Bruce is] in need of immediate hospitalization;
****
One Certificate of Examination is attached.
Amended Compl., d/e 20 Ex. 1 at 2-3. Defendant Guernsey also wrote
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that Plaintiff had threatened suicide and that she told Deputy Guernsey
that she had been thinking of suicide:
Falyn told neighbor she wanted to die, punched herself in the
face, and tried to kill herself by placing a belt around her neck
and tightening it. Falyn told Deputy Guernsey that she has
been thinking of suicide.
Amended Compl., d/e 20, Ex. 1 at 2.
Plaintiff asserts that she did not suffer from a mental illness and
asserts that Defendant Guernsey had no basis for making this assertion.
Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant Guernsey had no basis for believing
Plaintiff presented a threat to herself or others because of a mental
illness. Lastly, Plaintiff asserts that she never told Defendant Guernsey
that she had contemplated suicide.
Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Guernsey did not
attach a certificate of examination to the petition because no physician
had performed an examination before Defendant Guernsey completed
the petition. In fact, Plaintiff alleges, Defendant Guernsey never spoke
with a medical professional who saw Plaintiff at St. John’s Hospital. The
first professional who saw Plaintiff, Dr. Nate S. Blaustein, concluded at
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11:53 a.m. that Plaintiff was in good condition and ready for discharge.
After Dr. Blaustein saw Plaintiff, a psychologist completed a report that
indicated Plaintiff had neither suicidal nor homicidal ideations.
Despite the alleged approval for discharge, Plaintiff was admitted to
a mental health institution. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Guernsey’s,
Sweeney’s, and Harris’s actions resulted in her wrongful
institutionalization. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Sangamon
County’s and the Rochester Police Department’s failure to instruct their
law enforcement officers on the officers’ obligations under the Illinois
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code led to Plaintiff’s
inappropriate hospitalization.
II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed her Amended Complaint on May 10, 2013 and
brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Count I of the
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Rochester Police Officer Justin
Harris violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by seizing Plaintiff
without probable cause to believe that Plaintiff presented a threat to
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herself or others. Plaintiff also alleges the same Fourth Amendment
claims against Deputy Derek L. Guernsey (Count II) and Deputy Troy
M. Sweeney (Count III) of the Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department.
Counts IV and V allege that Defendants Sangamon County and the
Rochester Police Department failed to train their law enforcement
officers on the proper method for taking custody of individuals under the
Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code. Plaintiff
asserts that this failure to train resulted in her unlawful seizure.
On May 24, 2013, Defendants Guernsey, Sweeney, and Sangamon
County filed a Motion to Dismiss Counts II, III, and IV of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint. Motion to Dismiss, d/e 21. On May 31, 2013,
Defendants Harris and the Rochester Police Department filed a Motion
to Dismiss Counts I and V of the Amended Complaint. Motion to
Dismiss, d/e 24.
On June 17, 2013, Plaintiff submitted her Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendants’ Motions. See d/e 18. In the Memorandum,
Plaintiff argues that she has pleaded plausible claims of Fourth
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Amendment violations by Defendants Harris, Guernsey, and Sweeney in
Counts I through III. Plaintiff also argues that she has pleaded facts
regarding Counts IV and V that permit a reasonable inference that
Defendants Sangamon County and the Rochester Police Department are
liable for those entities’ failure to train their officers on the proper
method for taking custody of individuals under the Illinois Mental
Health and Developmental Disabilities Code.
III.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
Plaintiff pursues her claims against Defendants pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Federal district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction
over federal civil rights actions brought pursuant to § 1983. See 28
U.S.C. § 1331. Furthermore, venue is proper in this Court because the
actions giving rise to the claims in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
occurred in Sangamon County, Illinois. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
IV.
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the
complaint. Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th Cir.
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2007). To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff's complaint need only
provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief and giving the defendant fair notice of the claims.
Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir. 2008). When
considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the court construes
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff accepting all
well-pleaded allegations as true and construing all reasonable inferences
in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. However, the complaint must set forth facts
that plausibly demonstrate a claim for relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). Plausibility means alleging factual
content that allows a court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Merely reciting the elements of a cause of action or supporting claims
with conclusory statements is insufficient. Id.
V. ANALYSIS
Defendants Harris, Guernsey, and Sweeney argue in their Motions
to Dismiss that the Fourth Amendment claims against them should be
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dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to state plausible claims for relief.
Defendants Sweeney and Guernsey also argue that they are entitled to
qualified immunity. Furthermore, Defendants Sangamon County and
the Rochester Police Department contend that Plaintiff has not alleged
facts that permit a reasonable inference that these Defendants were
deliberately indifferent to a need to train their officers.
A.
Plaintiff Has Alleged Facts that Demonstrate Deputy Sweeney Was
Not Personally Involved in Plaintiff’s Seizure Which Means
Defendant Sweeney Cannot Be Liable Under § 1983
Defendant Sweeney argues that Plaintiff has alleged facts that
demonstrate Defendant Sweeney was not personally involved in
Plaintiff’s seizure. Defendant Sweeney asserts that Plaintiff must allege
Defendant Sweeney had some personal involvement in the allegedly
unlawful seizure to state a plausible claim for relief under § 1983.
To recover under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish a defendant’s
direct personal responsibility for the claimed deprivation of a
constitutional right. Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653, 655 (7th Cir.
1981). In the Seventh Circuit, allegations that an officer acted as a
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temporary custodian of a plaintiff who claims improper seizure is
insufficient for finding that officer liable under § 1983. See Morfin v.
City of East Chicago, 349 F.3d 989, 1000-01 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding no
personal involvement in the plaintiff’s arrest where the officer
transported the plaintiff from a barbershop to the police department for
booking); see also Maltby v. Winston, 36 F.3d 548, 559 (7th Cir. 1994)
(holding that sheriff who transported and otherwise acted as custodian of
arrestee could not be liable for alleged constitutional violation of arrest
without probable cause).
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
Sweeney arrived at St. John’s Hospital at 11:21 a.m., just one minute
before Plaintiff and Defendant Guernsey arrived at the Hospital. Beyond
this allegation, Plaintiff does not allege how Defendant Sweeney was
personally involved in Plaintiff’s seizure, where Defendant Sweeney was
while Plaintiff awaited a mental health evaluation, or what Defendant
Sweeney did or did not do while at St. John’s Hospital. Defendant only
alleges that Defendants Guernsey and Sweeney had custody of Plaintiff
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until she was admitted at 11:58 a.m.
The allegations in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint do not show that
Defendant Sweeney had any personal involvement in Plaintiff’s seizure
that would render Defendant Sweeney liable under § 1983. Instead,
Defendant Sweeney, at most, acted in concert with Defendant Guernsey
as a temporary custodian. Allegations that Defendant Sweeney acted as
a temporary custodian are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief
against Defendant Sweeney under § 1983.
B.
Plaintiff Has Alleged Facts that Demonstrate Defendants Harris
and Guernsey Had Objectively Reasonable Grounds to Believe that
Plaintiff Presented a Threat to Herself or Others
Defendants Harris and Guernsey also argue that the allegations in
the Amended Complaint fail to establish a plausible claim for relief
against them under § 1983. Specifically, Defendant Harris argues that,
even if he seized Plaintiff, the allegations in the Amended Complaint
demonstrate that Defendant Harris acted in an objectively reasonable
manner based on the information he had received regarding Plaintiff’s
possible suicidal ideations. Defendant Guernsey also contends that the
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allegations in the Amended Complaint demonstrate that he acted in an
objectively reasonable manner by seizing Plaintiff and taking her to St.
John’s Hospital for a mental health evaluation after receiving information
that Plaintiff was possibly suicidal.
A seizure made to effectuate an involuntary hospitalization is
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard.
Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725, 732-33 (7th Cir. 2013) (finding
that the officers had probable cause as matter of law to seize the plaintiff
to effectuate an involuntary mental health commitment where the
plaintiff had called a local police station and made suicidal statements,
appeared unsteady on her feet and possibly intoxicated, and told officers
she was taking anti-depressants and was going through a difficult period).
Probable cause exists if the officer has reasonable grounds to believe that
the individual may be seized under the governing legal standard. Id.
Peace officers may seize a minor and transport the minor to a mental
health facility when the peace officer reasonably believes that the minor
requires immediate medical attention:
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A peace officer may take a minor into custody and transport
the minor to a mental health facility when, as a result of his
personal observation, the peace officer has reasonable grounds
to believe that the minor is eligible for admission under
Section 3-503 and is in a condition that immediate
hospitalization is necessary in order to protect the minor or
others from physical harm.
405 ILCS 5/3-504(b).
The probable cause inquiry focuses on the facts and circumstances
known to the police officer at the time of the seizure and may be
determined based on facts alleged in a complaint. See, e.g., Averhart v.
City of Chicago, 114 Fed. Appx. 246, 248 (7th Cir. 2004); Chathas v.
Smith, 884 F.2d 980, 987 (7th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, the question
here is whether Plaintiff’s allegations demonstrate that Defendants Harris
and Guernsey lacked reasonable grounds for believing Plaintiff required
immediate hospitalization to protect Plaintiff or others from harm.
1.
The Allegations in the Amended Complaint Demonstrate that
Officer Harris Had Objectively Reasonable Grounds to Seize
Plaintiff Before Defendant Guernsey Arrived and Transported
Plaintiff to the Hospital
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff states that Defendant Harris
received a phone call from Sangamon County Dispatch at 10:17 a.m. on
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September 6, 2011. In the phone call, Dispatch informed Defendant
Harris that Plaintiff was possibly suicidal. Defendant Harris proceeded
to D.F.’s home in Rochester, Illinois knowing that Plaintiff was possibly
suicidal and that she was absent from school that day. Based on these
facts in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, Defendant Harris had reasonable
grounds to remain with Plaintiff in D.F.’s driveway for a total of thirtynine minutes until Defendant Guernsey arrived at D.F.’s home.
2.
Plaintiff’s Allegations Demonstrate that Defendant Guernsey
Had Objectively Reasonable Grounds to Believe that Plaintiff
Presented a Threat to Herself or Others
The allegations in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint also show that
Defendant Guernsey proceeded to D.F.’s residence knowing that Plaintiff
was not in school on a Tuesday morning, that she had spent the night in
a home approximately fourteen miles away from Plaintiff’s hometown of
Riverton, Illinois, and that Plaintiff was possibly suicidal. Based on this
information, Defendant Guernsey took Plaintiff to St. John’s Hospital for
a professional evaluation of Plaintiff’s mental health.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant Guernsey acted without probable
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cause to bring Plaintiff to St. John’s Hospital because Defendant
Guernsey only had information from Sangamon County Dispatch that
Plaintiff was possibly suicidal. The report that Plaintiff was possibly
suicidal was started by Plaintiff’s former boyfriend, conveyed to the
Riverton High School Guidance Counselor, reported to Riverton Police
Officer Landgrebe, and finally passed on to Sangamon County Dispatch.
Plaintiff argues that this chain of reports hardly forms a reliable basis for
seizing Plaintiff and taking her to St. John’s Hospital.
Plaintiff also argues that Plaintiff’s father met Defendant Guernsey
at D.F.’s home, and, along with Plaintiff, told Defendant Guernsey that
Plaintiff did not need a mental health evaluation. Plaintiff contends
that, at that point, Defendant Guernsey knew that Plaintiff did not
present a threat to herself or others.
However, had Plaintiff actually been suicidal, not taking her to St.
John’s Hospital could have created a risk to Plaintiff’s life. In Bloom v.
Palos Heights, officers were faced with similar circumstances after a boy’s
mother reported to authorities that the boy’s minor girlfriend was
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contemplating suicide and had a knife to her throat. Bloom v. Palos
Heights Police Dept., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1068 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
After receiving the report, officers arrived, seized Plaintiff, and took her
to the hospital for a mental health evaluation. Id. at 1063-64.
The girl’s mother filed suit against the officers alleging, among
other claims, a Fourth Amendment violation by the officers for seizing
the girl without probable cause. Id. at 1068. The complaint alleged that
the officers lacked probable cause because the reports regarding the girl’s
threat of suicide were false, Plaintiff was not in distress when the officers
arrived, and the girl told the officers that she had not contemplated
suicide. Id.
The Northern District of Illinois rejected these arguments and
dismissed the plaintiff’s claim. The court explained that the officers
acted properly under the circumstances by turning to professionals for an
accurate evaluation of plaintiff’s mental state. Id. The court reasoned
that failing to take any action after reports that the girl was suicidal may
have presented a threat to the girl’s life. Id. at 1069.
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Like the officers in Bloom, Defendant Guernsey acted reasonably
by relying on professional opinions rather than his own when he seized
Plaintiff and took her to St. John’s Hospital based on a report that
Plaintiff was possibly suicidal. Furthermore, while Plaintiff and her
father told Defendant Guernsey that Plaintiff was fine, the facts alleged
demonstrate that Defendant Guernsey knew that Plaintiff had not been
in her father’s care since at least the previous evening. In fact, Plaintiff
had stayed in a different town with another minor. Based on these facts,
Defendant Guernsey had probable cause to believe Plaintiff presented a
threat to herself or others and properly submitted any question of
Plaintiff’s mental health status to professionals.
3.
Plaintiff’s Allegations Demonstrate that Defendant Guernsey
Had Arguable Probable Cause to Believe that Plaintiff
Presented a Threat to Herself or Others
Defendant Guernsey also argues that, even if he lacked probable
cause, he is still entitled to qualified immunity.
Defendant Guernsey is entitled to qualified immunity if he could
have mistakenly believed that probable cause existed. This is often
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referred to as arguable probable cause. Humphrey v. Staszak, 148 F.3d
719, 725 (7th Cir. 1998). Arguable probable cause exists when a
reasonable police officer in the same circumstance and with the same
knowledge as the officer in question could have reasonably believed that
probable cause existed in light of well-established law. Id.; see also
Sherman v. Four Cnty. Counseling Ctr., 987 F.2d 397, 402 (7th Cir.
1993) (explaining that qualified immunity accommodates reasonable
errors because police officers should not always err on the side of caution
for fear of being sued).
Here, the inquiry is whether a police officer, knowing what
Defendant Guernsey knew, could have reasonably believed that Plaintiff
presented a threat to herself or others. The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint demonstrate that Defendant Guernsey had
probable cause to believe that Plaintiff presented a threat to herself or
others. These same allegations also entitle Defendant Guernsey to
qualified immunity.
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C.
Plaintiff Has Not Alleged that Sangamon County and the
Rochester Police Department Were Deliberately Indifferent to a
Need to Train Their Officers
Since Plaintiff has not stated claims for relief against Defendants
Harris, Guernsey, and Sweeney, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants
Sangamon County and the Rochester Police Department for failure to
train must also be dismissed. See Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 492
(7th Cir. 2007) (“Although a municipality may be directly liable for
constitutional violations by its officers when the municipality evinces a
deliberate indifference to the rights of the plaintiff by failing to train
adequately its officers to prevent the violation, there can be no liability
[against a municipality] for failure to train when there has been no
violation of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.”). Moreover, even if
Plaintiff had stated plausible claims for relief against Defendants Harris,
Guernsey, and Sweeney, Plaintiff has not alleged facts that permit a
reasonable inference that Defendants Sangamon County and the
Rochester Police Department were deliberately indifferent to a need to
train their officers on the proper method for taking custody of individuals
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under the Illinois Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code.
To state a claim for relief under § 1983 based on a municipal
defendant’s failure to train its employees, a plaintiff must allege that a
municipality’s failure to train its officers amounts to deliberate
indifference. See, e.g., Suber v. City of Chicago, 2011 WL 1706156, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (finding that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim
for relief where the facts in the complaint included one alleged episode of
injury and no allegations of deliberate indifference by the municipality).
Deliberate indifference exists in either of two circumstances. Jenkins v.
Bartlett, 487 F.3d at 492. One involves the municipality failing to train
when, in light of the duties assumed by specific employees of the
municipality, the need for more or different training is so obvious that
the inadequate training is likely to result in a violation of constitutional
rights. Id. A municipality also evinces deliberate indifference where a
repeated pattern of constitutional violations makes the need for further
training evident to city policymakers. Id.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Sangamon County and the
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Rochester Police Department should have known that their failure to
properly train Defendants Harris, Guernsey, and Sweeney would result in
a violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Furthermore, Plaintiff
argues in her Memorandum in Opposition to the Motions to Dismiss
that nothing in the Amended Complaint establishes that the lack of
training was not deliberate or not a conscious choice by the
municipalities to not train their officers on proper seizure protocol under
the Fourth Amendment and the Illinois Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code. Plaintiff then asserts that the case is at
the pleading stage and more detailed facts will be developed in discovery.
However, Plaintiff’s assertion that discovery may reveal evidence
pertinent to her failure to train claims against Defendants Sangamon
County and the Rochester Police Department demonstrates that she has
not pleaded facts that establish these Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to a need to train their officers. See Strauss v. City of
Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767-68 (7th Cir. 1985) (cautioning that
“plaintiffs could file claims whenever a police officer abused them, add
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boilerplate allegations [against the municipality], and proceed to
discovery in the hope of turning up some evidence to support the ‘claims’
made” if the court did not require some facts showing deliberate
indifference by the municipality). Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations in
Counts IV and V are merely boilerplate recitations of the elements of a
failure to train cause of action. Absent allegations giving rise to a
reasonable inference that deliberate indifference exists, these claims are
mere attempts to hold Defendants Sangamon County and the Rochester
Police Department vicariously liable for the alleged wrongful acts of their
officers. Such claims are not viable under § 1983 and must be dismissed.
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 692 (1978) (“[A]
municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory.”).
VI.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Counts I through V of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint (d/e 21, 24) are GRANTED and Counts I through
V of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint are DISMISSED without prejudice
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and with leave to replead. Plaintiff shall file her second amended
complaint on or before January 14, 2014.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER: January 2, 2013
FOR THE COURT:
s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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