Makeda-Phillips v. Illinois Secretary of State
Filing
80
OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 12/30/2014. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (d/e 76 ) is DENIED. (DM, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 30 December, 2014 02:46:19 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
MARION MAKEDA-PHILLIPS,
)
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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ILLINOIS SECRETARY OF STATE
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JESSE WHITE, DENISE
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WESTNEDGE, and MISTY CASKEY, )
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Defendants.
)
No. 12-3312
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on the Motion to Strike (d/e 76)
filed by Plaintiff Marion Makeda-Phillips, who is proceeding pro se.
The Motion is DENIED. The affirmative defenses asserted by
Defendants Jesse White in his official capacity as the Illinois
Secretary of State, Denise Westnedge, and Misty Caskey are
sufficiently pleaded.
I. BACKGROUND
In November 2014, Defendants filed an Answer to Fourth
Amended Complaint and Affirmative Defenses (d/e 69). The
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affirmative defenses included qualified immunity, Eleventh
Amendment immunity, sovereign immunity, statute of limitations,
res judicata, and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Plaintiff timely filed a Motion to Strike (d/e 71), but failed to include
a certificate of service. Therefore, this Court struck the Motion with
leave to refile. See December 17, 2014 Text Order.
On December 24, 2014, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Strike at
issue herein. Plaintiff asks the Court to strike the answer and the
affirmative defenses pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(f)(2). Plaintiff then lists four cases, citing one case twice, with no
explanation of how the cases support Plaintiff’s motion.
That same day, Defendants filed a response that consisted
primarily of the statement that counsel could “discern no valid legal
reason raised by the motion to strike for the Court to take the
action Plaintiff requests.” See Resp. ¶ 3 (d/e 78). While Plaintiff’s
Motion is not the model of clarity, pro se pleadings must
nonetheless be liberally construed. See, e.g., Hudson v. McHugh,
148 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that “district courts
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must construe pro se pleadings liberally”). The Court construes
Plaintiff’s Motion as a motion to strike the affirmative defenses.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When a defendant responds to a pleading, the defendant must
affirmatively state any affirmative defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
Rule 8(c)(1) lists several affirmative defenses, including res judicata
and statute of limitations. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1). However, the list
is not exhaustive. See Native Am. Arts, Inc. v. Waldron Corp., 253
F.Supp.2d 1041, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 2003); 5 Charles Alan Wright &
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1271 (3d ed.
2004).
Pursuant to Rule 12(f) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Court may strike from a pleading “an insufficient defense or any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(f). Motions to strike are generally disfavored because
such motions often only delay the proceedings. See Heller Fin., Inc.
v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1294 (7th Cir. 1989).
However, if a motion to strike removes unnecessary clutter from the
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case, then the motion serves to expedite, not delay, the proceedings.
Id.
Generally, a court will strike an affirmative defense only if the
defense is insufficient on its face. Heller, 883 F.2d at 1294 (also
providing that a court will ordinarily not strike an affirmative
defense if it is sufficient as a matter of law or presents questions of
law or fact). Because affirmative defenses are pleadings, they are
subject to the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and must set forth a “short and plain statement” of that
defense. Id. (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)).
Although the Seventh Circuit has not addressed whether the
heightened pleading standard set forth in Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 530 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662
(2009) applies to affirmative defenses, several courts in this Circuit
have found that the heightened pleading standard does apply to
affirmative defenses. See Sarkis’ Cafe, Inc. v. Sarks in the Park,
LLC, --- F. Supp. 2d ---, No. 12 C 9686, 2014 WL 3018002, at *4
(N.D. Ill. July 3, 2014) (citing cases). These courts examine whether
the defendant states an “affirmative defense to relief that is
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plausible on its face.” SEC v. Sachdeva, No. 10-C-747, 2011 WL
933967 at *1 (E.D. Wisc. Mar. 16, 2011). However, whether the
heightened pleading standard applies likely makes little difference.
Factual allegations that were sufficient before Twombly and Iqbal
will likely still be sufficient, and “bare bones” affirmative defenses
have always been insufficient. See Shield Techs. Corp. v. Paradigm
Positioning, LLC, No. 11 C 6183, 2012 WL 4120440 at *8 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 19, 2012). In any event, if an affirmative defense is defective,
leave to amend should be freely granted as justice requires under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). See Heller, 883 F.2d at 1294.
III. ANALYSIS
None of Defendants’ affirmative defenses are insufficient on
their face. Each defense is a proper affirmative defense, and
Defendants set forth the basis of each of the defenses. The cases
cited by Plaintiff do not support her argument that the Court
should strike the affirmative defenses. See Rascon v. Hardiman,
803 F.2d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that to state a claim
against the director in his official capacity, the plaintiff had to show
“that the actions of the offending officers were taken pursuant to an
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official—albeit impermissible—policy”); Wilson v. Edward Hosp., 981
N.E. 2d 971, 980 (Ill. 2012) (holding that actual agency and
apparent agency are not separate claims for purposes of res
judicata); Rekhi v. Wildwood Enterprises, Inc., 579 N.E.2d 1189,
1192 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that Illinois Department of Labor
proceedings under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act are
not judicial in nature and have no res judicata effect); Chowdhury
v. Reading Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 677 F.2d 317,322 (3d Cir. 1982)
(holding that administrative exhaustion was not required for a
private action for individual injunctive relief under section 601 of
Title VI, which bars discrimination in any program receiving federal
financial assistance). Therefore, the Court will not strike
Defendants’ affirmative defenses.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike (d/e 76) is
DENIED.
ENTER: December 30, 2014
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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