Martinez v. UHS of Delaware, Inc.

Filing 41

OPINION: The Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 34 isALLOWED. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION) Entered by Judge Richard Mills on 2/18/2016.(GL, ilcd)

E-FILED

Thursday, 18 February, 2016 09:52:30 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
VERONICA MARTINEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
UHS OF DELAWARE, INC. and/or
SPRINGFIELD HOSPITAL, INC.,
d/b/a Lincoln Prairie Behavioral
Health Care,
Defendants.

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NO. 13-3070

OPINION
RICHARD MILLS, U.S. District Judge:
Veronica Martinez brings this action against her former employer
asserting failure to accommodate and unlawful termination claims pursuant
to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 2008 (“ADA”).
Pending is the Motion of Defendant Springfield Hospital, Inc. d/b/a/
Lincoln Prairie Behavioral Health Center (the “Defendant” or “Lincoln
Prairie”) for Summary Judgment.
At the end of the day, the motion is allowed.
But first, let us review the facts.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Veronica Martinez was employed as a Clinical Nurse Manager for
Lincoln Prairie when she was terminated in November of 2012. The
Plaintiff has been diagnosed with and treated for depression and bipolar
disorder.
Lincoln Prairie is an inpatient (residential) psychiatric hospital for
pediatric and adolescent patients. Its philosophy is to promote healing of
children and families through compassionate and supportive care by
providing a safe, nurturing and comfortable environment.
A. Lincoln Prairie
Lincoln Prairie is a “lockdown” secured facility. The pediatric and
adolescent patients are not free to leave the facility and are wholly
dependent on staff members to care for them and to provide for their
physical and emotional needs. Patients are involuntarily admitted to the
facility because they are at risk of harm to themselves, to others, or their
parents cannot care for them due to the severity of their acute mental
health conditions.

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The primary responsibility of the nursing staff is the day to day care
and safety of the patients. The risk of physical aggression from patients is
a daily occurrence. In 2012, patients would bite, scratch, kick, throw
things, attack staff, attack each other and self-injure. The Plaintiff herself
has personally experienced this behavior. On one occasion, the Plaintiff
was attacked by a patient and had her hair pulled, kicked and punched.
The Plaintiff was attacked, put in a hold, fell to the ground and hit her
head on the floor. A patient bit the Plaintiff while conducting physical
restraint. A patient dug his nails and scratched the Plaintiff.
To address these risks, the facility staffs each unit with a sufficient
number of adequately trained and experienced personnel. Based on the
acuity of the unit, there should be at least 1-2 registered nurses per floor.
The facility was generally slower during the summer months and would get
busier (increased patient population) in September, which was the
beginning of the school year. If a unit is left understaffed, there is a
significant safety risk of physical harm to the residents and staff members.
The Plaintiff disputes that the facility was always adequately staffed.

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The condition of the patient population varied, which would affect the
number of necessary staff. The Plaintiff claims she always worked at least
two hours after her shift was scheduled to end. Additionally, she and other
employees were on call after hours and on weekends.
To ensure compliance with various state and federal regulations,
Lincoln Prairie would be subject to internal compliance site inspections.
The Plaintiff knew and understood that a corporate visit was an intense and
critical time at the facility.
In 2012, the Plaintiff was a clinical nurse manager of the pediatric
unit. The clinical nurse manager is the most senior “hands on” person on
the unit responsible for the management of patient care and is the role
model and leader to staff. The nurse manager oversees the unit, the staff
nurses and documentation.
The Defendant alleges that the pediatric unit that Plaintiff was
assigned to is one of the more acute units at the facility. The Plaintiff
purports to dispute the assertion, claiming there could be an aggressive
patient on any floor.

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In 2012, Renae Hale was the Chief Nursing Officer and Plaintiff’s
direct manager. The Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) was Mark Littrell and
Tami Ireland was the human resource director.
B. Lincoln Prairie’s policies1
The Plaintiff was an employee-at-will for Lincoln Prairie and could be
terminated at any time for any reason with or without notice. The facility
did not require the implementation of any disciplinary plan prior to
termination. The Plaintiff disputes this to the extent that the facility had
a progressive discipline plan which was not followed in her case. The
Defendant notes that company policy provides that based on the severity
of the situation, disciplinary steps may be eliminated and/or it may be
appropriate to immediately terminate the employee.
The Plaintiff received and acknowledged Lincoln Prairie’s Employee
Handbook, Attendance, Human Resource and Code of Conduct Policy and
agreed to abide by it. The facility has policies that relate to the behavior of
The Plaintiff purports to dispute a number of assertions without
adequate support from the record. At times, she also adds facts which do not
directly contest the facts alleged. The Court notes any allegations that are
properly disputed.
1

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employees. The Plaintiff acknowledged these rules, which included the
following:
Certain rules and regulations regarding employee behavior are
necessary for the efficient operation of the Facility and for the
benefit and protection of the rights and safety of all. Conduct
that interferes with Facility operations, brings discredit to the
Facility, or is offensive to patients or fellow employees will not
be tolerated. . . . [including but not limited to]
•
•

•
•

Non-compliance with any established Facility policy or work
rules.
Insubordination, including refusal to do assigned work or
refusal to perform work in the manner described by a supervisor
without proper justification.
Inattention to duties or unsatisfactory job performance.
Violation of any Facility safety and health rules or standards.

Lincoln Prairie employees are required to exercise appropriate
judgment and conduct themselves in a manner that reflects use of common
sense and good judgment, including (1) a total commitment to providing
the highest quality of care through personal effort; (2) carrying out the
written policies and procedures designed to enhance the dignity of patients;
(3) avoidance of conflicting outside activities; (4) contribute to a supportive
work environment by working to maintain a positive attitude; and (5)
conduct relationships between staff that is characterized by mutual respect.
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Lincoln Prairie made clear to its employees that disciplinary action could
result from: (a) inadequate or incompetent job performance; (b) failing to
follow the directives of management; (c) abusive or improper treatment of
patients or other employees; (d) violation of the attendance policy; or (e)
failure to follow the code of conduct and ethical standards.
Lincoln Prairie relies on punctual attendance in order to provide
quality patient care. The Plaintiff was expected to be at the facility at 7:00
a.m. on her scheduled shift. The Defendant alleges that, if she was not
coming in, she was supposed to call-in by 5:00 a.m., two hours before the
start of her shift. As a supervisor, the Plaintiff disputes she was subject to
the call-in policy, though she says she adhered to it.
Lincoln Prairie has a written policy setting forth that it complies with
the ADA and it provides equal employment to individuals with physical or
mental handicaps and will, upon request and evaluating of the facts and
circumstances, make reasonable accommodations to otherwise qualified
individuals.
C. Plaintiff’s mental health and FMLA leave

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The Plaintiff did not tell Lincoln Prairie about her mental health
illness when she was hired in 2009. The Plaintiff states that the ADA
prohibits pre-employment inquires about disabilities and she was not asked
on the employment application about mental health illness.
In 2012, the Plaintiff voluntarily elected to stop taking her mental
health medication and undergo electroconvulsive therapy (“ECT”) because
she wanted to try and get pregnant. In connection with the treatment, the
Plaintiff applied for (and was granted) leave under the Family Medical
Leave Act (“FMLA Leave”) in January of 2012. The Plaintiff’s physician
noted the FMLA leave was necessary for the Plaintiff’s “major depressive
disorder, recurrent without psychosis [and] generalized anxiety disorder.”
The paperwork did not inform Lincoln Prairie that she had bipolar disorder,
for which she was diagnosed in 2007. The Plaintiff did not submit other
medical information or any medical records in support of her request for
leave.
Lincoln Prairie granted the Plaintiff’s request for FMLA leave. The
Plaintiff began ECT treatment in February of 2012 but then voluntarily

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withdrew from treatment and returned to work. The Plaintiff did not like
the treatment and decided to return to her medication. The Plaintiff stated
that the ECT treatment was not geared toward her needs and did not
benefit her and her last ECT treatment did not go well.
When the Plaintiff returned to work from FMLA leave, she was placed
in her same job position and her same pay. According to the Defendant,
the Plaintiff did not request any accommodations upon return and returned
without any restrictions. The Plaintiff was able to adequately perform her
duties upon her return.

The Plaintiff was able to return to work,

communicate with patients and staff, and drive her vehicle. The Plaintiff
disputes the allegation that she did not request an accommodation. In June
of 2012, the Plaintiff claims she had discussions with her supervisor, Renae
Hale, about stepping down from her Clinical Nurse Manager position due
to stress and moving to another position. In August and September of
2012, the Plaintiff alleges she had further discussions with Hale and
reiterated she could no longer handle the demands of the position. The
Plaintiff was told that a floor nurse position was available in one of the

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units. However, she would have to wait until someone was hired to fill her
position.
Mark Littrell did not know that the Plaintiff was bipolar.

The

Defendant alleges that Renae Hale did not know either. Hale knew that
Plaintiff took FMLA leave to seek ECT but did not know why. The
Plaintiff claims that, although Hale testified she did not know the Plaintiff
was bipolar, this is disputed because Hale knew the Plaintiff was having
behavioral problems. Because of Hale’s training and knowledge of ECT, the
Plaintiff alleges she would have known about the extent of the Plaintiff’s
mental health problems.
D. Request for job modification and reasonable accommodations
In the Summer of 2012, the Plaintiff made complaints about another
employee not performing adequately and the impact it was having on the
Plaintiff’s workload. The facility investigated this report and provided
counseling to this employee and the Plaintiff.
In June of 2012, the Plaintiff elected to return to school part-time and
pursue her Master’s degree. The Plaintiff’s five-year old daughter and

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teenage son were living with her at the time. When the Plaintiff initially
enrolled in school, it was her intention to stay in the clinical nurse manager
position, take online classes and study in the evenings. The Plaintiff
disputes the assertion only to the extent that she talked to Renae Hale in
June of 2012 about potentially moving to another position. Lincoln Prairie
supported the Plaintiff’s pursuit of further education and even provided the
Plaintiff with tuition reimbursement.
In the late Summer/early Fall time frame of 2012, the Plaintiff
complained to Littrell she felt overworked and underpaid compared to other
clinical nurse managers. The Plaintiff stated she was not going to continue
working as hard unless she made more money. Littrell offered her more
money and the Plaintiff agreed to stay on in the position of clinical nurse
manager. Littrell gave her a 3% raise on October 5, 2012 and was told to
expect two more raises over the next six months. The Plaintiff did not
mention her bipolar condition or any disability during this conversation.
The Plaintiff further notes that Littrell and Hale had approved her transfer
to a floor nurse position when a successor was found for her position.

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The Defendant asserts that later in the Fall of 2012, the Plaintiff
asked to step down from the clinical nurse manager position entirely
because of her school, her life duties and the position was stressful. The
Plaintiff did not mention her bipolar condition or any mental health
condition as being the reason she wanted to step down. The Plaintiff
reiterates that Renae Hale knew she had ETC, which is used to treat
individuals with severe depression. Hale responded that the facility would
accommodate her request because they thought the Plaintiff was a good
nurse and she was an asset to the facility. The facility never told the
Plaintiff they would not try to accommodate her request to step down.
The Plaintiff was asked to stay on until they could find a replacement
for her.

She agreed to stay on as the clinical nurse manager until a

replacement could be found. The clinical nurse manager is an important
position at the facility and it had to be filled before the Plaintiff could be
moved. Lincoln Prairie did discuss with the Plaintiff other positions that
she could be transferred into, such as a nurse educator or floor nurse. The
Plaintiff contends that, although her transfer was approved, she was

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terminated before she could take the position.
Renae Hale spoke to other employees that might be able to fill the
Plaintiff’s position. Specifically, Hale contemplated and discussed: (1)
moving Adam Cooper from the floor nurse to the charge nurse position on
the fourth floor; (2) moving Barb Smith from the fourth floor charge
position to the Plaintiff’s position; (3) temporarily moving the Plaintiff to
the floor nurse position on the fourth floor. Hale then began evaluating the
scope and development of the nurse educator position, which was not
currently available but something the facility had in the past. Although the
position had been vacant for two years, Hale contemplated re-establishing
it for the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff reiterates that her transfer to a floor nurse
position had been approved upon the naming of a replacement for clinical
nurse manager position.
On October 25, 2012, Tami Ireland sent Hale the job description for
the Plaintiff’s clinical nurse manager position so that the position could be
posted and filled–in order to accommodate the Plaintiff’s request to step
down. The same day, Ireland sent Hale a former job description for the

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nurse educator position so that the needs of the facility could be evaluated
and the position responsibilities could be identified, finalized and posted
as a possible alternative position for the Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff was encouraged to apply for the nurse educator position.
On October 26, 2012, the Plaintiff submitted a job bid for the nurse
educator position that was accepted by Hale.
On October 29, 2012, Hale and Ireland had an email exchange
regarding posting the finalized nurse educator position. Hale then charted
out a tentative restructuring schedule to fill the Plaintiff’s role as a clinical
nurse manager, which would then open a floor nurse position and/or floor
nurse position for the Plaintiff and discussed this with Linda Simko, the
corporate representative.
E. Events leading to termination
The Defendant alleges that, in the days leading up to her termination,
the Plaintiff knew that the facility was undergoing an important site
inspection from a corporate representative, Linda Simko. The Plaintiff
asserts that the inspection of her floor was completed on October 31, 2012.

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She had helped prepare for the inspection. The Plaintiff spent most of that
day with Simko. Simko’s last day at the facility was November 1, 2012,
when the Plaintiff was home sick.
The Defendant alleges that, before November 1, 2012, the Plaintiff
knew that Hale was going to be unavailable that day because she was
scheduled to be with Simko and it was important for the Plaintiff to be
present on the floor of her unit. One of the other floor nurses (Jovetta
Brown) had been given the day off because the Plaintiff had promised that
she would be available to cover the floor of her unit. The Plaintiff disputes
this assertion and states she does not recall talking to Hale about Jovetta
Brown taking the day off.
The Defendant alleges that Plaintiff’s shift on November 1, 2012 was
scheduled to begin at 7:00 a.m. On that date, the Plaintiff contacted the
facility by sending a text message at 7:13 a.m., stating she was running late.
The Plaintiff did not say she was sick. The Plaintiff states the text message
was not the first message. She testified she had called Debra Buck and told
her she would not be at work. After reviewing her phone records, however,

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the Plaintiff later conceded the earlier call did not occur and her first
contact with the facility was not until the 7:13 a.m. text message. The
Plaintiff states she had cold and flu-like symptoms and was exhausted. The
Plaintiff also sent a text message to Hale at 7:20 a.m., stating she was tired,
she woke up late and would be in as soon as possible. The Plaintiff admits
sending the text message but says she was groggy.
One hour later, Hale followed up with the Plaintiff to see if she was
in yet. In response, the Plaintiff said not yet and admitted she was up late
the night before doing homework. The Plaintiff mentioned she might be
getting a cold but told Hale she would be in at 11:00 a.m. The Plaintiff
states she was groggy and had an exhausting day the day before. Hale
asked the Plaintiff to come in sooner because there was a medical need that
had to be addressed with a new patient. The Defendant alleges that when
Hale questioned the Plaintiff’s attendance, the Plaintiff was rude,
unprofessional and unapologetic. At 9:51 a.m., Hale sent the following text
message to the Plaintiff, “We gave Jovetta day off and you said you would
[be] here to help . . . this is worrisome that this was not a priority for you.”

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At 10:06 and 10:07 a.m., the Plaintiff responded as follows:
What’s worrisome is my classes at this point. The whole reason
I stepped down was because my education is my priority. I’m
not going to pretend I’m not offended. I have often wondered
why you showed the same, not shown something to be a
“priority.” Like now. The audacity you have is beyond me. I
work hard, and to be honest, harder than you do at times. So
please don’t dare comment on my dedication and priorities. All
would find your comment asinine.
And don’t text me again today. If you want to speak to me, do
so face to face.
According to the Defendant, the Plaintiff then called into the facility
claiming she was not coming in because she was sick.

This was

approximately five and a half hours after the start of her shift. Until then,
Hale expected the Plaintiff to come in to work. At 12:33 p.m., Hale sent
the following text message to the Plaintiff: Please meet me tomorrow
morning at 8am in my office. . . I have every right to comment on your
actions . . . this was an important week having Linda here.” The Plaintiff
denies that she was rude and unprofessional, though she admitted her
behavior could be described that way. She had cold and flu symptoms, was
groggy and had an exhausting previous day. She had been dealing with

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stress. The Plaintiff admits the text messages quoted above are accurate.
The Plaintiff’s text messages do not mention anxiety, depression, stress,
bipolar or her mental health as being the reason she was running late or
eventually not coming in at all.
F. Decision to terminate the Plaintiff
On November 2, 2012, the Plaintiff was temporarily suspended while
the facility investigated what occurred on November 1. Mark Littrell
testified that upon meeting with Tami Ireland and Renae Hale on
November 2, 2012, it was decided that termination would occur.
On November 5, 2012, the Plaintiff then had a meeting with Ireland
and Hale and acknowledged her behavior on November 1 had been
unprofessional, insolent and that she had acted beneath her status. The
Plaintiff did not claim she was having issues with her mental health or
bipolar nor did she attribute her conduct on the day to mental health
conditions.
Lincoln Prairie concluded the Plaintiff’s actions were especially
egregious because she left her unit unattended with the understanding of

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low staffing, which created a potential safety issue, coupled with the blatant
disrespectful and insubordinate behavior to her current supervisor. The
Defendant decided to terminate the Plaintiff, citing the following reasons:
(1) her actions constituted a total disregard for the safety of the facility by
putting patients and staff at risk; (2) the Plaintiff demonstrated
insubordination and unprofessional conduct; (3) the Plaintiff violated the
attendance policy; and (4) her behavior was generally at odds with the
company’s cultures.

The Plaintiff generally denies the Defendant’s

assertions and states that clinical nurse managers are not essential to
patient care.
Lincoln Prairie states that Plaintiff was not terminated due to her
bipolar condition. The Plaintiff’s bipolar condition and mental health were
not raised by the Plaintiff or discussed during the meeting. The Plaintiff
reiterates that Renae Hale knew the Plaintiff was having behavioral
problems and had gone through ETC. Moreover, the Plaintiff’s previous
diagnoses were available in the records.
The Plaintiff was terminated from her position at Springfield Clinic

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in October of 2008 for insubordination.

The Plaintiff also had work

performance issues at St. John’s Hospital. She was written up because of
her behavior and work performance. When her employment ended at St.
John’s, it was noted that the quality of her work, her relationship with
others and her communication with others needed improvement and she
was not eligible for re-employment.

The Plaintiff started working at

Heritage Behavioral in December of 2012 and was terminated less than
three months later, in February of 2013. The Plaintiff has received verbal
counseling from her current employer, McFarland Hospital.2
The Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint asserts claims pursuant
to the ADA. The Plaintiff alleges that the termination of her employment
constituted a failure to accommodate her disability of depression, anxiety
disorder and bipolar 1 disorder, the symptoms of which were evident in the
November 1, 2012 text message exchange with Renae Hale. Alternatively,

The Plaintiff alleges her work history and/or experience is immaterial.
Based on her allegation of wrongful termination by Lincoln Prairie in violation
of the ADA, however, the Court believes the information is relevant-particularly given that these examples are all in relative close proximity to her
termination from Lincoln Prairie.
2

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the Plaintiff asserts her termination was the result of discrimination due to
her disability.
The Defendant moves for summary judgment on all counts of the
Second Amended Complaint.
II. LEGAL DISCUSSION
A. Legal standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if the motion is properly supported
and “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The
Court construes all inferences in favor of the non-movant. See Siliven v.
Indiana Dept. of Child Services, 635 F.3d 921, 925 (7th Cir. 2011). To
create a genuine factual dispute, however, any such inference must be based
on something more than “speculation or conjecture.” See Harper v. C.R.
England, Inc., 687 F.3d 297, 306 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
Because summary judgment “is the put up or shut up moment in a lawsuit,”
a “hunch” about the opposing party’s motives is not enough to withstand
a properly supported motion. See Springer v. Durflinger, 518 F.3d 479,

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484 (7th Cir. 2008). Ultimately, there must be enough evidence in favor
of the non-movant to permit a jury to return a verdict in its favor. See id.
B. Termination claim
(1)
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an
individual by discharging her from employment due to her disability. 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a).

To establish a prima facie ADA claim for

discriminatory termination, a plaintiff must show that: “(1) she is disabled
within the meaning of the ADA, (2) she is qualified to perform the essential
functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3)
she has suffered from an adverse employment decision because of her
disability.” Dvorak v. Mostardi Platt Assoc., Inc.,289 F.3d 479, 483 (7th
Cir. 2002). In order to establish the third prong, the plaintiff must show
that the disability was a “but for” cause of her termination, which can be
shown through direct or circumstantial evidence. See Hooper v. Proctor
Health Care Inc., 804 F.3d 846, 853 (7th Cir. 2015).

Therefore, the

employer must have knowledge of the employee’s disability in order for

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liability to attach under the ADA. See Spurling v. C&M Fine Pack, Inc.,
739 F.3d 1055, 1061 (7th Cir. 2014) (citing 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9).
The Plaintiff claims that her depression and anxiety disorder together
with her Bipolar 1 condition made her a qualified individual with a
disability. Assuming that the Plaintiff was a qualified individual with a
disability, the Court concludes that she did not suffer an adverse
employment decision due to her disability.
The undisputed facts show that Plaintiff was aware that her
attendance on November 1, 2012 was more critical than on the typical day.
On that morning, the Plaintiff initially said she would be late to work. The
Plaintiff reported she had been up late doing homework. The Plaintiff said
she would be in “ASAP” via text message to Renae Hale at 7:20 a.m. At
9:00 a.m., she reported she would be in at 11:00 a.m.

When Hale

described the Plaintiff’s attitude as “worrisome,” the Plaintiff responded via
text that her classes were “worrisome” and her education was now her
priority. The Plaintiff commented on Hale’s “audacity” and claimed she
worked harder than Hale does at times. The Plaintiff told Hale not to

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opine on her dedication and priorities and labeled her comment on those
topics to be “asinine.” The Plaintiff also told Hale not to text her again
that day and to speak to her face to face. She then called in sick.
One of the reasons given for the Plaintiff’s termination was
insubordination and unprofessional conduct. The Lincoln Prairie Employee
Handbook Resource and Code of Conduct Policy was received by the
Plaintiff and acknowledged. It provided that insubordination is one type
of conduct that could lead to corrective action, including “immediate
employment termination.”
There can be little question that Plaintiff’s conduct on November 1,
2012 qualified as being insubordinate and unprofessional. Both Renae
Hale and Mark Littrell testified that Plaintiff did not mention she was
bipolar when they all met after November 1, 2012, and she did not
attribute her behavior to any mental health conditions. Hale and Littrell
both said they did not know she was bipolar.
The Plaintiff alleges that Pamela Campbell, M.D., a child psychiatrist
who worked on contract at Lincoln Prairie, mentioned the Plaintiff’s mental

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health issues to Renae Hale. Dr. Campbell testified she told Hale that she
did not believe the ECT process was working and they discussed the
Plaintiff’s erratic behavior. Dr. Campbell testified she did not tell anyone
at Lincoln Prairie that Plaintiff had been diagnosed as bipolar because that
was confidential information. The Plaintiff contends that Karma Howley,
a nurse who worked at Lincoln Prairie, testified it would have been obvious
to any registered nurse that the Plaintiff was overwhelmed and it was
affecting her depression. However, Howley’s testimony is based at least in
part on her own conversations and interactions with the Plaintiff.
The Court cannot assume that Renae Hale or Mark Littrell would
have made the same observations about the Plaintiff’s depression. The
evidence suggests they were generally aware that the Plaintiff experienced
increased stress due to the demands of work and school, which is why she
wanted to move to another position at Lincoln Prairie–a request that the
facility was accommodating.
Under the ADA, the employee has the “initial duty to inform the
employer of a disability.” Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d

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1130, 1134 (7th Cir. 1996). In this case, the Plaintiff did not tell anyone
she was going to be late because of a disability. The Plaintiff also did not
attribute her unprofessional and insubordinate behavior to any disability
such as depression, stress or bipolar disorder. Rather, the Plaintiff alleges
her supervisors should have known why she sent the text messages on
November 1, 2012. However, the Plaintiff points to no authority tending
to show that an employer must speculate as to why an employee engages in
conduct that violates company policy.
There simply is no evidence that discriminatory intent based on
disability was a factor in deciding to terminate the Plaintiff’s employment.
Even when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to her, the
Plaintiff cannot show that her disability was the “but for” cause of her
termination. Accordingly, the Plaintiff cannot establish she was terminated
because of a disability under the direct method of proof.
(2)
Under the indirect method of proof, a plaintiff must establish that (1)
she is disabled pursuant to the ADA; (2) she was meeting her employer’s

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legitimate expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and
(4) her employer treated similarly situated, non-disabled employees more
favorably. See Hooper, 804 F.3d at 853. If a plaintiff meets her initial
burden, then the employer must come forth with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision. See id. The plaintiff
would then have to show that the proffered reason is a pretext for a
discriminatory reason. See id.
The Plaintiff cannot show she was discriminated against because of
her disability under the indirect method. There is no evidence that a
similarly situated, non-disabled individual engaged in conduct similar to
that of the Plaintiff and was not terminated from Lincoln Prairie as a result
of that conduct. Because she has presented no such evidence, the Plaintiff
did not meet her burden of production under the indirect method of proof.
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on the Plaintiff’s ADA termination claim.
C. Reasonable accommodation claim
In order to assert a prima facie case, a plaintiff alleging reasonable

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accommodation must show: “(1) she is a qualified individual with a
disability; (2) the employer was aware of her disability; and (3) the
employer failed to reasonably accommodate the disability.” Kotwicka v.
Rose Packing Co., 637 F.3d 744, 747-48 (7th Cir. 2011).
Assuming the Plaintiff can meet the first two elements, the record
establishes that the Defendant attempted to reasonably accommodate the
Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff admits that she complained about another

employee’s work performance, Lincoln Prairie investigated the matter and
provided counseling to the Plaintiff and the employee. The Plaintiff also
acknowledges that Lincoln Prairie supported her pursuit of further
education and even provided her with tuition reimbursement.
The Plaintiff admits that, when she complained in the late
Summer/early Fall time frame of 2012 about being overworked and
underpaid compared to other clinical nurse managers, she was given a 3%
raise on October 5, 2012, and told to expect two more raises over the next
six months.
Subsequently, the Plaintiff asked to step down from the nurse

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manager position entirely because of her school demands, her life duties
and the position was stressful. Renae Hale responded that the facility
would accommodate her request because they thought the Plaintiff was a
good nurse and she was an asset to the facility. The facility never told the
Plaintiff they would not try to accommodate her request.
The Plaintiff purports to dispute the above assertion by saying that
Lincoln Prairie approved a transfer to a floor nurse position, but never
transferred her because she was terminated first. In fact, the Plaintiff was
terminated before she could be transferred. This is because the request for
transfer was made almost immediately prior to the Plaintiff’s unprofessional
and insubordinate conduct. The Plaintiff testified she filled out a job bid
on October 26, 2012. The document was signed by Renae Hale, granting
permission for the Plaintiff to apply. The Plaintiff testified Hale stated on
October 29, 2012, that she would support the Plaintiff in any possible way.
Accordingly, the Plaintiff testified that her supervisor was taking measures
to accommodate her request prior to November 1, 2012.
The record establishes that Defendant had every intention of

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accommodating the Plaintiff’s request to change positions before
circumstances changed on November 1, 2012.

The Plaintiff cites no

authority that her request must be accommodated as soon as it is
communicated. On November 1, 2012, the Plaintiff’s actions provided
cause for Lincoln Prairie to terminate her employment before she could be
transferred. Lincoln Prairie was entitled to act in accordance with its
policies.
Because the Plaintiff cannot show that the Defendant failed to
reasonably accommodate her disability, Lincoln Prairie is entitled to
summary judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
Upon viewing the factual allegations and construing all inferences in
a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court concludes that summary
judgment in favor of the Defendants is warranted. The record establishes
that Lincoln Prairie was attempting to accommodate the Plaintiff’s request
to transfer to another position until November 1, 2012, when she engaged
in insubordinate and unprofessional conduct.

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There is no evidence that Plaintiff’s employment was terminated due
to her depression, anxiety disorder or Bipolar condition.
The Defendant was entitled to terminate the Plaintiff in accordance
with its policies. The Defendant simply made a business decision and there
is no evidence that discrimination due to disability was the reason for the
decision.
Ergo, the Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [d/e 34] is
ALLOWED.
The Clerk will enter Judgment in favor of the Defendants and against
the Plaintiff.
Upon the entry of Judgment, the Clerk will terminate this case.
ENTER: February 17, 2016
FOR THE COURT:
/s/ Richard Mills
Richard Mills
United States District Judge

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