Walker v. Pennock et al

Filing 78

OPINION: Defendants' motion is denied 76 to the extent Defendants request dismissal of this case. The motion is granted to the extent Defendants ask for an extension of deadlines. Discovery is extended to February 29, 2016. The dispositive motion deadline is extended to March 31, 2016. (SEE WRITTEN OPINION) Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 12/11/2015. (GL, ilcd)

E-FILED

Friday, 11 December, 2015 04:09:59 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
FRANKIE N. WALKER,
Plaintiff,
v.
SHAN JUMPER, et al.,
Defendants.

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13-CV-3079

OPINION
Plaintiff is detained in the Rushville Treatment and Detention
Center pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Act.
Pursuant to the Court’s 1/31/14 Order, the claim in this case is
about the alleged refusal to allow Plaintiff to participate in sex
offender treatment without completing prerequisites such as a
polygraph test and certain programs that allegedly are designed
only to stall Plaintiff’s treatment.
On January 27, 2015, the Court directed Plaintiff to sign an
authorization to release his DHS clinical records from 2010 to the
present. Plaintiff refused to sign the authorization, prompting
Defendants to file a motion to show cause why this case should not
be dismissed with prejudice.

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Plaintiff asserts in his response to the motion to show cause
that the Court has been biased and incorrect in its rulings. Plaintiff
will be able to challenge all of the Court’s rulings on appeal after a
judgment is entered. The Court’s rulings are not a reason not to
comply with the Court’s orders and are not a reason not to
cooperate in discovery.
Plaintiff also contends that his records from 2010 are
irrelevant because this Court has limited his claims to 2013. The
Court has not limited Plaintiff’s claims to the year 2013. The Court
has ruled that Plaintiff’s challenge to his March, 2010 polygraph is
barred by the statute of limitations. (11/18/13 Order, p. 6.) The
claim in this case is about the “alleged refusal to allow Plaintiff to
participate in sex offender treatment without completing
prerequisites such as a polygraph test and certain programs.”
(1/31/14 Order, p. 4.) The claim proceeding is subject to the same
two-year statute of limitations, which (barring exceptions) would
extend back to April 2011, since Plaintiff filed this case on April 1,
2013. Further, Plaintiff’s records outside of the two-year period
could be relevant to the claims and defenses in this case. The
records may be necessary to show Plaintiff’s diagnosis and to
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provide background for Defendants’ treatment decisions that fall
within the two-year period. Whether the records actually are
relevant and admissible is a decision that will be made on summary
judgment or at trial.
Plaintiff next argues that his records are protected by the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. However, Plaintiff’s clinical
records are directly relevant to his claim of inadequate mental
health treatment. The records will show what treatment Plaintiff
has been offered and given. Because Plaintiff has put his mental
condition and treatment directly at issue, the privilege does not
protect the records from disclosure. See Doe v. Oberweis Dairy,
456 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2006)(psychotherapist-patient privilege did
not apply where the plaintiff put her psychological state at issue by
claiming emotional damages); Caine v. Burge, 2012 WL 6720597
(N.D. Ill. 2012)(plaintiff waived psychotherapist privilege by making
his psychological treatment an issue in the case). The use of the
records will be subject to the protective order already in place, and
the parties may file appropriate motions if they wish the records to
be sealed or wish the Court to conduct an in camera review.
IT IS ORDERED THAT:
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(1) Plaintiff’s clinical records from 2010 to the present are
directly relevant to the claims and defenses in this case.
Defendants are authorized to serve subpoenas to obtain the
records, and the Illinois Department of Human Services is
authorized to release the records to defense counsel. The
records that are produced shall be subject to the protective
order already in place.
(2) Defendants’ motion is denied (76) to the extent
Defendants request dismissal of this case. The motion
is granted to the extent Defendants ask for an
extension of deadlines.
(3) Discovery is extended to February 29, 2016.
(4) The dispositive motion deadline is extended to March
31, 2016.
ENTERED: December 11, 2015
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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