Keller v. Finks et al

Filing 6

OPINION: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (d/e 3 ) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims in Counts I, III, and IV are DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to replead. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state law claims. Plaintiff may replead his state law causes of action along with his constitutional claims. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 3/31/2014. (MJ, ilcd)

E-FILED

Monday, 31 March, 2014 04:06:35 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
COREY KELLER, individually,
and as Special Administrator of
the Estate of MELISSA KELLER,
deceased,

)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
THOMAS FINKS, individually and )
in his official capacity as
)
CHRISTIAN COUNTY STATE’S
)
ATTORNEY, CHRISTIAN
)
COUNTY, CHRISTIAN COUNTY
)
ADULT PROBATION
)
DEPARTMENT, AMY CALVERT
)
WINANS, individually and in her )
official capacity as CHRISTIAN
)
COUNTY CORONER,
)
)
Defendants.
)

13-03117

OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Defendants Thomas Finks, individually and in his official
capacity as Christian County State’s Attorney, Christian County,
the Christian County Adult Probation Department, and Amy Calvert
Winans, individually and in her official capacity as Christian
County Coroner, have filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint

that is now before the Court (d/e 3). Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
(d/e 3) is GRANTED. Plaintiff Corey Keller, individually, and as
Special Administrator of the Estate of Melissa Keller, deceased, has
failed to plead facts in Count I that Defendants Finks, Christian
County, and the Christian County Probation Department violated
Decedent Melissa Keller’s constitutional rights. Additionally, after
death, Decedent was no longer a person within our constitutional
and statutory framework and, therefore, had no rights of which she
may have been deprived. Based on this reasoning, Plaintiff cannot
state claims for an alleged violation of Decedent’s First and Fourth
Amendment rights by Defendant Winans in Counts III and IV
respectively. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims in Counts I, III, and IV
are DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to replead.
Because Plaintiff has not alleged claims for relief under federal law
in the instant Complaint, the Court does not address Plaintiff’s
state law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Plaintiff may,
however, replead his state law causes of action along with his
constitutional claims.

Page 2 of 27

I.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Plaintiff’s Complaint. On
April 27, 2012, Decedent was riding as a passenger in a vehicle
operated by Katie McKenna. (Compl. ¶¶ 8, 26.) Before this date,
Ms. McKenna had been under the supervision of Christian County
and the Christian County Adult Probation Department. (Id. ¶¶ 2,
20.) While serving her term of probation, Ms. McKenna had violated
the terms of her probation, resulting in a revocation. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 22.)
Despite having had her term of probation revoked, however, Ms.
McKenna was not in custody. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 22.)
On the morning of April 27, 2012, Ms. McKenna was driving
the vehicle in which Decedent rode at a rate of 70 miles per hour in
a 10-miles-per-hour zone. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 27.) The vehicle struck a tree
at this speed, tragically killing Decedent and two other passengers
in the vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 2, 20.) Following the accident, Defendant
Amy Calvert Winans, the Christian County Coroner, drew
Decedent’s blood and performed an autopsy. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 28.)
Following these events, Plaintiff Corey Keller, as special
administrator of Decedent’s estate, filed a five-count Complaint in
this Court. In Count I, Plaintiff brings claims against Christian
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County, the Christian County Adult Probation Department, and the
Christian County State’s Attorney, Thomas Finks, in his official and
individual capacities. Plaintiff alleges in Count I that these
Defendants’ actions violated Decedent’s constitutional rights by
depriving her of life without due process of law, thereby subjecting
the Defendants to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff also
alleges that these Defendants are liable for their actions pursuant
to the Illinois Wrongful Death Act.1
In Count II, Plaintiff brings claims against Christian County,
the Christian County Adult Probation Department, and the
Christian County State’s Attorney, Thomas Finks, in his individual
and official capacities. Plaintiff alleges in Count II that these
Defendants are liable under Illinois law for spoliation of evidence
because the Defendants failed to preserve Ms. McKenna’s probation
file.

The Court reads Count I to allege losses of “services, society,
companionship, comfort, guidance, counsel, and advice, [and
claims] for funeral and burial expenses, [and for] grief and sorrow”
under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act alone, because such interests
are not protectable under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

1

Page 4 of 27

In Counts III and IV, Plaintiff brings claims against the
Christian County Coroner, Amy Calvert Winans, in her individual
and official capacities. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges in Count III that
Defendant Winans is liable under § 1983 for violating Decedent’s
First Amendment rights. Plaintiff bases this claim on her allegation
that the autopsy performed by Defendant Winans violated Decedent
and her family’s religious beliefs. In Count IV, Plaintiff alleges that
Defendant Winans is also liable under § 1983 for violating
Decedent’s Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff’s claim in Count IV
is based on Plaintiff’s allegation that the autopsy of and removal of
blood from Decedent by Defendant Winans constituted an
unreasonable search and seizure. Lastly, Plaintiff alleges in Count
V that Defendant Winans battered Decedent. Plaintiff seeks
compensatory and punitive damages. (Id. at 8.)
On May 30, 2013, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss
Counts I through V of the Complaint.
II.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

The Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
constitutional claims in Counts I, III, and IV. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Page 5 of 27

The Court has supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law
claims in Counts I, II and V because those claims arise out of the
same transaction or series of transactions as Plaintiff’s
constitutional claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Venue is proper in this
Court because the events or omissions giving rise to the claims at
issue took place in this judicial district. 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) challenges the sufficiency of the
complaint. Christensen v. Cnty. of Boone, 483 F.3d 454, 458 (7th
Cir. 2007). To state a claim for relief, a plaintiff’s complaint need
only provide a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief and giving the defendant fair notice
of the claims. Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.
2008). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),
the court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true and
construing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Id. The
complaint must set forth facts that plausibly demonstrate a claim
for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007).

Page 6 of 27

Plausibility means alleging factual content that allows a court to
reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Merely
reciting the elements of a cause of action or supporting claims with
conclusory statements is insufficient. Id.
IV.

ANALYSIS

In the Motion to Dismiss, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has
failed to state claims for relief in Counts I through V of the
Complaint. Defendants seek an Order dismissing all five Counts of
Plaintiff’s Complaint.
A.

Count I Against Defendant Finks in His Official Capacity
and Individually Must Be Dismissed.
Plaintiff’s Count I against Defendant Finks in his official

capacity and individually must be dismissed. When sued in his
official capacity as State’s Attorney for Christian County, Defendant
Finks is merely the legal alter ego of the State of Illinois and, as
such, enjoys sovereign immunity under the principles articulated in
the United States Constitution’s Eleventh Amendment. In his
individual capacity, Defendant Finks enjoys absolute prosecutorial
immunity.
Page 7 of 27

1.

In His Official Capacity, Defendant State’s Attorney
Finks Is an Agent of the State of Illinois, Which Is
Immune from Suit as a Sovereign State.

As an initial matter, claims against government officials in
their official capacities are treated as claims against the government
entities for which they serve as agents. See Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985) (“[A] judgment against a public servant in
his official capacity imposes liability on the entity that he
represents.” (citations omitted)); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978) (“[O]fficial-capacity suits generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity
of which an officer is an agent . . . .”); Richman v. Sheahan, 270
F.3d 430, 439 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[Plaintiff] sued [Defendant, an
Illinois county sheriff,] in his official capacity, and therefore the
claim is against the entity of which he is an agent.”). As a state’s
attorney, Defendant Finks is an agent of the State of Illinois when
prosecuting criminal actions. See Nat’l Cas. Co. v. McFatridge, 604
F.3d 335, 341–42 (7th Cir. 2010) (“[H]is primary duty is prosecuting
criminal actions—a function he fulfills as a state employee. The
government of the county in which the state’s attorney is elected
has neither the power to direct, oversee nor control these
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prosecutions; the state’s attorney is not its employee.” (citations
omitted)); see also McGrath v. Gillis, 44 F.3d 567, 571 (7th Cir.
1995) (recognizing the Illinois Supreme Court’s holding that Illinois
state’s attorneys are State employees with jurisdiction within their
respective counties); Ingemunson v. Hedges, 549 N.E.2d 1269, 1272
(Ill. 1990) (“[D]rafters of our present constitution agreed . . . that
state’s attorneys should be classified as state, rather than county
officers.”). As such, when prosecuting criminal actions, a state’s
attorney is subject to liability in his official capacity only where the
State of Illinois is subject to liability.
Principles of sovereign immunity, as articulated in part in the
United States Constitution’s Eleventh Amendment, sharply
circumscribe States’ vulnerability to suit. The Eleventh Amendment
states: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const.
amend. XI. Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment has long been held
to bar federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over actions
brought against a State by its own citizens. Scott v. O’Grady, 975
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F.2d 366, 369 (7th Cir. 1992). Suits at law against a State or its
agencies by citizens of the State are therefore barred, save when the
State consents to suit in federal court or Congress uses its power
under the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate the State’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity. Id. (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985)). An exception to sovereign
immunity is that an official-capacity suit in equity that seeks
prospective injunctive relief from an unconstitutional state action
may go forward. See id. (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–
60 (1908)).
In this case, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive
damages. Plaintiff does not allege that Congress has abrogated the
State of Illinois’s sovereign immunity in the context of the
prosecution of States’ criminal law, nor has the State of Illinois
waived its immunity in this context. Thus, the sovereign immunity
of the State of Illinois bars suit in this Court against the State, and,
therefore, against Defendant Finks in his official capacity.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Count I against Finks in his official capacity
must be dismissed.

Page 10 of 27

2.

In His Individual Capacity, Defendant State’s
Attorney Finks Enjoys Absolute Prosecutorial
Immunity.

In his individual capacity, Defendant Finks enjoys
prosecutorial immunity, and, therefore, Count I against him in his
individual capacity must also be dismissed. The nature of an
official’s immunity turns on “the nature of the function performed,
not the identity of the person who performed it.” Kalina v. Fletcher,
522 U.S. 118, 127 (1997); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259,
269 (1993).
Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability when acting
as advocates for the State by engaging in conduct that is “intimately
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler
v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430–31 (1976); Benson v. Safford, 13
Fed. App’x 405, 407 (7th Cir. 2001). Activities commonly
associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process include
deciding whether to prosecute, engaging in pretrial litigation, and
plea bargaining. Prosecutors enjoy only qualified immunity in their
investigative and administrative duties. Prosecutors’ absolute
immunity in the judicial phase applies even where they are alleged
to have acted “with an improper state of mind or improper motive.”
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Burns v. Reed, 894 F.2d 949, 955 (7th Cir. 1990), vacated in part
on other grounds and rev’d in part on other grounds, 500 U.S. 478
(1991), and 958 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1992).
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Katie McKenna “was a repeat
offender,” (Compl. ¶ 21), “had multiple cases filed against her,” (id.),
“had . . . probation violations,” (id.), “had been revoked prior to the
fatal accident that killed [Plaintiff’s Decedent],” (id. ¶ 22), and “was
shielded from jail for whatever reason the defendants saw fit.” (Id.
¶ 23.) Defendant Finks’s alleged conduct comprises only these
activities, each of which is intimately associated with the judicial
phase of the criminal process against McKenna. As such, each of
Defendants’ alleged activities is entitled to absolute immunity;
nowhere has Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Finks engaged in any
action entitled to qualified immunity only. That Plaintiff may hint
at Defendant Finks’s allegedly improper motive, with the allegation
that McKenna “was shielded from jail for whatever reason the
defendants saw fit,” does not change this conclusion. See Burns,
894 F.2d at 955 (“Whenever duties of a judicial nature are imposed
upon a public officer, the due execution of which depends upon his
judgment, he is exempt from all responsibility by action for the
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motives which influence him and the manner in which said duties
are performed.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)) Because
Defendant Finks’s actions as alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint entitle
Defendant Finks to absolute prosecutorial immunity, Count I
against him in his personal capacity must be dismissed.
B.

Count I Against Christian County and the Christian
County Adult Probation Office Must Be Dismissed.
Plaintiff’s Count I against Christian County and the Christian

County Adult Probation Office must also be dismissed because
Plaintiff does not allege a custom, policy, or decision of a final
municipal policy-maker that violates plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
As discussed, as a state’s attorney, Defendant Finks was an
agent of the State of Illinois. But even assuming for the sake of
argument that he was an agent of Christian County, in this case
Defendant Finks, when sued in his official capacity, serves merely
as an alter ego for Christian County.2 (Defendant Christian County

In fact, the status of municipal officials sued in their official
capacity as mere alter egos of the municipalities they serve is so
straightforward that some district courts have routinely dismissed
official-capacity claims as redundant or duplicative. See, e.g.,
Cotton v. District of Columbia, 421 F. Supp. 2d 83, 86 (D.D.C.
2

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Adult Probation Office is, similarly, Christian County’s alter ego as
an agency of the County.) Accordingly, Defendant Finks is subject
to suit in his official capacity only where Christian County and its
agencies are subject to suit.
In general, municipal entities like Christian County can be
subject to § 1983 liability, though not on the basis of respondeat
superior liability. Id. at 690, 694. Rather, municipalities are
subject to § 1983 liability when the violation of the plaintiff’s federal
right is caused by the enforcement of municipal policy, custom, or
decision of a final municipal policy-maker. Id. at 694. The causal
connection between the policy, custom, or decision and the
violation of a plaintiff’s federal right has been described as a “direct
causal link,” one that is “closely related.” City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 385, 391 (1989). In other words, the policy, custom,
or decision must be the “moving force” behind the violation of the
right. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997).
Plaintiff in this case has failed to allege that any policy or
custom of Christian County, either as exercised through its Adult

2006); Baines v. Masiello, 288 F. Supp. 2d 376, 384 (W.D.N.Y.
2003); McCachren v. Blacklick Valley Sch. Dist., 217 F. Supp. 2d
594, 599 (W.D. Pa. 2002).
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Probation Office or as executed by Defendant Finks in his official
capacity as Christian County State’s Attorney, has deprived
Plaintiff’s Decedent of life without due process of law. Plaintiff’s
allegation that the driver in the car crash that killed Plaintiff’s
Decedent, Katie McKenna, “was shielded from jail for whatever
reason the defendants saw fit,” (Compl. ¶ 23), undermines the
suggestion that a policy or custom of Christian County caused
Plaintiff’s Decedent’s death.
At best, the allegation that McKenna was “shielded” for
“whatever reason” amounts to an allegation that Defendants’
discrete decision, rather than a policy or custom, resulted in
McKenna’s ongoing liberty. To be sure, municipal liability may be
based on a single decision by a municipal official who has final
policy-making authority. City of St. Louis v. Proprotnik, 485 U.S.
112, 123 (1988); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S.469, 480
(1986). And Defendant Finks, as Christian County State’s Attorney,
may have held some policy-making or discretionary authority to the
extent that he is an official of Christian County. See McFatridge,
604 F.3d at 341–42 (“It is true . . . that the state’s attorney can be
characterized a county agent at various times.”). But the mere fact
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that a municipal official has discretionary authority is not sufficient
to impose municipal liability. Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 481–82 (“The
fact that a particular official—even a policymaking official—has
discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without
more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that
discretion.”). Moreover, as discussed, Plaintiff’s only allegations as
to Defendant Finks’s decisions as a county official with policymaking or discretionary authority pertain directly to Defendant
Finks’s prosecutorial duties, in which he is entitled to absolute
immunity. Indeed, the fact that these allegations pertain only to
Defendant Finks’s actions pursuant to his prosecutorial duties
substantially undercuts any suggestion that Defendant Finks was
acting as a county official at all. See McFatridge, 604 F.3d at 342
(discussing the state’s attorney’s role as agent of the county when
acting as the county’s attorney in civil actions but as agent of the
State when prosecuting criminal cases).
Finally, even if the events at the center of Plaintiff’s claims
were the result of a policy, custom, or decision of a duly authorized
municipal officer, Plaintiff’s allegations do not plausibly state that
the policy, custom, or decision alleged was the “moving force”
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behind Plaintiff’s Decedent’s death. To be sure, but for McKenna’s
liberty from imprisonment, she would not have driven the car that
crashed and killed Plaintiff’s Decedent. Even construing the
allegations in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, however, the
connection between the Defendants’ decision permitting McKenna’s
liberty and Decedent’s death is too attenuated to provide the
necessary “direct causal link.” Intervening causes, including
McKenna’s tortious (or even criminal) conduct and Plaintiff’s
Decedent’s decision to ride in the car with McKenna, disrupt the
direct causal link. Accordingly, because no policy, custom, or
decision of a final municipal policy-maker of Christian County
caused a violation of Plaintiff’s Decedent’s constitutional rights,
Count I against Christian County and the Christian County Adult
Probation Office must be dismissed.
C.

Count III Against Defendant Winans Individually and in
Her Official Capacity Must Be Dismissed.
Count III against Defendant Winans individually and in her

official capacity must be dismissed because Defendant Winans
acted under the authority of a state statute that is valid under the

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United States Constitution when she drew blood from and
performed an autopsy on Plaintiff’s Decedent.
Neutral laws of general application do not offend the First
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. In Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith in 1990, the
Supreme Court held that neutral laws of general applicability do not
violate the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause simply because
they burden religious practice. 494 U.S. 872, 878–79 (1990) (“[I]f
prohibiting [or burdening] the exercise of religion . . . is not the
object of [a law] but merely the incidental effect of a generally
applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has
not been offended. . . . [T]he right of free exercise does not relieve
an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral
law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).”)
Congress attempted to overrule Smith with the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA, or “the Act”), which states that “laws
‘neutral’ toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as
laws intended to interfere with religious exercise” and that “the
compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is
Page 18 of 27

a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious
liberty and competing prior governmental interests.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb(a)(2), (5). The Act, thereby, required federal and state
laws to further only compelling governmental interests by the least
restrictive means, a standard often referred to as strict scrutiny.
RFRA was held unconstitutional as applied to the States,
however, in City of Boerne v. Flores in 1997, because its application
to state statutes exceeded Congress’s authority under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). Illinois has
since passed its own Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 775 ILCS
35/1 et seq., subjecting state laws that burden religious exercise to
strict scrutiny under the Illinois Constitution, but under the United
States Constitution, the Free Exercise Clause requires only that
state statutes be generally and neutrally applicable. See id. at 533–
34; Smith, 494 U.S. at 878–79; River of Life Kingdom Ministries v.
Vill. of Hazel Crest, 611 F.3d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2010) (observing
that “the clause of the First Amendment that guarantees the free
exercise of religion does not excuse churches from having to comply
with nondiscriminatory regulations, such as the prohibition of

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drugs believed to be dangerous, even if the regulation interferes
with church rituals or observances” and citing Smith).
In this case, Defendant Winans’s authority as Christian
County Coroner is provided by statute. 55 ILCS 5/3-3013, 3-3015.
Section 3-3013 requires that a county coroner go as soon as she
knows of a dead body lying within her county whose death is
suspected of being a sudden or violent death, whether apparently
suicidal, homicidal, or accidental, and take charge of that body to
make a preliminary investigation into the circumstances of death.
55 ILCS 5/3-3013(a). Section 3-3013 invests county coroners with
the discretion to attempt to ascertain the cause of death, either by
autopsy or otherwise, and provides several more specific
circumstances in which a county coroner may draw blood from a
dead body. Id. Section 3-3015 also provides circumstances under
which an autopsy is to be performed, including situations where a
death has occurred under circumstances that are suspicious,
obscure, mysterious, or otherwise unexplained and in the opinion of
the coroner the cause of death cannot be established definitively
except by autopsy. Id. § 3-3015. Section 3-3021 pronounces the
public policy of the State of Illinois that a coroner shall release the
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body of the decedent to the decedent’s next of kin, and none of the
coroner’s duties or powers shall be construed to interfere with or
control the right of the next of kin to the custody and burial of the
decedent upon completion of the coroner’s investigation. Id. § 33021.
Altogether, the statutes that create county coroners’ authority
are general laws of neutral application, making no reference to
religious practices or to any exception to be exercised by the
decedent’s next of kin. A county coroner’s authority is the same in
all cases involving “violent death” and extends to the discretion to
perform an autopsy or to draw blood. Cf. § 3-3013. In this case,
Plaintiff’s own Complaint establishes that Plaintiff’s Decedent died
in a car crash at a speed of 70 miles per hour in a 10-miles-perhour zone, a tragically violent death. An autopsy may also be
performed at the discretion of the county coroner when the
circumstances of death are suspicious; a 70-mile-per-hour, singlecar crash in a 10-miles-per-hour zone is at least sufficiently out of
the ordinary to raise suspicions. Cf. § 3-3015. Finally, Plaintiff
does not allege that Defendant Winans exceeded her authority in
her release of the body of Plaintiff’s Decedent to Plaintiff upon
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completion of the coroner’s investigation. Cf. § 3-3021. Because
Defendant Winans’s conduct in investigating the death of Plaintiff’s
Decedent did not exceed her authority, as coroner of Christian
County, pursuant to a general law of neutral applicability,
Defendant Winans’s conduct could not have violated the
constitutional rights of either Plaintiff himself or Plaintiff’s Decedent
under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause. Accordingly,
Count III must be dismissed.
D.

Count IV Against Defendant Winans Individually and in
Her Official Capacity Must Be Dismissed.
Count IV against Defendant Winans individually and in her

official capacity must be dismissed because Plaintiff’s Decedent’s
rights under the Fourth Amendment do not survive Plaintiff’s
Decedent’s death, and even if those rights did survive, Plaintiff
cannot assert those rights on the Decedent’s behalf.
To begin with, a deceased person has no rights within our
constitutional scheme. The common law and the statutes of the
State of Illinois have long recognized the authority of an estate’s
administrator or executor to stand in the shoes of a decedent in
order to pursue suits for wrongful death under circumstances

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where decedent herself would have had a cause of action in tort if
not for her death. See, e.g., the Illinois Wrongful Death Act, 740
ILCS 180/1 et seq. But once dead, Plaintiff’s Decedent did not have
a right to be free from search or seizure. To be sure, through
criminal prohibition, the Illinois Compiled Statutes protect against
the dismemberment of human bodies, 720 ILCS 5/12-20.5, and the
abuse of corpses, 720 ILCS 5/12-20.6. No statute, however,
creates a private right of action against those who commit these
criminal acts. Moreover, persons employed by a county coroner’s
office enjoy exemptions from criminal liability under both the
dismemberment statute, see 720 ILCS 5/12-20.5(b)(4), and the
abuse of a corpse statute. See 720 ILCS 5/12-20.6(d)(1). Thus,
there was no right which Plaintiff could assert on Plaintiff’s
Decedent’s behalf. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot bring a claim on
behalf of Plaintiff’s Decedent premised on Defendant Winans’ s
purported violation of Decedent’s Fourth Amendment right to be
free from illegal search or seizure.
Furthermore, even if Plaintiff’s Decedent did maintain some
federal right against unreasonable search or seizure after death,
Plaintiff does not have standing to assert the right on her behalf.
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Prudential doctrines of standing typically bar third-party standing
and require individuals to seek to vindicate their own rights. See
Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113–14 (1976). Exceptions to the
rule against third-party standing arise in circumstances where the
rights of the litigant before the court and the right of the third-party
are closely related, see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (permitting licensed physician to assert the privacy rights of
the married persons whom they advised on reproductive health and
contraception), or where an obstacle prevents the third party from
asserting her own claim. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (permitting National Association for Advancement of Colored
People to assert its members right to anonymous membership to
prevent destruction of the right in its assertion). The rule against
third-party standing is especially strong in the context of the Fourth
Amendment. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86–87
(1980) (“It is entirely proper to require of one who seeks to challenge
the legality of a search . . . that he establish that he himself was the
victim of an invasion of privacy. Subsequent attempts to
vicariously assert violations of the Fourth Amendment rights of

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others have been repeatedly rejected by this Court.” (citations
omitted)).
In this case, even if Plaintiff’s Decedent maintained some
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches or
seizures even after death, Plaintiff cannot assert those rights on
Decedent’s behalf because Plaintiff’s own rights were not closely
related. Moreover, the rule against third-party standing in the
context of the Fourth Amendment bars Plaintiff’s claim.
Accordingly, Count IV must be dismissed.
E.

The Court Declines to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction
Over Plaintiff’s Remaining State Law Claims.
The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. In any civil action in which a
district court has original jurisdiction, the district court also has
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims so related to the
claims in the action within original jurisdiction that they form the
same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). A district court has discretion to
decline supplemental jurisdiction, however, if no claim remains over
which it has original jurisdiction. Id. § 1367(c)(3). In the Seventh

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Circuit, a district court should relinquish supplemental jurisdiction
over state law claims unless: “(1) the state law claims may not be
re-filed because a statute of limitations has expired, (2) substantial
judicial resources have been expended on the state law claims, or
(3) it is clearly apparent how the state law claims are to be decided.”
Dargis v. Sheahan, 526 F.3d 981, 990 (7th Cir. 2008).
First, the statutes of limitations on Plaintiff’s claims had not
run at the time of first filing, and a proper amended claim in this
Court will relate back to the date of first filing for purposes of
complying with those statutes of limitations. Moreover, the running
of the statutes of limitations on any of the claims would not bar
Plaintiff from filing suit in state court instead because state law
gives plaintiffs one year to file their claims in state court after
dismissal by a federal court. See 735 ILCS 5/13-217 (“In the
actions specified in . . . any other act . . . where the time for
commencing an action is limited, if . . . the action is dismissed by a
United States District Court . . . then, whether or not the time
limitation for bringing such action expires during the pendency of
such action, the plaintiff . . . may commence a new action within
one year or within the remaining period of limitation, whichever is
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greater, after . . . the action is dismissed by [the United States
District Court] . . . .”). Second, this Court has not expended
substantial judicial resources to resolve Plaintiff’s state law claims
because this Court has not addressed those claims thus far in the
litigation. Third, the resolution of the state law claims is not clearly
apparent, but Plaintiff may replead related state law claims along
with his constitutional claims. For these reasons, the Court
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state
law claims at this time.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
(d/e 3) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s claims in Counts I, III, and IV
are DISMISSED without prejudice and with leave to replead.
The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. Plaintiff may replead his
state law causes of action along with his constitutional claims.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTER: March 31, 2014
FOR THE COURT:

s/ Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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