Christian v. City of Springfield et al

Filing 21

OPINION entered by Judge Colin Stirling Bruce on 3/6/2014. The Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 9 is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. See written opinion. (JMW, ilcd)

E-FILED

Thursday, 06 March, 2014 11:50:37 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
URBANA DIVISION
____________________________________________________________________________
CALVIN CHRISTIAN III,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
v.
)
Case No. 13-CV-3135
)
CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, et al.,
)
)
Defendants.
)
OPINION

This case is before the court for ruling on the Motion to Dismiss (#9) filed by
Defendants City of Springfield, Michelle Awe, Christopher Vollmer, Burton Brown, Eric
Copelin, Mark Mitchell, Michael Egan and Unknown Springfield Police Officers, John Does
and Jane Roes 1-10. This court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint (#1) and the
arguments of the parties. Following this thorough review, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
(#9) is GRANTED as to Count XIII, which Plaintiff has withdrawn, and DENIED as to the
remaining counts of the Complaint.
BACKGROUND
On May 9, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Complaint (#1) against Defendants. Plaintiff
alleged that he filed a lawsuit against Defendant City of Springfield in July 2010 seeking
access to disciplinary files of Springfield police officers. Plaintiff alleged that the State
Journal Register published multiple articles about the lawsuit and that the Judge ruled in
Plaintiff’s favor and required certain disciplinary files to be disclosed in response to
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests.

Plaintiff alleged that officers in the

Springfield Police Department, including the named and unnamed Defendants, began to

systematically harass Plaintiff by issuing him numerous traffic citations and stopping his
vehicle without probable cause or any other legal justification. Plaintiff alleged that he was
stopped by various Defendants on May 9, 2011, June 2, 2011, July 17, 2011, June 3, 2012,
July 13, 2012, and October 22, 2012. Plaintiff alleged that there was no probable cause or
other legal justification for these stops. Plaintiff alleged that the June 3, 2012, traffic stop was
made by Defendants Brown and Awe. Plaintiff alleged that he had previously filed a citizen
complaint against Awe which resulted in disciplinary measures against Awe just a few
months prior to this incident. Plaintiff alleged that, during the illegal stop, Defendant Brown
violently grabbed Plaintiff and yanked him out of his vehicle. Plaintiff alleged that he was
taken to St. John’s Hospital for treatment of his injury sustained during the arrest. Plaintiff
alleged that Defendant Awe issued traffic citations to Plaintiff.
Plaintiff also alleged that, on August 2, 2011, he was followed by two unknown
Springfield police officers for more than six blocks and that the officers pointed at him and
tried to intimidate him. Plaintiff alleged that, on January 30, 2013, he was at the drive-thru
at a McDonald’s restaurant and was approached by a police officer who began to write him
a ticket. Plaintiff alleged that, once he took a picture of the officer, the officer left the scene
without issuing the ticket. Plaintiff further alleged that many of the charges resulting from
the traffic stops were dismissed or not pursued.
In Counts I, II, III, IV, V and VI, Plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to recover
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unreasonable seizure based upon the six traffic stops alleged in
the Complaint. In Count VII, Plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to recover under § 1983

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for excessive force by Defendant Brown. In Count VIII, Plaintiff claimed that Defendant
Awe had an opportunity to intervene when Plaintiff was subjected to excessive force but
failed to do so. In Count IX, Plaintiff claimed civil conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In
Count X, Plaintiff alleged a violation of his equal protection rights as a class of one. In
Count XI, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant City of Springfield was liable under § 1983 based
upon Monell. In Count XII, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Awe was liable under state law
for malicious prosecution. In Count XIII, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Mitchell was liable
under state law for malicious prosecution. In Count XIV, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant
City of Springfield was liable for the actions of Awe and Mitchell under respondeat superior.
In Count XV, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant City of Springfield was liable for any
judgments for compensatory damages arising from the Defendant Officers’ actions under the
Illinois Tort Immunity Act.
On July 2, 2013, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (#9) and a Memorandum in
Support (#10). Citing Iqbal v. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), Defendants argued that
Plaintiff has formulaically recited elements with bare assertions and that many of the
paragraphs of the Complaint are conclusory with no factual support. Defendants argued that
Plaintiff’s claims of unreasonable seizure in Counts I through VI are conclusory and not
entitled to be presumed true because Plaintiff has given no facts upon which to base his legal
conclusion that there was no probable cause for the traffic stops. Defendants asserted that
Plaintiff needed to answer such questions as “Was he not driving? Was he obeying the traffic
laws of the State of Illinois? Was he not playing the music too loud?” As far as Counts VII

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and VIII, Defendants argued that Plaintiff failed to claim that the alleged force was
unreasonable and failed to plead facts that show Awe had an opportunity to intervene or
acted with deliberate indifference. Citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556
(2007), Defendants argued that Count IX is insufficient because Plaintiff’s allegation of a
conspiracy is an unsupported legal conclusion. Defendants also argued that Count X is
insufficient to state a “class of one” equal protection claim and that Count XI does not state
a Monell claim. Defendants also argued that Counts XII and XIII are not ripe because the
malicious prosecutions he is claiming have not yet terminated. Defendants asked this court
to dismiss Counts I to XIII.
On July 19, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (#13).
Plaintiff stated that, in his present Complaint, he has alleged a pattern of police harassment
by members of the Springfield Police Department. He stated that the harassment arises from
Plaintiff’s public and persistent pursuit of his FOIA requests for disciplinary files of
Springfield police officers. Plaintiff stated that he has been successful in his pursuits,
winning multiple legal rulings against the Springfield Police Department because of its
stubborn refusal to follow the law. Plaintiff stated that, not surprisingly, he has found
himself in the cross hairs of local law enforcement. Plaintiff stated that, following the filing
of a FOIA lawsuit against the Springfield Police Department in 2010, he has been subjected
to numerous unpleasant and unreasonable police encounters. Plaintiff argued that he was left
with no choice but to file this lawsuit.
Plaintiff then argued that he has properly and completely addressed all requirements

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for every one of the counts in his 13-page, 116-paragraph Complaint. Plaintiff stated that the
six counts for unreasonable seizure relate to six separate instances where he was stopped in
his vehicle. Plaintiff argued that the allegations put Defendants on notice of which particular
stops were unreasonable by providing the date and the name of each individual Defendant
involved. Plaintiff argued that his Complaint stated that these particular traffic stops lacked
probable cause and the individual Defendants did not have a reasonable suspicion, based on
specific and articulable facts, that Plaintiff was involved in criminal activity. Plaintiff stated
that he also alleged that the individual Defendants involved did not have any other legal
justification to seize Plaintiff for each stop, thereby stating that he did not commit the alleged
traffic violations that Defendants stated was the justification for the stop. Plaintiff argued
that he met the requirement to plausibly allege the deprivation of a constitutional right.
Plaintiff also argued that he properly pled a claim for excessive force because he alleged that
Defendant Brown “violently grabbed Plaintiff and yanked him out of his vehicle” and
violated his right “to be free from the use of excessive and unreasonable force.” Plaintiff
further contended that he has properly pled a claim for failure to intervene because he did,
in fact, allege that Awe had an opportunity to intervene and was deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s right to be free from excessive and unreasonable force.
Plaintiff also argued that he has properly pled a claim for civil conspiracy because of
the many facts alleged in his Complaint which undergird the civil conspiracy count as well
as the rest of Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff argued that, taken as true, the specifically-pled
allegations regarding the series of events in this case suggests coordinated conduct by several

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officers intended to harass Plaintiff. Plaintiff further argued that he has properly pled a “class
of one” equal protection claim and a Monell claim. As far as Count XII, Plaintiff argued that
he sufficiently alleged that the criminal proceedings were terminated in his favor and has
stated a claim for malicious prosecution. Plaintiff agreed with Defendants, however, that a
part of the underlying criminal matter alleged in Count XIII is still pending. Plaintiff stated
that he would voluntarily withdraw Count XIII until the criminal case has concluded.
ANALYSIS
In considering Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, this court must presume the truth of
the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in his favor. See
Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 746 (7th Cir. 2012). The complaint must contain
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To state a cognizable claim, the complaint must provide enough detail to
give defendants fair notice of the nature of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests and
to show that relief is plausible. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554-56 (2007).
Conclusory statements or the mere recitation of the elements of the cause of action are
insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must
include sufficient factual allegations to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A claim for
relief is plausible if the “plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Arnett v.
Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751-52 (7th Cir. 2011), quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The
complaint “must actually suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing

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allegations that raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Tamayo v. Blagojevich,
526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008) (emphasis in original).
This court has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint under the applicable standard.
This court agrees with Plaintiff that his claims of unreasonable seizure regarding the six
specified traffic stops are sufficient to plausibly allege that the stops were unreasonable and
violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.1 This court also agrees with Plaintiff that his claims
of excessive force and failure to intervene include sufficient factual content to allow “the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Arnett, 658 F.3d at 751-52.
This court further agrees with Plaintiff that he has properly pled a cause of action for
civil conspiracy. In Geinosky, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s civil
conspiracy claim should not have been dismissed by the district court. The Seventh Circuit
stated:
While the complaint makes only rather conclusory direct
allegations of conspiracy, the complaint also alleges a pattern of
harassment by several officers over a period of months. It is a
challenge to imagine a scenario in which that harassment would
1

A quick look at the Sangamon County circuit clerk’s website reveals that a huge
number of cases, most of which are traffic cases, have been brought against Plaintiff over the last
few years. Defendants have argued that Plaintiff has received more than 75 traffic citations, yet
has not complained about most of these citations. This court recognizes that, if Plaintiff was
properly stopped for traffic violations on approximately 69 occasions, it seems somewhat
unlikely that 6 traffic stops for the same kinds of offenses were in violation of his Constitutional
rights. At this stage in the proceedings, however, this court must look solely at the allegations of
the Complaint and must accept all factual allegations as true.
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not have been the product of a conspiracy. . . . If several
members of the same police unit allegedly acted in the same
inexplicable way against a plaintiff on many different occasions,
we will not dismiss a complaint for failure to recite language
explicitly linking these factual details to their obvious
suggestion of collusion. Geinosky’s allegations of a conspiracy
among the officers of Unit 253 to harass him by issuing bogus
parking tickets go well beyond the required threshold.
Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 749. This court agrees with Plaintiff that his lengthy fact-pleading
alleges a pattern of harassment by the individual Defendants which sufficiently anchors his
civil conspiracy claim, meeting the standard set out in Geinosky. In addition, this court
agrees that Plaintiff, who has alleged that he is the target of numerous unlawful stops and
other harassing behavior by officers of the Springfield Police Department, has set out enough
facts to plead a civil conspiracy claim.
This court also concludes that Plaintiff has adequately stated an equal protection
claim. To state a so-called “class-of-one” equal protection claim, Plaintiff must allege that
he was “intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no
rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 747, quoting Engquist
v. Oregon Dep’t of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008). The Seventh Circuit stated in
Geinosky that it has held “that class-of-one claims can be brought based on allegations of the
irrational or malicious application of law enforcement powers.” Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 747,

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citing Hanes v. Zurick, 578 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir. 2009). In Geinosky, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that the plaintiff’s class-of-one claim was improperly dismissed. The Seventh
Circuit stated:
Here, the pattern and nature of defendants’ alleged conduct do
the work of demonstrating the officers’ improper discriminatory
purpose. Geinosky’s general allegation that defendants
“intentionally treated plaintiff differently than others similarly
situated” is sufficient here, where the alleged facts so clearly
suggest harassment by public officials that has no conceivable
legitimate purpose. To require more would elevate form over
substance. Geinosky’s complaint states a class-of-one claim in
light of the pattern of unjustified harassment he has alleged.
Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 748. This court concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations in this case are
similar. Plaintiff has alleged that he was harassed through numerous unreasonable traffic
stops, that he was followed by police, and that a Springfield police officer attempted to issue
a parking ticket while he was waiting for food at a McDonald’s. Plaintiff alleged that the
reason for these actions was because the Defendant police officers were angry with him for
filing a lawsuit seeking disciplinary files of Springfield police officers and for causing
Defendant Awe to be disciplined for misconduct. Plaintiff further alleged, like the plaintiff
in Geinosky, that Defendants “intentionally treated Plaintiff differently than others similarly
situated.” This court therefore agrees with Plaintiff that, based on Geinosky, he has

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adequately stated a class-of-one equal protection claim.
This court further agrees with Plaintiff that, at this stage of the proceedings, he has
adequately stated a Monell claim against Defendant City of Springfield. A municipality is
not liable under § 1983 unless the constitutional violations at issue are caused by a municipal
policy or custom. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Under
Monell, a plaintiff may establish municipal policy liability by showing that the constitutional
deprivation was caused by: (1) the enforcement of an express policy; (2) a widespread
practice that is so permanent and well-settled that it constitutes a custom or usage with the
force of law; or (3) a person with final policymaking authority. Palka v. City of Chicago,
662 F.3d 428, 434 (7th Cir. 2011). In this case, Plaintiff has alleged that the Internal Affairs
Division of the Springfield Police Department conducts sham investigations and does not
maintain adequate complaint files against police officers. Plaintiff has argued that this de
facto policy of not conducting proper investigations and not properly disciplining officers
fosters an environment wherein officers felt that they could violate citizen’s civil rights with
impunity. This court concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient. See Obrycka v. City
of Chicago, 2012 WL 601810, at *6-7 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
Finally, this court agrees with Plaintiff that Count XII is sufficient to state a cause of
action for malicious prosecution under Illinois law. Plaintiff has agreed with Defendants that
part of underlying criminal matter is still pending regarding the criminal charge which is the
basis of Count XIII. Plaintiff has agreed to voluntarily withdraw Count XIII and Count XIII
is therefore dismissed.

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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
(1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (#9) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff has withdrawn Count XIII, so that Count is dismissed. The Motion to Dismiss is
DENIED as to the remaining Counts of the Complaint.
(2) This case is referred to Magistrate Judge David G. Bernthal for further
proceedings.
ENTERED this 6th day of March, 2014.
s/COLIN S. BRUCE
U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

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