Whitfield v. Althoff et al
Filing
4
MERIT REVIEW OPINION entered by Judge Richard Mills on 11/15/2013. SEE WRITTEN OPINION. (1) Plaintiff's petition to proceed in forma pauperis is granted (d/e 2); (2) the Clerk is directed to attempt service on Defendants pursuant to the sta ndard procedures and to set a 60-day internal deadline to check on service; (3) Defendants Althoff, Blackman-Donnovan, Findley, Harris, Jackson, Johnson, Maxwell, Montes, Motes, Nicholson, Taylor, the Illinois Department of Corrections, the Illinois Prisoner Review Board, and the State of Illinois are terminated. (DM, ilcd)
E-FILED
Tuesday, 19 November, 2013 10:16:02 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
BENYEHUDAH WHITFIELD,
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Plaintiff,
v.
ERIC ALTHOFF, et al.,
Defendants.
13-CV-3192
OPINION
RICHARD MILLS, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, seeks leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on claims arising from three allegedly false disciplinary
tickets he received during his incarceration in the Illinois
Department of Corrections (IDOC). Plaintiff was released from the
IDOC on or around July 7, 2011.
The “privilege to proceed without posting security for costs
and fees is reserved to the many truly impoverished litigants who,
within the District Court's sound discretion, would remain without
legal remedy if such privilege were not afforded to them.” Brewster
v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 1972).
Additionally, a court must dismiss cases proceeding in forma
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pauperis “at any time” if the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim, even if part of the filing fee has been paid. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d)(2). Accordingly, this Court grants leave to proceed in
forma pauperis only if the complaint states a federal claim.
In reviewing the Complaint, the Court accepts the factual
allegations as true, liberally construing them in Plaintiff's favor.
Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However,
conclusions and labels are insufficient. Enough underlying facts
must be offered to "'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.'" Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013)(quoted
cite omitted).
ANALYSIS
I. Plaintiff states federal procedural due process and retaliation
claims against the Adjustment Committee Members who
presided over Plaintiff's disciplinary hearings. Plaintiff states
no federal equal protection claim.
Plaintiff pursues claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
procedural due process violations arising from three prison
disciplinary reports he received while incarcerated. The reports at
issue are dated January 13, 2002, September 18, 2003, and July
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14, 2007. Plaintiff lost good conduct credits as part of his
punishment for all these reports.
Plaintiff alleges that the disciplinary findings were not
supported by the evidence or adequately explained. Plaintiff also
alleges that he was not permitted to present exonerating evidence.
See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974)(setting forth
procedural due process requirements in prison disciplinary
hearing). Plaintiff alleges that the Adjustment Committee Members
presiding at the disciplinary hearings falsely wrote down that
Plaintiff had not requested any witnesses when in fact Plaintiff had
requested witnesses.
Plaintiff was entitled to a meaningful opportunity to oppose
the disciplinary charges, including the opportunity to present
exonerating evidence if consistent with security concerns. Wolff,
418 U.S. at 564-565. To succeed, Plaintiff will need to show that
the exonerating evidence would have made a difference in the
outcome, but more facts are needed to make that determination.
Piggie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2003)(applying
harmless error analysis to refusal to call witnesses in prison
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disciplinary hearings). Plaintiff therefore states procedural due
process claims against the Adjustment Committee Members.
At this point, Plaintiff may also proceed on his claim that the
Adjustment Committee members were motivated by retaliation for
Plaintiff's exercise of his First Amendment rights, though Plaintiff's
allegations are largely conclusory.
Plaintiff also alleges that his equal protection rights were
violated because he was subjected to arbitrary discipline that other
similarly situated inmates were not. This allegation is too vague
and conclusory to state an equal protection claim. No plausible
inference arises that other inmates accused of the same infractions
with the same disciplinary record as Plaintiff received lighter
punishments. What Plaintiff appears to be saying is that he was
treated arbitrarily because of his grievances and other protected
First Amendment activity. That is a retaliation claim, which is
already proceeding.
Of the twenty-one Defendants named, only seven bear
plausible personally responsibility on the due process and
retaliation claims, at least on the present allegations. Kuhn v.
Goodlaw, 678 F.3d. 552, 555 (7th Cir. 2012)(Ҥ 1983 liability is
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premised on the wrongdoer's personal responsibility”). These seven
are the Adjustment Committee Members who presided over
Plaintiff's disciplinary hearings, for they are the ones who
committed the alleged procedural due process violations. These
Defendants are: Julia Vincent and Jon Wilson (Adjustment
Committee Members hearing 1/13/02 disciplinary ticket); Benny
Dallas, Erika Howard, and Michael Williams (Adjustment
Committee Members hearing 9/18/03 disciplinary ticket); Cynthia
Jordan and Carol McBride (Adjustment Committee Members
hearing 7/14/07 disciplinary ticket).
Plaintiff names as Defendants members of the Prisoner Review
Board, alleging that they were complicit in the Adjustment
Committee Members' transgressions.1 However, the Board cannot
increase the loss of good time above that recommended by the
Adjustment Committee. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(c); 20 Ill.Admin. Code
107.150(c); 20 Ill.Admin.Code 1610.170(a). Thus, no constitutional
liberty interest is implicated by the Prison Review Board's approval
of Plaintiff's loss of good time. Lucas v. Montgomery, 583 F.3d 1028
(7th Cir. 2009)("Since the PRB does not find facts, but rather only
1
Defendants Althoff, Blackman‐Donnovan, Findley, Harris, Maxwell, Montes, Nicholson, are alleged to be
members of the Prisoner Review Board.
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approves, reduces or abrogates penalties based on the prison
adjustment committee's findings, Wolff is not implicated.").
Plaintiff alleges that the Board members turned a "blind eye"
to the Adjustment Committee Members' misconduct. True,
individuals can be liable under § 1983 if they turn a blind eye to or
condone unconstitutional behavior. Matthews v. City of East St.
Louis, 675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012)(“To show personal
involvement, the supervisor must ‘know about the conduct and
facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of
what they might see.’”)(quoted cite omitted). However, ruling
against Plaintiff in an administrative appeal does not amount to
approving of or turning a blind eye to constitutional violations
which allegedly occurred in the disciplinary hearing. George v.
Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609-10 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Only persons who
cause or participate in the violations are responsible. Ruling against
a prisoner on an administrative complaint does not cause or
contribute to the violation.”); Soderbeck v. Burnett County, 752
F.2d 285, 293 (7th Cir. 1985)(“Failure to take corrective action
cannot in and of itself violate section 1983. Otherwise the action of
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an inferior officer would automatically be attributed up the line to
his highest superior . . . .”).
For the same reason, no claim is stated against the Wardens
(Jackson, Johnson, and Motes), whose only involvement was to
uphold the Adjustment Committee Members' recommendation, or
the acting IDOC Director (Gladyse Taylor), who played no role at all.
Respondeat superior liability does not exist for constitutional
violations. Chavez v. Illinois State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 651 (7th
Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff also names as Defendants the State of Illinois, the
Illinois Department of Corrections, and the Prisoner Review Board.
But these Defendants cannot be sued because the Eleventh
Amendment protects the State of Illinois, and § 1983 authorizes
suits against only "persons," which do not include states and state
agencies. Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 613 (7th Cir. 2012).
II. Plaintiff's state claims cannot proceed in this action.
The Court cannot discern any state law claim which may
proceed in this action. Plaintiff alleges violations of various state
laws, directives, and codes. Whether a state law private right of
action for damages exists for the state statutes cited by Plaintiff is
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doubtful. Ambrose v. Godinez, 2013 WL 647292 (7th Cir.
2013)(unpublished, non-precedential)("We cannot find any
authority suggesting that the Illinois courts would infer a damages
remedy from statutes regulating the Department of Corrections.").
Even if Plaintiff might have a cause of action under state law, "[t]he
Constitution does not require states to ensure that their laws are
implemented correctly." Simmons v. Gillespie, 712 F.3d 1041, 1044
(7th Cir. 2013). The violation of a state law does not, by itself,
violate federal law, and the Court would not take supplemental
jurisdiction of such a claim, even if it could. Guarjardo-Palma v.
Martinson, 622 F.3d 801, 806 (7th Cir. 2010)(“[A] violation of state
law is not a ground for a federal civil rights suit.”); 28 U.S.C. §
1367(c)(1). Finally, and in any event, the alleged misconduct arose
from Defendants' performance of their State jobs. State law claims
against them, if any exist, would belong in the Illinois Court of
Claims. Loman v. Freeman, 229 Ill.2d 104, 113 (2008)(“Where the
alleged negligence is the breach of a duty imposed on the employee
solely by virtue of his state employment, the Court of Claims has
exclusive jurisdiction.”).
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III. Whether Plaintiff's federal claims are still barred by Heck v.
Humphrey may be an issue to be addressed after Defendants
have appeared.
At first glance Plaintiff's claims may appear to be barred by the
statute of limitations, given that the discipline occurred more than
two years before Plaintiff filed this case. Woods v. Illinois Dept. of
Children and Family Serv., 710 F.3d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 2013)("To
sum up, we reiterate our holding that the limitations period
applicable to all § 1983 claims brought in Illinois is two years, . . .
.").
Not necessarily so. Under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477
(7th Cir. 1994) and progeny, § 1983 claims which imply that good
time credits should be restored generally do not accrue until the
loss of that good time has been invalidated through other legal
routes such as habeas corpus. Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641,
648 (1997). Plaintiff's earlier attempts to pursue some of these
same procedural due process claims were dismissed as barred by
Heck. See Whitfield v. Walker, et al., 04-CV-3136 (C.D.
Ill.)(12/2/04 Order: If Plaintiff "lost good time credits as a result of
those disciplinary reports, he cannot challenge them if doing so
would imply the invalidity of the loss of good time.") Plaintiff's
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claims therefore do not appear to be barred by the statute of
limitations.
However, a novel question may arise in this case regarding the
interplay of habeas corpus and § 1983. If Plaintiff did not timely
pursue state remedies for recovering his good time, can Plaintiff
nevertheless proceed in this Section 1983 action now that he is
released? When Plaintiff was released from prison in July 2011,
Plaintiff was pursuing a federal habeas claim before this Court.
However, Plaintiff's release from prison mooted Plaintiff's habeas
claim, and the habeas action was dismissed, leaving Plaintiff's only
remedy a § 1983 action. Whitfield v. Jackson, 11-CV-3061 (C.D.
Ill.).
A prisoner who "ignore[s] his opportunity to seek collateral
relief while incarcerated to skirt the Heck bar simply by waiting to
bring a § 1983 claim until habeas is no longer available undermines
Heck . . . ." Burd v. Sessler, 702 F.3d 429, 436 (7th Cir. 2012)("We
therefore join the Sixth and Ninth Circuits in holding that Heck
bars a § 1983 action where: (1) favorable judgment would
necessarily call into question the validity of the underlying
conviction or sentence and (2) the plaintiff could have pursued
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collateral relief but failed to do so in a timely manner."). Here,
Plaintiff did try to obtain relief in state court and federal court while
he was in prison, but whether he did so timely is unclear, and
whether that matters under Burd is also unclear. These issues may
need exploring after Defendants have appeared through counsel.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. Pursuant to a review of the Complaint, the Court finds that
Plaintiff states the following federal constitutional claims: 1) the
Adjustment Committee Members violated Plaintiff's procedural due
process rights in the disciplinary hearings held on January 13,
2002, September 18, 2003, and July 14, 2007; and, 2) the
Adjustment Committee Members acted in retaliation for Plaintiff's
exercise of his First Amendment rights. These claims proceed
against the following Defendants: Julia Vincent, Jon Wilson, Benny
Dallas, Erika Howard, Michael Williams, Cynthia Jordan, and Carol
McBride.
2. This case proceeds solely on the claims identified in
paragraph (1) and against the Defendants identified in paragraph
(1). All other claims are dismissed for the reasons stated above.
Any additional claims shall not be included in the case, except at
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the Court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.
3. Defendants Althoff, Blackman-Donnovan, Findley, Harris,
Jackson, Johnson, Maxwell, Montes, Motes, Nicholson, Taylor, the
Illinois Department of Corrections, the Illinois Prisoner Review
Board, and the State of Illinois are dismissed.
4. This case is now in the process of service. Plaintiff is
advised to wait until counsel has appeared for Defendants before
filing any motions, in order to give Defendants notice and an
opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
Defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be
denied as premature. Plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the
Court at this time.
5. The Clerk will attempt service on Defendants by sending
each Defendant a waiver of service. Defendants have 60 days from
the date the waiver of service is sent to file an Answer. If
Defendants have not filed Answers or appeared through counsel
within 90 days of the entry of this order, Plaintiff may file a motion
requesting the status of service. After counsel has appeared for
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Defendants, the Court will enter a scheduling order setting
deadlines for discovery and dispositive motions.
6. With respect to a Defendant who no longer works at the
address provided by Plaintiff, the entity for whom that Defendant
worked while at that address shall provide to the Clerk said
Defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said
Defendant's forwarding address. This information shall be used
only for effectuating service. Documentation of forwarding
addresses shall be retained only by the Clerk and shall not be
maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the Clerk.
7. Defendants shall file an Answer within 60 days of the day
the waiver of service is sent by the Clerk. A motion to dismiss is
not an answer. The Answer should include all defenses appropriate
under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings
shall be to the issues and claims stated in this Opinion.
8. Once counsel has appeared for a Defendant, Plaintiff need
not send copies of his filings to that Defendant or to that
Defendant's counsel. Instead, the Clerk will file Plaintiff's document
electronically and send a notice of electronic filing to Defense
counsel. The notice of electronic filing shall constitute service on
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Defendants pursuant to Local Rule 5.3. However, this does not
apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery requests and
responses are not filed with the Clerk. Plaintiff must mail his
discovery requests and responses directly to Defendants' counsel.
Discovery requests or responses sent to the Clerk will be returned
unfiled, unless they are attached to and the subject of a motion to
compel. Discovery does not begin until Defense counsel has filed
an appearance and the Court has entered a scheduling order,
which will explain the discovery process in more detail.
9. Plaintiff shall immediately notify the Court, in writing, of
any change in his mailing address and telephone number.
Plaintiff's failure to notify the Court of a change in mailing address
or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with
prejudice.
10.
If a Defendants fails to sign and return a waiver of service
to the clerk within 30 days after the waiver is sent, the Court will
take appropriate steps to effect formal service through the U.S.
Marshal's service on that Defendant and will require that Defendant
to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 4(d)(2).
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED: (1) Plaintiff's petition to
proceed in forma pauperis is granted (d/e 2); (2) the Clerk is
directed to attempt service on Defendants pursuant to the
standard procedures and to set a 60-day internal deadline to
check on service; (3) Defendants Althoff, Blackman-Donnovan,
Findley, Harris, Jackson, Johnson, Maxwell, Montes, Motes,
Nicholson, Taylor, the Illinois Department of Corrections, the
Illinois Prisoner Review Board, and the State of Illinois are
terminated.
ENTERED: November 15, 2013
FOR THE COURT:
s/Richard Mills
RICHARD MILLS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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