Quezada v. Clarenson

Filing 36

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION (See Written Opinion): Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED 28 . The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff. All pending motions are denied as moot, and this case is terminated, with the parties to bear their own costs. Plaintiff remains responsible for the $350.00 filing fee. If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4).. Entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 5/18/2015. (VM, ilcd)

E-FILED

Monday, 18 May, 2015 10:22:38 AM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
JONATHAN QUEZADA,
Plaintiff,
v.
C LARENSON,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

13-3224

SUMMARY JUDGMENT OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and incarcerated at Sheridan
Correctional Center, brings the present lawsuit pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 alleging an Eighth Amendment violation for
deliberate indifference to a serious medical need for an injury that
occurred at Western Illinois Correctional Center. The matter is
before the Court for ruling on the Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 28). For the reasons stated below, the motion is
granted.
FACTS
At all times relevant, Plaintiff was incarcerated at Western
Illinois Correctional Center (“Western”). On April 9, 2013, Plaintiff
Page 1 of 8

burnt his left hand after a hot pan of grits spilled onto it. The grits
contained a lot of sugar, causing them to stick to the affected area
on Plaintiff’s hand. Plaintiff was immediately sent to the healthcare
unit where he encountered Defendant Larenson, a nurse at
Western. According to Defendant Larenson, she observed a minor
burn with no blistering and affecting only the outer layers of
Plaintiff’s skin. Pursuant to protocol, Defendant Larenson cleaned
the affected area during which Plaintiff’s skin began to peel. After
Plaintiff complained of pain, Defendant Larenson explained that all
of the grits needed to be removed before she could apply ointment
and bandages. Thereafter, Defendant Larenson applied ointment to
and bandaged Plaintiff’s hand. Plaintiff was scheduled for a followup appointment in the health care unit later that morning. After
this initial treatment, Plaintiff did not speak with Defendant
Larenson again. Ultimately, Plaintiff’s hand healed with only slight
discoloration to the affected area and without resulting loss of use
of the hand.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
Page 2 of 8

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). All facts must be construed in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in
his favor. Ogden v. Atterholt, 606 F.3d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 2010).
The party moving for summary judgment must show the lack of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986). In order to be a “genuine” issue, there must be
more than “some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
586 (1986). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome
of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry
of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986).
ANALYSIS
To implicate a violation of the Eighth Amendment for
inadequate medical care, the Plaintiff must allege that the prison
official acted with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976). Deliberate indifference
is more than negligence, but does not require the plaintiff to show
that the defendants intended to cause harm. Mayoral v. Sheehan,
Page 3 of 8

245 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir. 2001). Liability attaches under the
Eighth Amendment when “the official knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the
inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
“An objectively serious medical need is one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity
for a doctor's attention.” King v. Kramer, 680 F.3d 1013, 1018 (7th
Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted). In evaluating the
seriousness of a medical condition, the court evaluates several
factors: (1) whether failure to treat the condition would result in
further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain; (2) whether a reasonable doctor or patient would find the
alleged injury worthy of comment or treatment; (3) the existence of
a medical condition that significantly affects daily activities; and, (4)
the existence of any chronic and substantial pain. Gutierrez v.
Peters, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997).

Page 4 of 8

Plaintiff alleges that the burn he suffered constituted a serious
medical need. Defendant concedes that Plaintiff was burned but
argues that the burn was not serious enough to implicate
constitutional concerns. Both parties agree that Plaintiff’s
supervisor sent Plaintiff to the healthcare unit immediately after the
incident that caused the burn and Plaintiff received medical
treatment shortly thereafter. The medical records provided in
Plaintiff’s response indicate that Plaintiff suffered a second-degree
burn that required follow-up care to, at a minimum, change the
bandages and monitor for infection. According to the medical
records, it appears that some blistering apparently appeared in
Plaintiff’s wound after Defendant’s initial assessment, and from that
initial assessment, it appears Defendant apparently recognized the
possibility of blistering at that time. See Doc. 28-3 at 2 (“No blisters
noted initially.”) (emphasis added). Given the initial determination
by Plaintiff’s supervisor that Plaintiff required immediate medical
treatment and the possibility that failure to treat the condition
could result in greater pain or other injury, a reasonable juror could
conclude that Plaintiff suffered from a serious medical need.

Page 5 of 8

Nonetheless, Plaintiff must still show that Defendant was
deliberately indifferent. Defendant is a nurse at Western. “A
medical professional is entitled to deference in treatment decisions
unless ‘no minimally competent professional would have so
responded under those circumstances.’” Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d
886, 894-95 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Collignon v. Milwaukee Cnty.,
163 F.3d 982, 988 (7th Cir. 1998)). A medical professional is
deliberately indifferent only if “the decision by the professional is
such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice, or standards, as to demonstrate that the person
responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment.”
Id. (quoting same).
Neither party disputes that Defendant cleaned Plaintiff’s
wounds, applied ointment, and bandaged the affected area. This
was done pursuant to Western’s protocol for the type of wound
Plaintiff suffered. See Doc. 28-3 at 1. Plaintiff’s main contention
appears to be that Defendant Larenson applied an unnecessary
amount of force while cleaning the wound, applied the bandage in a
manner that caused the bandage to “cut into” the affected area of
Plaintiff’s hand, and did not administer sufficient pain medication.
Page 6 of 8

Assuming Plaintiff’s contentions are true, a mere disagreement with
the course of medical treatment does not give rise to a
constitutional claim. Snipes v. DeTella, 95 F.3d 586, 592 (7th Cir.
1996). The Constitution does not require a specific course of
medical treatment, nor does it require that an inmate receiving
such treatment to remain pain-free. Id. In Plaintiff’s case, a
reasonable juror would be hard-pressed to say that cleaning a
wound, applying ointment and bandages to prevent infection, and
then administering pain medication was a substantial departure
from the treatment that Plaintiff would have received from any
professional medical provider. At least some pain could be expected
from the nature of the injury, and Plaintiff admitted in his
deposition that there was no other way to remove the grits from his
wound. See Pl. Dep. 68:13-22. Moreover, any concerns about a
worsening condition were alleviated by Defendant Larenson’s
scheduling of a follow-up appointment later that morning. Thus, on
these facts, a reasonable juror could not conclude that Defendant
Larenson was deliberately indifferent.

Page 7 of 8

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1) Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED
[28]. The clerk of the court is directed to enter judgment
in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff. All pending
motions are denied as moot, and this case is terminated,
with the parties to bear their own costs. Plaintiff remains
responsible for the $350.00 filing fee.
2) If Plaintiff wishes to appeal this judgment, he must file a
notice of appeal with this Court within 30 days of the
entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). A motion for
leave to appeal in forma pauperis MUST identify the issues
the Plaintiff will present on appeal to assist the court in
determining whether the appeal is taken in good faith. See
Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(1)(c); see also Celske v Edwards, 164
F.3d 396, 398 (7th Cir. 1999)(an appellant should be given
an opportunity to submit a statement of his grounds for
appealing so that the district judge “can make a
reasonable assessment of the issue of good faith.”); Walker
v O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 2000)(providing that
a good faith appeal is an appeal that “a reasonable person
could suppose…has some merit” from a legal perspective).
If Plaintiff does choose to appeal, he will be liable for the
$505.00 appellate filing fee regardless of the outcome of
the appeal.
Entered this 18th day of May, 2015.

s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Page 8 of 8