Draper v. Commisioner of Social Security
Filing
19
OPINION entered by Judge Sue E. Myerscough on 6/3/2015. The Acting Commissioner's Objection to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, d/e 18 is OVERRULED. This Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendatio n, d/e 16 in full. The Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, d/e 11 is GRANTED and Defendant's Motion for Summary Affirmance, d/e 14 is DENIED. The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). CASE CLOSED. (MAS, ilcd)
E-FILED
Friday, 05 June, 2015 05:53:45 PM
Clerk, U.S. District Court, ILCD
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION
DAVID DRAPER,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting
)
Commissioner of Social Security, )
)
Defendant.
)
No. 13-cv-3233
OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, U.S. District Judge:
On March 13, 2015, United States Magistrate Judge Tom
Schanzle-Haskins issued a Report and Recommendation (d/e 16)
recommending that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed
and the cause remanded for further proceedings pursuant to
sentence four of 42 U.S.C § 405(g). On April 23, 2015, Defendant
Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, filed her
Objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
(d/e 18). The Objection is OVERRULED. The Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) erred by failing to obtain the assistance of a medical
advisor to infer the onset date. Therefore, the Court ADOPTS the
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Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (d/e 16) in full.
The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED
for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).
I. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), this Court
determines “de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition
that has been properly objected to.” Although this Court does not
need to conduct a new hearing on the entire matter, the Court must
give “fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objections
have been made.” 12 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary
Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3070.2 (2d ed. 1997);
Wasserman v. Purdue Univ. ex rel. Jischke, 431 F. Supp. 2d 911,
914 (N.D. Ind. 2006).
If no objection is made, or if only a partial objection is made,
the Court reviews the unobjected to portions of the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendation for clear error. Johnson v.
Zema Sys. Corp., 170 F. 3d 734, 739 (7th Cir. 1999). This Court
may “accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive
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further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
II. BACKGROUND
The Court adopts the factual findings made by the Magistrate
Judge. The primary issue in this case is the onset date of Plaintiff’s
disability.
On October 5, 2010, Plaintiff David Draper filed applications
for Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (Disability Benefits)
and Supplemental Security Income under Title II and XVI of the
Social Security Act on October 5, 2010. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423,
1381a, and 1382c. Plaintiff alleged an onset date of December 31,
2007. To obtain Disability Benefits, Plaintiff had to establish
disability on or before March 31, 2010, the date he was last
insured. See Briscoe ex el. Taylor v. Barnhart, 425 F.3d 345, 348
(7th Cir. 2005) (noting that, to be entitled to Disability Benefits, “an
individual must establish that the disability arose while he or she
was insured for benefits”).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was disabled by bipolar disorder
as of the date of his application, October 5, 2010, and confirmed
the prior determination that Plaintiff was disabled for purposes of
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his Social Security Income (SSI) application as of that date. R. at
22 (d/e 7-3). However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff failed to show
that he suffered from a serious impairment on or before the last
date he was insured and eligible to receive Disability Benefits—
March 31, 2010. Id. at 21.
In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had
presented no medical evidence of an impairment prior to the
emergency room visit on September 17, 2010 and his
hospitalization from September 18 to September 23, 2010 for the
treatment of symptoms associated with the diagnosis of bipolar
affective disorder. Id. The ALJ noted that Plaintiff tried to establish
when the symptoms started by his own and his wife’s testimony.
Id. The ALJ found the testimony confusing, with the exception of
Plaintiff’s wife’s testimony that Plaintiff appeared to significantly
deteriorate after the deaths of his grandmother and mother-in-law
in July or August 2010, which was after the date last insured. Id.
at 21-22.
Plaintiff appealed the decision of the ALJ. When the Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, the decision became
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the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff then filed this
action for judicial review.
On March 13, 2015, Judge Schanzle-Haskins issued a Report
and Recommendation recommending that Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment be allowed and Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Affirmance be denied. See Report and Recommendation
(d/e 16). Judge Schanzle-Haskins recommended that the
Commissioner’s decision be reversed and remanded for further
proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Specifically, Magistrate Judge Schanzle-Haskins found the
ALJ erred by not developing a complete record. Citing Social
Security Ruling 83-20, Judge Schanzle-Haskins noted that an ALJ
should obtain the services of a medical advisor to assist in the
process of inferring the onset date when: (1) the date that a
claimant became disabled is at issue; (2) the date must be inferred
from the evidence; and (3) the medical history evidence is
incomplete. Report and Recommendation at 18. Finding those
circumstances present, Judge Schanzle-Haskins concluded that the
ALJ should have enlisted the assistance of a medical advisor to
assist in inferring the onset date. Id. at 19-20.
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The parties were advised that any objection to the Report and
Recommendation must be filed within 14 days. On April 23, 2015,
after having received an extension of time to file, the Acting
Commissioner filed an Objection to the Report and
Recommendation (d/e 18).
III. ANALYSIS
Defendant objects to Magistrate Judge Schanzle-Haskins’s
Report and Recommendation on the basis that the ALJ was not
obligated to obtain the assistance of a medical advisor to assist in
inferring the onset date.
An ALJ must apply the analytical framework of Social Security
Ruling 83-20 where, as here, the ALJ finds a claimant disabled but
must decide whether the disability arose at an earlier date. Briscoe,
425 F.3d at 352. For cases involving the onset of disabilities of
nontraumatic origins, the ALJ must consider the claimant’s
allegations as to the onset date, the date the claimant left work due
to the impairment, and medical evidence of the onset of the
disability. Titles II and XVI: Onset of Disability, Social Security
Ruling 83-20 (SSR 83-20). However, the most important factor is
the medical evidence, and the onset date chosen must be consistent
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with the medical evidence. Lichter v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 430, 434
(7th Cir. 1987).
Social Security Ruling 83-20 recognizes that with some slowly
progressive impairments, a claimant may not be able to obtain
medical evidence establishing the precise date the impairment
became disabling. SSR 83-20; see also Briscoe, 425 F.3d at 353
(the lack of medical evidence establishing the exact date an
impairment became disabling is not fatal to a plaintiff’s claim); see
also, e.g., Walton v. Halter, 243 F.3d 703, 709 (3d Cir. 2001)
(recognizing that bipolar disorder-manic depression is a slowly
progressive impairment). In such cases, the ALJ must “infer the
onset date from the medical and other evidence that describe the
history and symptomatology of the disease process.” SSR 83-20.
When onset must be inferred, the ALJ should “call on the services
of a medical advisor.” SSR 83-20; see also Briscoe, 425 F.3d at 353
(noting that where evidence establishing the precise date that the
impairment became disabling is lacking, the ALJ must infer the
onset date and “should seek the assistance of a medical expert to
make this inference”); Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Apfel, 179
F.3d 507, 513 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that an ALJ must “consult a
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medical advisor in situations involving incomplete medical histories
where an onset date must be inferred”).
Defendant argues the ALJ was not required to consult a
medical advisor because the ALJ considered all of the medical
evidence, as well as the testimony of Plaintiff and his wife, and
found no evidence of disabling mental impairments until after the
date of last insured. Defendant also argues that this was not a case
of an incomplete medical history. Medical evidence of a disabling
impairment prior to September 2010 did not exist, Defendant
alleges, and the existing evidence supports a finding that Plaintiff’s
symptoms were not severe enough, prior to his date of last insured,
to warrant medical treatment. Finally, Defendant notes there was
evidence in the record showing Plaintiff was able to work during
some of the period when he reported issues with anger management
and that some of his periods of unemployment were because he had
relocated or no jobs were available.
The Court disagrees with Defendant. Because the onset date
had to be inferred in this case, the ALJ was required under Social
Security Ruling 83-20 to use the services of a medical advisor and
not rely on her own lay analysis of the evidence to determine the
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onset date. Walton, 243 F.3d at 709. Using the services of a
medical advisor ensures that the onset determination is based on a
legitimate medical basis. Grebenick v. Chater, 121 F.3d 1193, 1201
(8th Cir. 1997).
Defendant correctly notes that there is no medical evidence of
a disabling impairment prior to September 17, 2010, when Plaintiff
was taken to the emergency room, admitted into the hospital, and
ultimately diagnosed with bipolar disorder. However, the lack of
medical evidence establishing the exact date the impairment
became disabling is not fatal to Plaintiff’s claim. Briscoe, 425 F.3d
at 353; see also Lichter, 814 F.2d at 435 (noting that the date of
onset of the disability is the critical date, not the date of the
diagnosis). Here, other evidence in the record suggests that
Plaintiff’s impairment might have become severe or disabling prior
to the diagnosis of bipolar in September 2010 and prior to Plaintiff’s
date last insured of March 31, 2010. See Transcript of Hearing, R.
47, 48, 52, 59, 60, 61, 63 (describing incidents prior to the date
Plaintiff was last insured, including Plaintiff: threatening others
with a hammer; damaging a truck with a hammer; being banned
from local gas stations; having his wife obtain a restraining order
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against him; being fired from an oil rig job for not sleeping for up to
four days at a time; throwing a coworker up against a locker;
keeping a hammer by the couch due to paranoia; having a
confrontation with the landlord, which resulted in Plaintiff putting
cardboard over the house windows and not letting his wife leave the
house through the door the faced the landlord’s house; and being
banned from his children’s school due to a confrontation with the
principal).
Because it can be reasonably inferred that the onset date
occurred some time prior to the first recorded medical examination
and diagnosis in September 2010, the ALJ should have consulted
with a medical advisor to determine the onset date. See Lichter,
814 F.2d at 434 (“In cases where there is no medical evidence as to
the precise onset date, but where the disabling impairment seems
to have occurred prior to the date of the first recorded medical
examination, the ALJ ‘should call on the services of a medical
advisor’ to help in making the necessary inferences”), (quoting SSR
83-20). Therefore, this case is remanded so that the ALJ can reevaluate the evidence under the proper Social Security Ruling 83-20
analysis by obtaining the assistance of a medical advisor.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Acting Commissioner’s Objection
to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (d/e 18) is
OVERRULED. This Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report
and Recommendation (d/e 16) in full. Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (d/e 11) is GRANTED and Defendant’s Motion
for Summary Affirmance (d/e 14) is DENIED. The decision of the
Commissioner is REVERSED and REMANDED for further
proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). CASE
CLOSED.
ENTER: June 3, 2015
FOR THE COURT:
s/Sue E. Myerscough
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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